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
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
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
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
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












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# CRITICK OF PURE REASON

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL OF

## IMMANUEL KANT



LONDON

WILLIAM PICKERING

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1838

PRINTED BY GEORGE TAYLOR, LITTLE JAMES STREET.

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## NOTICE OF THE TRANSLATOR.

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BORN's Latin translation of Kant's Critick of Pure Reason has long been before the literary world : that of Mantovani in Italian has likewise been known for some years ; and recently a French one by Tissot has appeared. An English translation, with all these means now existing for the better comprehending of the original, may therefore seem superfluous to such as have already made themselves in some degree conversant with Kant's views : but to those who may be entirely unacquainted with his principles, the difficulties inseparable from the study of the system itself, are sufficiently formidable to render it desirable to remove, as much as possible, all other impediments to the right understanding of an Author whose influence has produced so great a movement in mental philosophy generally. In the hope of clearing away some difficulties, and believing that much of what is deemed by many to be unintelligible in the doctrines of Kant, mainly arises from the obscurity of language in which it is couched,

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the following translation has been attempted. It is true, that, besides the foreign publications alluded to, several works explanatory of the system have at different times issued from the press; but still they do not seem to be all that is required for the full elucidation of the philosopher of Königsberg. Not that it is intended either to underrate the writings which have appeared in English upon this subject by Nitsch, Willich, or Beck, or lightly to appreciate the French epitomes of Villars, Kinker, or Schoen, all of which are highly valuable helps to the Student of Kant's Philosophy, but it is evident that these productions, from their very nature, must unavoidably omit much that is essential to a full exposition of so entirely novel and original a mode of philosophizing. The article in the *Encyclopedia Londinensis*, upon the Critick of Pure Reason, is the most elaborate interpretation of the system which has hitherto appeared in an English garb: and, from the masterly manner in which the æsthetick portion of the work itself is there rendered, and the mode in which the general subject is handled, it is much to be regretted that the translation of the whole of Kant's treatise, announced many years ago as then in preparation by Mr. Wirgman (the author of the article in question), has never been laid before the Public. In the following pages the reader will readily perceive that elegance of diction has on all occasions been sacrificed to a faithful cast of the original, and the literal version constantly preferred to cir-

cumlocution. Where the nature of the German language, differing as it does from the English in its declinable relatives, &c., has not rendered the repetition of the antecedent necessary, this last has been supplied in the translation, and where, moreover, it might be ambiguous to which of the substantives in a sentence reference was made, that substantive which is the subject has been itself inserted. With every endeavour, however, to be correct, the translator feels how frequently he may have failed in a right understanding of his Author. This misfortune he shares in common with the translators before named, who hardly ever seem to have agreed with one another in their renderings of those passages which constitute the great difficulties of the original.

Should the following effort be fortunate enough to reach a second edition, it would then be the translator's wish to add notes and parallel passages, illustrative of those peculiarities which are considered to be the stumbling blocks of the Kantian System, and to embody in his observations the views of different foreign writers, and of Mellin in particular, whose dictionary of Kant is in itself a mine of Philosophy. At present he has mainly to entreat the indulgence of his readers for the style of the translation itself, and most especially for such errors as may have crept into it from inattention or ignorance.

## BACO DE VERULAMIO.

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### *Instauratio Magna.*—PRÆFATIO.

DE NOBIS IPSIS SILEMUS: DE RE AUTEM, QUÆ AGITUR, PETIMUS:  
UT HOMINES EAM NON OPINIONEM, SED OPUS ESSE COGITENT; AC  
PRO CERTO HABEANT, NON SECTÆ NOS ALICUJUS AUT PLACITI, SED  
UTILITATIS ET AMPLITUDINIS HUMANÆ FUNDAMENTA MOLIRI.  
DEINDE UT SUIS COMMODIS ÆQUI—IN COMMUNE CONSULANT—ET  
IPSI IN PARTEM VENIANT. PRÆTEREA UT BENE SPERENT, NEQUE  
INSTAURATIONEM NOSTRAM UT QUIDDAM INFINITUM ET ULTRA  
MORTALE FINGANT ET ANIMO CONCIPIANT: QUUM REVERA SIT IN-  
FINITI ERRORIS FINIS ET TERMINUS LEGITIMUS.

## P R E F A C E

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

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WHETHER the elaboration of cognitions which belong to the business of reason, takes the sure march of a science or not, is easily judged of by the result. If, after many arrangements and preparations made, so soon as the object is approached, the elaboration comes to a stand, or, if in order to reach this object, we must go back again frequently, and strike into another path, and besides, if it be not possible to render different fellow labourers unanimous as to the mode in which the common end is to be pursued ; we may then always be convinced, that such a study is still far from taking the sure course of a science, but is a mere feeler, and it is already a merit, as regards reason, to discover this path, in case it is possible, although much must be given up as vain, which was comprized without due consideration, in the object previously proposed.

That *Logic* has proceeded in this sure course, already from the earliest times, may be seen from this, that since *Aristotle* it has not been necessitated to retrace a step, unless, perhaps, we may be disposed to reckon the brushing away of some superfluous subtleties from it, or the clearer determination of what had been propounded, but which belong more to the elegance than the certainty of the science, as ameliorations. It is however remarkable with respect to *Logic*, that hitherto it has not been able to make any step forwards, and therefore to all appearance seems to be

concluded and completed. For, if some moderns thought to extend it, by this, that they pushed in, partly *psychological* chapters of the different cognition-faculties (Imagination and Wit), partly *metaphysical*, as to the origin of cognition, or as to the different kind of certitude, according to the difference of objects, (Idealism, Scepticism, &c.) partly *anthropological*, of prejudices (the causes of the same and remedies); this then proceeded from their ignorance of the particular nature of this science. It is not augmentation, but disfiguration of the sciences, when we allow their boundaries to run into one another; but the boundary of Logic is very closely determined by this, that it is a science which fully exposes and strictly shows nothing but the formal rules of all Thinking, (whether this be *à priori* or empirical—have whatever origin or object it will—meet in our mind with accidental or natural impediments.)

That it has thus succeeded so well with Logic, for this advantage it has simply to thank its limitation, whereby it is allowed, nay in fact compelled to make abstraction of all objects of cognition and their difference; and consequently the Understanding has in Logic nothing further to do than with itself and its form. Much more difficult must it naturally be for Reason to strike into the sure way of science, if it have to do not only with itself, but also with objects—consequently Logic as Propædeutick only constitutes, as it were, the outer court of the sciences, and, if the question be with respect to cognitions, one certainly presupposes logic for the judgment thereof, but must seek their acquisition in the properly and objectively so called Sciences.

Now, so far as Reason is to exist in these, something then *à priori* must therein be cognized, and its cognition may be referred in two ways to its object, either *to determine* simply this object and its conception, (which must be given from elsewhere) or,

to make it real. The first is *theoretic*, the other *practical* Cognition of reason. The *pure* part of both must alone previously be treated, however little or however much it may contain, that is to say, that part wherein reason determines its object wholly à priori, and what proceeds from other sources, must not be mixed up with it; for it is a bad administration of means, if we spend blindly our income, without afterwards, if those means become straitened, being able to distinguish which department of receipt can bear the expence, and where this must be curtailed.

*Mathematick* and *Physics* are the two theoretical cognitions of reason, which are to determine their *objects* à priori—the first quite pure—the second at least in part pure, but then also in proportion to other sources of cognition than those of reason.

*Mathematick* has from the earliest times to which the history of human reason extends, amongst the remarkable nations of Greece, proceeded in the secure way of a science. But, we must not think that it has been as easy for it, as for logic, to fall upon that royal way, or rather itself to open it, where reason has only to do with itself—I believe rather, that for a long time (particularly amongst the Egyptians), with respect to mathematick, it remained feeling its way, and this change is to be ascribed to a *revolution*, which the happy conceit of an individual, by trying, brought about, whence the road which must be taken for the future, could not any more be missed, and the certain path of a science was struck out, and indicated for all ages and to an infinite distance. The history of this revolution in the mode of thinking, which is far more important than the discovery of the way round the famous Cape of Good Hope, and of the fortunate individual who accomplished it, has not come down to us. Yet the tradition which *Diogenes Laertius* transmits to us, who names the supposed inventor of elements the slightest in geometrical demonstration, and

according to the general judgment, not requiring a proof, indicates that the remembrance of the change, which was effected by means of the first trace of the discovery of this new way, must have appeared extremely important to mathematicians, and thereby become imperishable. Upon him who first demonstrated the *equilateral Triangle*, (he may have been called *Thales*, or what we please,) a light opened, for he found, that he must investigate, not that which he saw in the figure, or yet in its mere conception, and, as it were, thereof learn its properties, but (by construction) must produce, that which he represented and therein thought *à priori* according to the conceptions themselves, and that, in order securely to know something *à priori*, he must not attribute anything to the thing, but what followed necessarily from that which he had placed in it himself, according to his conception.

With Physics it was much longer before they took the high road of a science; for it is only about a century and a half ago, that the recommendation of the ingenious *Bacon of Verulam* partly suggested, partly, as men were already upon the track of the same, more animated this discovery, which can only be just in the same way explained by a rapid previous revolution in the mode of thinking. I will take into consideration here Physics, only so far as they are founded upon *empirical* principles.

As *Galilei* caused his balls to roll along the inclined plane, with a weight chosen by himself, or as *Torricelli* caused air to sustain a weight, which he himself had judged to be equal to a column of water previously known to him, or, at a still later period, as *Stahl* changed metals into chalk and this again into metal, in taking away from or adding something to them, a light rose upon\* all natural Phi-

\* I do not here follow exactly the thread of the history of the experimental method, the first beginnings of which are not even very well known.

losophers. They comprehended, that reason only perceives that which it itself produces according to its design, that it must precede with the principles of its judgments according to constant laws, and compel nature to answer its questions, and not allow itself as it were, only to be led in leading strings—for, otherwise, contingent observations, made according to no previously projected plan, are not at all connected in a necessary law, which reason yet seeks for and requires. Reason, with its principles on the one hand, according to which alone concordant phenomena could hold true as laws, and on the other, with experiment, which it has imagined according to those principles, must refer to nature certainly, in order to be instructed by it, but not in the character of a scholar, who allows himself to be taught everything which the teacher chooses, but of a constituted judge, who compels the witnesses to answer those questions which he proposes to them. And thus, in fact, physics are indebted for such an advantageous revolution in their mode of thinking only to the idea, agreeably to that which reason itself has introduced into nature, of seeking that in it (not of imagining it), which reason must learn from nature, and whereof it of itself would not know anything. By this first of all have physics been brought into the sure way of a science, when through so many ages, they had done nothing more than merely grope about here and there.

In respect of Metaphysics, as an entirely isolated speculative cognition of reason which raises itself wholly above the instruction of experience, and, in fact, by means of mere conceptions, (not as mathematick, by application of the same to intuition), where, therefore reason itself is to be its own scholar, the fate has hitherto not been so favourable, that it has been able to strike into the sure path of a science; although it is older than all the rest, and would



endure, if even the remainder were all to be wholly swallowed up in the vortex of an all annihilating barbarism. For reason continually comes to a stand-still therein, even when it wishes to see *à priori* those laws which the most common experience (as it pretends) confirms. We are compelled to retrace our steps numberless times in metaphysick, since we find that we are not led whither we wish, and as to what concerns the accordance of its followers as to assertions, it is still so far removed then from this, that it is rather an arena for combat ; which seems quite especially destined for the purpose of exercising its powers in mock contest, where no combatant ever has been able to gain the least ground, and to found upon his victory a permanent possession. There is, therefore, no doubt that its procedure hitherto has been a mere groping about here and there, and what is the worst, amongst mere conceptions.

Now whence happens it, that here no secure road of Science has yet been to be found ? Is it, perhaps, impossible ? Wherefore, then, has nature explored our reason with restless solicitude, to search into this, as one of its most important matters ? Still more, how little cause have we to place confidence in our reason, if it not only abandons us in one of the most important points of our curiosity, but amuses us by illusions, and in the end deceives us ! Or if the road only hitherto has been missed, what indications can we make use of, in order to hope that through renewed enquiry we shall be more fortunate than others have been before us.

I should think, the examples of mathematics and natural philosophy,—which are become what they now are by means of a revolution operated at once—were sufficiently remarkable, in order to investigate the essential part of that change in the mode of thinking which is become so advantageous to them, and in this regard to imitate them so far at least in the attempt, as

their analogy, as cognitions of reason with metaphysics allows. Up to this time it has been received, that all our cognition must regulate itself according to the objects, yet all attempts to make out something *à priori* by means of conceptions respecting such, whereby our cognitions would be extended, have proved under this supposition abortive. Let it be once, therefore, tried, whether we do not succeed better in the problems of metaphysics, when we admit that the objects must regulate themselves according to our cognition,—which thus accords already better with the desired possibility of their cognition *à priori*, which is to decide something with respect to objects, before they are given to us.—The circumstances in this case are precisely the same, as with the first thoughts of *Copernicus*, who, since he did not make any way in the explanation of the motions of the heavenly bodies, when he supposed the whole firmament turned round the spectator, sought whether it might not answer better, if he left the spectator himself to turn, and the stars, on the contrary, at rest.—Now, in metaphysics, as to what concerns the *intuition* of objects, we may try in the same way. If the intuition must regulate itself according to the property of the objects, I do not see how one can know anything with regard to it *à priori*, but if the object regulates itself, (as object of the senses,) according to the property of our faculty of intuition, I can very well represent to myself this possibility. But, since I cannot remain stationary with these intuitions if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them, as representations, to something as object, and determine this object by means of them, I can admit that the *conceptions* whereby I bring about this determination, either regulate themselves according to the object, and then I am again in the same difficulty respecting the mode, as I can *à priori* thereof know anything—or I admit, that the objects, or what is the same thing, *experience*, in which alone (as given objects) they are known, regulates

itself according to these conceptions, and I thus see immediately an easy escape, because experience itself is a mode of cognition which requires Understanding, the rule of which I must suppose in myself, before objects yet are given to me—consequently *à priori*, which rule is expressed in cognitions *à priori*, and according to which cognitions therefore all objects of experience must necessarily regulate themselves, and coincide therewith. As to what concerns objects, so far as they can be thought by means of reason merely, and, indeed, necessarily, but which (so at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given at all in experience, the attempts to think them (for still they must let themselves be thought) will hereafter furnish an excellent touchstone of that which we admit as the changed method of the mode of thinking, namely, that we only know that, *à priori*, of things which we place in them ourselves.\*

This attempt succeeds as we could desire, and promises to metaphysick in its first part, the sure march of a science, that is to say, where it concerns itself with conceptions *à priori*, whereof the corresponding objects may be given conformable to these in experience. For we may very well explain according to this change in the mode of thinking, the possibility of a cognition *à priori*, and what is still more, furnish the laws with their satisfactory proofs, which lie at the foundation *à priori* of nature

\* This method imitated from the Natural Philosophers consists, consequently, in this—to seek the elements of pure reason in that *which may be opposed or confirmed by experiment*. Now, no experiment can be made with its *objects* in the examination of pure reason, (as in physics,) especially when they are attempted out of and beyond the limits of possible experience, consequently, it will only be feasible with *conceptions* and *principles* which we admit *à priori*, since, that is to say, one so disposes them, that the same objects may be considered *on the one hand*, as objects of the senses and of the understanding for experience, and yet, *on the other hand*, as objects which we merely think, perhaps, for reason isolated and forcing itself out beyond the limits of experience, consequently, in two different ways. And if it is found, that when things are considered from such double point of view, accordance with the principle of pure reason takes place, but that from a single point of view an unavoidable opposition of reason arises with itself, experiment thus decides in favour of the correctness of the distinction in question.

as the complex of the objects of experience, both which things would be impossible according to the mode of proceeding up to this time. But there follows from this deduction of our faculty of cognizing à priori, in the first part of metaphysick, a surprising result, and according to appearance, a very disadvantageous one, as to its whole object, which object engages the second part, namely, that with this result we can never come out beyond the limits of possible experience, which, however, is precisely the most essential business of this science. But exactly in this lies the experiment of a counter-proof of the truth of the result of that first estimate of our reason-cognition à priori, namely, that it only refers to phenomena, but on the other hand lets the things in themselves remain as real of themselves, but unknown to us. For that which stimulates us to go out beyond the limits of experience and of all phenomena, is the *Unconditioned*, which reason requires in the things in themselves necessarily and with every right, for all that is conditioned, and the series of conditions as thereby completed. Now, if it is found, that if we admit our cognition of experience regulates itself according to objects, as things in themselves, the unconditioned *cannot be at all thought without contradiction*, but on the contrary, if we admit that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not regulate itself according to these as things in themselves, but that these objects as phenomena, rather regulate themselves according to our mode of representation, *the contradiction disappears*—and, consequently, that the unconditioned must not be met with in things, so far as we know them, (as they are given to us,) but, in fact, in them, so far as we do not know them, as things in themselves; it is then evident, that what we in the outset admitted as an experiment, has a foundation.\*

\* This experiment of pure reason possesses great resemblance with that of *the Chemists*, which they frequently term the trial by *reduction*, but in general the

Now, there still always remains to us to be sought, after all progress in this field of the supersensible has been denied to speculative reason, whether it does not find data in its practical cognition, for determining such transcendent conception of reason of the Unconditioned, and for arriving in such a way, according to the desire of metaphysick, out beyond the limits of all possible experience, by means of our cognitions *à priori*, though only possible in a practical respect. And by such a procedure, speculative reason has still always at least procured us place for such an extension, although it were compelled to leave the same unoccupied, and it, therefore, remains allowable to us, nay, we are, in fact, thereto invited by reason, to supply it, if we are able, by means of the practical data of the same.\*

In the above attempt to change the previous march of metaphysick, and as we thereby propose, according to the example of the geometricians and natural philosophers, to undertake an entire revolution in it, the business of the Critick of pure speculative reason at present consists. It is a treatise upon method, not a system of science itself, but yet, nevertheless, it indicates the whole contour of the same, as well in respect of its limits, as likewise its whole internal organiza-

*synthetic procedure.* The analysis of the *metaphysician* divides pure cognition *à priori* into two very dissimilar elements, namely, that of things as phenomena, and then of things in themselves. *Dialectick* conjoins again both in *unison* with the necessary reason-idea of the *Unconditioned*, and finds that this unison proceeds never otherwise than by means of the distinction in question, which, therefore, is the true one.

\* So the central laws of motion of the heavenly bodies furnished complete certainty to that which *Copernicus* in the outset only admitted as hypothesis, and show, at the same time, the invisible force connecting the universe, (that of *Newtonian* attraction), which would always have remained undiscovered, if the former (*Copernicus*) had not ventured in a manner contrary to the senses, but still a true one, to search for the observed motions, not in the heavenly objects, but in the spectator of them. I set forth in this preface, the change in the mode of thinking which has taken place in Critick analogous to the hypothesis in question only as hypothesis, although it will be demonstrated in the treatise itself, not hypothetically but apodictically, from the nature of our representations of space and time, and the elementary conceptions of the understanding, merely, in order to render observable the first attempts of such a change, which are always hypotheticalal.

tion. For pure speculative reason has this peculiar to itself, that it can and must measure its proper faculty according to the difference of the manner in which it selects objects for thinking, and must also itself completely enumerate the various modes of proposing to itself problems, and thus indicate the whole outline of a system of metaphysick ; whilst, as to what concerns the first point, nothing can be attributed to objects in the cognition *à priori*, but what the thinking subject deduces from itself, and, as to what regards the second, such reason is, in respect of the principles of cognition an entirely separate unity, existing of itself, in which every member, as in an organized body, by reason of all the others, and all the others by reason of one, exist,—and no principle can be taken with certainty in *one* relationship, without at the same time having investigated it in *universal* relationship to the whole pure use of reason. But Metaphysick has also, on this account, had that singular advantage, which can fall to the lot of no other science of reason that has to do with objects, (for *Logick* only concerns itself with the form of thinking in general,) that, if by this critick, it is brought into the certain way of a science, it can entirely take possession of the whole field of the cognitions belonging to it, and, therefore, complete its work, and can leave it for the use of posterity, as a permanently fixed capital, since it has merely to do with principles and the limits of its use, which limits are determined by it itself. To this completeness, therefore, is it bound as fundamental science and of it must we be enabled to say, *nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum*.

But, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is that then, which we think of leaving to posterity in such a Metaphysick, purified by means of critick, but thereby also brought into a permanent state ? In a superficial glance over the present work, we shall believe we perceive that the utility thereof is yet only *negative*,

namely, never to venture ourselves out with speculative reason beyond the limits of experience—and, certainly, this is its first utility. But this becomes forthwith *positive*, when we are aware, that the principles with which speculative reason ventures out beyond its limits, have not, indeed, *extension*, but if we consider them more closely *contraction* of our use of reason as an inevitable consequence, inasmuch as they threaten really to extend the limits of sensibility, to which they properly belong, over every thing, and so indeed to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason. Consequently, a Critick which limits the former is so far *negative*; but whilst it thereby at the same time does away with an obstacle which circumscribes the latter (*the practical*) use, or even threatens doing away with it altogether, it is undoubtedly of *positive* and very important utility as soon as we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral) in which it extends itself inevitably beyond the limits of sensibility, for which it indeed requires no assistance from speculative reason, but, nevertheless, must be secured against its counteraction, in order not to fall into contradiction with itself. To deny *positive* utility to this office of Critick would be just the same as to say that a police produces no positive utility, because its principal business, after all, is merely to hinder the violence which citizens have to fear from citizens, so that each may follow quietly and securely his vocation. That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, consequently only conditions of the existence of things as phenomena—that, farther, we have no conceptions of the understanding, consequently also, have no elements at all for the cognition of things, but so far as corresponding intuition can be given to these conceptions—consequently, that we can have no cognition of an object as a thing in itself, but only so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon, will be shown

in the analytical part of the Critick—whence then follows, undoubtedly, the limitation of all only possible speculative cognition of reason, to mere objects of *experience*. Nevertheless, it is still always in this to be kept in mind, which must be particularly remarked, that we must be enabled, at least, to *think* these objects as things in themselves, even though not to *cognize* them.\* For otherwise the absurd proposition would thence result, that there would be phenomenon (*appearance*) without anything which then appeared. Now, if we would assume that the difference *made necessarily by means of our Critick of things as objects of experience*, from these very same objects as things in themselves, were not at all made; then the principle of causality, and consequently of the mechanism of nature in determination of this, must be valid absolutely for all things in general as real causes. I could not, therefore, say of the self-same being, for example of the human soul, “Its will is free, and yet at the same time, that it is subjected to the necessity of nature, that is, is not free,” without falling into a palpable contradiction, because I have taken the soul in both propositions *in the self-same signification*, namely, as thing in general (as thing in itself), and without previous critick I could not, indeed, take it otherwise. But if this Critick have not erred, when it prescribes taking the object *in two meanings*, namely, as phenomenon, or as thing in itself; if the deduction of its conceptions of the understanding is correct, consequently, also, if the principle of causality refers only to things taken in the first sense, that is to say, so far as they

\* In order to *cognize* an object, it is required for this, that I can demonstrate its possibility (whether according to the testimony of experience from its reality, or, *a priori*, by means of reason). But I can *think* what I like, provided only I do not contradict myself—that is, if my conception is only a possible thought, although I cannot answer as to it, whether in the complex of all possibilities, an object yet corresponds to this or not. But in order to attribute to such a conception objective validity (real possibility, for the former was merely logical) for this something more is required. But there is no occasion, precisely, to seek this more, in the theoretical sources of cognition, it may lie also in the practical.



are objects of experience, but yet these according to the second meaning, are not subjected to it, then the very same will, in the phenomenon (visible operations) is thought as necessarily conformable to the law of nature, and so far, *not free*, and yet on the other hand, as belonging to a thing in itself, not subjected to that law, consequently as free, without on this account any contradiction occurring. Now, although I cannot *cognize* my soul, considered in the latter meaning, by means of my speculative reason (still less by means of empirical observation) consequently also not liberty, as the property of a being to which I ascribe effects in the sensible world, because to do this, I must cognize such a one, determined according to its existence, and yet not in time (which is impossible, since I cannot support my conception by any intuition), still I can think to myself liberty—that is to say, the representation thereof contains, at least, no contradiction in itself, if our critical separation of both modes of representation take place (the sensible and intellectual), and the limitation proceeding therefrom of the conceptions of the pure understanding, and consequently of the principles resulting from these. Now let it be supposed that morality presupposes necessarily liberty (in the strictest sense), as a property of our will, since it introduces practical original principles lying in our reason as data of it, *à priori*, which would be impossible without the presupposition of liberty; but that speculative reason had shown that this (*liberty*) cannot at all be thought—necessarily, then, the first presupposition, namely, the moral, must give way to that, the contrary of which contains a palpable contradiction; consequently *liberty*, and with it morality, (for the contrary thereof contains no contradiction, if liberty is not already presupposed) give place to the *mechanism of nature*. But as I require only for morality nothing more, except only that Liberty should not contradict itself, and, therefore, still at least may

be thought, without it being necessary to look farther into it, that consequently it lays no obstacle at all in the way of the mechanism of nature of the self-same action (taken in other relationship), the doctrine of Morality thus maintains its place, and Physics its, likewise, but which would not have occurred, had not Critick instructed us previously respecting our unavoidable ignorance in respect of things in themselves, and limited every thing to mere phenomena which we can *cognize* theoretically. Even this explanation of the positive utility of the critical principles of pure reason may be shown in respect of the conception of *God*, and of the *simple nature* of our *Soul*, but which I, for the sake of brevity, pass over. I cannot, therefore, *ever* assume *God*, *Freedom*, and *Immortality*, in favour of the necessary practical use of my reason, if I do not *take away* at the same time from speculative reason its pretension to transcendent insight, since, in order to attain to this, it must make use of those principles which, whilst they indeed extend merely to objects of possible experience, if they nevertheless are applied to that which cannot be an object of experience, turn this really always into phenomenon, and so declare all *practical extension* of pure reason for impossible. I must therefore, then, abolish *science*, in order to find place for *belief*, and the dogmatism of metaphysick, that is, the preconception of making progress in it, without critick of pure reason, is the sure source of all unbelief opposed to morality, which at all times is very dogmatic. If, therefore, it may not be at all difficult in a metaphysick, systematically drawn up in pursuance with the critick of pure reason, to leave a legacy to posterity, this is still no present to be lightly esteemed; whether we look merely to the cultivation of reason, by means of the secure march of a science in general, in comparison with the groping along without a bottom, and the inconsiderate roving about here and there, of the same without critick, or whether we

also look at the better application of time on the part of inquiring youth, which receives with the dogmatism which is current so early and so much encouragement, either to subtilize at pleasure with respect to things of which it understands nothing, and wherein it, like everybody in the world also, never will see anything, or to go out upon the discovery of new thoughts and opinions, and thus neglect the study of solid sciences,—and, above all, if we bring the inestimable advantage into account, of making an end for all future time of all objections against morality and religion, in the *Socratic* manner, namely, by means of the clearest proof of the ignorance of the opponents. For some metaphysick has always been in the world, and will truly be met with therein hereafter, but with it also a dialectick of pure reason, since this is natural to it. It is, therefore, the first and most important business of philosophy, once for all, to take thereby away all disadvantageous influence from it, in closing up the sources of error.

In this important change in the field of sciences, and the *loss* which speculative reason must experience from its hitherto fancied possession, everything still remains with respect to man's general concern, and to the utility which the world has hitherto derived from the doctrine of pure reason, in the same advantageous state that it ever did, and the loss only concerns the *monopoly of the schools*, but in no way the *interest of mankind*. I ask of the most obstinate dogmatist, whether the proof of the duration of our soul after death deduced from the simplicity of the substance—whether that of the liberty of the will opposed to general mechanism, by means of the subtle although weak distinction of subjective and objective practical necessity—or whether that of the existence of a God from the conception of the most real Being of all, (the contingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a first mover), after they issued from the schools,

have ever reached the public, and could have the least influence upon its conviction. Now, if this has never happened, and it can never be expected on account of the unfitness of the common human reason for such subtle speculation ; if, rather, as to what concerns the first point, the remarkable disposition in every man of his nature never to be able to be satisfied by means of the temporary (as insufficient for the dispositions of his whole destiny), must, quite of itself, have produced the hope of a *future life* ; and in respect of the second point, the mere clear exhibition of duties, in opposition to all claims of impulses, the consciousness of *Liberty* ; and, lastly, as to what concerns the third point, the sublime order, beauty and providence, which everywhere shine forth in nature, must alone have produced the belief as to a wise and great *Author of the world*—a conviction spreading itself amongst the people, so far as this reposes upon foundations of reason—this possession, thus, not only remains undisturbed, but it yet rather gains thereby in respect, because the schools now are taught not to assume to themselves any higher and more extended insight into a matter which regards man's general care, than that to which the great (the most estimable for us) mass can equally easily attain to, and to limit themselves only therefore to the cultivation of these proofs, generally comprehensible and sufficient in a moral respect. The change, therefore, concerns merely the arrogant pretensions of the schools, who herein (as with justice in many other points) would willingly be held to be the only judges and depositors of such truths, of which they merely impart to the public the use, but retain the key of the same for themselves (*quod mecum nescit solus vult scire videri*). Still, however, provision is also made for a more equitable claim of the speculative philosopher. He remains always exclusive depositor of a science useful to the public, without its knowing it, namely, the critick of reason,

for this can never become popularised, nor is it necessary to be, since as little as fine-spun arguments will enter into the head of the people as useful truths, just as little also do the equally subtle objections on the other hand, ever come into their mind: on the contrary, since the school, as well as every man raising himself up to speculation, falls inevitably into both—the first is bound to this, by means of a fundamental investigation of the claims of speculative reason, once for all, to prevent the scandal which must sooner or later strike the people themselves, from the contentions in which metaphysicians (and as such, finally, also, theologians) involve themselves without Critick, and which contentions even subsequently pervert their doctrines. Only by means of this critick can the roots themselves be cut off from *Materialism*, *Fatalism*, *Atheism*, freethinking *Unbelief*, *Fanaticism*, and *Superstition*, which may be universally hurtful—finally, also, from *Idealism* and *Scepticism*, which are more dangerous to the schools, but hardly can pass over to the public. If governments thought fit, indeed, ever to meddle with the affairs of the learned, it would be much more suitable to their wise solicitude for sciences, as well as for men, to favour the liberty of such a critick, whereby the labours of reason alone can be established upon a firm footing, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry with respect to the public danger, if one tears in pieces their spiders' webs, yet of which the public never had taken any notice, and the loss of which, likewise, it never can feel.

Critick is not opposed to the *dogmatic procedure* of reason in its pure cognition as science, (for this must always be dogmatical, that is, be strictly demonstrable from sure principles *à priori*), but to *Dogmatism*, that is, to the pretension of advancing alone with a pure cognition from conceptions (the philosophical), according to principles, such as reason has had them long in

use, without enquiring into the manner and right by which it has attained thereto. Dogmatism is, therefore, the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, *without previous critick of its own faculty*. This opposition is not, therefore, for the purpose of saying a word in favour of loquacious superficialness, under the pretended name of popularity, nor indeed of scepticism, which makes a short business of the whole of metaphysick—Critick is rather the necessary preliminary preparation for the promotion of a fundamental metaphysick as science, which must be treated necessarily dogmatically, and according to the strictest demand systematically, consequently scholastically, (not popularly), for this claim upon it is indispensable, as it binds itself to execute its work wholly *à priori*—consequently to the full satisfaction of speculative reason. In the execution, therefore, of the plan which critick prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysick, we must follow some day the strict method of the famous *Wolf*, the greatest amongst all dogmatic philosophers, who first gave the example, (and by means of this example, was the author of that spirit of profoundness not yet extinguished in Germany), how by means of a legitimate firm laying down of principles, clear determination of conceptions, tried severity of proofs, caution against rash jumps into conclusions, the sure march of a science is to be taken—who, on this account, was especially suited to place such a one as metaphysick is, in such a state, had it occurred to him, through critick of the organ, that is to say, of pure reason itself, to prepare the field previously;—a failing which is to be attributed not so much to him, but rather to the dogmatic mode of thinking of his age, and whereupon philosophers of his, as well as of all previous times, had no cause to find fault with one another. Those who reject his method, and yet at the same time the mode of proceeding of the Critick of pure reason, can have nothing else in mind, but to

throw off entirely the bonds of *science*—to change work into play—certainty into opinion—and philosophy into philodoxy.

*As to what concerns this second edition*, I have as right, not wished the opportunity of it to escape, in order to remedy as much as possible the difficulties and obscurity whence many misconceptions may have arisen, which acute men, perhaps not without fault of mine, have fallen into, in the judgment of this book. In the propositions themselves, and their proofs, together with the form as well as the completeness of the plan, I have found nothing to change, which is to be attributed partly to the long examination to which I had subjected them, before I proposed this work to the public; partly to the nature of the subjects themselves, that is to say, to the nature of a pure speculative reason, which contains a real organization, wherein all is organ, that is to say, all is for the sake of one, and each individual one for the sake of all—consequently, every imperfection however small, whether a fault (error) or deficiency, must infallibly betray itself in use. In this fixedness, this system will, as I hope, henceforward also still maintain itself. Not self-conceit justifies me in this confidence, but simply the evidence which the experiment of the similarity in the result effects, in beginning from the least elements up to the whole of pure reason, and in the retrogression from the whole (for this is also given of itself by means of the ultimate design thereof in the practical) to every part; since the attempt to change, only even the smallest part, carries along with it immediately contradiction, not merely of the system, but of general human reason. But there is still much to be done in the *exposition*, and I have attempted with regard to this, ameliorations in this edition, which are to remedy partly the misunderstanding in the *Æsthetick*, particularly that in the conception of time, partly the obscurity of the deduction of the

conceptions of reason, partly the pretended want of a satisfactory evidence of the proofs of the principles of pure understanding, partly, finally, the misconception of the reprobated paralogisms of rational psychology. Up to this point (namely, only to the end of the first division of transcendental dialectick) and not farther, my alterations extend in the mode of exposition,\*

\* I can only term that strictly addition, and then merely in the proof which I have made, in a new refutation of the Psychological Idealism, and a strong (and, as I believe, in fact, the only possible) proof of the objective reality of external intuition. (Page 207.) However harmless Idealism may, in respect of the essential objects of metaphysick, be held to be, (which, indeed, it is not), there always remains in being obliged to admit purely on *belief* the existence of things out of us a reproach upon philosophy and human reason, (from which things nevertheless, we get the whole matter of cognitions themselves for our internal sense), and if it occur to any one to doubt this, *not* to be able to oppose to him any satisfactory proof. Inasmuch as in the expressions of the proof from the third line unto the sixth an obscurity exists, I desire to alter the period in this way—" *But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all the grounds of determination of my existence that can be met with in me are representations, and require as such, themselves, a permanent different from them, whereupon can be determined in relation the change thereof, consequently my existence in the time in which they change.*" It will be, probably, stated against this proof, that I am still only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that is, of my *representation* of external things—consequently, it still always remains undecided, whether anything corresponding to it is out of me or not. But I am conscious of my *existence in time*, consequently, also, of its determinateness in this time by means of internal *experience*; and this is more than to be merely conscious of my representation, but still identical with the *empirical consciousness of my existence*, which is only determinable by means of reference to something, which, conjoined with my existence, is *out of me*. This consciousness of my existence in time is, therefore, conjoined identically with the consciousness of a relationship to something out of me, and it is, therefore, experience and not invention, sense and not imagination, which connects inseparably that which is external, with my internal sense; for the external sense is already itself relation of the intuition to something real out of me, and the reality of the same, different from the imagination, reposes only thereon, because it is inseparably conjoined with the internal experience itself, as the condition of its possibility, which here takes place. If, with the *intellectual consciousness* of my existence in the representation, *I am*, which accompanies all my judgments and actions of the understanding, I could connect at the same time a determination of my existence by means of *intellectual intuition*, the consciousness of a relationship to something out of me would not be necessarily belonging to the same. But, now, as that intellectual consciousness certainly precedes, yet the internal intuition in which my existence alone can be determined is sensible and bound to condition of time, and this determination, consequently the internal experience itself, depends upon something permanent which is not in me, consequently only in something out of me, and towards which I must consider myself in relation, so is the reality of the external sense necessarily conjoined with that of the internal sense, for the possibility of an experience in general, that is, I am as certainly conscious that there are things out of me which refer to my sense, as I am conscious



because time is too short, and no misapprehension by well informed and impartial judges has come before me in respect of the rest, who without that I require to name them here with their due praise, will of themselves see the respect which I have paid to their suggestions in their places. But with this improvement, a slight loss to the reader is connected, which was not to be prevented, without making the work much too voluminous, that is to say, different matters have been necessarily omitted, or propounded, abridged, which did not, in fact, belong essentially to the completeness of the whole, but still would be missed unwillingly by several readers, as they might have been useful in other respects; in order to make room, as I hope, for my now intelligible exposition, which, at the bottom, in respect propositions, and, even their proofs, absolutely changes nothing, but still in the method of the propounding varies here and there so much from the preceding, that it could not be effected by intercalations. This trifling loss, which, after all, may be supplied agreeably to the pleasure of every one, by comparison with the first edition, will, as I hope, be more than balanced by means of greater comprehensibleness. I have perceived, in different public writings, (partly upon the occasion of the review of several works,

that I myself exist determined in time. But now to what given intuitions really objects correspond out of me, and which therefore belong to the *external sense*, to which sense and not to the imagination they are to be ascribed, must be made out in each particular case according to the rules, agreeably to which experience in general (even internal) is distinguished from imagination, in which the *proposition*, that there is really an external experience, always lies at the foundation. We may yet add to this the remark, that the representation of something *permanent* in existence is not identical with *permanent representation*, for this may be very changeable and changing like all our representations, even as those of matter, and still refer to something permanent, which therefore must be a thing external and different from all my representations, the existence of which is necessarily included in the *determination* of my own existence, and constitutes with this (*determination*) only a single experience, which never would take place internally, if it were not (in part) at the same time external. The how? in this case can be as little further explained as how we in general think the Fixed in time, the co-existence of which with the changeable produces the conception of change.

partly in special treatises), with grateful satisfaction, that the spirit of profoundness was not extinct in Germany, but merely overwhelmed for a short time by a certain fashion of freedom in thought pretending to be genius, and that the thorny paths in Critick which lead to a scholastical science of pure reason, but, as such alone durable and consequently highly necessary, have not prevented determined and clear-sighted heads from making themselves master of it. To these deserving men, who so happily join to solidity of view, the talent also of a clear exposition (which I myself am not conscious of), I leave my labour, in respect of the latter point, perhaps here and there still defective, to be completed—for the danger in this case is not that of being opposed, but of not being understood. For my part, from this time, I cannot enter into disputes, although I shall certainly carefully consider all the hints, whether of opponents or friends, in order to make use of them suitably in the future execution of the system of this Propadeutick. As I, during the course of my labours, am advanced tolerably far in years, (in this month I am in my sixty-fourth year), I must be economical of time if I wish to execute my plan of exposing the “Metaphysick of nature” as well as of “morals,” in confirmation of the correctness of the “critick of speculative as well as practical reason,” and I must wait the clearing up of the obscurities, hardly to be avoided at the outset in this work, as well as the justification of the whole, at the hands of those deserving men who have made it their own. Every philosophical system may be pressed hard in some particular points, (for it cannot come forth so fully armed as the mathematical), notwithstanding that the organisation of the system, considered as unity, does not run the least risk, and for the examination of which, if it be new, only few possess the activity of mind, and still fewer the desire, since all novelty is disagreeable to them. Thus, apparent contradictions

may be cavilled at, if particularly in every passing off-hand production, we compare isolated passages with one another, severed from their connexion, which in the eyes of him who relies upon another's judgment cast an unfavourable light upon them, but in respect of him, who has made himself master of the idea as a whole, are easily to be resolved. When, however, a theory has consistence in itself, action and reaction, which in the beginning threatened it with great danger, only serve in time for the purpose of rubbing off its asperities, and when men of impartiality, insight, and true popularity occupy themselves therewith, procuring for it also in a short period, the requisite elegance.

*Königsberg, April, 1787.*

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# ERRATA.

Page XII Line	34.....	read <i>calx</i> for <i>chalk</i>
XV	35.....	" <i>how</i> " <i>as</i>
16	35.....	" <i>see only</i> for <i>which only</i>
19	9.....	" <i>its</i> " <i>these</i>
21	4, &c.....	" <i>Propædæutick</i> for <i>Propædæutick</i>
61	9.....	" no semicolon after <i>only</i>
68	8.....	dele (and)
80	11.....	" <i>pure</i>
81	15.....	read <i>them alone</i>
94	4.....	comma instead of semicolon
96	35.....	read <i>their</i> instead of <i>hcn</i>
104	28.....	" <i>at all</i> " <i>all</i>
105	17.....	" <i>refer them as</i>
107	3 note	" <i>art</i> instead of <i>act</i>
"	4 "	" <i>premises</i> for <i>promises</i>
121	9 "	" <i>through it</i> for <i>through</i>
124	5.....	" <i>their</i> instead of <i>its</i>
129	20.....	" <i>instruction</i> " <i>construction</i>
136	38.....	" <i>themselves</i> " <i>itself</i>
140	15, 16, &c..	" <i>Phænomenon</i> instead of <i>Phænomenon</i>
144	9.....	" <i>conceptions as the object itself</i>
148	32.....	" <i>in</i> instead of <i>to</i>
153	12.....	" <i>thence</i> " <i>these</i>
155	33.....	" <i>the</i> " <i>its</i>
158	8 .....	" <i>known synthetically</i> instead of <i>known</i>
"	12.....	" <i>intensive</i> " <i>extensive</i>
161	36.....	" <i>when</i> instead of <i>that</i> "
162	8.....	" <i>as</i> " <i>by</i>
169	4.....	" <i>but</i> " <i>pro</i>
174	7.....	" <i>nihilum</i> " <i>nihil non</i>
179	34.....	" <i>contains not</i> " <i>contains</i>
210	22.....	" <i>cognized</i> " <i>required</i>
"	23.....	" <i>perceived</i> " <i>cognized</i>
216	25.....	" <i>can take</i> " <i>take</i>
225	15.....	" <i>its</i> " <i>their</i>
225	18.....	" <i>three</i> " <i>these</i>
229	21.....	" <i>reach</i> " <i>belong</i>
232	34.....	" <i>so much</i> " <i>much</i>
266	29.....	" ( <i>the sea near the shore</i> ) instead of <i>the sea in the other case</i>
273	7.....	" <i>convenience</i> instead of <i>connection</i>
273	2.....	" <i>thinking</i> " <i>taking</i>
284	15.....	" <i>united</i> " <i>limited</i>
304	22.....	" <i>themselves</i> " <i>itself</i>
308	8.....	" <i>carries</i> " <i>comes</i>
312	94.....	" <i>serves</i> " <i>seems</i>
318	34.....	" <i>thinks</i> " <i>think</i>
319	11.....	" <i>no more</i> " <i>not</i>
330	16.....	" <i>potentially</i> " <i>potential</i>
332	16.....	" a full stop after <i>this</i>
337	5.....	omit semicolon after <i>which</i>
339	13.....	read <i>how great</i> for <i>so great as</i>
352	33.....	" <i>as</i> " <i>is</i>
355	31.....	" <i>conditional</i> for <i>condition</i>
362	10.....	" <i>convenience</i> " <i>convincing</i>
373	37.....	" <i>foundation of the cognition</i> for <i>foundation</i>
381	11.....	" <i>to this</i> for <i>this</i>
387	22.....	" <i>does not exale</i> instead of <i>has evaporated</i>
399	5.....	omit semicolon
406	20.....	insert <i>from this point of view</i> after <i>reason</i>
420	17.....	" <i>in the phenomena</i> after <i>effects</i>
420	14.....	read <i>every</i> instead of <i>even</i>
432	11.....	" <i>transcendent</i> instead of <i>transcendent<sup>al</sup></i>
435	13.....	put a dash after <i>Platonic</i> instead of a hyphen
462	27.....	read <i>necessity</i> instead of <i>reality</i>
464	2.....	" <i>Ignoratio</i> " <i>Ignorantia</i>
464	28.....	" <i>much less are</i> " <i>are much less</i>
470	38.....	" <i>mere</i> instead of <i>first</i>
476	12.....	" <i>art</i> " <i>reason</i>
486	26.....	" <i>treatment</i> " <i>treatise</i>
489	6.....	" <i>understanding</i> instead of <i>von on</i>
491	29.....	" <i>unity</i> " <i>idea</i>
495	5.....	" <i>esse</i> " <i>est</i>
510	34.....	insert <i>whereof</i> after <i>but</i>
518	37.....	" <i>as before of the</i>
525	13 & 14 .....	" <i>through the nature of reason and between only and as</i>
528	30.....	" <i>comic</i> after <i>this</i>
530	15.....	read <i>transcendent</i> instead of <i>transcendental</i>
563	34.....	" <i>succeed by</i> instead of <i>penetrate</i>
563	35.....	" <i>in</i> instead of <i>into</i>
564	37.....	" <i>opiniative</i> instead of <i>pretendit</i>
565	16.....	" <i>honourable</i> " <i>eloquent</i>
566	24.....	" <i>effect</i> " <i>effort</i>
615	32.....	" <i>our understanding</i> instead of <i>our reason</i>
616	2.....	" <i>he has</i> " <i>it has</i>
623	2 note	omit <i>in</i> after <i>for</i>
630	17.....	read <i>our</i> instead of <i>his</i>
639	20.....	" <i>difference of the schools</i> for <i>difference</i>
640	2.....	" <i>Plato</i> for <i>Philo</i>
641	13.....	" <i>road alone</i> for <i>road</i>






CRITICK OF PURE REASON.

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I.

INTRODUCTION.



## INTRODUCTION.

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### I.

#### OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PURE AND EMPIRICAL COGNITION.

THAT all our Cognition begins with Experience, there is not any doubt; for how otherwise should the faculty of cognition be awakened into exercise, if this did not occur through objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, and partly bring our Understanding-capacity into action, to compare these, to connect, or to separate them, and in this way to work up the rude matter of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects, which is termed experience? In respect of time, therefore, no cognition can precede in us experience, and with this, all commences.

But although all our cognition begins with experience, still on that account, all does not precisely spring up *out* of experience. For it may easily happen that even our empirical cognition may be a compound of that which we have received through our impressions, and of that which our proper Cognition-faculty (merely called into action by sensible impressions) supplies from itself, which addition we cannot distinguish from the former original matter, until long exercise has made us attentive to it, and skilful in the separation thereof.

It is, therefore, at least, one of the questions still requiring a closer investigation, and not at the first glance immediately to be answered, whether there is such a cognition independent of Experience, and even of all impressions of the senses. Such *cognitions* we term *à priori*, and we distinguish them from the *empirical*, which have their sources, *à posteriori*, that is to say, in experience.

That expression is not, however, definite enough, in order to indicate, adequately, the complete meaning of the proposed question. For we are accustomed to say of much of our cognition deduced from empirical sources, that we are capable of, or participant in it, *à priori*, since we do not derive it immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which itself we, however, have still borrowed from experience. Thus, it is said of one who undermines the foundation of his house, he might know, *à priori*, that it would fall; that is to say, that he need not wait for the experience of its really falling. But still, entirely *à priori*, he could not know this; for even that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been made known to him, previously, by experience.

We shall, in the sequel, amongst Cognitions *à priori*, not understand such, as are independent of this or that Experience, but those which are *absolutely* so, of all Experience. To these are opposed Cognitions which are empirical, or such as only are *à posteriori*, or are possible by experience. But amongst the cognitions *à priori*, those are called pure, with which nothing at all empirical is mixed. For instance, the proposition: Every change has its cause, is thus a proposition *à priori*, but not pure, because change is a conception, which can only be derived from experience.

## II.

WE ARE IN POSSESSION OF CERTAIN COGNITIONS, *À PRIORI*, AND EVEN THE COMMON STATE (of *mankind*) IS NEVER WITHOUT SUCH.

The question now is, as to the criterion by which we can securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience teaches us, indeed, that something is constituted in such and such a manner, but not, that it could not be otherwise. If in the *first place*, therefore, a proposition is met with, which is thought of at the same time with its necessity, it is a Judgment *à priori*, and if, besides this, it is not deduced from any other, and as itself, again is valid as a necessary proposition, it is thus, absolutely, *à priori*. In the *second place*, Experience never gives to its Judgments certain and strict Universality, but only admitted and comparative, (by induction); so that, properly speaking, it must be said—so far as we have hitherto perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. If a judgment is, therefore, thought in strict universality, that is, so that not any exception is allowed as possible, this is not derivable from experience, but is absolutely valid, *à priori*. Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary progression of validity from that which is valid in most cases, to that which is so in all, as, for example, in the proposition, “All bodies are heavy.” Where on the other hand strict universality belongs essentially to a judgment, that indicates a particular source of its cognition, namely, a faculty of cognition, *à priori*. Necessity and strict Universality are, therefore, sure characteristics of a Cognition *à priori*, and belong, also, inseparably to each other. As, however, in the use of the same, it is sometimes easier to show the empirical limitation thereof than the contingency in Judgments, or as occasionally the unlimited Universality which we attach

to a judgment is more clear to be shown than its necessity ; it is thus advisable to make use, separately, of the stated criteria, each of which is, in itself, infallible.

Now, that there are effectually such necessary, and in the strictest sense, universal, and consequently, pure judgments *à priori*, in human cognition, is easily shown. If we wish an example from the sciences, we have only to look at the Axioms of mathematics. If we wish such, from the most common use of the understanding, the proposition, That all change must have a cause, will serve for this ; nay, in the latter case, the conception of a cause so ostensibly involves that of a necessity of connexion with an effect, and of a strict universality of the rule, that it (*the conception of a Cause*) would be entirely lost, if, as Hume did, we wished to derive it from a frequent association of what happens, with that which precedes it, and from a habit thence originating, (consequently from merely subjective necessity) of connecting representations. And without requiring such examples as to the proof of the reality of pure principles *à priori* in our cognition, we might demonstrate its indispensableness for the possibility of experience itself, consequently *à priori*. For whence would experience deduce its certainty, when all the rules according to which it proceeds were again always empirical, consequently contingent, and when therefore we could hardly look upon them as valid first principles ? But here we may content ourselves with having exposed the pure use of our faculty of cognition, as a fact, together with its criteria. It is not merely in judgments but even in conceptions, an origin *à priori*, of some of them, shows itself. Take away from your Experience-conceptions of a body, gradually, every thing which is empirical therein, Colour, Hardness, Softness, Weight, Impenetrability, still the Space remains which it, (*the body*), that has now disappeared, occupied, and this you cannot

leave out. Just so, when you abstract from your empirical conception of each corporeal or incorporeal object, all the properties which experience teaches you, yet you cannot take those from it, by which you think upon it as a substance, or appertaining to a substance, (notwithstanding this conception contains more determinateness than that of an object in general). You must, therefore, impelled by the necessity with which this conception presses upon you, confess, that it has its seat in your faculty of cognition *à priori*.

### III.

PHILOSOPHY STANDS IN NEED OF A SCIENCE WHICH DETERMINES THE POSSIBILITY, THE PRINCIPLES, AND THE EXTENT OF ALL COGNITIONS *À PRIORI*.

That which is really more important than all which has preceded, is this, that certain cognitions even leave the field of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which no corresponding object in Experience can any where be given, seem to extend the compass of our Judgments beyond all limits of this (*Experience*.)

And exactly in these last cognitions, which transcend the sensible world, where Experience can afford neither guide nor correction, lie the investigations of our Reason, which we, as far as regards their importance, hold to be highly preferable, and in their object far more elevated, than all that the Understanding can teach us in the field of *Phænomena*, and whereby we hazard every thing, even with the danger of erring, rather than that we should give up such important investigations from any ground of doubtfulness, or disregard, or indifference. These unavoidable problems of pure Reason itself, are *God*, *Liberty*, and *Immortality*. But the science whose final object, with all its preliminaries, is strictly



directed to the solution thereof, is called *Metaphysick*, whose proceeding in the beginning is dogmatical; that is—without previous investigation of the power or impotency of reason for so great an undertaking, it takes upon itself the execution, confidently.

Now it certainly appears natural, that so soon as one has left the territory of experience, one still should not straightway erect a building with cognitions which we possess we know not whence; and upon the strength of principles, with whose origin we are not acquainted, without being previously assured of the foundation of this (*building*) by careful investigation; that, consequently, we should rather long ago have proposed the question, how the understanding could attain to all these cognitions *à priori*, and what is the extent, validity, and worth, which they possess. Indeed, nothing is at all more natural (*than this*), if we understand by the word *natural*, that which should happen according to a right and reasonable manner; but if we understand by it what usually takes place, then nothing, on the other hand, is more natural and comprehensible, than that this investigation must long remain neglected. For, a part of these cognitions, as the mathematical, is in ancient possession of certitude, and thereby also affords a favourable expectation for others,—although these may be of quite a different nature. Besides this, when we are out of the circle of experience, we are thus sure not to be opposed by experience. The charm of extending his cognition is so great, that only through an evident contradiction which he falls upon, can a man be restrained in his progress. This, however, can be avoided, if he only fabricate his fictions with care, without their remaining on this account less fictions. The science of mathematics affords us a striking example how far we can advance in cognition *à priori*, independent of experience. It indeed only occupies itself with objects and cognitions simply so far as the same may be

represented in the Intuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked, since the said Intuition itself can be given, *à priori*; consequently is hardly distinguishable from a mere pure conception. Influenced by such a proof of the power of Reason, the impulse to extension perceives no limits. The light dove, whilst in its free flight it divides the air, whose resistance it feels, might entertain the supposition that it would succeed much better in airless space. Just in the same way, Plato abandoned the sensible world, because it set such narrow limits to the understanding, and hazarded himself beyond it, upon the wings of Ideas, into the void space of the pure Understanding. He did not remark, that he made no way by his efforts, since he had no counter-pressure, as it were for support, whereupon he could rest, and whereby he could employ his power in order to make the understanding move onward. But it is the usual fate of human reason in Speculation, to make its edifice ready as soon as possible, and then for the first time investigate, whether the foundation has been even well laid. Then all kinds of excuses are sought after in order to console us for its want of fitness, or rather indeed to avoid so late and dangerous an examination. That which frees us during the building from all apprehension and suspicion, and flatters us with apparent solidity, is this. A great, perhaps the greatest part of the business of our reason consists in the analysis of the conceptions, which we already possess of objects. This furnishes us with a multitude of cognitions, which, although they are not more than elucidations or explanations of that which had already been thought in our conceptions (although in a confused manner) still at least according to the Form, are prized as new views, notwithstanding that so far as respects their Matter or Content, they do not extend the conceptions which we have, but only disentangle them. Now as this proceeding furnishes a real Cognition

à priori, which has a certain and useful progression, reason slips in, without itself perceiving it, under this illusion, assertions of quite another kind, where, to given conceptions, it adds others entirely foreign, but à priori, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and without such a question ever coming into our thoughts. I will, therefore, at once, at the outset, treat of the difference of these two different kinds of Cognition.

## IV.

## OF THE DIFFERENCE OF ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS.

In all judgments wherein the relationship of a subject to a Predicate is thought, (if I only consider the affirmative as the application to the negative is afterwards easy,) this relationship is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is contained in the conception A, (in a covert manner,) or B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connexion with it. In the first case, I name the judgment *analytical*, in the other *synthetical*. Analytical judgments (the affirmative) are consequently those in which is conceived the connexion of the predicate with the subject, through identity, but those in which this connexion is conceived, without identity, should be named synthetical judgments. We might name the first also *explicative*, the other *extending judgments*, since the former add, by means of the predicate, nothing to the conception of the subject, but only through analysis divide this into its constituent conceptions, which were thought already in the same, (although confusedly) whilst, on the contrary, the latter add a predicate to the conception of the subject, which was never at all thought in it, and which, through no analysis of the same, could have

been deduced. For example ; all bodies are extended—is an analytical judgment. For I need not go out beyond the conception which I unite with body in order to find extension connected with it ; but I only have to analyze the conception, that is, I only have to be acquainted with the diversity (*Multiplex*) which I at all times think in it (*the Conception*), therein to find this predicate. It is therefore an analytical judgment. On the contrary, when I say, all bodies are heavy, this predicate is something quite other than that which I think in the mere conception of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate consequently gives a synthetical judgment.

*Judgments of Experience*, as such, are all synthetical ; for it were absurd to ground an analytical judgment upon experience, because I need not at all go out of my conception to form the judgment, and, consequently, have no testimony of experience necessary for it. That a body is extended, is a proposition which stands firm, *a priori*, and is not a judgment of experience. For before I go to experience, I have all the conditions of my judgment already in the conception, from which I can deduce the predicate according to the principle of contradiction only, and thereby, at the same time, become conscious of the necessity of the judgment ; which (*necessity*) Experience would never teach me. On the other hand, although I, in the conception of a body in general, do not at all include the predicate of heaviness, yet that (*Conception*) indicates an object of experience, by means of a part thereof, to which (*part*) I can consequently add still other parts of the self-same experience as belonged to the first. I can cognize (*know*) before hand the conception of body analytically, through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, &c., all of which are thought in this conception. But I now extend my cognition, and as I look back to experience, from which I had derived this conception of

body, I then find, with the above signs, heaviness at all times connected, and I add, therefore this, as predicate to that conception, synthetically. It is therefore experience, whereupon the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of heaviness with the conception of body is grounded, since both conceptions—although indeed one is not contained in the other, yet as parts of a whole, that is to say, of experience, which itself is a synthetic conjunction of intuitions—belong to one another, but only contingently.

But in synthetical judgments *à priori*, this means of help fails entirely. If I am to go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to cognize another (*Conception*) B, as connected with it, what is that upon which I rely, and whereby the Synthesis becomes possible? for in this case I have not the advantage of looking about after it, in the field of experience. Take the proposition,—“Every thing which happens has its cause.” In the conception of something that happens, I think indeed upon an existence which a time precedes, &c., and thence analytical judgments may be deduced. But the conception of a cause lies quite out of the first conception, and indicates something different from “that which happens,” and is not therefore at all contained in this latter representation. How then do I arrive at this, from that which happens in general, to state something quite different from it, and to cognize the conception of cause, although indeed not contained in it, yet as belonging thereto, and even necessarily so? What is in this case the unknown =X whereupon the understanding rests, when out of the conception of A, it fancies it discovers a predicate, B, foreign to this (*Conception*), yet which it believes to be connected therewith? It cannot be experience, because the adduced principle joins the second representation to the first, not only with greater Universality, but also with the expression of Necessity, con-

sequently wholly *à priori*, and from mere conceptions. Now the whole design of our speculative cognition, *à priori*, rests upon such synthetical principles, that is Extension-principles; for although the Analytical ones are indeed highly important and necessary, yet only they are so for the purpose of coming at that clearness of conceptions, which is requisite for a sure and extended Synthesis, as a really new acquisition.

## V.

IN ALL THEORETICAL SCIENCES OF REASON, SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS, *À PRIORI*, ARE CONTAINED AS PRINCIPLES.

1. Mathematical judgments are all synthetical. This point seems to have escaped, hitherto, the analyzers of human reason; nay, to have been directly opposed to all their conjectures, although it is undeniably true, and in its consequence is very important. For since it was found that the conclusions of mathematicians proceed all according to the principle of contradiction, (which the nature of every apodictical certainty requires,) men were convinced that the principles also were admitted according to the principle of contradiction. In this they erred, for although a synthetical proposition may at all times be discerned, by means of the principle of contradiction, yet only in this way, inasmuch as another synthetic proposition is presupposed from which it can be deduced—but never of itself.

In the first place, it must be remarked, that proper mathematical propositions are at all times judgments *à priori*, and not empirical, because they carry along with them necessity, which can never be derived from experience. If this be not admitted, then I limit my proposition to pure mathematics, the conception of which carries along with it, that they do

not contain empirical, but merely pure Cognition, *à priori*.

At the first, one would certainly think that the proposition,  $7 + 5 = 12$ , is a mere analytical proposition, which follows from the conception of a sum of seven and five; according to the principle of contradiction. But when we consider it more closely, we find that the conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing farther than the union of both numbers in one, whereby it cannot at all be thought what this single number is, which embraces the two. The conception of twelve is already by no means thought from this cause that I think the union of seven and five, and though I analyze my conception of such a possible sum ever so far, still I shall never meet with twelve therein. We must go out of, and beyond these conceptions, taking intuition in aid, which corresponds to one of the two, possibly the five fingers, or (as *Segner* has done in his Arithmetic) five points, and thus add in succession the unities of the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For, first I take the number seven; and, for the Conception of five, taking the fingers of my hand in aid as Intuition, I join the unities which I before took together in order to make up the number 5, in my first image in succession to the number 7, and then I see the number 12 arise. That 7 was to be added to 5, I had already thought, in the conception of a sum  $= 7 + 5$ ; but not that this sum should be equal to the number 12. The arithmetical proposition is therefore always synthetical, which we become more clearly convinced of, when we take somewhat larger numbers, as it then is clearly shown, that, turn and twist our conceptions as we like, without taking Intuition in aid, we never could find the sum by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions.

Equally as little is any principle of geometry

analytical. That the straight line between two points is the shortest, is a synthetical proposition. For my conception of *straight* contains nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The conception of shortness is therefore wholly added, and cannot be deduced by any analysis from the conception of a straight line. Intuition, therefore, must here be taken in aid, by means of which alone the synthesis is possible.

Some few principles which geometers presuppose, are indeed really analytical, and rest upon the principle of contradiction. They, however, only serve as identical propositions, for a link in method, and not as principles; for example,  $a = a$ , "the whole is equal to itself," or  $(a + b) > a$ , that is, "the whole is greater than its part." And yet even these principles themselves, although they are valid agreeably to pure conceptions, are only admitted for this reason in mathematics, that they can be presented (*exhibited*) in the intuition. That which causes us here commonly to believe, that the predicate of such apodictical judgments already lies in our conception, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the ambiguity of the expression. For instance: we have to think, as belonging to a given conception, a certain predicate, in addition, and this necessity is already attached to the conceptions. But the question is not what we *have* to think, in addition to the given conception, but what we *think*, *really* in it, although obscurely; and then it is obvious that the predicate adheres to those conceptions certainly necessarily, yet not as being thought in the conception itself, but by means of an Intuition, which must be added to the Conception.

2. *Natural Philosophy* (Physica) contains *Synthetical Judgments, à priori, as Principles, in itself*.—I will only adduce two propositions by way of example; for instance, the proposition, "that in all changes of the corporeal world, the quantity of matter remains un-



changed ;" or this,—“that, in all communication of motion, action and reaction always must be equal to each other.” In both propositions, not only is the necessity, consequently their origin, *à priori*, clear, but also that they are *synthetical propositions*. For in the conception of matter I do not think upon the permanence (*perdurability*), but merely upon its presence in space, through filling the same. I therefore really go out, beyond the conception of matter, in order to think something additional to it, *à priori*, which in it (*the conception*) I did not think. The proposition is, therefore, not analytical, but *synthetical*, and yet thought *à priori*. It is the same in the remaining propositions of the pure part of Physics.

3. In *Metaphysick*, if we look at it as a science hitherto merely attempted, but still, from the nature of human reason, as an indispensable one, *Synthetical Cognitions à priori must be contained*; and it is not the business of *Metaphysick* simply to dissect, and thereby analytically to elucidate conceptions, which we make to ourselves of things, *à priori*. We desire to extend our cognition, *à priori*; and for this purpose we must make use of such principles as add something to the given conception, which was not contained in it, and which only through *synthetical judgments, à priori*, indeed reach so far, that experience itself cannot follow us; as, for example, in the proposition, “The world must have a beginning, &c. ;” and thus *Metaphysick*, at least *as to its end*, consists of unmixed *synthetical propositions, à priori*.

## VI.

### UNIVERSAL PROBLEM OF PURE REASON.

We thereby gain, already, very much, when we can bring a number of investigations under the Formula of a single problem. For through this, not only do

we facilitate our own business, inasmuch as we define it to ourselves exactly, but also the judgment of every other person who wishes to examine, whether we have or have not fulfilled our intention. The proper problem of Pure Reason is contained, then, in the question, *How are Synthetical Judgments, à priori, possible?*

That metaphysics hitherto have remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the cause, that this problem, and perhaps even the difference of *Analytical* and *Synthetical* judgments, was not earlier thought of. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon a satisfactory proof that the possibility which it longs to know explained, cannot at all in fact take place, depends, now, whether Metaphysick falls or stands. David Hume, who, though of all philosophers he came the nearest to this problem, but who was far from thinking it sufficiently determinate, nor in its universality,—inasmuch as he proceeded no farther than the synthetical proposition of the connexion of effect with its causes (*principium causalitatis*)—believed thence to deduce, that such a proposition *à priori*, was wholly impossible, and, according to his conclusions, every thing which we term Metaphysick, would terminate in a mere fancy of the pretended insight of Reason into that which in fact is borrowed from experience, and by habit has assumed the appearance of necessity. This position, subversive of all pure philosophy, he never would have fallen upon, had he had our problem in its universality before his eyes; since he then would have seen, that, according to his argument, there could be no pure mathematics, because they contain certain synthetical propositions *à priori*; against which position, then, his own good understanding would certainly have protected him.

In the solution of the above problem, the possibility, at the same time, of the use of pure Reason, in the

foundation and construction of all sciences which contain a theoretic cognition of objects à priori is comprehended,—that is to say, the answer to the questions, *How are pure Mathematics possible? How are pure Physics possible?*

Respecting these sciences, since they in reality exist, we may certainly fairly ask, How they are possible? for *that* they are possible, is shown by their reality.\* But, as far as concerns *Metaphysics*, from their hitherto miserable progress, and because from no one system hitherto propounded, in what regards their principal object, can it be said that they really exist, every one may with cause, doubt as to their possibility.

But yet this *kind of cognition*, in a certain sense, is also to be looked upon given, and metaphysics are, if not exactly as science, still as a natural disposition (*or gift*), (*metaphysica naturalis*), real. For human reason advances eagerly, without the mere vanity of knowing much impelling it thereto, urged on by its own want, towards such questions, which cannot be answered by any empirical use of Reason, and the thence deduced principles: and thus there has ever been in all men, metaphysics, and will always be, so soon as Reason within them extends itself to speculation. And now the question is as to this likewise—*How are Metaphysics as a natural disposition possible?* that is, How do those questions arise, which pure Reason proposes to itself, and which, as well as it can, it is pushed to answer through its own requirement, from the nature of universal human Reason?

As, however, in all the attempts hitherto made to answer these natural questions, as, for example, Whether the world had a beginning or was from eternity,

\* With regard to pure Physics one might yet doubt as to this reality. But we require only to look at the different propositions which occur at the beginning of proper empirical physical Science, as that of the permanence of the same quantity of matter, of inertia, of the equality of action and reaction, and so forth, and we shall soon be convinced that they form pure (or rational) Physics, which well deserve to be treated separately as a special science in its whole extent, whether contracted or wide.

&c.; unavoidable contradictions have at all times been found, one cannot rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition to metaphysics, that is, with the pure Reason-faculty itself, whence at all times certainly a kind of metaphysics (be it what it may) arises; but it must be possible through this to arrive at a certainty, either in knowing or not knowing the objects, that is either to arrive at a decision upon the objects of ~~these~~ questions, or as to the power or inability of reason, to judge any thing in regard of them; consequently either to extend our pure Reason with certainty, or to affix to it definite and sure limits. This last question then, which flows out of the above stated universal problem, would correctly be this: *How are Metaphysics, as a Science, possible?*

The Critick of Reason leads, therefore, ultimately, to Science, necessarily; the dogmatic use of this Reason, without Critick on the other hand to groundless positions, to which one may oppose others, as apparent; consequently it leads to *scepticism*.

This Science cannot, however, be of any alarming prolixity, since it has not to do with objects of Reason, the diversity of which objects is infinite, but merely with Reason itself; with problems which entirely spring out of its own breast, and are proposed to it, not through the nature of things, which are distinct from it, but by means of its own nature—since when it has previously become acquainted completely with its own Faculty (*or power*) in regard to objects which may come before it in experience, it must then be easy to determine completely and securely, the extent and limits of its use, sought beyond the confines of experience.

We may and must, therefore, consider all the trials hitherto made as not having taken place, for establishing metaphysics dogmatically—for what in one or other (*of them*) is analytical, namely, mere Anatomy of conceptions which dwell in our Reason *à priori*, is not

at all the end, but simply a preliminary, for proper metaphysics, namely, to extend its cognition *à priori*, synthetically, and is unfit for this, since it (*the analysis*) merely shows, what is contained in these conceptions, but not, how we attain *à priori* to such conceptions, in order then to be able also to determine their valid use in reference to the objects of all cognition in general. There requires, indeed, but little self-denial for this, to surrender all these pretensions; as the undeniable, and, in the dogmatic mode of procedure, unavoidable contradictions of Reason with itself, in each previous metaphysical system, have already long ago destroyed its character. More firmness will be necessary as to this, not to let ourselves be held back by difficulties internally and by opposition externally, from at last encouraging for once to a healthy and fruitful growth a science indispensable for human Reason, by means of treatment different and quite opposed to what has gone before; from which science we may indeed lop off every branch which has shot forth, but which we cannot tear up by the roots.

## VII.

### IDEA AND DIVISION OF A PARTICULAR SCIENCE, UNDER THE NAME OF CRITICK OF PURE REASON.

From what precedes, the idea now presents itself of a particular science, which may be called The CRITICK OF PURE REASON. For, Reason is the faculty which furnishes the *principles* of cognition *à priori*. Therefore pure Reason is that which contains the principles of knowing something, absolutely *à priori*. An *Organon* of pure Reason would be a complex of these principles, according to which all pure cognition *à priori* can be obtained, and really accomplished. The extended application of such an organon would furnish a system of pure reason. As this, however, is requiring very much, and it is yet uncertain whe-

ther in general here an extension of our cognition is possible and in what cases; we may therefore regard a science of the mere investigation of pure Reason, its sources and bounds, as the *Propadeutick* to a system of pure Reason. Such would not be a *Doctrine*, but must only be termed a *Critick* of pure Reason, and its utility would, in respect of speculation, really only be negative, serving not for the augmentation, but only for the purifying of our Reason and holding it free from errors, which is already gaining a great deal. I term all cognition *transcendental*, which concerns itself in general not so much with objects, as with our mode of cognition of objects, so far as this may be possible à priori. A *system* of such conceptions would be called *Transcendental Philosophy*. But this, again, for the beginning implies still too much. For since such science must contain entirely both analytical cognition and synthetical à priori, it is, as far as it regards our intention, of too wide an extent, because we merely require to push the analysis as far as such is indispensably necessary in order to look into the principles of synthesis à priori in their whole extent; with which we have only to do. This investigation, which we cannot properly call *Doctrine*, but only *transcendental Critick*, since it has for its object not the extension of cognitions themselves but only their correction, and is to furnish the touchstone of the value or worthlessness of all our cognitions à priori, is that wherewith we now concern ourselves. Such a *Critick* is consequently a *Preparation* where possible, for an *Organon*, and if this should not be attainable, at least, for a *Canon* of the same Pure Reason, according to which canon one day or other, perhaps, the complete system of the *Philosophy of Pure Reason*, whether it consist in the extension or mere limitation of its cognition, might be represented both analytically and synthetically. For, that this is possible, nay

that such a system, cannot be of too great an extent to hope that it may be completed entirely, may already beforehand be conjectured from this, that here not the nature of things which is inexhaustible, but the Understanding, which judges of the nature of things, and this again only in respect of its cognition *à priori*, constitutes the object, the extent of which, since we must not seek for it externally, cannot remain concealed from us, and according to all probability is circumscribed enough, to be completely laid hold of; to be judged of according to its value or worthlessness, and to be brought into right estimation. Still less must we here expect a Critick of the books and systems of pure Reason, but that of the pure Faculty of Reason itself. Only when this Critick lies at the foundation, have we a sure touchstone for estimating the philosophical contents of ancient and modern works in this branch; otherwise the incompetent Historian and Judge decides upon the groundless assertions of others by means of his own, which are equally groundless.

Transcendental Philosophy is the idea of a Science, for which the Critick of pure Reason is to design the whole plan architectonically, that is to say, from principles, with full security as to the completeness and security of all the parts which constitute this building. It is the system of all the principles of pure Reason. That this Critick is not already itself called Transcendental Philosophy rests solely upon this, that in order to be a complete system, it must also contain a full analysis of the whole of human cognition *à priori*. Our Critick then, must also certainly lay before us a complete enumeration of all the fundamental conceptions which form the before-mentioned pure cognition. But from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as well as from the full review of those thence derived, it correctly refrains; partly because this analysis would not be conformable to its object,

since it (*the Analysis*) has not the difficulty which is met with in the *Synthesis*, for the sake of which the whole Critick properly exists ; partly because it would be opposed to the Unity of plan, to engage itself in the responsibility of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction, and which, in reference to its object, might moreover be dispensed with. This completeness of the *Analysis*, as well as of the deduction from conceptions *à priori* subsequently to be afforded, is however easy to be supplied, provided only these first exist as complete principles of the *synthesis*, and that in respect of this essential end nothing is wanting.

To the Critick of pure Reason, every thing therefore belongs which constitutes Transcendental Philosophy ; and it is the complete idea of Transcendental Philosophy, but still not the science itself, since it only goes as far in analysis as is requisite for the complete examination of synthetical cognition *à priori*.

The principal object in the division of such a science is, that no conceptions at all must be admitted which contain in themselves any thing empirical, or, in other words, that the cognition *à priori* is wholly pure. Therefore, although the highest principles of morality, and its fundamental conceptions are cognitions *à priori*, yet do they not belong to Transcendental Philosophy ; since they certainly do not lay the conceptions of Pleasure, Displeasure, Desires, and Inclinations, which are altogether of empirical origin at the foundation of their precepts, and yet into the conception of duty as an obstacle which is to be overcome, or as an incitement which is not to be made into a motive, these must necessarily enter in the composition of a system of pure Morality. Transcendental Philosophy is hence a science of mere pure speculative Reason. For all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, refers to feelings, which belong to empirical sources of cognition.



If we wish to order the division of this science from the universal point of view of a system in general, that (*division*) which we now propose, must *first* contain an *Elementary Doctrine* of Pure Reason, and *secondly*, one of the *Method* of Pure Reason. Each of these principal divisions will have its subdivision, the grounds of which however cannot yet be propounded here. Only this much seems necessary as an introduction or preface, (*namely*) that there are two sources of human cognition, which spring perhaps out of a common but to us unknown root, that is to say, Sensibility (*or Sensitivity*) and Understanding, through the first of which, objects are *given* to us, but through the second *thought*. Now, so far as Sensibility is to contain representations à priori, which constitute the condition under which objects are given to us, it would belong to Transcendental Philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of Sense would necessarily belong to the first part of the elementary science, because the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given, precede those under which the same are thought.

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## TRANSCENDENTAL ELEMENTARY DOCTRINE.

### FIRST PART.

#### TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICK.

IN whatever mode, and by whatever means, Cognition may refer to objects, yet *Intuition* is that whereby it immediately refers to them, and whereunto all Thinking (*Cogitation*) points as the means. This (*Intuition*) however, only takes place so far as the object is given to us; but this again, at least to man, is only thereby possible, inasmuch as it affects the mind in a certain manner. The faculty (Receptivity) of receiving representations through the mode by which we are affected by objects, is called *Sensibility*. By means of Sensibility consequently objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us *Intuitions*, but they are *thought* by the understanding, and from it *Conceptions* arise. Still all thinking must, whether directly or indirectly, by means of certain signs refer ultimately to intuitions, consequently, in us, to sensibility, because in no other manner can any object be given to us.

The effect of an object upon the representation-faculty, so far as we are affected by it (*the object*), is *Sensation*. That intuition which refers to an object by means of Sensation, is termed *empirical*. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called *Phenomenon*.

I term that in the phenomenon which corresponds to the sensation, its *Matter*, but that which causes that the diversity of the phenomenon can be ordered in certain relationships, I call the *Form* of the phenomenon.

As that cannot itself again be Sensation, wherein the sensations are alone ordered and can be reduced into a certain form, the matter of all Phenomena is thus certainly given *à posteriori*, but the form thereof must lie ready *à priori* for them all in the mind; and therefore can be considered separated from all sensation.

I call all Representations pure (in the transcendental meaning) in which nothing that belongs to sensation is met with. The pure form of sensible intuitions in general is therefore found *à priori* in the mind, wherein all diversity of phenomena is envisaged (*angeschauet*) in certain relationship. This pure Form of Sensibility is also itself termed *pure Intuition*. Thus, if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks in it, as substance, power, divisibility, and likewise what thereof belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, &c., something yet remains over to me of the empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which *à priori* has place in the mind as a pure form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses, or sensation.

I call the Science of all the principles of sensibility *à priori*, transcendental *Æsthetick*.\* There must therefore be such a science, forming the first part of the transcendental elementary doctrine, in opposition

\* The Germans are the only persons who, at present, make use of the word *Æsthetick*, in order thereby to denote what others term Critick of Taste. At the foundation of this (term) the disappointed hope lies, which that excellent analyst Baumgarten conceived, of subjecting the Critical judgment of the Beautiful to principles of Reason, and of raising the rules of the same to a Science. But this attempt is vain. For the conceived rules or Criteria are in respect of their principal sources, merely empirical, and therefore can never serve for determinate laws *à priori*, according to which our Judgment in Taste must be directed. It is rather this last which constitutes the particular touchstone of the correctness of the first. On this account it is advisable either again to give up this term (*Æsthetick*) and to reserve it for that doctrine, which is true science (by which we shall come nearer to the language, and the sense of the Ancients with whom the division of Cognition, into *scientia* and *ars* was very famous) or to share the term with speculative philosophy, and to take *Æsthetick*, partly in a transcendental sense, and partly in a psychological signification.

to that which contains the principles of pure Thinking, and is termed Transcendental Logic.

In transcendental *Æsthetick*, therefore, we shall first isolate Sensibility in this way that we separate every thing which the understanding by means of its conceptions therein thinks, so that nothing but empirical intuition may remain. Secondly, we shall farther separate from this last every thing which belongs to sensation, so that nothing but pure intuition, and the mere form of phenomena may remain ; which is the only thing which sensibility can furnish *à priori*. In the investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, as principles of cognition *à priori*, namely, Space and Time, with the consideration of which we shall occupy ourselves.

## OF TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICK.

## FIRST SECTION.

## OF SPACE.

## II.

## METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THIS CONCEPTION.

By means of the external sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as external to us, and these all in space. Therein is determined, or is determinable, their shape, quantity, and relationship towards each other. The internal sense by means of which the mind envisages itself or its internal state, gives indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its internal state alone is possible, so that all which belongs to the internal determinations is represented in the relationship of Time. Externally, Time can be viewed as little as Space as something in us. Now what are Time and Space? Are they real beings? Are they in fact only determinations, or moreover relations of things, but still such as would belong to these (*things*) in themselves, though they should not be envisaged; or are they such, that they belong only to the form of the intuition and consequently to the subjective property of our mind, without which these predicates could not be attributed even to anything? In order to inform ourselves upon this, we will first explain the conception of space. I understand, under *Explanation*, (*Expositio*) the clear (though not detailed) representation of that

which belongs to a conception, and the explanation is *Metaphysical*, when it contains that which represents the conception as given à priori.

1<sup>st</sup>. Space is no empirical conception which has been derived from external experiences. For in order that certain sensations may be referred to something external to me, (that is, to something in another part of space to that in which I am,) and likewise in order that I may be able to represent them as without of and near to each other, consequently not merely different but as in different places, the representation of space for this purpose must already lie at the foundation. The representation of space cannot therefore be borrowed from the relations of the external phenomenon by experience, but this external experience is itself first only possible by this stated representation.

2<sup>dly</sup>. Space is a necessary representation à priori, which lies at the foundation of all external intuitions. We can never make to ourselves a representation of this,—that there is no space, although we may very readily think, that no objects therein are to be met with. It is therefore regarded as the condition of the possibility of phenomena, and not as a determination depending upon them, and it is a representation à priori, which necessarily lies at the foundation of all external phenomena.

3<sup>dly</sup>. Space is no discursive, or, as we say, universal conception of the relationships of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, one can only figure to oneself, one space, and when we speak of several spaces, we understand by this only parts of one, and the same sole space. These parts too, could not precede the sole all-embracing space, as if constituent parts of the same, (whence its aggregate is possible,) but only in it, can they be thought. It is essentially one—the Diversity in it, consequently also the universal conception of spaces

in general, rests solely upon limitations. Hence it follows, that in respect of it, an intuition à priori, (which is not empirical), lies at the foundation of all conceptions of it. And thus all geometrical propositions, for example this : That in a triangle two sides together are greater than the third, never could be deduced with apodictical certainty from the general conceptions of line and triangle, but from Intuition and certainly à priori.

4<sup>thly</sup>. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. We must indeed think each conception as a representation which is contained in an endless multitude of different possible representations, (as their common sign), consequently it contains these in itself; but no conception can be so thought, as if it contained an infinite number of representations in itself. Nevertheless, space is thus thought, (for all parts of space are coexistent to infinity). Consequently the original representation of space is *Intuition* à priori, and not *Conception*.

## III.

TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPTION  
OF SPACE.

I understand by transcendental *Exposition*, the explanation of a conception as a principle whence the possibility of other synthetical Cognitions à priori, can be discerned. For this purpose it is required, 1<sup>st</sup>, that really such cognitions flow from the given conceptions. 2<sup>dly</sup>, that these cognitions are only possible, under the presupposition of a given mode of explanation of this conception.

Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet à priori. What then must the representation of space be, so that such a cognition is possible of it? It must originally be intuition, since from a mere conception, no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception—yet this happens in geometry (Introduction 5). But this intuition must be met with in us à priori, that is before all perception of an object, consequently must be pure not empirical intuition. For geometrical propositions are all apodictical, that is, conjoined with the consciousness of their necessity, as, for example: Space has only three measurements, (*Dimensions*), and the like propositions cannot be either empirical or experience-judgments, or concluded from these. (Introd. 2.)

Now, how can an external intuition dwell in the mind, which precedes the objects themselves, and in which the conception of these may be determined,



à priori. Evidently not otherwise than so far as it has its seat merely in the subject, as the formal property of this (*Subject*) being affected by objects, and thereby of receiving *immediate Representation* of them, that is, *Intuition*—consequently only as form of the external *Sense* in general.

Hence our explanation alone renders the *possibility* of *Geometry* as a synthetical cognition à priori comprehensible. Every mode of explanation which does not furnish this, although as to appearance it may have some similarity with it, may be distinguished with the utmost certainty therefrom by these criteria.

#### CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE CONCEPTIONS.

1<sup>st</sup>. Space represents no property at all of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relationship to each other,—that is to say, no determination of them which attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains, if we make abstraction of all the subjective conditions of intuition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be envisaged before the existence of the things to which they belong, nor consequently à priori.

2<sup>nd</sup>. Space is nothing else but the form of all phenomena of the external senses,—that is, the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible to us. Now, since the receptivity (*capacity*) of the subject to be affected by objects, necessarily precedes all intuitions of these objects, it may be understood how the form of all phenomena can be given in the mind previous to all real perceptions, consequently à priori; and how this, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, can contain principles of the relationships of these prior to all experience.

We can therefore, only from the point of view as men, speak of Space, Extended Beings, &c.

If we abandon the subjective condition under which we alone can receive external intuition, that is to say, the way we may be affected by objects, the representation of space then means nothing. This predicate (*attribute*) is only so far applied to things, as they appear to us—that is, as they are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this Receptivity which we name Sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relationships, wherein objects are envisaged as external to us, and, if we make abstraction of these objects it is a pure intuition, which bears the name of Space. As we cannot make the particular conditions of sensibility into the conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their phenomena, we may very well say, that space comprehends all things which externally may appear to us, but not all things in themselves—whether they can or cannot be perceived—or by whatsoever being we choose. For we cannot at all judge as to the intuitions of other thinking beings whether they are bound by the same conditions which limit our intuition, and which are as regards ourselves universally valid. If we join the limitation of a judgment to the conception of the subject, the judgment is then valid unconditionally. The proposition that all things are side by side (*co-existent*) in space, is valid under the restriction, that these things are taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If I join in this case the condition to the conception, and say all things as external phenomena are co-existent in space, this rule is valid universally and without restriction. Our exposition, consequently teaches the *Reality* (that is the objective validity) of space, in reference to all that externally as object can be presented to us, but at the same time the *Ideality* of space, in reference to things if they are considered in themselves by means of reason—that is, without regard to the nature of our sensibility. We maintain

the conception of space as a condition

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therefore, the *empirical Reality* of Space, (in respect to all possible external experience,) although indeed, we acknowledge the *transcendental Ideality* of the same—that is, that it is nothing—so soon as we omit the condition of the possibility of all experience, and assume it (*space*) as something which lies at the foundation of things in themselves.

But independent of space, there is no other representation, subjective and referring to something external, which could be called objective *à priori*. For we cannot deduce from any of them synthetical propositions *à priori*, in the same way as from intuition in space. (3.) Consequently, to speak strictly, no Ideality belongs to them, although they accord in this respect with the representation of space, that they belong merely to the subjective property of a mode of sense, as, for example, Seeing, Hearing, Feeling, by means of the sensation of colours, sounds, and heat, but which, since they are simply Sensations and not Intuitions, they do not give any object to be known in itself, at least *à priori*.

The object of this observation only goes as far as this—to prevent us from thinking to explain the asserted Ideality of Space from extremely insufficient examples: since, namely, perhaps Colours, Taste, &c. with propriety may be considered not as the property of things, but merely as change of our subject, which may be different even in different men. For in such a case, that which itself originally is only phenomenon, as for example a Rose, is held to be valid in the empirical sense, as a thing in itself, which, nevertheless, to each eye, in respect to its colour, may appear different. On the contrary, the transcendental conception of phenomena in space, is a critical reminding, that nothing generally which is perceived in space is a thing in itself—that Space is not a form of things which perhaps was proper to them in themselves;

but that objects in themselves are not at all known to us, and that what we term external objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlative, that is to say, the thing in itself, is not thereby known, and cannot be, but in respect of which neither is enquiry ever made in experience.

## TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICK.

## SECOND SECTION.

## OF TIME.

## IV.

## METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPTION OF TIME.

1. Time is no empirical conception, which can be deduced from an experience. For Simultaneousness or Succession would not even come into the perception, if the representation of time did not, *à priori*, lie at the foundation. Only under this presupposition can we represent to ourselves that something can be in one and the same time, (contemporaneously,) or in different times (successively).

2. Time is a necessary representation, which lies at the foundation of all intuitions. We cannot, in respect of phenomena in general, annihilate time itself, although, indeed, we may take away from time, phenomena. Time is therefore given *à priori*. In it alone is all reality of phenomena possible. These may all disappear, but it itself, (as the general condition of their possibility,) cannot be annihilated.

3. Upon this necessity *à priori* is grounded the possibility of apodictical principles as to the relationships of time, or the axioms of time, in general. "It has only one dimension," "Different times are not contemporaneously, but in succession," (as different spaces are not in succession, but contemporaneously.) These principles cannot be deduced from experience, for this would neither give strict universality, nor apodictical certainty. We should

only be able to say—"The general perception teaches us it," but not "that it must be so." These principles are valid as rules, under which in general experiences are possible, and they instruct us concerning them, and not by means of them.

4. Time is no discursive, or as it is called, general conception, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of the self-same time. But the representation which can only be given by a single object is intuition. The proposition also "that different Times cannot be contemporaneously," could not be deduced from a universal conception. The proposition is synthetical, and cannot arise alone from conceptions. It is, therefore, contained in the intuition and representation of time immediately.

5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more, than that all determinate quantity of time is only possible by means of the limitations of one time lying at the foundation. Consequently the original representation time, must be given as unlimited. But where the parts thereof themselves, and each quantity of an object, can only be represented through limitation, the whole representation there must not be given by means of conceptions, (for these comprehend only representations of parts), but immediate intuition must lie at the foundation of them.

## V.

### TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPTION OF TIME.

I may refer, in respect to this, to No. 4, (3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph) where, in order to be brief, I have placed what is properly transcendental, under the article of metaphysical Explanation. Here, I still further add, that the conception of change, and with it, the conception of motion (as change of place,) is only possible through and in the representation of time: that if

this representation were not intuition (internal) *à priori*, no conception, whatever it may be, could render comprehensible the possibility of a change, that is, of a conjunction of contradictory opposite predicates (as, for example, the being in a place and the not being of the self-same thing in the same place,) in one and the same object. Only in time can two contradictory opposite determinations in one thing, that is to say, successively, be met with. Consequently our conception of time explains the possibility of so much synthetical cognition *à priori*, as the general doctrine of motion, which is not less productive, exhibits.

## VI.

### CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE CONCEPTIONS.

1. Time is not something which subsists of itself, or inheres in things as objective determination, and consequently remains over, if we make abstraction of all subjective conditions of their intuition; for in the first case, it would be something, which without a real object was nevertheless real. And as to what concerns the second case, it could not, only as a determination inherent in things in themselves, or order, precede the objects as their condition, and be known and perceived *à priori* through synthetical propositions. This last case, on the other hand, very properly occurs, if time is nothing but the subjective condition under which all intuitions can take place in us. For then this form of the internal intuition may be represented previous to the objects, and consequently *à priori*.

2. Time is nothing else but the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves, and of our internal state. For time can be no determination of external phenomena—it belongs neither to a figure, nor situation; on the contrary, it deter-

mines the relationship of the representations in our internal state. And precisely because this internal intuition presents no figure, we seek to supply this want by analogy, and represent the succession of time by a line continuing to infinity, in which the diversity constitutes a series, which is only of one dimension, and we conclude from the properties of this line as to all the properties of time, except the single one, that the parts of the first are simultaneous, but those of the latter always successive. Hence also it appears, that the representation of time is itself intuition, since all its relationships may be expressed in an external intuition.

3. Time is the formal condition *à priori* of all phenomena generally. Space, as the pure form of all external intuition, is, as condition *à priori*, limited simply to external phenomena. On the other hand, since all representations, whether they have external things for objects or not, still belong in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to the internal state—but as this internal state under the formal condition of internal intuition consequently belongs to time, so is time a condition *à priori* of every phenomenon in general, and in fact the immediate condition of the internal phenomena (belonging to our minds), and also thereby, mediately, of external phenomena. If I can say *à priori*; all external phenomena are in space, and determined according to the relationships of space *à priori*; I can say quite universally from the principle of the internal sense; all phenomena in general, that is, all objects of sense, are in time, and stand necessarily in relationships of time.

If we make abstraction of our manner of envisaging ourselves internally, and by means of this intuition of embracing also all external intuitions in the Representation-faculty, and consequently, if we take the objects as they may be in themselves, time is thus



nothing. It is only of objective validity in respect of phenomena, since these are already things which we accept as *Objects of our senses*; but time is no longer objective, if we make abstraction of the sensibility of our intuition, consequently of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and we speak of *Things in general*. Time is therefore solely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), but it is in itself, independent of the Subject, nothing. Nevertheless it is in reference to all phenomena, consequently also to all things which can occur to us in experience, necessarily objective. We cannot say, "All things are in time," since in the conception of things in general, abstraction is made of all kind of intuition of the same, but this (*intuition*) is the especial condition, under which time belongs to the representation of objects. Now, if the condition be joined to the conception, and it is said, "All things as phenomena (objects of sensible intuition) are in time," the principle then has its true objective correctness and universality *à priori*.

Our positions, therefore, teach the *empirical Reality* of time: that is, objective validity in respect of all objects that may ever be offered to our senses. And as our intuition is always sensible, an object can never thus be given to us in experience, which does not stand under the condition of time. On the other hand we deny to time all claim to *absolute Reality*, that is to say, that without having regard to the form of our sensible intuition, it absolutely inheres in things as condition or property. . Such properties as belong to things in themselves, can never be given to us by the senses. Herein consists, therefore, the *transcendental Ideality* of time, according to which, if we make abstraction of the subjective conditions of the sensible intuition, it (*time*) is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as either subsisting in, or adhering to objects

in themselves, (independently of their relationship to our intuition). Yet this Ideality (*of time*) is just as little as that of space to be compared with the subreptions of sensation, because therein we still presuppose as to the phenomenon itself to which these predicates adhere, that it (*the Phenomenon*) has objective reality, which in our case entirely falls away, except so far as such is merely empirical; that is, as it concerns the object itself merely as Phenomenon—with regard to which the foregoing observation in the first Section is to be referred to.

## EXPLANATION.

Against this theory, which accords to Time empirical reality, but contends against absolute and transcendental, I have heard from perspicacious men so unanimous an objection, that I have collected from it, that such naturally presents itself to every reader who is unaccustomed to these considerations. It runs thus:—Changes are real, (the alternation of our own representations shows this, although we should deny all external phenomena, together with their changes). Now these changes are only possible in time, consequently Time is something real. The answer presents no difficulty. I concede the whole argument. Time is certainly something real, that is to say, it is the real form of the internal Intuition. It has, therefore, subjective reality in regard of internal experience; that is, I have really the representation of Time, and of my determinations in it. It is therefore not to be looked at really as object, but as the mode of representation of myself as object. But if I myself could envisage myself, or if any other being (*could envisage*) me, without this condition of sensibility, the self-same determinations which we represent to ourselves as changes, would then afford us a cognition, in which

the representation of time, and consequently also of change would not at all occur. Its empirical reality remains, therefore, as condition of all our experiences. Absolute Reality only can, according to what is above advanced not be granted to it. It is nothing but the form of our internal intuition.\* If we take away from it the particular condition of our sensibility, the conception of time vanishes also, and it adheres not to the objects themselves, but to the subject which envisages them.

But the cause why this objection is made so unanimously, and certainly by those who still do not know how to apply any thing very clear against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this. The absolute reality of space they did not hope to demonstrate apodictically, since Idealism opposes them, according to which the reality of external objects is not capable of any strict proof. On the other hand, the reality of the object of our internal senses (of myself and of my state) is clear immediately by consciousness. Those (*the external objects*) might be mere appearance; but this, (*the object of internal sense*) according to the opinions of these parties is undeniably something real. But they did not reflect that both, without it being required to contest their reality as representations, nevertheless only belong to the phenomenon, which has always two sides: the one, as the object is considered in itself, (irrespective of the manner of perceiving the same, but whose property, precisely on this account, always remains problematical); the other, as we look at the form of the intuition of this object, which must be sought not in the object in itself, but in the subject to which this appears, but still belongs to the phenomenon of this object, really and necessarily.

\* I may certainly say, my representations are successive, but this only signifies we are conscious of them as in a succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense. Time is not thereby something in itself, nor a determination objectively inhering in things.

Time and Space are, therefore, two sources of cognition from which, à priori different synthetical cognitions may be deduced, as pure Mathematics particularly in respect of the cognitions of space and its relationships afford a striking example. They (*Time and Space*) are for instance, both taken together, pure forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make synthetical propositions à priori possible. But these cognition-sources à priori thereby determine exactly (because they are merely conditions of sensibility) their own limits; that is, they merely refer to objects, so far as they are considered as phenomena, but do not exhibit things in themselves. Those (*Phænomena*) are alone the field of their Validity, whence if we issue out, no further objective use of them takes place. This reality of space and time, besides, leaves untouched the certainty of experience-cognition; for we are equally as sure of this, whether these forms inhere in the things themselves necessarily, or only in our intuition of these things. On the contrary, those who maintain the absolute reality of Space and Time, whether they admit it as subsisting in, or only adherent, must be at variance with the principles of experience itself. For if they decide for the first (*as subsisting in*) (which commonly is the side of the mathematical natural philosophers,) they must admit two eternal and infinite and self-existing nonentities (Space and Time), which only exist (still without there being any thing real) in order in themselves to embrace every thing real. If they take the second view (*as adherent*), which is that of some metaphysical natural philosophers; and space and time are valid to them as relationships of phenomena, (co-existent with or successive to one another,) abstracted from experience, although represented confusedly in the separated state; then must they refuse to mathematical principles à priori their validity in reference to real things, (as, for example,

in space), or at least apodictical certainty, since this does not at all occur *à posteriori*, and the conceptions *à priori* of space and time, are, according to this opinion, only creatures of the imagination, the source of which must be sought really in experience, from the abstracted relationships of which the imagination has made something, which contains indeed what is general in these relationships, but which cannot take place without the restrictions which nature has connected with them. The former gain thus much, that they render the field of phenomena free for mathematical positions. On the other hand, they embarrass themselves greatly by these very conditions, if the understanding desire to issue out beyond this field. The second gain certainly in respect of this last thing; namely, that the representations of time and space do not come in the way against them, if they wish to judge of objects not as phenomena, but merely in relation to the understanding; but they can neither establish a foundation for the possibility of mathematical cognitions, *à priori*, (because a true and objectively valid intuition *à priori* is wanting for these), nor bring the laws of experience with those positions into necessary accordance. In our theory of the true nature of these two original forms of sensibility, both difficulties are done away with.

That, in conclusion, Transcendental *Æsthetic* cannot contain any more than these two elements, namely, Space and Time, is thereby clear, since all other conceptions appertaining to sensibility, even that of Motion, which unites both points (*space and time*) presuppose something empirical. For this (*Motion*) presupposes the perception of something movable. But in Space, considered in itself, there is nothing movable; consequently the movable must be something which is found *in Space only by experience*, consequently an empirical Datum. In the same way, Transcendental *Æsthetic* cannot number under its

Data à priori, the conception of change, for Time itself does not change, but something which is in time. Therefore for this, the perception of some existence and of the successiveness of its determinations, consequently experience is required.

## VIII.

### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS UPON TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICK.

1. First, it will be necessary to explain ourselves as clearly as possible, as to what is our opinion in respect of the fundamental quality of sensible cognition in general, in order to guard against all misinterpretation of the same.

We have therefore intended to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomenon,—that the things which we envisage are not that in themselves for which we take them; neither are their relationships in themselves so constituted as they appear to us, and that if we do away with our Subject, or even only the subjective quality of the senses in general, every quality, all relationships of objects in space and time, nay, even Time and Space themselves, would disappear, and cannot exist as phenomena in themselves, but only in us. It remains wholly unknown to us, what may be the nature of the objects in themselves, separated from all the receptivity of our sensibility. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which need not belong necessarily to every Being, although to every man. With this we have only to do. Space and Time are the pure forms of them, Sensation in general the matter. Those (*forms of Space and Time*) we alone cognize à priori, that is, before all real perception, and therefore the intuition is called pure. But the latter (*Sensation*) is that in our cognition which causes that the cognition is

termed *à posteriori*; that is, empirical intuition. The former inhere in our sensibility absolutely necessarily, of whatever kind our sensations may be; these (*the sensations*) may be very different. If we could carry this our intuition even to the highest degree of clearness, yet should we not thereby come nearer to the quality of objects in themselves. We should still, in any case, only know completely our own mode of intuition, that is, our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions of space and time originally inherent in the subject. What the objects may be in themselves would still never be known by the clearest cognition of their phenomenon, which (*phenomenon*) alone is given to us.

To say therefore that our whole sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things, which solely contains that which belongs to them in themselves, but only under an aggregation of signs and partial representations which we cannot separate from one another with consciousness, is a perversion of the conception of sensibility and of phenomenon, which renders the whole doctrine of the same useless and void. The difference between an obscure and a clear representation is merely logical, and does not affect the content (*or matter*). No doubt, the conception of *Right*, of which a sound (*plain*) understanding makes use, contains the same as the most subtle speculation can develop from it, only that in the common and practical use, we are not conscious of the diverse representations in this Thought. We cannot say, on this account, that the vulgar conception is sensible, and contains a mere phenomenon, for the *Right* cannot at all appear, but its conception lies in the understanding, and represents a quality (the moral) of actions which belongs to them in themselves. On the contrary, the representation of a body in the Intuition, contains nothing at all which could belong to an object in itself, but merely

the phenomena of something, and the manner in which we are thereby affected ; and this receptivity of our cognition-faculty is called sensibility, which nevertheless remains separated by an immeasurable distance, from the cognition of the object in itself, although we might examine the first (the phenomenon) thoroughly.

The Lerbantz-Wolfian Philosophy, therefore, assigned an entirely erroneous point of view for all investigations with respect to the nature and origin of our cognitions, in considering the difference between sensibility and what is intellectual, merely as logical, whereas it is evidently transcendental, and concerns not merely the form as to clearness or obscurity, but the origin and content of these (*cognitions*), in such a way that by the first (*sensibility*) we are not acquainted merely obscurely, but not at all with the quality of things in themselves ; and so soon as we remove our subjective quality, the represented object, together with the properties which the sensible intuition attributed to it, is not to be met with any where, neither can it be met with, since this very subjective quality determines the form of the same (*the object*) as phenomenon.

We certainly distinguish besides in phenomena, that which essentially inheres in the intuition of them, and is valid for every human sense generally, from that which belongs accidentally to the same, inasmuch it is not valid with regard to sensibility in general, but only with respect to a particular situation or organization of this or that sense. And we then name the first cognition such a one as represents the object in itself, but the second only as the phenomenon thereof. Still this difference is only empirical. If we stop here (as is commonly the case) and do not again look at that empirical intuition (as it ought to be the case) as mere phenomenon, in such a way, that therein nothing at all is to be found which belongs to any thing in itself, our transcendental



distinction is lost, and we still then believe we know things in themselves, although every where (in the sensible world) even in the profoundest investigation of their objects, we have not to do with any thing but phenomena. Thus, indeed, we shall call the rainbow a mere phenomenon in a sunny shower ; but the rain a thing itself ; which likewise is correct, so long as we only understand the latter conception physically, as that which in general experience under all the different situations with respect to the senses, is still thus determined in the intuition, and not otherwise. But if we take this Empirical generally, and ask whether, without regarding its accordance with the sense of every man, it represents an object in itself (not the drops of rain, for they are already as phenomena empirical objects) the question as to the relationship of the representation to the object is transcendental ; and not only are these drops mere phenomena, but their round form itself, nay, indeed, the very space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves, but mere modifications or principles of our sensible intuition ; the transcendental object, however, remains unknown to us.

The second important matter in our transcendental *Æsthetick* is, that it does not obtain a degree of favour as mere plausible hypothesis, but that it is as certain and undoubted as can ever be required for a theory which is to serve as an *Organon*. In order to make this certainty fully clear, we will make choice of a case wherein the validity of this is apparent, and may serve for the greater elucidation of that which has been advanced. (5.)

Suppose, then, that Space and Time are in themselves objective, and conditions of the possibility of things in themselves, it is manifest, first, that from both, apodictical and synthetical propositions *à priori* present themselves, (*but*) in a greater number, especially from Space, which we therefore particularly

here will investigate by way of example. As the propositions of Geometry are known synthetically à priori and with apodictical certainty, I ask, whence do you take such propositions, and upon what does our understanding support itself, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths? There is no other way than through conceptions or through intuitions, but both, as such that are given either à priori or posteriori. The latter, namely, empirical conceptions, with that whereupon they are founded, the empirical intuition, can furnish no synthetical proposition, except only such a one as is also purely empirical, that is, an experience-proposition, consequently, can never contain necessity and absolute universality; and yet such is the characteristic of all propositions in Geometry. But as to what would be the first and only means, namely, through pure conceptions or through intuitions à priori of arriving at such cognitions, it is clear, that from pure Conceptions, certainly no synthetical cognition at all but only analytical can be obtained. Take merely the proposition, that "Between two straight lines no space at all can be enclosed;" consequently, that no Figure is possible, and try to deduce this from the conception of straight lines and the number two; or take also the proposition, "that a Figure is possible from three straight lines," and try it just in the same way simply from these conceptions. All your effort is vain, and you see yourself obliged to take refuge in intuition, as Geometry at all times does. You therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is this; is it a pure intuition à priori, or an empirical one? If it were the last, a universally valid, and still less an apodictical proposition, could never thence arise, for experience can never supply such. You must therefore give yourself an object à priori in the intuition, and upon this ground your synthetical proposition. If there did not lie in you a faculty of envisag-

ing *à priori*,—were this subjective condition as to form, not at the same time the general condition *à priori*, under which alone the object of this (external) intuition itself is possible—were the object (the triangle) something in itself without reference to your Subject, how could you say, that what lies necessarily in your subjective conditions for constructing a triangle, must likewise belong to the triangle necessarily in itself? for you could not still join to your conceptions (of three lines) any thing new (figure), which for this reason must necessarily be met with in the object; since this (*object*) is given previous to your cognition, and not by means of it. Were Time therefore (and thus also Space) not a mere form of your intuition, which contains conditions *à priori*, under which alone things can be external objects for you, which, without these subjective conditions are nothing in themselves, you could not decide any thing at all *à priori* with respect to external objects synthetically. It is therefore undoubtedly certain, and not merely possible or yet probable, that Space and Time as the necessary conditions of all (external and internal) experience, are mere subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which therefore all Objects are mere Phenomena, and not things given in this way in themselves—respecting which on that account, also as to what concerns the form of them, much may be said *à priori*, though not the least of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena.

2<sup>nd</sup>. In conformation of this theory of the Ideality of the external as well as the internal sense, consequently of all objects of the senses as mere phenomena, the observation may be particularly useful, that All which belongs to intuition in our cognition (the feeling of pleasure and pain and the Will which are not at all cognitions excepted consequently) contains nothing but mere relationships of places in

an intuition (Extension), change of places (Motion), and Laws according to which this change is determined (Moving Forces). But as to what is present in the place, or what is effected besides the change of place in the things themselves, is not given thereby (*in the intuition*). Now, a thing in itself is still not known through mere relationships, and it is therefore correct to judge, that as by means of the external sense, nothing but mere relations of Representation are given to us, this (*sense*) can only contain the relationship of an object to the subject in its representation, and not that which is intrinsic, which belongs to the object in itself. With the internal intuition the circumstances are just the same. Not only, because therein the representations of the *external senses* constitute the particular matter wherewith we furnish our mind, but because Time, in which we place these representations, which even precedes their consciousness in experience and lies at the foundation as formal condition of the manner in which we place them in the mind, contains already relationships of succession, simultaneousness, and of that, which is, at the same time with succession, (the Permanent.) Now, that which as representation can precede all action of thinking of any thing, is intuition, and if this contain nothing but relationships, it is the form of the intuition, which as it represents nothing except inasmuch as something is placed in the mind, can be nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity, namely, this arrangement of its representation, consequently through itself, that is to say, an internal sense in respect to its form. Every thing which is represented by a sense, is so far at all times phenomenon; and an internal sense ought therefore not at all to be admitted, or the subject which is the object of this could be represented by the same (*sense*) only as phenomenon, and not as it (*the subject*) would judge of

itself, if its intuition were simply self-effectivity, that is, intellectual. Upon this only, rests here all the difficulty as to the way in which a subject can have an intuition of itself internally. But this difficulty is common to every theory. The consciousness of oneself (Apperception) is the simple representation of the I; and if thereby alone all the diverse were given in the Subject *self-actively*, the internal intuition would thus be intellectual. This consciousness requires in man internal perception of the diverse, which is previously given in the Subject, and the mode in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity, must, on account of this difference, be termed sensibility. If the faculty of being self-conscious is to search out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it (*the faculty*) must affect this (*the mind*), and can in such a manner only produce an intuition of itself; but the form of this, which lies previously at the foundation in the mind, determines in the representation of time, the mode in which the diversity is combined in the mind: since this then envisages itself, not as it would represent itself, immediately of its own proper accord, but according to the manner in which it is affected inwardly, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is.

3<sup>rd</sup>. If I say in space and time intuition represents (*the properties of*) external objects as well as that the self-intuition of the mind (*is represented*)—both so far as our senses are affected, that is, as there is phenomenon—this does not state, that these objects are a mere *Appearance*. For in the phenomena, the objects, nay even the qualities which we attribute to them, are always regarded as something really given, only that so far as this quality depends upon the mode of intuition of the Subject in the relation of the given object to it (*the Subject*), this object as *phenomenon*, is different from itself as object in itself. Thus I do not say, that the bodies seem merely to be external to me, or that my soul only seems to be given in my

consciousness, if I assert that the quality of space and time, conformably to which as condition of their existence I assume both, lies in my mode of intuition, and not in these objects in themselves. It were my own fault, if, of that which I should reckon as phenomenon I should make\* mere appearance. But this does not take place according to our principle of the ideality of all our sensible intuitions. On the other hand, if we attribute *objective reality* to all those forms of representation, we cannot prevent every thing thereby from being converted into mere *appearance*. For if we consider Space and Time as properties, which must be met with, according to their possibility in things in themselves, and we reflect upon the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved,—inasmuch as two infinite things remain over which must not be substances—nor even something really adherent to substances, but still existing,—nay, the necessary condition of the existence of all things, if even all things were annihilated—we may well not impute blame to that good man *Berkeley*, when he degraded bodies into mere appearance. In fact our very existence, which in such a manner is made dependent upon the self-subsisting reality of a nonentity like time, would be changed with it into mere appearance,—an absurdity which hitherto still no one has been guilty of.

4<sup>th</sup>. In natural Theology where we think of an object

\* The predicates of the phenomenon can be attributed to the object in itself in relationship with our senses, as, for example, the red colour, or smell to the rose, but the Appearance can never as predicate be attributed to the object, precisely on this account, because it attributes to the object in *itself* that which belongs to this (*object*) only in relationship to the senses, or generally to the subject, as, for instance, the two handles, which in the beginning were attributed to Saturn. That which is to be met with, not in the object in itself, but always in its relationship to the subject, and is inseparable from its representation of the former (*the object*), is phenomenon; and thus the predicates of Space and Time, are with justice attributed to the objects of sense as such, and herein there is no (*false*) appearance. On the contrary, when I attribute to the rose in *itself* redness, to Saturn the handles, or to all exterior objects, Extension, in *themselves*, without looking at a determined relationship of these objects to the subject, and thereupon limiting my Judgment, then first arises Appearance (*or Illusion*).

(*God*), which not only cannot at all be an object of intuition for us, but which cannot in the least be an object of sensible intuition to itself, we are particularly cautious as to removing the conditions of time and space from all its intuition, (since, such must all its cognition be, and not *Thought* which always indicates limitation). But with what right can we do this, when we have previously made both (*time and space*) forms of things in themselves, and, in fact, such as remain as conditions of the existence of things à priori, even when we have annihilated the things themselves,—for, as conditions of all existence in general, they must also be those of the existence of God. There remains nothing else, provided we are not willing to make them into the objective forms of all things, but that we should make them into subjective forms of our external as well as our internal mode of intuition, which on this account is termed sensible, because it is not original *i. e.*, is not such a one, as through which even the existence of the object of intuition is given, (and which, as far as we can see, only can belong to the Creator), but is dependent upon the existence of the object—consequently is only possible from this circumstance, that the representation-faculty of the Subject is thereby affected.

It is also necessary that we limit the mode of intuition in space and time to the sensibility of man. It is possible that all finite thinking Beings must therein necessarily coincide with man, (although we are not able to decide this,) yet on account of such general validity does it not cease to belong to sensibility, precisely for this reason, because it is derived, (*intuitus derivativus*) not primitive (*original*) (*intuitus originarius*)—consequently is not intellectual intuition—which, from the just-adduced reasons, alone seems to belong to the Creator, but never in respect both to his existence and to his intuition (which (*intuition*) determines his existence in reference to given objects)

to a dependent Being. This last observation, however, must be reckoned as an elucidation and not as a proof of our æsthetic theory.

#### CONCLUSION OF TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETICK.

We have now before us one of the requisite points for the solution of the general problem of Transcendental Philosophy of "How *Synthetical Propositions à priori are possible?*" That is to say, (*we have now*) pure intuitions à priori, Space and Time, in which, if we, in the Judgment à priori will go out beyond the given conception, we meet with that which cannot be discovered in the conception, but certainly in the intuition which answers thereto, and can be united synthetically with that (*conception*;) but from this reason such Judgments never reach further than to objects of sense, and can only be valid for objects of possible experience.



## OF TRANSCENDENTAL ELEMENTARY SCIENCE.

### SECOND PART.

### TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

#### INTRODUCTION.

#### IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

#### I.

#### OF LOGIC IN GENERAL.

Our cognition springs from two fundamental sources of the mind, the first of which is, to receive representations (the receptivity of the impressions); the second, the faculty by means of those representations of cognizing an object, (spontaneity of the conceptions). Through the former an object is given to us. By the second this (*object*) is *thought* in relationship with such representation (as mere determination of the mind). Intuition and conceptions form therefore the elements of all our cognition; so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, could produce cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. *Empirical*, if sensation (which presupposes the real presence of the object) is contained therein; but *pure*, if with the representation no sensation is mixed. We may term the latter the matter of sensible cognition. Pure intuition contains consequently only the Form under which something is envisaged and pure conception only the form of thought of an object in general. But pure intuitions or conceptions are only possible *à priori*, and empirical only *à posteriori*.

If we will term the *receptivity* of our mind for receiving representations, so far as it is in some way affected, *sensibility*, so is, on the other hand, the faculty of itself bringing forth representations, or the *Spontaneity* of the cognition, the *Understanding*. Our nature has for its property, that the intuition can never be other than sensible, that is, it contains only the *mode* in which we are affected by objects. On the contrary, the faculty of thinking the object of sensible intuition, is the *Understanding*. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none be thought. Thoughts without content (*matter*) are void—intuitions without conceptions are blind. Therefore it is equally as necessary to make our conceptions sensible (that is to join them to the object in the intuition), as it is to make our intuitions intelligible to ourselves (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither (*of these*) faculties, or capacities can exchange its functions. The understanding cannot envisage and the senses cannot think. Only because they are united can cognition thence arise. But still on this account we must not confound their functions—on the contrary, we have great reason for carefully separating and distinguishing one from the other. Consequently we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, that is to say, *Æsthetick*, from the science of the laws of the understanding in general, that is to say, *Logic*.

Now *Logic*, again, can be attempted in a twofold point of view, either as *Logic* of the universal or of the particular use of the understanding. The first contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use (*employment*) at all of the understanding takes place, and therefore applies to these (*rules*), regardless of the difference of the objects towards which it (*the understanding*) may be directed.

The Logic of the particular use of the understanding, contains the rules of thinking correctly as to a particular kind of objects. The first we may term elementary Logic, but the second the Organon of this or that science. The latter is for the most part preinculcated in the schools, as Propadeutick for the sciences, although it is the last (*in order*) according to the march of human reason, and to which it first of all only attains, when science has long been already in existence, and merely requires the finishing stroke for its correction and perfectness. For we must already know the objects (*themselves*) in a tolerably high degree, if we will indicate the rules as to which a science in respect of them can be established.

Now universal Logic is either pure or applied Logic. In the first, we make abstraction of all empirical conditions, under which our understanding is exercised; for example, of the influence of the senses—the play of the imagination—the laws of memory—the power of habit, of inclination, &c.; consequently also of the sources of prejudices, nay, in fact, in general of all causes, out of which certain cognitions arise to us, or may be pretended (*to do so*), since they merely concern the understanding under certain circumstances of its application, and in order to know these, experience is required. A *universal* but *pure* Logic has therefore to do with unmixed principles *à priori*, and is a *Canon (Rule) of the Understanding* and of Reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use, whatever the content may be (empirical or transcendental). But a *universal* Logic is termed applied, if it be directed to the rules of the use of the understanding, under the subjective empirical conditions which Psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical principles, although it is universal so far, that it refers to the use of the understanding without distinction of the

objects. On this account it is neither a Canon of the understanding in general, nor an Organon (*Instrument*) of particular sciences, but only a Catharticon (*Purgative*) of the common (*usual*) understanding.

In universal Logic, the part, therefore, which is to constitute the doctrine of pure Reason, must be wholly separated from that which constitutes the applied (although still always universal) Logic. The first (*of these parts*) is alone properly Science, although short and dry, and (*such*) as the scholastical exhibition of an elementary doctrine of the understanding demands. In this, therefore, Logicians must at all times have before them two rules :

1st. As universal Logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition of the understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to do with nothing but the pure form of Thought.

2d. As pure Logic, it has no empirical principles, consequently it draws nothing (as sometimes we have been persuaded) from Psychology, which, therefore, has no influence at all upon the Canon of the understanding. It is a demonstrated Doctrine, and every thing in it must be entirely certain *à priori*.

What I term applied Logic (contrary to the common meaning of this word, agreeably to which it should contain certain exercises, for which pure Logic affords the rules) is thus a representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary use in concreto, that is to say—under the contingent conditions of the Subject which can hinder or further this use, and which altogether are only given empirically. It treats of the Attention, of its obstacles, and consequences, of the origin of Error, the state of Doubt—of Hesitation—of Conviction, and so forth ; and universal and pure Logic relates to it, as pure morality, which contains merely the necessary moral laws of a free will in general, does to the proper doctrine of Ethics, which considers these laws under the impedi-

ments of feelings, inclinations, and passions, to which men more or less are subjected, and which never can furnish a true and demonstrated science, because it equally the same as the applied Logic, requires empirical, and psychological principles.

## II.

### OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

Universal Logic makes abstraction, as we have shown, of all content of cognition, that is, of all relationship of this to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relations of cognitions to each other, that is to say, the form of thought in general. But now, inasmuch as there are pure as well as empirical intuitions, (as the transcendental *Æsthetick* proves), a difference thus between pure and empirical Thinking of objects might also in fact be found. In this case there would be a Logic, in which we should not make abstraction of all content of the intuition ; for such a Logic as merely contained the rules of the pure Thinking of an object, would exclude all those cognitions, which were of empirical content. It would also refer to the origin of our cognition of objects, so far as the origin cannot be ascribed to the objects, whilst, on the contrary, universal Logic has nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but considers the representations, whether given primitively *à priori* in ourselves, or only empirically, simply according to the laws, agreeably to which the understanding uses them in relationship one with another when it thinks—and therefore this (*universal Logic*) only treats of the form of the understanding, which can be furnished to representations, whencesoever they may have sprung.

And here I make an observation which extends its influence over all the following considerations, and which we must have well impressed upon our minds,

namely, that not every cognition *à priori*, but only that (*cognition*) by which we know that certain representations (intuitions or conceptions) only are applied or are possible *à priori*, and in what way, must be called transcendental (that is to say, the possibility of the cognition, or the use of it *à priori*.) Consequently, neither is space, nor any geometrical determination of the same *à priori*, a transcendental representation, but the cognition; only that these representations cannot at all be of empirical origin, and the possibility, nevertheless, how they may, *à priori* refer to objects of experience, can be termed transcendental. The use of space, with respect to objects in general, would in like manner also be transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of sense alone, it is then called empirical. The difference, therefore, between the transcendental and the empirical, belongs only to the Critick of cognitions, and does not concern the relationship of these with their object.

In the expectation, therefore, that perhaps there could be conceptions which might be referred *à priori* to objects, not as pure or sensible intuitions, but merely as actions of pure Thought, which are consequently conceptions, although neither of empirical nor æsthetic origin, we thus form for ourselves by anticipation, the idea of a science of Pure Understanding and of Cognition of reason, whereby we think objects entirely *à priori*.—Such a science which should define the origin, the circumscription and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be termed *transcendental Logic*, because it has merely to do with the laws of the Understanding and of Reason, yet so far only as it is referred to objects *à priori*; and it differs from universal Logic, which refers to empirical cognitions as well as to those of pure Reason, without distinction.

## III.

OF THE DIVISION OF GENERAL LOGIC INTO  
ANALYTICK AND DIALECTICK.

The old and celebrated question, whereby it was intended to push Logicians into a corner, and attempted to reduce them to this, that they either suffered themselves to be entrapped into a pitiful Dialexis (*question of words*), or that they must acknowledge their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this—*What is Truth?*—The definition of Truth—that it is namely, the accordance of the cognition with its object is here granted and presupposed—but we desire to know what is the general and sure criterion of the truth of every cognition?

It is already a great and indispensable proof of good sense and penetration, to know what one ought reasonably to demand? For if the question be absurd in itself, and require unnecessary answers, it has, exclusive of the disgrace which falls upon him who originates it, sometimes this farther disadvantage, of seducing the incautious hearer into absurd answers, and of affording the laughable spectacle that “one (as the ancients said) milks the goat, and the other supplies the sieve.”

If truth consist in the accordance of a cognition with its object, so must thereby this object be separated from others; for a cognition is false if it do not agree with the object to which it refers, although it contains something which may certainly be valid for other objects. Now a general criterium of Truth would be that which was valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is clear, that as we make abstraction by this of all content of cognition, (reference to its object,) and Truth relates exactly to this content, it is quite impossible and absurd to enquire after a mark of the Truth of this content of cognitions—and, consequently, that a

sufficient, and, moreover at the same time, general characteristic of the Truth, cannot possibly be given. As we have already before called the content of a cognition its matter, we are thus compelled to say, that no universal characteristic can be expected of the truth of the cognition in respect to its matter, since this is in itself contradictory.

But as to what concerns cognition, in regard to its mere form, (in putting aside all content,) it is equally as clear, that a Logic, so far as it exposes the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must exactly in these rules lay down criteria of Truth. For what contradicts these is erroneous, because the understanding thereby contradicts its general rules of Thought,—consequently itself. But these criteria only concern the Form of truth, that is of Thought in general, and are so far entirely right, but not sufficient. For although a cognition might be wholly agreeable to logical Form, that is, did not contradict itself, still nevertheless it may contradict the object. The mere logical criterium of Truth, therefore, or the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of the Understanding and of Reason, is certainly the *conditio sine quâ non*—consequently the negative condition of all Truth. But Logic cannot go further; and that error which does not regard the form but the content, Logic cannot discover by any test.

Now universal Logic resolves the whole formal business of the Understanding and of Reason into its elements, and exhibits them as principles of all logical Judging of our cognition. This part of Logic may, therefore, be called Analytick, and is on this account the negative touchstone, at least, of Truth; because, first of all, we must examine and appreciate, in respect to its form, all cognition by these rules, before we investigate it according to its content, in order to make out, whether it contains positive Truth in respect of the object. But since the mere form



of cognition, however it may even agree with logical laws, is still far from sufficing on that account, in order to decide upon the material (objective) truth of cognitions, no one, thus, can venture merely with Logic to judge as to objects, and to affirm any thing, without having imbibed, (*made*) independently of Logic, a previous fundamental enquiry respecting them, so as afterwards to seek in a connected Whole their application and connection agreeably to logical laws, or what is still better, thereby only to examine them. Yet there exists something so attractive in the possession of so plausible an art, of giving to all our cognitions the form of the understanding—although in respect of the content thereof, we may still be very deficient and wanting—that universal Logic, which is merely a *Canon* for judging, has been used, as it were, as an *Organon* for the real production, at least deceptively, of objective positions, and has in fact been thereby consequently abused. Now, universal Logic, as pretended *Organon*, is termed *Dialectick*.

However different the meaning may be, in which the ancients made use of this term of a science or an art, we may still certainly infer from the effective employment of it, that with them it was nothing but the *Logic of Appearance*. A sophistical art to give to its ignorance, nay, further, to its premeditated delusions, the colouring of truth, so that the method of solidity which Logic in general prescribes, was imitated, and the Topick of it employed in palliation of every vain pretention. Now we may observe as a sure and useful warning, that universal Logic, *considered as Organon*, is always a Logic of Appearance, that is, is dialectical. For as it, in fact, teaches us nothing with respect to the content of cognition, but only the formal conditions merely of the accordance with the understanding, which besides are wholly indifferent with respect to objects, the expectation of making use of it as of an instrument, (*organon*), in

order to extend and to enlarge its Cognitions, at least as to what is pretended, must terminate in nothing but idle talk,—to maintain with some semblance (*of truth*), or to oppose at our pleasure whatever we like.

Such instruction is in no way conformable to the dignity of Philosophy. On this account we have preferred giving to Logic the name of Dialectick, in the sense of a *Critick of dialectical appearance*, and as such, also, we here wish it to be known as understood.

#### IV.

##### OF THE DIVISION OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC INTO TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICK AND DIALECTICK.

In a transcendental Logic, we isolate the understanding, (as previously in the transcendental *Æsthetic* (*we isolated*) sensibility,) and we extract merely that part of thought from our cognition which has solely its origin in the understanding. But the use (*employ*) of this pure cognition, rests upon this as its condition, that objects can be given to us in the intuition, to which such can be applied. For without intuition, all our cognition is wanting in objects, and it then remains entirely void. The part of transcendental Logic, therefore, which propounds the elements of pure cognition of the understanding and the principles—without which no object can be at all thought—is transcendental Analytick, and at the same time a Logic of Truth. For no cognition can contradict it, without losing at the same time all its content, that is to say, all reference to an object—consequently all Truth. But as it is very engaging and seductive, to make use of these pure Understanding-cognitions and principles alone, and even beyond the limits of experience, which still singly and only can supply us with the matter (objects) to which those pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied; the understanding thus falls into danger through empty

sophisms, of making a material use of the merely formal principles of the pure understanding, and of judging in respect of objects without distinction, which are not given to us, and which perhaps cannot be given to us in any way. As, therefore, this (*Analytick*) should only be, properly, a Canon of Judgment in empirical use, it is misapplied when it is allowed to be valid as the *Organon* of a universal and unlimited use, and when it hazards, with the pure understanding alone, to judge, to maintain, and to decide, *synthetically*, as to objects in general. The use of the pure understanding would, therefore, then be dialectical. The second part of transcendental Logic must, therefore, be a Critick of this dialectical Appearance, and is called Transcendental Dialectick, not as an art for creating, dogmatically, such appearance, (unfortunately a very prevailing art in various metaphysical artifices,) but as a Critick of the Understanding, and of Reason, in respect of their hyperphysical use—in order to lay open the false appearance of their groundless pretensions, and to bring down their claims to invention and enlargement which they pretend to attain to simply by transcendental principles, to mere judging and the protection of the pure understanding from sophistical delusion.

## FIRST DIVISION OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

### TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICK.

This Analytick is the dissection of our whole cognition, à priori, into the elements of the pure Understanding-cognition. The question concerns the following points :—1<sup>st</sup>. That the conceptions are pure and not empirical conceptions. 2<sup>d</sup>. That they do not belong to Intuition or to Sensibility, but to the Thought and Understanding. 3<sup>d</sup>. That they are elementary conceptions, and quite different from the derived or the thence composed. 4<sup>th</sup>. That their table is complete, and that they entirely fill up the whole field of pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science, cannot be received with certainty upon the calculation “of a mere aggregate effected by experiments.” It is only possible, therefore, by means of an *Idea of the Whole* of the cognition of the understanding à priori, and through the thence-determined divisions of conceptions which constitute this; consequently it is only possible through *their connexion in a system*. The pure understanding wholly separates itself, not alone from all that is empirical, but even from all sensibility.—It is, therefore, a unity, self-subsisting, self-sufficient, and not to be augmented by any addition extrinsically adjoined. The complex of its cognition will, therefore, form a system to be comprehended and to be determined under an idea, the completeness and the articulation of which, at the same time, may furnish a touchstone of the correctness and legitimacy of all the within-adjusted cognition-parts. But the whole of this part of Transcendental Logic consists of *two Books*, of which the one contains the *conceptions*, the other the *principles*, of the pure understanding.

## OF TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICK.

## FIRST BOOK.

## THE ANALYTICK OF CONCEPTIONS.

I understand by the Analytick of conceptions, not their analysis or the usual mode of proceeding in philosophical investigations—to dissect according to their contents, and to render perspicuous conceptions which offer themselves; but the dissection hitherto little attempted of the faculty of the understanding itself, in order thereby to investigate the possibility of conceptions *à priori*; (*and*) that we seek these in the Understanding alone as their birth-place, and analyze the pure use of this (*faculty*) itself, in general. For such is the special business of a Transcendental Philosophy. The rest is the logical treatment of conceptions in philosophy generally. We shall, therefore, pursue pure Conceptions into their first germs and dispositions in the human understanding, in which (*states*) they lie prepared, until finally developed by opportunity of experience, and liberated through the same understanding from their adhering empirical conditions, they become exposed in their purity.

## OF THE ANALYTICK OF CONCEPTIONS.

## FIRST PRINCIPAL DIVISION.

OF THE CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE  
CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

If we call into play a Cognition-faculty different conceptions manifest themselves, according to the different occasions which render this faculty knowable, and are collected in a more or less detailed exposition, accordingly as the observation of them has been instituted a longer (*or shorter*) time, or with greater (*or less*) perspicuity. Where this investigation, according to such a mechanical procedure, as it were, will be completed, can never with certainty be determined. The conceptions, too, which are only thus found occasionally, reveal themselves in no order, or systematic unity, but are finally only coupled together agreeably to resemblances, and to the quantity of their content—arranged from the simple to the more compounded in series, which are anything but systematical although effected in a certain manner methodically.

Transcendental Philosophy has the advantage, but (*is*) likewise (*under*) the obligation, of seeking its conceptions according to a principle, since they spring from the understanding, as absolute unity, pure and unadulterated, and, therefore, must themselves be connected together according to a conception or idea. But such a connexion suggests a rule, according to which its place may be determined to each pure conception of the understanding, and to all collectively their integrality *à priori*; the whole of which, otherwise, would depend upon pleasure or accident.

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY  
OF ALL PURE UNDERSTANDING-CONCEPTIONS.

SECTION FIRST.

OF THE LOGICAL USE OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN  
GENERAL.

The understanding was before explained merely negatively—as a non-sensible cognition-faculty. Now, we cannot participate in any intuition independently of sensibility. The understanding, therefore, is no faculty of intuition. But there is, besides intuition, no other mode of cognizing, except by conceptions; consequently the cognition of every understanding, at least every human one, is a cognition by means of conceptions, not intuitive, but discursive. All intuitions as sensible repose upon affections, (*and*) conceptions, therefore, upon functions. But I understand, under functions, the unity of action, so as to order different representations under a common one. Conceptions, therefore, are based upon the spontaneity of Thought, as sensible intuitions (*are*) upon the receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding can make no other use of these conceptions, except that it *judges* by means of them. As no representation refers immediately to the object, but to the intuition only, a conception, thus, never refers immediately to an object, but to some other Representation of this, (whether it (*the representation*) is intuition, or even already conception.) *Judgment* is,

therefore, the mediate Cognition of an Object, consequently the representation of a representation of it. In every Judgment there is a conception, which is valid for many, and under such many, it comprehends also a given representation, which last then, is referred immediately to the object. Thus, for example, in the Judgment ; *All bodies are divisible* : the conception of divisible refers to other different conceptions, but amongst these, it is, here, particularly referred to the conception of body, and this (*last*) to certain phenomena occurring to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented to us by the conception of divisibility. All Judgments are, thus, functions of unity in our representations—so that, for instance, instead of an immediate representation, a higher one which comprehends that and others within itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. But we can reduce all actions of the understanding to Judgments so that the *Understanding* in general can be represented as a *faculty of judging*. For it is according to what precedes a faculty of thinking. Thinking is cognition by means of conceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible Judgments, refer to a representation of an object yet undetermined. Thus, the conception of body means something, as, for example, Metal, which can be known by means of that conception. It is, therefore, only conception from this that under it other representations are contained, by means of which it can refer to objects. It is, therefore, the predicate of a possible Judgment, as, for example, “Every metal is a body.” The functions of the understanding may, therefore, all be found, if we can expose with certainty the functions of unity in judgments. And that this may very well be effected, the following division will manifest.



# OF THE CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE UNDERSTANDING-CONCEPTIONS.

## SECOND SECTION.

### IX.

#### OF THE LOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN JUDGMENTS.

If we make abstraction of all content of a Judgment in general, and only pay attention therein to the mere form of the understanding, we then find that the function of thought in this (*the judgment*) can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three Moments (*Gradations*) subordinate to itself. They may be conveniently represented in the following table:—

#### I.

#### *Quantity of Judgments.*

Universal.  
Particular.  
Individual.

#### II.

#### *Quality.*

Affirmative.  
Negative.  
Infinite.

#### III.

#### *Relation.*

Categorical.  
Hypothetical.  
Disjunctive.

#### IV.

#### *Modality.*

Problematical.  
Assertorical.  
Apodictical.

As this decision seems to depart from the usual Technick (*or System*) of Logicians, in some although not in essential parts, the following preservatives against an apprehensible misunderstanding will not thus be unnecessary.

1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of Judgments in reasonings (*syllogisms*) individual (*singular*) judgments may be treated as general ones. For, precisely because they have no extension at all, their predicate cannot merely refer to some portion of that which is contained under the conception of subject, and yet be excepted from some other. It is valid therefore for that conception without exception, in like manner as if the same were a universally valid conception which had an extension in regard to the whole signification of which the predicate was valid. On the contrary, if we compare an individual judgment, with a universally valid one, merely as cognition, according to quantity, the former refers itself to the latter, as unity to infinity, and is in itself consequently essentially different therefrom. Hence if I estimate an individual judgment (*judicium singulare*) not simply as to its internal validity, but also as cognition in general, according to the quantity which it has in comparison with other cognitions, it is entirely different from universally valid judgments, (*judicia communia*) and deserves, in a complete table of the moments of Thought in general, a particular place, (although certainly not in a Logic, limited merely to the use of judgments one with another).

2. In the same way in Transcendental Logic, *infinite Judgments* must again be distinguished from *affirmative*, although in universal Logic the latter properly are reckoned with the former, and constitute no particular member of the division. This (*universal Logic*) makes abstraction of all content of the predicate, (although it is negative,) and only looks at this, whether the same (*the predicate*) belongs to the Subject, or is opposed to it. The former (*Transcendental Logic*) considers the judgment likewise according to the value, or content of this logical affirmation, by means of a merely negative predicate, and what this (*affirmation*) furnishes us as gain in

respect of the whole cognition. Did I say of the soul that it is not mortal, in this way I had at least avoided by a negative judgment an error. And by the proposition, that the soul is not mortal according to logical form, I have affirmed really, since I place the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, since the mortal comprehends one part of the whole sphere of possible beings—the non-mortal the other—nothing else is said by my proposition, but that the soul is one of the infinite multitude of things which still remain, when I have taken away all the mortal. But the infinite sphere of all that is possible, is thereby only so far limited, that the mortal is separated therefrom, and the soul is placed in the remaining extent of its space. But this space still remains always infinite under this abstraction, and more parts of the same can yet be taken away without on this account that the conception of the soul increases in the least, and is determined affirmatively. These infinite judgments, therefore, in respect of the logical sphere, are in fact merely limitative in regard to the content of cognition in general, and so far they must not be passed over in the transcendental table of all moments of Thought in judgments, because the hereby-exercised function of the understanding may, perhaps, be important in the field of its pure cognition *à priori*.

3. All the relationships of thinking in Judgments are those. 1<sup>st</sup>. Of the predicate to the subject; 2<sup>dly</sup>. Of the foundation to the consequence; 3<sup>dly</sup>. Of the divided cognition and of the whole members of the division with each other. In the first kind of Judgments, there are only two conceptions considered; in the second, two judgments; in the third, several judgments, in relation one to another. The hypothetical proposition, “If there be a perfect justice, the perseveringly bad man is then punished,” contains properly the relationship of two propositions,—

There is a perfect justice, and the perseveringly bad man is punished. Whether both of these propositions are true in themselves, remains here undecided. It is merely the consequence which is thought by means of this judgment. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relationship of two or more propositions with one another, but not of deduction, but of logical opposition, so far as the sphere of the one excludes that of the other ; but still at the same time, of community (*reciprocity*), in so far as they fill up together the sphere of proper cognition and therefore a relationship of the parts of the sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of each part is a supplemental part of the sphere of the other to the whole aggregate of the proper cognition—as, for example, “The world exists either through a blind accident, or through internal necessity, or through an external cause.” Each of these propositions embraces a part of the sphere of possible cognition, as to the existence of a world in general—all together (*embrace*) the whole sphere. To abstract cognition, from one of these spheres, means to place it in one of the others ; and, on the contrary, to place it in one sphere, means to take it away from the rest. There is consequently in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of cognitions, which consists in this, that they mutually exclude each other, but still thereby *in the Whole* determine the true cognition, since, taken together, they constitute the whole content of a particular given cognition. And this it is only, which, on account of what follows, I now deem it necessary to notice.

4. The Modality of Judgments, is quite a particular function of the same, which has this distinctive in itself, that it contributes nothing to the content of the Judgment (for besides quantity, quality, and relationship, there is nothing more which constitutes the content of judgment) but it only regards the value of the copula, in reference to Thought in

general. *Problematical* judgments are those, where the Affirmation or Negation is taken, as merely *possible* (at pleasure). *Assertorical*, as it is considered, *real* (true). *Apodictical*, in which it is looked upon as necessary.\* Thus, both the Judgments, the relationship of which forms the hypothetical judgment (antecedens and consequens), in whose reciprocity likewise the disjunctive consists, (members of the division), together are only problematical. In the above example, the proposition, "there is a perfect justice," is not assertorically stated, but only thought as an arbitrary judgment, whereof it is possible that some one may admit it; and the consequence only is assertorical. Therefore such judgments may be also palpably false, and yet problematically taken be the conditions of the cognition of the truth. Thus the Judgment, *the world exists through blind chance*, is in the disjunctive judgment, only of problematical meaning; that is to say, some one might perhaps admit this proposition for an instant—and yet it serves (as the indication of the false way amidst the number of all those which may be taken,) to find out the true one. The problematical proposition is, therefore, that which expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective), that is, a free option to admit as valid such a proposition—a mere arbitrary reception of the same into the understanding. The assertorical declares the logical reality or truth, as, perhaps, in an hypothetical reasoning, the antecedent presents itself problematically in the Major, assertorically in the Minor, and shows that the proposition is already conjoined with the understanding according to the laws thereof. The apodictical proposition thinks the assertorical determined by these laws of the understanding itself, and consequently as affirming *à priori*,

\* Like as if Thought in the first case, were a function of the *Understanding*, in the second of *Judgment*, in the third of *Reason*. An observation which will first have its explanation in the sequel.

and in this way it expresses logical necessity. Now, since here, All is incorporated progressively with the understanding, so that we first judge something problematically, and after that, we also admit it as true assertorically, and finally as inseparably bound up with the understanding—that is to say, we maintain it as necessary and apodictical—we may thus term the three functions of Modality, so many moments of Thought in general.

## OF THE CLUE TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING-CONCEPTIONS.

### THIRD SECTION.

#### X.

#### OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING-CONCEPTIONS OR CATEGORIES.

Universal Logic makes abstraction, as we have already stated several times, of all content of cognition, and expects that representations should be given from somewhere or other, in order, first, to convert these into conceptions, which takes place analytically. On the other hand, Transcendental Logic has lying before it a diversity of sensibility *à priori*, which transcendental *Æsthetick* presents to it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions of the understanding, without which it (*Logic*) would be without any content, consequently completely void. Now, space and time contain a diversity of the pure intuition *à priori*, but yet belong to the conditions of the receptivity of our mind under which (*conditions*) alone, it can receive representations of objects, and which consequently must also affect at all times the conception of them. But the spontaneity of our Thought requires, that this diversity be first, in a certain manner, examined, adopted, and connected, in order thence to form a cognition. This operation, I term *Synthesis*.

But I understand by *Synthesis* in the most general acceptation, the operation of adding different representations to one another, and of embracing their diversity in a cognition. Such a *Synthesis* is pure, when the diversity is not empirical, but given

à priori, (as that in space and time). Previous to all analysis of our representations, these (*representations*) must before be given, and no conceptions can, as to the content, arise analytically. But the synthesis of a diverse (whether empirical or given à priori) first produces a cognition, which indeed in the beginning may be crude and confused, and therefore require analysis; but still synthesis is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions, and unites them into a certain content. It is therefore the first thing to which we have to pay attention, if we wish to judge as to the first origin of our cognition.

Synthesis in general is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere action of the Imagination, of a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should not have any cognition at all, but of which we are seldom ever conscious. But to apply this synthesis to *conceptions* is a function which belongs to the understanding, and whereby it (*the understanding*) first procures for us cognition, in the proper meaning.

Now, pure *Synthesis, represented generally*, supplies the pure understanding-conception. But I understand by this synthesis, that which rests upon a foundation of the synthetic unity à priori; thus, our counting (it is more observable particularly in the higher numbers) is a *Synthesis according to conceptions*, since it occurs according to a common foundation of unity. (As, for example, the Decade.) Under this conception, therefore, unity is necessary in the synthesis of the diverse.

By analysis, different representations are brought under a conception (a matter which general Logic treats of). But transcendental Logic teaches us, not to apply to conceptions the representations, but the pure *synthesis* of the representations. The first thing which must be given to us in behalf of the cognition of all objects à priori, is the *Diversity* of the pure intuition. The *Synthesis* of this diversity,



by means of the Imagination, is the second; but yet there is no cognition. The conceptions which give *Unity* to this pure synthesis, and consist only in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, effect the third thing for the cognition of a presented object, and repose upon the understanding.

The self-same function, which gives *Unity* to the different representations in a *Judgment*, gives also to the mere synthesis of different representations in an *intuition*, *Unity*, which expressed generally, is termed the pure conception of the ~~pure~~ Understanding. The same understanding therefore, and indeed through the self-same operations, whereby in conceptions it effected, by means of the analytical unity, the logical Form of a judgment, produces also by means of the synthetic unity of the diverse in the *Intuition* in general, a transcendental content in its representations,—on which account those are termed pure conceptions of the understanding, which refer, *à priori*, to objects, which is what a universal Logic cannot perform.

In such a way, exactly as many pure Understanding-conceptions arise which, *à priori*, refer to objects of intuition in general, as there were logical functions in all possible *Judgments* in the foregoing table. For the understanding is through the before-mentioned functions completely exhausted, and its faculty thereby wholly ascertained. We will term these conceptions *Categories*, according to Aristotle, since our object in the origin is, in fact, identical with his, although in the execution it is very far removed from it.

### TABLE OF CATEGORIES.

I.	II.
<i>Of Quantity.</i>	<i>Of Quality.</i>
Unity.	Reality.
Plurality ( <i>Multitude.</i> )	Negation.
Totality.	Limitation.

## III.

*Of Relation.*

Of Inherence and Subsistence (Substantia et Accidens).

Of Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect).

Of Community (Reciprocity between the Agent and the Patient).

## IV.

*Of Modality.*

Possibility	Impossibility.
Existence	Non-existence.
Necessity	Contingence.

Now, this is the catalogue of all originally pure conceptions of synthesis, which the understanding contains within itself, à priori, and by reason of which only it is pure understanding, since through them can it comprehend any thing in the diversity of the intuition; that is, think an object of the same. This division is systematically generated from a common principle; namely, the faculty of judging (which is just the same as the faculty of thinking), and has not arisen rhapsodically from an investigation of pure conceptions undertaken at random: as to the complete enumeration of which, we can never be certain, since it is only concluded from induction, without reflecting that still we never can perceive in this manner why precisely these Conceptions, and none others, so dwell in the pure Understanding. It was a design worthy of an acute man like *Aristotle*, to investigate these fundamental conceptions. But as he had no pure principium, he picked these conceptions up as they occurred to him, and fell first upon ten of them, which he called *categories* (Predicaments). Subsequently he believed himself to have found five more thereof, which he added by the name of Post-predicaments. But his table still remained defective. There

are besides some modi of pure sensibility (*quando, ubi, situs*, as well as *prius, simul*) and an empirical one (*motus*), which do not belong at all to this genealogical register of the understanding; and there are also deduced conceptions enumerated amongst the original conceptions, (*actio, passio*). And some of these latter are entirely wanting.

With regard to these last it is consequently still to be observed, that the categories, as the true *primitive conceptions* of the pure understanding, have likewise thus equally their pure deduced conceptions, which in a complete system of transcendental philosophy can on no account be passed over, but with the simple mention of which I may be satisfied in a merely critical experiment.

Let it be permitted to me to call these pure, but deduced understanding-conceptions, the *Predicables* of the pure understanding (in opposition to Predicaments). If we possess the original and primitive conceptions, the deduced and subordinate may easily be added, and the genealogical tree of the pure understanding completely delineated. As I have not to do here with the completeness of a system, but only with the principles of a system, I reserve this complement for another occupation. But we can tolerably well attain this object if we refer to ontological manuals, and subject, for example, to the category of causality, the predicables of force, action and passion; to that of community, those of presence, resistance; to the predicaments of modality, those of origin, extinction, change, &c. Categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility, or with one another, furnish a great quantity of conceptions deduced *à priori*; to observe which, and when it is possible to indicate them completely, would be a useful, and not an unpleasant, but here an unnecessary labour.

I dispense with the definitions of these categories

in this treatise intentionally, although I might desire to be in possession of them. I shall analyze these conceptions subsequently as fundamentally as is sufficient in respect of the Methodology which I am working upon. In a system of pure Reason, they might with reason be demanded of me, but here they would only remove from our view the principal point in the investigation, in exciting doubt and attacks, which, without withdrawing any thing from the essential object, we may very well defer until another occasion. In the mean time, it is clearly evident from the little which I have adduced concerning it, that a complete vocabulary, with all the requisite explanations thereto, is not only possible, but may also be easily accomplished. The compartments exist—it is only necessary to fill them, and a systematic Topick like the present does not allow the places to be missed easily to which each Conception properly belongs, whilst, at the same time, it lets those be perceived readily which are still empty.

## XI.

Interesting observations may be instituted touching this table of categories, which perhaps might have important results as respects the scientific form of all cognitions of reason. For that this table in the theoretic parts of philosophy is uncommonly useful, nay, is indispensable, in order to sketch completely the plan for the *Totality of a Science* so far as it reposes upon conceptions à priori, and mathematically to divide it according to determinate principles, is thence already evident of itself, inasmuch as the said table contains all the elementary conceptions of the understanding completely, even the form itself of a system of them in the human understanding, and consequently affords instruction as to every *Moment* of a designed speculative philosophy, nay,

even as to its *arrangement*, as I thereof elsewhere\* have given a proof. The following are some of these observations :—

*The first is*, That this table, which contains four classes of understanding-conceptions, may be broken first into two divisions, the first of which classes are directed to objects of intuition (pure as well as empirical), and the second to the existence of these objects (whether in reference to one another, or to the understanding).

I would term the first class that of the *mathematical* categories ; the second, that of the *dynamical*. The first class has, as we see, no correlatives, which are only to be found in the second class. This difference must however have a foundation in the nature of the understanding.

*Second Observation.*—That everywhere there is a like number of categories of each class ; that is to say three, which fact equally demands reflection, as all division else, à priori, by Conceptions, must be Dichotomy. And to this is to be added, that the third Category always arises from the combination of the second with the first of its class.

Thus *Wholeness* (Totality) is nothing else but plurality considered as unity, *Limitation* nothing else but reality combined with negation, *Community* is *causality* of a substance in determination reciprocally with others ; lastly, *Necessity* is nothing else but the existence which is given through possibility itself. But we must not by any means think on this account that the third Category is merely a deduced, and not a primitive conception of pure understanding. For the conjunction of the first and the second, in order to produce the third conception, requires a particular actus of the understanding, which is not identical with that which is exercised in

\* *Metaphys. Anfangs-grunde der Naturwissenschaft.*

the first and second. Thus, the conception of a *number* (which belongs to the category of totality) is not always possible, when the conceptions of multitude and unity are, (as, for example, in the representation of the Infinite); nor from this, because I join the conception of a *cause* and of a *substance*, is *Influence* still to be at once understood; that is, in what way one substance can be the cause of something in another substance. Hence it is evident that a particular act of the understanding is necessary for this, and it is the same as to all the rest.

*Third Observation.*—The accordance of one single category, namely, that of Community, which is found under the third title, with its corresponding form of a disjunctive Judgment in the table of logical functions, is not so striking as with the rest.

In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must remark, that in every disjunctive judgment the sphere (the multitude of all that which is contained thereunder) is represented as a whole divided in parts (the subordinate conceptions); and since one part cannot be contained in the other, they are thought as co-ordinate with, not subordinate to one another, so that they determine one another not unilaterally, as in a series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate.—(If one member of the division is given, all the others are excluded, and so conversely.)

Now, a like connexion is thought in a *Whole of Things*, when not one thing as effect is subordinate to another, as cause of its existence, but is co-ordinate contemporaneously and reciprocally as cause in respect of the determination of another, (as in a body whose parts reciprocally attract or repel each other,) which is quite another kind of connexion to that which is met with in the mere relationship of cause to effect, (of foundation to consequence,) wherein the consequence does not again determine reciprocally the foundation, and, therefore, does not with this (as the Creator

with the world) constitute a Whole. That proceeding of the understanding, when it represents to itself the sphere of a divided conception, it also observes when it thinks a thing as divisible ; and as the members of the division in the first case exclude one another, and yet are conjoined in a sphere, the understanding represents to itself the parts in the last case, as such whereof existence (as substances) belongs to each exclusively of the others, though conjoined as in a whole.

## XII.

But there exists besides in the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, a leading division, embracing pure conceptions of the understanding, which, although they are not enumerated amongst the categories, yet, according to the ancients, should be valid of objects, as conceptions *à priori*. But in this case they would augment the member of the categories, which cannot be. The proposition so famous with the scholastics, "*Quodlibet ens est Unum, Verum, Bonum,*" conveys these. Now, although certainly the use of this principle, in regard to the consequences, (which merely afforded tautological propositions,) succeed so very indifferently, that in modern times, persons were accustomed to place it in *Metaphysicks*, almost simply out of respect ; still an idea which has maintained itself during so long a period, however empty it may seem to be, always deserves an enquiry as to its origin, and justifies the conjecture that it may have its foundation in some rule of the understanding, but which, as it often happens, has been erroneously interpreted. These supposed transcendental Predicates of Things (*that is, Unity, Truth and Goodness, or Perfection*) are nothing else but logical requirements and criteria of all *cognition of things* in general, and whereof

the categories of quantity, or *Unity*, *Plurality*, and *Totality*, lie at its foundation—only that such which as properly material, must be taken as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they really only used in a formal sense, as belonging to the logical requisite, in respect of every cognition, and yet inconsiderately they made these criteria of thought into properties of things in themselves. In every cognition of an object, there is, namely, *Unity* of the Conception, which we may term *qualitative unity*, so far as under this only is the unity of the aggregation of the diversity of cognitions thought, as for instance, the unity of the thema in a drama, a speech, or fable.—Secondly.—*Truth* in respect of consequences. The more true consequences from a given Conception, so many the more characteristics of its objective reality. This we may term the *qualitative plurality* of the signs which belong to a conception, as to a common foundation, (not thought in it as quantity).—Thirdly, and lastly. *Perfection*, which consists in this, that this plurality inversed altogether leads back again to the unity of the conception, and agrees completely with this and none other, which may be termed *qualitative Completeness* (Totality).—Hence it is evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition in general, change in a consciousness, by means of the quality of a cognition as principle, the three categories of quantity, in which unity in the generation of the quantum must be adopted as absolutely homogeneous, only in this case in view of the connection also of *heterogeneous* parts of cognition. Thus the criterium of the possibility of a conception (not of the object thereof) is the definition, in which the Unity of the conception, the Truth of all that which can be deduced immediately from it, lastly, the *Totality* of that which has been derived from it, constitutes what is required for the formation of



the whole conception. Or the *criterium of an hypothesis* is also thus the intelligibleness of the adopted *principle of explanation*, or its *Unity*, (without subsidiary hypotheses,)—the *Truth* (accordance with itself and with experience) of the consequences deduced therefrom,—and, lastly, the *Completeness* of the ground of explanation for these, which refer back again to nothing more or less than had been admitted in the hypothesis, and again afford that which was thought synthetically à priori, analytically à posteriori, and coincide therein. Consequently, the transcendental table of categories is not by means of the conceptions of Unity, Truth, and Perfection, were it perchance defective, at all completed, but only inasmuch as the relationship of these conceptions to objects is set wholly aside, the procedure with them is brought under universal logical rules of the agreement of the cognition with itself.

## OF TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICK.

## SECOND PRINCIPAL DIVISION.

## OF THE DEDUCTION OF PURE UNDERSTANDING-CONCEPTIONS.

## FIRST SECTION.

## XIII.

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF A TRANSCENDENTAL  
DEDUCTION IN GENERAL.

Teachers of jurisprudence, when they speak of rights and claims, distinguish in a cause the question with respect to what is law (*quid juris*) from that which concerns the fact (*quid facti*), and in requiring a proof of both, they call the first which is to prove the claim or the pretension of law, *Deduction*. We make use, ourselves, of a multiplicity of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any one, and likewise hold ourselves justified, without deduction, in attaching to them a sense, and figurative signification, because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective reality. There are, however, also usurped conceptions, as perhaps *Fortune*, *Fate*, which indeed circulate with almost universal consent, but still sometimes are challenged by this question, *quid juris*? where we then fall into no little embarrassment on account of their deduction, since we cannot adduce any clear foundation of law, either from experience, or from reason, whereby the right of our use would be clear.

But amidst the various conceptions which make

up the very complicated web of human cognition, there are some, which are even destined to pure use *à priori*, (entirely independent of all experience,) and their title to this at all times requires a deduction, since proofs from experience of the legitimacy of such a use are not sufficient, but we must still know how these conceptions can refer to Objects, which yet are derived from no experience. I, therefore, name the explanation of the mode in which way conceptions *à priori* can refer to objects, their transcendental deduction, and distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which shows the manner in which a conception is obtained by experience, and by reflection upon it, and therefore does not concern the legitimacy, but the fact whereby the possession has arisen.

We have now already two sorts of conceptions of quite a different kind, which yet in this agree with one another, that they both totally, *à priori*, refer to objects, namely, the conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility and the Categories as conceptions of the understanding. To try to seek an empirical deduction of these would be entirely lost labour, because that which is distinctive in their nature lies precisely in this, that they refer to their objects without having borrowed anything for the representation of them from experience. If, therefore, a deduction of the same is necessary, it must always be transcendental.

Still we may investigate, with regard to these conceptions, as with regard to all cognition, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the causal occasions of their production in experience, where the impressions of sense give the first motive for developing the whole faculty of cognition in respect of them, and for producing experience, which contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, a *Matter* for cognition arising out of the senses, and a certain Form to

order it, arising from the internal source of pure intuition and thought, which by occasion of the former (*the impressions of sense*) first are brought into exercise and produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition, in order to ascend from particular perceptions to general conceptions, is undoubtedly of the greatest utility, and we have the celebrated Locke to thank for it, that he first opened the way to the same. But a *Deduction* of pure conceptions *à priori* is thereby never accomplished, since it does not at all lie in this direction, and in respect of its future use, which is to be entirely independent of experience, it must have shown quite another certificate of origin than that of descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which properly cannot at all be called deduction, since it regards a *Questio facti*, I shall therefore term the explanation of the *Possession* of a pure cognition. It is then clear that there can only be a transcendental Deduction of these conceptions, and by no means an empirical one; and that the last, in respect of pure conceptions *à priori*, is nothing but vain labour, wherewith he only can concern himself who has not understood the quite peculiar nature of these cognitions.

But, now, although the only mode of a possible deduction of pure cognition *à priori*, is admitted, namely, that in the transcendental way, still it is not even thereby evident, that it is thus inevitably necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of space and of time, by means of a transcendental deduction, and we have declared and determined their objective validity, *à priori*. Nevertheless, Geometry proceeds with firm step through pure cognition *à priori*, without requiring to ask from philosophy a certificate of authenticity for the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental conception of space. But the use of the conception in this science extends

only to the external sensible world, in respect of which space is the pure form of its intuition, and in which therefore all geometrical cognition, as it is founded upon intuition *à priori*, possesses immediate evidence; and the objects, through cognition itself *à priori*, (according to the form,) are given in the intuition. On the contrary, with the pure *conceptions of the understanding*, the indispensable necessity commences not only of seeking the transcendental deduction of themselves, but likewise of space, because as it treats of objects not through predicates of intuition, and sensibility, but of pure thinking *à priori*, the conceptions refer to objects, without any of the conditions of sensibility commonly, and which as they are not based upon experience, can present no object in the intuition *à priori*, whereupon they founded their synthesis previous to all experience. And hence they excite suspicion, not only on account of the objective validity and limits of their use, but also render equivocal the conception of space; because they are inclined to make use of it, beyond the conditions of sensible intuition; on which account a transcendental deduction of it was before necessary. The reader must thus be convinced of the indispensable necessity of such a transcendental deduction, before making one single step in the field of pure reason, as otherwise he proceeds blindly, and after he has wandered about here and there variously, he is compelled still to come back to the uncertainty from whence he started. But he must also clearly discern beforehand, the unavoidable difficulty which exists, so that he may not complain as to the obscurity wherein the Thing itself is deeply involved, or he may be disgusted too soon in the removal of the obstacles, because the point is, either entirely to give up all pretensions as to insight into pure reason, as the most agreeable field, namely, that

out beyond the limits of all possible experience, or to bring this critical investigation to perfection.

We were before able, in treating of the conceptions of space and time, to render comprehensible, with little trouble, in what way they, as Cognitions *à priori*, must yet necessarily refer to objects, and how they made their synthetic cognition of the same possible, independent of all experience.—For since only by means of such pure forms of sensibility an object can appear to us, that is, can be an object of the empirical intuition; space and time thus are pure intuitions, which contain, *à priori*, the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and the synthesis in these has objective validity.

On the contrary, the categories of the understanding do not at all represent to us the conditions, under which objects are given in the intuition; consequently objects certainly can appear to us, without their necessarily referring themselves to functions of the understanding, and that this contained therefore the conditions of them *à priori*. On this account a difficulty presents itself in this case which we did not meet with in the field of sensibility,—that is to say, How *subjective conditions of thought, are to have objective validity*; that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects—because, without functions of the understanding, phenomena may certainly be given in the intuition. I take, for example, the conception of cause, which means a particular kind of synthesis; since upon something *A*, something quite different, *B*, is fixed according to a rule. It is, *à priori*, not clear why phenomena should contain something of this kind (since experiences cannot lead to proofs, because the objective validity of this conception must be able to be proved *à priori*), and it is therefore, *à priori*, doubtful whether such a conception is not perhaps quite void, and does not at all meet amongst the Phenomena

with an object. For that objects of sensible intuition must be conformable to those formal conditions of sensibility, lying in the mind, *à priori*, is clear from this, because otherwise they would not be objects with respect to us, but that besides this, they must be conformable to the conditions of which the understanding stands in need for synthetical insight into thought, the conclusion as to this is not so easily to be seen. For there might be possibly phenomena so constituted, that the understanding would not find them at all conformable to the conditions of its unity, and every thing might lie in such confusion, that, for example, in the succession of phenomena nothing offered itself which would furnish a rule of synthesis, and therefore answer to the conception of cause and effect; so that consequently the conception would be quite void, null, and without meaning. Phenomena would, notwithstanding, afford objects to our intuition, for the intuition stands in need in no way of the functions of thought.

But if we thought by this of freeing ourselves from the tediousness of these investigations, in saying, experience affords continually examples of such regularity of phenomena as give sufficient opportunity of separating the conception of cause therefrom, and at the same time thereby of confirming the objective validity of such a conception, we do not remark that in such way the conception of cause cannot arise, but that it must be founded entirely *à priori*, in the understanding, or wholly given up as a chimera. For this conception requires absolutely that something, A, is of the kind that another thing, B, thence necessarily follows, and, agreeably to an *absolutely universal rule*. Phenomena furnish certainly cases from which a rule is possible, agreeably to which something happens usually, but never that the consequence is *necessary*, and therefore to the synthesis of cause and effect, a dignity belongs which

we cannot at all express empirically, that is to say, that the effect is not added merely to the cause, but is fixed by the same, and results from it. The strict universality of a rule is likewise no property at all of empirical rules, which through induction can obtain no other than comparative universality, that is, extended application. The use, however, of the pure conceptions of the understanding would entirely be changed, if we were willing to treat them only as empirical productions.

PASSAGE TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION  
OF THE CATEGORIES.

There are only two cases possible under which synthetical representation and its objects can coincide and refer necessarily one to another, and as it were, meet one another. Either, if the object alone make the representation possible, or the representation the object. If it is the first, this relationship is only empirical, and the representation is never *à priori* possible. And this is the case with phenomena in respect of that which belongs to sensation in them. If it is the second, since representation in itself (for of the causality of this case by means of the will, it is not at all here question) does not produce its object *as to its existence*, yet the representation in respect of the object is still then *à priori* determining, if by means of it alone it is possible to cognize something as an object. But there are two conditions under which only the cognition of an object is possible; first, intuition, whereby this object is given, but only as phenomenon; secondly, the conception whereby an object is thought which answers to this intuition. But it is clear from what has preceded, that the previous condition, namely, that under which alone objects can be



envisaged, in fact, lies in the mind *à priori* as a foundation of these Objects in respect of the form. With this formal condition of sensibility, all phenomena therefore necessarily coincide, since they only appear by means of it, that is, can only be empirically envisaged and given. Now the question is, whether also conceptions *à priori* do not precede as conditions, under which alone something, although not perceived, still is thought as object in general; for then all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily conformable with such conceptions, because without the presupposition of them nothing is possible as *object of experience*. But now all experience, besides the intuition of the senses whereby something is given, also contains a *conception* of an object, which is given in the intuition or appears. Therefore conceptions of object in general, will be as conditions *à priori* at the foundation of all cognition of experience. The objective validity of the categories as conceptions *à priori*, will consequently repose on this, that through them alone experience, in respect of the Form of thought, is possible. For they then refer necessarily and *à priori* to objects of experience, since only by means thereof generally can an object of experience be thought.

The transcendental deduction of all conceptions *à priori*, has therefore a principle to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely this, that these must be acknowledged as conditions *à priori*, of the possibility of experience (whether it be of the intuition which is met with therein, or of thought). Conceptions which furnish the objective ground of the possibility of experience, are just on this account necessary. But the development of ~~the~~ experience wherein they are found, is not ~~then~~ deduction (but illustration), inasmuch as thereby they would still only be contingent. Without this original relationship to possible experience, in which all

objects of cognition present themselves, the relationship of the same to any object could not at all be comprehended.

The celebrated *Locke*, from want of this consideration, and because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in experience, has also derived them from experience; and moreover he proceeded so *unconsequentially*, that he ventured therewith upon attempts at cognitions, which go out far beyond all limits of experience. *David Hume* acknowledged in order to do this, that it was necessary these conceptions should have their origin *à priori*. But as he could not explain how it was possible that the understanding is compelled to think conceptions which are not in themselves conjoined in the understanding, still as necessarily conjoined in the object, and as he did not fall upon this, that perhaps the understanding, by means of these conceptions, might be itself the author of the experience, wherein its objects are found, impelled by necessity he deduced them from experience (that is to say from subjective necessity arising from frequent association in experience, which lastly is erroneously considered to be objective—that is to say, from *Habit*;) though afterwards he acted very consistently in this, that he declared it to be impossible with these conceptions, and the principles which they gave rise to, to go out beyond the limits of experience. But the empirical derivation whereupon *Locke* and *Hume* fell, is not reconcilable with the reality of those scientific cognitions *à priori* which we possess, namely—*pure Mathematics* and *general Physics*, and is therefore refuted by the fact.

The first of these two celebrated men opened all the portals to *Enthusiasm*, because reason, if it once have right on its side, does not allow itself any more to be held in check by vague recommendations of moderation. The second gave himself up entirely to *Scepticism*, when once he

believed himself to have detected so general a delusion of our cognition-faculty, held to be reason. We are now upon the point of making a trial, whether we cannot bring human reason safely through these two rocks—assign to it definite limits, and yet preserve open to it the whole field of its suitable activity.

Previously I will merely premise the *Explanation of the categories*. They are conceptions of an object in general, whereby Intuition of this in respect of one of the *logical functions of judgments* is looked upon as determined. Thus the function of *categorical judgments* was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, as, for example, "All bodies are divisible." But in respect of the mere logical use of the understanding it remains undetermined to which of the two conceptions we will accord the function of the subject and to which that of predicate. For we can likewise say,—"Something divisible is a body." But it is determined by means of the category of substance, if I bring the conception of a body under it, that the empirical intuition of this in experience, must always be considered only as a subject, never as a mere predicate, and it is the same in all the other categories.

OF THE DEDUCTION OF PURE UNDERSTANDING-  
CONCEPTIONS.

## SECOND SECTION.

TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF PURE UNDERSTANDING-  
CONCEPTIONS.

## XV.

## OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONJUNCTION IN GENERAL.

The diversity of representations may be given in an intuition which is merely sensible, that is, is nothing but susceptibility, and the form of this intuition may lie *à priori* in our faculty of representation, yet without being anything else than the mode in which the subject is affected. But the Conjunction of a diversity in general, can never occur in us by means of the senses, and therefore cannot be contained also at the same time in the pure form of the sensible intuition, for it is an act of the Spontaneity of the representation-faculty, and as we must name this understanding, to distinguish it from sensibility, all conjunction is—whether we are conscious of it or not, whether a conjunction of the diversity of the intuition, or of different conceptions, and in the former, of sensible or non-sensible intuition—an action of the Understanding—which we would invest with the general denomination of *synthesis*, in order thereby to show at the same time, that we can represent to ourselves nothing as conjoined in the object, without having ourselves previously conjoined it; and amongst all representations, *conjunction* is the only one, which is not given by means of objects, but can only be effected by the subject itself; because it is an act of its self-activity. We easily perceive

here, that this action must be originally one, and be alike valid for every conjunction, and that decomposition, or *Analysis*, which appears to be its contrary, always yet presupposes it; for where the understanding has previously not conjoined anything, there can it also not decompose anything; since only as conjoined *through the Understanding* it must have been offered to the representation-faculty.

But the conception of cognition carries also along with it, besides the conception of the diversity, and of the synthesis of it, also that of its unity. Conjunction is the representation of the *synthetic* unity of the diverse.\* The representation of this unity cannot therefore arise out of the conjunction. It rather makes the conception of conjunction first of all possible, inasmuch as it adds itself to the representation of the diverse. This unity which *a priori* precedes all conceptions of conjunction, is not for instance the category of unity (Sec. 10) previously spoken of, for all categories are based upon logical functions in judgments—conjunction is however already thought in these—consequently unity of the given conceptions. The category therefore already presupposes conjunction. We must in consequence seek this unity (as qualitative Sec. 12) still higher; that is to say, in that which contains even the foundation of the unity of different conceptions in judgments, and therefore of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use.

## XVI.

### OF THE ORIGINALLY SYNTHETIC UNITY OF APPERCEPTION.

The "*I think*," must *be able* to accompany all my

\* It is not here to be considered whether the representations themselves are identical, and therefore whether one can be thought analytically through the other. The *consciousness* of the one, however, so far as it is question of the diversity, is always to be separated from the consciousness of the other. Here the point is only as to the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness.

representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me, which could not at all be thought—which is just as much as to say, that the representation would be either impossible, or at least nothing to me. The representation which can be given before all thought *is termed intuition*. Consequently all the diversity of the intuition has a necessary reference with the “*I think*” in that subject, wherein this diversity is found. But this representation is an act of *spontaneity*—that is, it cannot be looked upon as belonging to sensibility. I term it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical, as also *original apperception*, because it is the same consciousness which, whilst it produces the representation, “*I think*,” which must accompany every other, and is one and the same in all consciousness, cannot be accompanied by any farther one. I also term its unity, the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of Cognition *à priori*, arising out of it. For, the diverse representations which are given in a certain intuition would not be all my representations, if they did not belong all to a self-consciousness, that is to say, they must still, as my representations, (although I may not as such be conscious of them,) be necessarily conformable to the condition under which alone they can together stand in a general self-consciousness, for otherwise they would not absolutely belong to me. From this original conjunction much may be deduced.

For instance, this absolute identity of the apperception of a diversity, given in the intuition, contains a synthesis of representations, and is only possible by means of the consciousness of this synthesis. For that empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself scattered about, and is without relation to the identity of the subject. This relation therefore does not yet occur, because I accompany every representation with consciousness, but be-

cause I add one to the other, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently only because I can join a diversity of given representations in *one consciousness*, is it possible that I represent to myself *the identity of consciousness in these representations*—that is to say, the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of a synthetical one.\* The Thought, that these representations given in the Intuition all belong to me, is therefore the same as if I unite them in one consciousness, or at least I can unite them therein, and although it itself is not the consciousness of the *synthesis* of the representations, yet it presupposes the possibility thereof,—that is, only inasmuch as I embrace the diversity of these in one consciousness, do I term these collectively my representations. For otherwise I should have as many-coloured different a Self, as I have representations of which I am conscious. Synthetical unity of the diversity of intuitions, as given *à priori*, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes *à priori* all my determined thought. But conjunction does not lie in the objects, and cannot be derived as it were from them through perception, and thereby first of all received into the understanding, but is alone an operation of the understanding, which itself is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining *à priori* and of bringing the diversity of

\* The analytical unity of consciousness adheres to all common conceptions as such. For example, if I think of *red* in general, I represent to myself thereby a quality which (as sign) may be met with somewhere, or be conjoined with other representations. Consequently I can only represent to myself analytical, by virtue of previously-thought, possible synthetical unity. A representation which is to be thought as common to *different things* is looked upon as belonging to such, as besides this representation have got something *different in themselves*, consequently it must be thought previously in synthetical unity with other (if only even possible) representations, before I can think in it that analytical unity of consciousness, which makes it into *Conceptus communis*. And thus the synthetic unity of the apperception is the highest point to which we must attach all use of the understanding—even the whole of Logic and after this transcendental Philosophy. In fact this faculty is the understanding itself.

given representations under unity of perception ; which principle is the highest in the whole of human cognition.

Now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception, is in fact itself an identical consequently an analytical proposition, but it still declares a synthesis of the given diversity in an intuition as necessary, and without which the absolute identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. For through the I, as simple representation, no diversity is given,—in the intuition which is different from it, the diversity can only be given, and through *conjunction* be thought, in a consciousness.—An understanding in which through self-consciousness, all diversity would at the same time be given, would envisage. Ours can only think and must seek intuition in the senses. I am conscious, therefore, of the identical self in respect of the diversity of the representations given to me in an intuition, since I call these collectively my representations which form one. But this is the same as if I were conscious of a necessary synthesis of them, *à priori*, which is termed the original synthetic unity of apperception, to which all my given representations are subject, but under which they must be brought by means of a synthesis.

## XVII.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SYNTHETICAL UNITY OF THE APPERCEPTION IS THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE OF ALL USE OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

The highest principle of the possibility of all intuition, in relation to sensibility, was, according to the transcendental *Æsthetick*, that all the diversity thereof stands under the formal conditions of space and time. The highest principle of the same, in reference to the understanding, is, that all diversity of the intuition stands under the original synthe-



tical unity of the apperception.\* Under the first case stand all the diverse representations of the intuitions, so far as they are given to us; under the second, so far as they must be able to be conjoined in a consciousness, for without this, nothing can thereby be thought or known, because the given representations have not in common the act of apperception, I think, and would not thereby be joined in a consciousness.

The *understanding*, to speak generally, is the faculty of *cognitions*. These consist in the determined relationship of given representations to an object. But *an object* is that in the conception whereof the diversity of a given intuition is united. But all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, unity of consciousness is that alone which constitutes the relationship of representations to an object; consequently their objective validity; consequently that they become cognitions, and upon which, therefore, even reposes the possibility of the understanding.

The first pure cognition of the understanding, therefore, whereon its entire remaining use is founded, which at the same time is quite independent of all conditions of sensible intuition, is then the principle of the original *synthetical* unity of the apperception. Thus the simple form of the external sensible intuition, Space, is yet not all cognition. It only furnishes the diversity of the intuition *a priori* for a possible cognition. But in order to know something in space, as, for example, a line, I must *draw* it, and consequently effect a determined conjunction of the

\* Space and Time, and all parts of these, are *intuitions*, consequently are individual representations with the diversity which they contain in themselves. (See the *Transcendental Aesthetic*). Hence they are not mere conceptions through which the selfsame consciousness is contained, as in many representations; but are many representations as in one, together with consciousness of the same—consequently as compounded—and therefore unity of consciousness is met with as *synthetical*, but yet original. The *individuality* thereof is important in the application. See sec. xxv.

given diversity synthetically, so that the unity of this action is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the conception of a line), and thereby first of all an object (a determined space) is known. The synthetical unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not of that which I merely require to know an object, but to which every intuition must be subjected, in order to become an object as to me ; because otherwise, and without this synthesis, the diversity would not be united in a consciousness.

This last proposition is, as it was stated, itself analytical, although, in fact, it makes synthetical unity into the condition of all thinking ; for it states nothing further but that all my representations must stand in some given intuition under the condition, under which alone I can refer my representations to the identical self, and consequently can connect them synthetically in one apperception, by means of the general expression, "I think."

But still this principle is not a principle for every possible understanding generally, but only for that by means of the pure apperception of which, in the representation, I am, still nothing at all diverse is given. That understanding, through the self-consciousness of which the diversity of the intuition would at the same time be given—an understanding by means of the representation of which the objects of this representation at the same time existed,—would not require a particular act of the synthesis of the diversity for the unity of consciousness, which the human understanding requires, which merely thinks and does not envisage. But for the human understanding the first principle is still indispensable, so much so, that it cannot have the least conception of any other understanding possible ; either of such a one, as should perceive itself, or possessed lying at its foundation, although a sensible

intuition, yet one of a different kind to that in space or time.

### XVIII.

#### WHAT THE OBJECTIVE UNITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IS.

The transcendental *Unity* of Apperception is that by which all diversity given in an intuition is united in a conception of the object. It is on this account termed *objective*, and must be separated from the *subjective unity* of consciousness, which is a *determination* of the internal *sense*, whereby the stated diversity of the intuition is given empirically for such a conjunction. Whether I may be *empirically* conscious of the diversity, as co-existent or successive, depends upon circumstances, or upon empirical conditions. Consequently, the empirical unity of consciousness through association of representations itself concerns a phenomenon, and is wholly contingent. On the contrary, the pure Form of intuition in time, merely as intuition generally, which contains a given diversity, is subjected to the original unity of consciousness, solely by means of the necessary relationship of the diversity of the intuition, to an "I think," and, consequently, by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding, which lies *à priori* at the foundation of the empirical. The first unity is alone objectively valid. The empirical unity of the apperception, which we do not here consider, and which, in fact, is only deduced from the first under given conditions, *in concreto*, has subjective validity only. One connects the representation of a certain word with one thing, the other with another thing, and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is in respect of what is given, not necessarily and generally valid.

## XIX.

THE LOGICAL FORM OF ALL JUDGMENTS CONSISTS IN THE OBJECTIVE UNITY OF THE APPERCEPTION OF THE CONCEPTIONS THEREIN CONTAINED.

I have never been able to satisfy myself with the explanation which the Logicians give of a judgment in general. It is, as they say, the representation of a relationship between two conceptions. Now without disputing with them here, notwithstanding that from this error of Logic many weighty consequences have resulted, in respect to what is defective in this explanation, that at all events it only applies to categorical but not to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, (which last do not contain a relationship of conceptions but of judgments themselves), I will simply observe, that here it is not determined wherein this *relationship* consists.\*

But if I investigate more precisely the reference of given cognitions in each judgment, and distinguish this reference as belonging to the understanding from the relationship according to the laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), I then find that a judgment is nothing else but the manner of bringing given cognitions to the *objective* unity of the apperception. The Copula "is" has this for its object in these, in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For it indicates their relationship to the original apperception and their neces-

\* The diffuse theory of the four syllogistical figures concerns only the Categorical Syllogisms; and although it is in fact nothing more than an act to obtain surreptitiously, by means of the introduction of immediate consequences under the promises of a pure Syllogism, the appearance of more kinds of conclusions—that that in the first figure,—yet this art would have had, by these means alone, no particular success, if it had not succeeded in bringing the Categorical Judgments, as those to which all the remainder must be referred, into exclusive consideration, but which, according to sec. ix., is erroneous.

sary *unity*, although the Judgment itself is empirical, consequently contingent ; as, for example, " Bodies are heavy." By this I do not certainly mean to say that these representations belong, *necessarily*, to one another in the empirical intuition, but that they belong to one another, by virtue of the *necessary unity* of the apperception, in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to the principles of the objective determination of all representations, so far as cognition can thence emanate, and which principles are all deduced from the fundamental proposition of the transcendental unity of the apperception. Thereby alone from this relationship a *judgment* arises, that is to say, a relationship which is objectively valid, and which distinguishes itself sufficiently from the relationship of those same representations wherein was only subjective validity, as, for instance, agreeably to the laws of association. According to these last I should only be able to say, when I carry a body, I feel an oppression of heaviness, but not that it, the body, is heavy, which is tantamount to saying, that both these representations are conjoined in the object, that is, without distinction of the state of the subject, and not merely together in the perception, (however often it may be repeated.)

## XX.

ALL SYNTHETICAL INTUITIONS ARE SUBJECTED TO THE CATEGORIES AS CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ALONE THEIR DIVERSITY CAN MEET IN ONE CONSCIOUSNESS.

The diversity given in a sensible intuition belongs necessarily to the original synthetical unity of the apperception, since through this the *unity* of the intuition is alone possible (17.) But the action of the understanding, by which the diversity of given representations (whether intuitions or conceptions)

is brought under an apperception generally, is the logical function of judgments (19). Consequently, all diversity, so far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is *determined* in respect of one of the logical functions of judging, by means of which, namely, the diversity is brought to ~~one~~ consciousness in general. Now the *Categories* are nothing else but these same functions of judgment, so far as the diversity of a given intuition is determined in respect of them (13). The diversity in a given intuition is subject therefore necessarily to the categories.

## XXI.

## OBSERVATION.

A diversity contained in the intuition which I call mine is represented by the synthesis of the understanding as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this occurs by means of the category.\* This category shows, therefore, that the empirical consciousness of a given diversity of an intuition is subject just the same to a pure self-consciousness, *à priori*, as empirical intuition is to a pure sensible one, which likewise takes place *à priori*. In the preceding proposition, the beginning of a *Deduction* of pure Conceptions of the Understanding is therefore made, in which deduction, as the categories arise simply in the understanding, *independent of Sensibility*, I must make abstraction still of the mode in which the diversity is given for an empirical intuition, in order to look only at the unity which is joined through the understanding, by means of the categories to the intuition. Subsequently (§ 26) it will

\* The argument for this rests upon the represented *unity of intuition*, whereby an object is given, which unity always includes within itself a synthesis of the diversity given in an intuition, and already contains the relationship of this last diversity to the unity of the apperception.

also be shown, from the manner in which the empirical intuition is given in the sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the category, according to what has gone before, (§ 20,) prescribes to the diversity of a given intuition generally. And therefore, inasmuch as thereby its validity *à priori* is explained in respect of all objects of our senses, the object of the deduction will be first fully attained.

But still I could not make abstraction of one point in the preceding demonstration, namely, of this, that the diversity for the intuition must yet be given previous to the synthesis of the understanding and independent of it; but in what way remains here undetermined. For if I would think of an understanding which envisaged itself (as possibly a divine one, which would not itself represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects themselves would be co-existently given or produced), the categories would have no meaning in respect of such cognition. They are only rules for an understanding, whose whole faculty consists in thinking, that is, in the action of bringing the synthesis of the diverse, which has been besides given to it in the intuition, to the unity of the apperception, which understanding consequently knows nothing of itself, but only connects and orders the matter for cognition—the Intuition—which must be given to it through an object. But respecting the property of our understanding, to effect Unity of Apperception *à priori*, only by means of the Categories, and precisely only in this manner and number thereof, no more motive can be adduced than why we have exactly these and no other functions of judgment, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition.

## XXII.

THE CATEGORY HAS NO OTHER USE IN THE COGNITION OF THINGS THAN ITS APPLICATION TO OBJECTS OF EXPERIENCE.

To think an object, and to know an object, are not therefore the same thing. To cognitions belong two parts, namely,—first, the conception, whereby in general an object is thought (the category), and, secondly, the intuition whereby it is given; for could a corresponding intuition to the conception not at all be given, it would be a thought as to its form, but without any object, and by means of it no cognition at all of any object possible; since so far as I knew there was neither any thing, nor could be any thing, whereto my thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is sensible (*Æsthetick*), therefore the thinking of an object in general by means of a pure conception of the understanding, can only become cognition in us, so far as that is referred to objects of the senses. Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is immediately represented in space and time as real, by means of sensation. By the determination of the first we can obtain cognitions *à priori* of objects (in mathematics), but only according to their form as phenomena. It still thereby remains undecided whether there are things which must be perceived under this form. Consequently all mathematical conceptions of themselves are not cognitions, except so far as we presuppose that there are things, which only can be represented to us conformably to the form of that pure sensible intuition. But *things* in *space* and *time* are only given so far as they are perceptions, (representations accompanied by sensation), consequently by means of empirical representation. There-



fore, the pure conceptions of the understanding procure even when they are applied to intuitions *à priori* (as in mathematics) only so far cognition, as the same, consequently also the conceptions of the understanding by their means, can be applied to empirical intuitions. The categories, consequently, by means of intuition, afford us no cognition of things, except through their possible application to empirical *intuition*, that is, they serve only for the possibility of empirical *cognition*. But this is called *experience*. Thus the categories possess no other use for the cognition of things, except so far as such are admitted as objects of possible experience.

## XXIII.

The preceding proposition is of the highest importance, for it determines equally the limits of the use of the pure conceptions of the understanding in relation to objects, as transcendental *Æsthetick* did the limits of the use of the pure form of our sensible intuition. Space and time are valid as conditions of the possibility of the way in which objects may be given to us no further than for objects of sense, consequently only for experience. Beyond these limits they represent nothing at all, for they are only in the senses, and have no reality out of them. The pure conceptions of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend themselves to objects of intuition in general, whether similar or not to our own, provided it is only sensual and not *intellectual*. But this further extension of conceptions beyond our sensible intuition is of no assistance. For then, there are only empty conceptions of objects, as to which, whether the latter are even possible or not, we cannot at all judge by means of the former—mere forms of Thought without objective Reality, since we have no intuition at hand to which the

synthetical unity of the apperception which such conceptions alone contain could be applied, and thus could determine an object. *Our* sensual and empirical intuition can alone give to them sense and meaning.

If we assume therefore an object of a non-sensible intuition as given, we can thus certainly represent it by means of all the predicates that already lie in the supposition—that *nothing belonging to the sensible intuition appertains to it*—consequently, that it is neither extended, nor in space,—that its duration is no time, that in it no change (succession of the determinations in time) is found, and so forth. But still, this is no proper cognition, if I merely indicate what the intuition of an object *is not*, without being able to say, what yet is contained therein, for then I have not represented at all the possibility of an object to my pure understanding-conception, since I have not been able to give any intuition which corresponded to it, but only have been able to say that our own was not valid for it. But the most essential thing here is, that also not even a single category could be applied to such a thing, for example, the conception of substance, that is, of something which can exist as subject but never as mere predicate, and of which I do not in any way know, whether there could be any thing that would correspond to this determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the case of application. But of this more hereafter.

## XXIV.

### OF THE APPLICATION OF THE CATEGORIES TO OBJECTS OF THE SENSES IN GENERAL.

The pure conceptions of the understanding refer by the mere understanding to objects of intuition in general, without its being determined whether it

is our own intuition or some other, being a sensible one; but precisely on that account they are mere *forms of thought*, whereby no determined object is known. The synthesis or conjunction of the diverse in these, had reference merely to the unity of the apperception, and was thereby the ground of the possibility of cognition *à priori*, so far as this reposes upon the understanding, and consequently is not transcendental alone, but also simply purely intellectual. But since there lies at the foundation within us, a certain form of sensible intuition *à priori*, which reposes upon the receptivity of the representation-faculty (sensibility); the understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the internal sense, agreeably to the synthetical unity of the apperception by means of the diversity of given representations, and so think synthetical unity of the apperception of the diversity of *the sensible intuition* *à priori*, as the condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily stand, and whereby the categories, as mere forms of thought, receive objective reality, that is to say, application to objects which can be given to us in the intuition, but only as phenomena, for only of such are we capable of the intuition *à priori*.

This *synthesis* of the diverse of the sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary *à priori*, may be termed *figurative* (synthesis speciosa) in contradistinction to that which, in respect of the diversity of an intuition in general would be thought in the mere category, and is termed conjunction of the understanding (synthesis intellectualis). Both are transcendental, not merely because they themselves precede, *à priori*, but also form the basis of the possibility of other cognition, *à priori*.

But figurative synthesis, if it refer merely to the original synthetical unity of the apperception, that is, to that transcendental unity which is thought in

the categories, must be called the transcendental *Synthesis of the Imagination*, as distinguished from the mere intellectual conjunction. *Imagination* is the faculty of representing an object *without the presence of it* in the intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensible, the imagination belongs to *sensibility*, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding; but still so far as its synthesis is an exercise of the spontaneity which is determining, and not like sense, merely determinable, and consequently can determine *à priori*; sense according to its form, conformably to the unity of apperception, the imagination is thus far a faculty for determining sensibility *à priori*; and its synthesis of intuitions *agreeably to the categories*, must be the transcendental synthesis of the *imagination*, which is an effect of the understanding upon the sensibility, and the first application thereof (at the same time the ground of all the others) to objects of intuition possible to us. Synthesis, as figurative, is distinguished from the intellectual without any imagination, simply by means of the understanding. Now, so far as imagination is spontaneity, I call it also sometimes *productive* imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the *reproductive*, whose synthesis is subjected to empirical laws only, namely, those of association, and which synthesis consequently contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition *à priori*, and on this account does not belong to transcendental philosophy, but psychology.

This now is the place for making intelligible that which is paradoxical, and must have struck every one in the exposition of the form of the internal sense (§ 6), namely,—How such exhibits us ourselves to consciousness, only as we appear to ourselves (and not as we are in ourselves), since, that is to say, we only envisage ourselves in the way we are *affected*

internally—which appears contradictory, because we must act towards ourselves as passive. Hence has it been customary, in systems of psychology, to prefer giving out the *Internal Sense* and the faculty of *Apperception* (which we carefully separate), for one and the same thing.

That which determines the internal sense is the understanding and its original faculty of conjoining the diversity of the intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception (as that whereon its possibility itself rests). Now since the understanding in us men, is even no faculty of intuition, and cannot still admit this into itself, although it were given in the sensibility, in order to conjoin, as it were, the diversity of *its own* intuition, its synthesis thus, if considered only in itself, is nothing else but the unity of action, of which as such, it itself is conscious also without sensibility, but by means of which it is capable of determining the sensibility internally, in respect of that diversity which may be given to it, according to the form of its intuition. It exercises, therefore, under the denomination of a *transcendental synthesis of the imagination*, that action upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is—touching which we with reason say, that the internal sense is thereby affected. The apperception and its synthetical unity is so little the same with the internal sense, that the former rather as the source of all conjunction, refers to the diversity of *intuitions in general*, under the name of categories, anterior to all sensible intuition as to objects generally. On the other hand, the internal sense contains the mere *form* of intuition, but without conjunction of the diversity in it, consequently, no *determined* intuition at all, which is only possible by means of the consciousness of the determination of this sense through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding upon

the internal sense,) which I have called figurative synthesis.

This, we perceive also at all times in ourselves. We cannot think to ourselves any line without drawing it in thought—we can think no circle without describing it—we cannot at all represent the three dimensions of space, without *setting* three lines from the same point, perpendicular to one other, and we cannot represent even time itself, unless whilst in the *drawing* of a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of time), we pay attention merely as to the action of the synthesis of the diverse, whereby we determine successively the internal sense, and as to the succession thereby of this determination in it. Motion as action of the subject (not as determination of an object)\*—consequently, the synthesis of the diverse in space—if we make abstraction of this, and only pay attention to the action by which we determine the internal sense according to its form, first produces in fact, the conception of succession. The understanding therefore does not, as it were, *find* already in this sense such conjunction of the diverse, but *produces it*, since the understanding affects the sense. But how the I which thinks, can be different from the I which envisages itself, inasmuch as I can still represent to myself other modes of intuition at least as possible, and yet be identical with this latter as the same subject, and how therefore I can say, I, as Intelligence and *thinking* Subject know myself, as Object thought, so far moreover as I am given to myself in the intuition, only, like other phenomena, not as I am prior to the understanding, but as I appear to myself—this has neither more nor less

\* Motion of an *object* in space does not belong to a pure science, consequently not to Geometry, since that something is moveable cannot be known, *a priori*, but only from experience. But motion as *Describing* of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the diverse in the internal intuition in general, by means of the productive imagination, and does not belong only to geometry, but in fact to transcendental philosophy.

difficulty in it, than how I can be to myself in general an object, and, in fact, of intuition and of internal perceptions. But still that it must really be so, can clearly be demonstrated, if space is held valid as a simple pure form of the phenomena of the external senses, from this, that we cannot render time, which still is no object at all of external intuition, representable to ourselves, except under the form of a line, so far as we draw it—without which kind of representation, we could not at all know the unity of its dimension;—and, likewise, that we must always take the determination of lengths of time or points of time in respect of all internal perceptions, from that which external things offer to us of what is changeable. Consequently we must order the determinations of the internal sense as phenomena in time, in the same way exactly as we order those of the external sense in space; and hence, if we grant as to the latter that we only know objects thereby, so far as we are externally affected, we must also admit of the internal sense, that we thereby only so envisage ourselves as we are affected inwardly of ourselves; that is—as to what concerns the internal intuition, our own subject is to be known only as phenomenon, but not in respect of that which it is in itself.\*

## XXV.

On the other hand, I am conscious of myself in the transcendental synthesis of the diversity of representation in general, consequently in the synthetical original unity of apperception; not as I appear to

\* I do not see how so much difficulty can be found in this, that the internal sense is affected by ourselves. Each act of the *Attention* may afford us an example of it. The understanding always determines therein the internal sense, in conformity with the conjunction which it thinks, to internal intuition, which intuition corresponds to the diversity in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is commonly hereby affected, each will be able to perceive in himself.

myself, nor as I in myself am, but only that I am. *This representation is a Thought, not an Intuition.* Now as for the *cognition* of ourselves, besides the action of thought, which reduces the diversity of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a definite kind of intuition is still requisite whereby this diversity is given, so is in fact my own existence, not phenomenon (much less mere appearance):—but the determination of my existence\* can only occur agreeably to a form of the internal sense, according to the particular mode in which the diversity that I connect, is given in the internal intuition, and thus I have therefore no *cognition* of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of one self, is therefore still far from being a cognition of one self, notwithstanding all the categories that make up the thought of an object in general, through conjunction of the diverse in an apperception. As in regard to the cognition of an object different to myself, besides the thought of an object in general (in the category), I also stand in need of an intuition, whereby I may determine that general conception, so I still require for the cognition of myself, besides consciousness, or besides this that I think me myself, an intuition of the diversity in me, whereby I determine these thoughts—and I exist as Intelligence, that is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction, but in respect of the diversity which it is to conjoin, subjected to a limiting conjunction which

\* The “I think,” expresses the act of determining my existence. The existence is therefore already thereby given, but the mode by which I am to determine it, that is to place in myself the diversity belonging to the same, is not given thereby. To this self-intuition belongs, which has a given form *a priori*, that is, time lying at the foundation, which is sensible, and belongs to the receptivity of the Determinable. Now if I have not besides another self intuition, which gives the *Determining* in me, the spontaneity of which I am only conscious of, and before the act of *Determination*—as Time gives the Determinable—I cannot determine my existence, as a spontaneous being, but I represent to myself only the spontaneity of my thought, that is to say, of determining—and my existence still always remains only determinable sensibly that is, as the existence of a phenomenon. Yet this Spontaneity is the cause, that I call myself *Intelligence*.



it terms the internal sense—and that conjunction only according to relationships of time, which lie entirely out of the proper conceptions of the understanding can I make perceptible, and consequently know only itself, as in respect of an intuition, (which cannot be intellectual and given by the understanding itself,) it merely appears to itself, not as it would cognize itself, if its *intuition* were intellectual.

## XXVI.

TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE GENERAL POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE-USE OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

In the *Metaphysical deduction*, the origin of the categories à priori, in general, was proved by their perfect accordance with the general logical functions of thinking,—but in the *transcendental* the possibility thereof was shown as cognition à priori of objects of an intuition in general (§ 20 and 21). Now the possibility is to be explained of cognizing, à priori, by categories, the objects that at all times may be *presented to our senses*, and not indeed according to the form of their intuition, but to the laws of their conjunction,—consequently, as it were, prescribing the law to nature and making it even possible. For without this its fitness, would it not be evident how every thing that can be presented only to our senses must stand under the laws which spring alone à priori out of the understanding.

First, I call to mind, that under the *synthesis of apprehension* I understand the composition of the diverse in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is to say, empirical consciousness of this intuition as phenomenon is possible.

We have forms of the external as well as of

internal sensible intuition, à priori, in the representations of time and space, and to these must the synthesis of the apprehension of the diverse of the phenomenon at all times be conformable; because it itself can only take place according to these forms. But space and time are not merely represented as *Forms* of sensible intuition, but as *intuitions* themselves, (which contain a diversity); consequently with the determination of the *Unity* of this diversity in them à priori. (See Transcendental *Æsthetic*).<sup>\*</sup> Consequently *unity of the synthesis* of the diversity, is itself already given either out of or in us—therefore likewise a *conjunction* to which must be conformable à priori, all that is to be represented, determined in space and time, as condition of the synthesis of all *apprehension*, *already* at the same time *with* (not in) these intuitions. But this synthetical unity cannot be any other, than the conjunction of the diverse of a given *intuition in general* in an original consciousness, only applied to *our sensible intuition* according to the categories. Thus all synthesis, whereby perception itself is possible, is subjected to the categories, and as experience is cognition by means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience,—and are therefore valid also à priori for all objects of experience.

If therefore for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house, through apperception of its diversity, into a perception, the *necessary unity* of

\* Space represented as *object* (as it is required really in Geometry) contains more in an *intuitive* representation than the mere form of the intuition, namely the *composition* of the diverse, given according to the form of the sensibility, so that the *form of the intuition* gives merely the diversity, but the formal intuition, the unity of the representation. This unity in the *Æsthetic* I have simply enumerated as belonging to sensibility, in order only to remark that it precedes every conception, although in fact it presupposes a *synthesis* which does not belong to the senses, but through which all conceptions of Space and Time become first possible. For as through (since the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity thus of this intuition à priori, belongs to space and time,—and not to the conception of the understanding. (§ 24).

space, and of the external sensible intuition in general, lies at the foundation within me, and I draw, as it were, its form agreeably to this synthetical unity of the diverse in space. Even this synthetical unity, if I make abstraction of the form of space, has its seat in the understanding, and is the category of the *Synthesis of the homogeneous* in an intuition in general,—that is the category of *Quantity*, to which therefore the stated synthesis of apprehension, that is to say, perception, must be absolutely conformable.\*

If (in another example) I observe the congelation of water I apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity) which as such, stand towards one another, in a relation of time. But in time, as I lie at the foundation of the phenomenon as *internal intuition*, I represent to myself necessarily synthetical *unity* of the diversity, without which the stated relation could not be given, *determined* in an intuition—(in respect of succession of time). But now this synthetical unity, as condition *à priori*, under which I conjoin the diversity of an *intuition in general*, if I make abstraction of the constant form of my internal intuition, time, is the category of *cause*, by means of which, if I apply it to my sensibility, *I determine according to its relation all that happens in time in general*. Consequently the apprehension in such an event, and therefore the event itself, according to its possible perception, is subject to the conception of the relationship of effects and causes: and the same takes place in all other cases.

Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws *à priori* to phenomena, and consequently to nature, as

\* In such a way it is proved, that the synthesis of the apprehension which is empirical, must be necessarily conformable to the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual, and is entirely contained *à priori* in the category. It is one, and the same spontaneity, which in one case under the name of imagination, and in the other under that of understanding, produces conjunction in the diversity of the intuition.

the complex of all phenomena (*natura materialiter spectata*); and the question now arises, how, since they are not derived from nature, and do not regulate themselves according to it as their model, (else would they be merely empirical,) can it be comprehended, that nature must be regulated according to them, that is to say, how they can determine, *à priori*, the conjunction of the diversity of nature, without deducing it from nature. This is the solution of this enigma.

It is not now more surprising how the laws of the phenomena in nature must coincide with the understanding, and its form *à priori*, that is, with its faculty of *conjoining* the diverse in general, than how the phenomena themselves must coincide with the form of the sensible intuition *à priori*. For laws exist just as little in phenomena, except only relatively to the subject to which the phenomena adhere so far as the subject has understanding, as phenomena exist not of themselves, but only relative to the same being so far as this has sense. Legitimacy would also belong necessarily to things in themselves independent of the understanding which cognizes them. But phenomena are only representations of things, which, as to what they may be in themselves, exist unknown to us. But as mere representations, they are subject to no law of connexion but that which the connecting faculty prescribes. — Now that which connects the diversity of the sensible intuition, is the imagination, which, according to the unity of its intellectual synthesis depends upon the understanding, and upon the sensibility according to the diversity of the apprehension. And as all possible perception depends upon the synthesis of the apprehension, but as it itself, this empirical synthesis, depends upon the transcendental one, consequently upon the categories, all possible perceptions, and therefore also all which can

ever attain to empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature, in respect of their conjunction, must be subjected to the categories, from which, nature (simply considered as nature in general) as the original ground of its necessary legitimacy (*natura formaliter spectata*), depends. But to extra laws than those on which a *nature in general* reposes, as legitimacy of the phenomena in space and time, the pure faculty of understanding does not reach for prescribing laws *à priori* to phenomena, by means of mere categories. Particular laws, since they regard empirically determined phenomena, cannot be derived completely therefrom, although collectively they are all subjected thereto. For this experience must be added, in order to learn to know these last generally—but as to experience in general, and that which can be known as an object of the same, the first laws alone *à priori* afford instruction.

## XXVII.

### RESULT OF THIS DEDUCTION OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

We can think no object, except by the categories, we can know no thought object, except by intuitions, that correspond to those conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensible, and this cognition, so far as the object of the same is given, is empirical. But empirical cognition is experience. Consequently, no *cognition à priori* is possible to us, except of *objects of possible experience*.\*

\* In order that we should not in a hasty manner take offence at the disadvantageous consequences to be apprehended from this proposition, I will only call to remembrance, that the categories in *thought* are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but that they have an unlimited field, and that only the *cognizing* of that which we think, the determining of the object, requires intuition, yet wanting this last, the thought of the object still may always have its true and useful consequences *in the use of reason* belonging to the subject, but which use itself moreover can here not be propounded, since it is not always directed to the determination of the object, and therefore to its cognition, but also to that of the subject and its will.

But this cognition, which is merely limited to objects of experience, is not on that account all deduced from experience; but as to what concerns pure intuitions, as well as pure understanding-conceptions, these are elements of cognition, which may be met with in us *à priori*. Now there are only two ways by which a necessary accordance of experience with the conceptions of its objects, can be thought—either experience makes these conceptions possible, or these conceptions make experience possible. The former does not take place, in respect of the categories, (nor for pure sensible intuition), since they are conceptions *à priori*; consequently, independent of experience, (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of *generatio equivoca*.) The second way, therefore, only remains, as it were, a system of *Epigenesis* of pure reason, that is to say, that the categories, with regard to the understanding, contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general. But in which way they make experience possible, and what principles of the possibility of the same they furnish in their application to phenomena, the following chapter, on the transcendental use of the faculty of Judgment, will fully teach.

If any one should still wish to propose a middle way, between the two named particular ways, that is to say, that the categories were neither self thought first principles, *à priori*, of our cognition, nor yet derived from experience, but subjective dispositions implanted for thinking at the same time with our existence, which were so ordered by our Creator, that their use coincided exactly with the laws of nature upon which experience is formed, (a sort of *Preformation system* of pure Reason,) yet (independently of this, that no end is to be seen to such an hypothesis, as to how far one might push the supposition of predetermined dispositions for future judgments,) this, would be decisive against the ima-

gined middle way, that in such a case that *necessity* would be wanting to the categories which belongs essentially to the conceptions of them. As, for example, the conception of cause, which expresses the necessity of a consequence under a presupposed condition, would be false, if it only rested upon an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us for conjoining certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relationship. I should not be able to say, the effect is conjoined with the cause in the object (that is, necessarily), but only that I am so formed, that I cannot think this representation otherwise than so connected, which is exactly that which the sceptic most desires, for then all our knowledge by means of the presumed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but mere appearance; and there would not be wanting persons who would refuse to admit this in itself subjective necessity (which must be felt): at least one could not dispute with any one in respect of that which merely rests upon the way in which his subject (*he individually*) is organized.

#### SHORT CONCEPTION OF THIS DEDUCTION.

This is the exposition of the pure conceptions of the understanding, (and with them of all theoretical cognition *à priori*,) as principles of the possibility of experience—but of this experience, as *Determination* of phenomena in space and in time *in general*;—in fine, of this experience, from the principle of the *original* synthetical unity of apperception as the form of the understanding in reference to space and time, as original forms of the sensibility.

Up to this point only do I hold the division by paragraphs to be necessary, because we have had to do with elementary conceptions. As we now wish to represent the use of them, the exposition may be proceeded with, in uninterrupted connection, without these paragraphs.

## TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICK.

## SECOND BOOK.

## THE ANALYTICK OF PRINCIPLES.

General logic is built upon a plan which coincides precisely with the division of the before-mentioned faculties of cognition. These are the *Understanding*, the *faculty of Judgment*, and *Reason*. This doctrine treats therefore in its Analytick, of *conceptions*, *judgments*, and *conclusions*, exactly in conformity with the functions and the order of those powers of the mind, which we comprehend in general under the wide denomination of the understanding.

As such mere formal logic makes abstraction of all content of cognition, (whether it is pure or empirical,) and only is occupied in general with the form of thought (discursive cognition,) it can also embrace in its analytical part the canon of Reason, the form of which has its certain rule, which can be perceived *à priori*, by means of the simple dissection of the actions of reason, in their different moments, without bringing into consideration the particular nature of the thereby employed cognition.

Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a definite content, namely, to pure cognitions *à priori*, cannot imitate formal logic in this division. For it is obvious that the transcendental use of reason is not at all objectively valid; and, consequently, does not belong to the *Logic of Truth*, that is, to Analytick, but that as a *Logic of Appearance* it claims a particular part of the scholastic system, under the name of *Transcendental Dialectick*.



Understanding and the faculty of Judgment have therefore their canon of objectively valid consequently true use, in transcendental logic, and therefore belong to its analytical part. But *Reason*, in its endeavours to decide something as to objects à priori, and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible experience is entirely *dialectical*, and its assertions of appearance cannot at all accommodate themselves to a canon, although the analytick should contain such.

The *Analytick* of principles is consequently only a canon for the *faculty of judgment*, which canon teaches judgment to apply to phenomena, the conceptions of the understanding which contain the condition for rules à priori. From this cause, in taking the especial principles of the *understanding* for thema, I will make use of the term *Doctrine of the faculty of judgment*, whereby this matter will be more particularly indicated.

## INTRODUCTION.

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT  
IN GENERAL.

If the understanding in general be explained as the faculty of rules, the faculty of Judgment is that of *subsuming* under rules ; that is to say, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule, (*casus datæ legis*.) General logic does not contain any precepts, nor can it contain any for the faculty of judgment. For as it *makes abstraction* of all *content of cognition*, nothing more remains to it than the business of exposing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions, judgments, and conclusions, and thereby of establishing formal rules of all use of the understanding. Now if logic wished to show generally how we are to subsume under these rules, that is, to distinguish whether something did or did not stand under these, this again could not occur otherwise than by means of a rule. But this, because it is a rule, requires precisely, on that account, a fresh direction of the faculty of judgment, and, it is thus obvious, that the understanding is capable indeed of construction and preparation, by means of rules, but that the faculty of judgment is a particular talent, which is not to be taught, but only exercised, and this, consequently, is the speciality of the so-called mother-wit, the want of which no schooling can supply ; for although this may offer to, and as it

were, graft upon a limited understanding, rules in abundance borrowed from another mind, still the faculty of availing himself correctly of these must belong to the learner himself; and no rule which we could prescribe to him with this intention is, under the deficiency of such a natural gift, secure from misuse.\* A physician, therefore, a judge, or politician, may have many excellent pathological, judicial, or political rules in his head, to such a degree that he himself may become therein a profound teacher, and yet in the application of these will easily make a mistake, either because he is deficient in natural judgment (although not in understanding), and certainly can see the general in abstracto, but cannot distinguish whether a case, in concreto, fall under it, or from this cause, that he has not sufficiently been trained by examples and real business to this judgment. This is likewise the *single* and great use of examples, that they sharpen the faculty of judgment. For as to what concerns the correctness and precision of the understanding's insight, generally they rather do some detriment to the same; since they but seldom adequately fulfil the condition of the rule, (as *casus in terminis*,) and, besides, frequently weaken that effort of the understanding for seeing into rules in general, according to their sufficiency, independently of the particular circumstances of experience; and thus they accustom the judgment to use them at least more as formulæ than principles. Examples are thus, as it were, the go-cart of the faculty of judgment, which he never dispenses with, who is wanting in natural talent as to this.

\* The want of the faculty of judgment is properly that which we term stupidity, and such a *failing* is not to be remedied. A stupid or limited head, which is wanting in nothing but in the requisite degree of understanding and its proper conceptions, may be furnished very well by instruction, even in fact to erudition. But as then commonly there is the want alluded to (*secunda Petri*), it is not unusual to meet with very learned men, who in the use of their science frequently let this irremediable deficiency appear.

But now although *universal logic* cannot give any precepts to the faculty of judgment, yet transcendental logic is quite otherwise circumstanced,—so that it even appears, as if the latter had for its particular business to correct and secure, by means of determinate rules, the faculty of judgment in the use of pure understanding. For philosophy does not seem at all necessary, or rather to be wrongly employed, for the purpose of obtaining extension for the understanding in the field of pure cognition *à priori*—consequently as Doctrine—since from all the attempts hitherto made, still so little ground or none at all, has thereby been gained; but as Critick in order to guard against the false steps of the faculty of judgment (*lapsus judicii*), in the use of the few pure conceptions of the understanding which we have, (although the advantage there is only negative), philosophy is called upon for this, with all its acuteness and art of examination.

But transcendental philosophy has this peculiar to it, that besides the rule, (or rather the general condition for rules) which is given in the pure conception of the understanding, it can indicate at the same time *à priori*, the case whereupon these rules are to be applied. The cause of the preference which it has in this point, beyond all other instructing sciences, (except mathematics) lies just in this, that it treats of conceptions, which are to refer to their objects *à priori*—consequently their objective validity cannot be demonstrated *à posteriori*: for that would leave the dignity of the same quite undisturbed: but it must expose at the same time in general or in sufficient characters, the conditions under which objects can be given in accordance with such conceptions. In the contrary case they would be without content, consequently mere logical forms, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.

*This transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judg-*

*ment* will then contain two chapters—the first which treats of the sensible condition under which pure conception of the understanding alone can be used, that is to say, the Schematism of the pure understanding ; and the second, of those synthetic judgments which flow from pure conceptions of the understanding, under these conditions *à priori*, and which lie at the foundation of all other cognitions *à priori*—that is to say, the principles of the pure understanding.

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE  
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT,  
(OR ANALYTICK OF PRINCIPLES.)

FIRST CHAPTER.

OF THE SCHEMATISM OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF  
THE UNDERSTANDING.

In all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation of the former must be *homogeneous* with the latter, that is to say, the conception must contain that which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it, since the expression that an object is contained in a conception, means this. The empirical conception of a *plate*, has thus homogeneousness with the pure geometrical one of a *circle*, since the roundness which is thought in the first is envisaged in the latter.

But now pure conceptions of the understanding, in comparison with empirical (indeed generally with sensible) intuition, are quite heterogeneous, and can never be met with in any intuition. Now, how is the *subsumption* of the latter under the former, consequently the application of the categories to phenomena possible, as still no one can say, that this—for example, causality—can be envisaged by the senses, and is contained in the phenomenon? Now this so natural and important question, is properly the cause which makes a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment necessary, in order, for instance, to show the possibility, how *pure conceptions of the understanding* can be applied in general to phenomena. In

all other sciences, where the conceptions by which the object in general is thought, are not thus different to and heterogeneous from those which represent this object in concreto, as it is given, it is unnecessary respecting the application of the former to the last, to afford a particular explanation.

It is now clear that there is a third way, which must stand on the one hand with the category, on the other with the phenomenon, in homogeneity, and renders possible the application of the first to the last. This mediating representation must be pure (without any thing empirical), and yet on the one side *intellectual*, on the other *sensible*. Such a one is the *transcendental schema*.

The conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical unity of the diverse in general. Time, as the formal condition of the diversity of the internal sense, consequently of the connexion of all representations, contains a diversity *à priori* in the pure intuition. Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the *category* (which constitutes the unity thereof), as it is *general* and reposes upon a rule *à priori*. And, on the other hand, it is so far homogeneous with the *phenomenon*, as time is contained in every empirical representation of the diverse. Consequently an application of the category to phenomena is possible, by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the last under the first.

According to what has been shewn in the deduction of the categories, nobody will, it is to be hoped, remain in doubt, as to deciding upon the question, whether these pure conceptions of the understanding are of merely pure or also transcendental use,—that is to say, whether they only, as conditions of a possible experience, refer *à priori* to phenomena, or whether

as conditions of the possibility of things in general, they can be extended to objects in themselves, (without some restriction as to our sensibility). For as we have seen that conceptions are quite impossible, and cannot have any meaning where, either to themselves, or at least to the elements whereof they consist an object is not given, they cannot consequently at all extend to things in themselves (irrespective of whether and how they may be given to us); and farther, that the only mode in which things can be given to us, is the modification of our sensibility; and finally, that pure conceptions *à priori*, besides the function of the understanding in the category, must also contain *à priori*, formal conditions of sensibility (namely, of the internal sense,) which contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. We will call this, formal and pure condition of the sensibility, to which the conception of the understanding is restricted in its use—the *schema* of this conception of the understanding, and the procedure of the understanding with these schemata we will name the *schematism* of the pure understanding.

The schema is always in itself a product only of imagination, but since the synthesis of this last, has for its end no individual intuition, but only the unity in the determination of the sensibility, the schema is still to be distinguished from the image. Thus, when I set five points one after another . . . . . this is an image of the number five. On the contrary, when I only think a number in general, which may be five or hundred, this thinking is then more the representation of a method of representing a multitude (for example a thousand) in an image, according to a certain conception, than the image itself, which in the latter case I should with difficulty be able to look over, and to compare with the conception. Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination,



in order to procure for a conception its image, I term the schema to this conception.

Images of objects indeed do not lie, but schemata, at the foundation of our pure sensible conceptions. To the conception of a triangle in general, no image thereof would ever be adequate. For it would never attain to the universality of the conception, whence it results that this conception is valid for all right or oblique-angled, &c.—but would always be limited only to a part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle, can never exist elsewhere than in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination, in respect of pure figures in space. An object of experience, or image thereof, still attains much less to the empirical conception, but this refers always immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule of the determination of our intuition according to a certain general conception. The conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to which my imagination can trace the figure of a four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any individual particular figure which experience offers to me, or yet any possible image which I can figure to myself in concreto. This schematismus of our understanding in respect of phenomena, and their mere form is a concealed art in the depths of the human soul, the true handling of which we shall with difficulty ever divine from nature, and lay open to our view. Thus much only can we say, that the *image* is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination,—the *schema* of sensible conceptions (as of figures in space) is a product, and as it were a monogram of the pure imagination à priori, by which, and according to which, the images are first of all possible, but which always must be connected with the conception by means of the schema which they indicate, and with which in itself they do not entirely congrue. On

the contrary, the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something which cannot be brought into any image at all, but is only the pure synthesis, which the category expresses, conformably to the rule of unity according to conceptions in general, and is a transcendental product of the imagination, which product concerns the determination of the internal sense in general, according to conditions of its form (time), in respect of all representations, so far as these, conformably to the unity of the apprehension are to cohere in a conception *à priori*.

Without delaying ourselves at present with a dry and tedious analysis of that which is required for the transcendental schemata of pure conceptions of the understanding in general, we prefer exposing them according to the order of the categories and in connexion therewith.

The pure image of all quantities (*quantorum*) for the external sense, is space—but that of all objects of the senses in general, is time. But the pure *schema of quantity* (*quantitatis*), as a conception of the understanding, is *number*, which is a representation comprehending the successive addition of one to one (of the same kind). Consequently, number is nothing else but unity of the synthesis of the diversity of an homogeneous intuition in general, in this way that I generate the sum itself in the apprehension of the intuition.

Reality in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; consequently is that, the conception whereof indicates, in itself, a being (in time). Negation is that, the conception of which represents a non-being (in time). The opposition of both occurs therefore in the difference of the same time, as filled or void. As time is only the form of the intuition, consequently of objects, as phenomena, that which answers in these to sensation, is the transcendental matter of all objects, as things in themselves (the *Sachheit* reality).

Now every sensation has a degree or quantity, whereby it can more or less fill the same time—that is, the internal sense in respect of this representation of an object until it terminates in nothing (=0=negatio.) Therefore there is a relation and coherence, or rather a transition from reality to negation, which makes representable every reality as a quantum; and the schema of a reality, as of the quantity of something, so far as it fills time, is precisely this continual and uniform production of the same in time—since we descend in time from the sensation which has a certain degree, until its disappearance, or we ascend gradually from the negation to the quantity of it.

The Schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time, that is to say, the representation of this as a substratum of the empirical determination of time in general, which substratum therefore remains whilst all the rest changes.—(Time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the changeable. To time, consequently, which is itself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds in the phenomenon the unchangeable in existence, that is to say, substance, and only in this can the succession and co-existence of the phenomenon, in respect of time, be determined).

The Schema of cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real, whereupon, if it is fixed at pleasure, something else always follows. It consists, therefore, in the succession of the diverse, in so far as this is subjected to a rule.

The Schema of community (reciprocity,) or of the mutual causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is the contemporaneousness of the determinations of the one with those of the other, according to a general rule.

The Schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general (for example, as opposites cannot be in one thing contemporaneously, but only

successively,) it is consequently the determination of the representation of a thing in a time.

The Schema of reality is existence in a determinate time.

The Schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time.

Now we see from all this, that the schema of each category—for instance, that of Quantity—contains and makes representable the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality, the synthesis of sensation (perception with the representation of time or filling of time); the schema of relation, the relationships of the perceptions one with another in all time, (that is, according to a rule of the determination of time.) Lastly, the schema of modality and its categories, time itself, as the correlative of the determination of an object, whether and how it belongs to time. The schemata therefore are nothing but *determinations of time* à priori, according to rules; and these, conformably to the order of the categories, concern the *series of time*, the *content of time*, the *order of time*, and finally the *whole of time*, in respect of all possible objects.

Hence it is now apparent, that the schematism of the understanding by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, terminates in nothing else but the unity of all diversity of the intuition in the internal sense, and thus indirectly in the unity of the apprehension, as function which corresponds to the internal sense (a receptivity.) Therefore the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true and only conditions for procuring for these a reference to objects, consequently *meaning*; and the categories therefore finally have no other than a possible empirical use, since they merely serve for this, by reason of an à priori necessary unity, (on account of the necessary uniting of all consciousness

in an original apperception,) to subject phenomena to the general rules of synthesis, and thereby to render them suitable for a general connexion in experience.

But in the whole of all possible experience lie all our cognitions, and in the universal reference to this transcendental truth consists, which precedes all empirical truth, and renders it possible.

But still it is evident, that although the schemata of sensibility first of all realize the categories, they also nevertheless restrict them ; that is, limit them to conditions which lie out of the understanding, (that is to say, which are in the sensibility). Consequently the schema is properly the phenomenon, or the sensible conception of an object, in unison with the category, (*numerus est quantitas Phænomenon—sensatio realitas phænomenon—constans, et perdurable rerum substantia phænomenon—æternitas, necessitas, phænomena, &c.*) Now if we omit a restrictive condition, we amplify as it appears the previous limited conception ; so that the categories in their pure signification, without any conditions of sensibility, would be valid for things *as they are*, in place of which their schemata only *represent them as they appear* ; therefore, the former have a signification independent of all schemata, and more widely extended. In fact, to the pure conceptions of the understanding, decidedly, and after abstraction is made of all sensible condition, a signification though only a logical one, of the pure unity of the representations remains, but to which no object, consequently no meaning can be given, which could give a conception of the object. Thus, for example, Substance, when I omit the sensible determination of permanence, would mean nothing but a something that can be thought as subject (without being predicate of something else). Now I can make nothing of this representation, because it does not indicate to me, what

determinations the thing has, which is to be valid as such first subject. Therefore the categories without schemata are only functions of the understanding for conceptions, but they represent no object. This meaning comes to them from the sensibility, which realizes, whilst at the same time it restricts, the understanding.

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE  
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT,  
(OR ANALYTICK OF PRINCIPLES.)

*SECOND CHAPTER.*

SYSTEM OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE  
UNDERSTANDING.

In the preceding chapter we have considered the transcendental faculty of judgment, only according to the general conditions under which alone it is authorized to use pure conceptions of the understanding for synthetical judgments. At present it is our business to represent the judgments which the understanding under this critical circumspection really effects *à priori*, in systematic conjunction, to which undoubtedly our table of the categories must give us the natural and sure direction. For these are precisely what in their reference to possible experience must constitute all pure understanding-cognition *à priori*, and whose relationship to sensibility in general will, for that reason, expose to view completely and in a system, all the transcendental principles of the use of the understanding.

Principles *à priori* bear the name not merely on this account, that they contain in themselves the foundation of other judgments, but because they are not themselves grounded upon higher and more general cognitions. Still this property does not exempt them always from a proof. For although such could not be carried further objectively, but rather lies at the foundation of all cognition of its object, this still does not prevent a proof from being possible to be procured from the subjective sources of the possi-

bility of a cognition of an object in general, nay, even that it is necessary, since the proposition otherwise would bring upon itself the greatest suspicion of a mere subreptitious assertion.

In the second place, we will limit ourselves to those principles which refer to the categories. The principles of transcendental æsthetick, according to which space and time are the conditions of the possibility of all things as phenomena, together with the restriction of these principles, namely, that they cannot be referred to things in themselves, do not therefore belong to our marked-out field of investigation. Equally so, the principles of mathematics form no part of this system, since they are drawn only from the intuition, and not from the pure conceptions of the understanding ; their possibility, however, as they are still synthetical judgments *à priori*, will here necessarily find a place, not indeed in order to show their correctness and apodictical certainty, which they do not at all require, but only to deduce and to make comprehensible the possibility of such evident cognitions *à priori*.

But we shall have also to speak as to the principle of analytical judgments, and this, indeed, in opposition with synthetical ones, with which we properly occupy ourselves, because precisely this opposition frees the theory of the latter from all misunderstanding, and lays it clearly before us in its particular nature.



OF THE SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE  
PURE UNDERSTANDING.

## FIRST DIVISION.

OF THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE OF ALL ANALYTICAL  
JUDGMENTS.

Of whatever content our cognition may be, and however it may refer to the object, yet the universal, although certainly only negative, condition of all our judgments in general, is, that they do not contradict one another; otherwise these judgments are nothing in themselves, (in fact without reference to an object). But although there be no contradiction in our judgment, yet it can, notwithstanding this, still so connect conception as the object does not require, or without even any foundation whatever either *a priori* or *a posteriori* being given to us which justified such a judgment,—and thus a judgment, in spite of this, that it is free from all internal contradiction, may still be either false, or without foundation.

Now the principle that a predicate does not belong to any thing which contradicts it,—is termed the principle of contradiction, and is a general although only negative criterium of truth. But it also belongs on this account purely to logic because it is valid for cognitions, merely as cognitions in general, without regard to their content, and asserts, that contradiction entirely annihilates and destroys them.

But we can likewise moreover make a positive use of this,—that is, not only in order to banish falsehood and error, (so far as it rests upon contradiction) but also to cognize truth. For if the *judgment be analy-*

*tical*, whether negative or affirmative, the truth thereof must be able to be known sufficiently, according to the principle of contradiction. For the contrary is always justly negated of that which lies already and is thought, as conception in the cognition of the object, but the conception itself must necessarily be affirmed of the same, because the opposite as to it would contradict the object.

Consequently, we must hold as valid the *principle of contradiction*, as the general and fully sufficient principle of all analytical *cognition*; but its authority and utility likewise extend no further, as a sufficient criterium of truth. For, that no cognition can be contrary to it, without annihilating itself, makes this proposition certainly into a *conditio sine qua non*, but not into a ground of determination of the truth of our cognition. As we have now properly only to do with the synthetical part of our cognition, we shall always be very cautious, never to act in opposition to this inviolable principle, but from it, in respect of the truth of the like kind of cognition (*the synthetical*) we can never expect any elucidation.

But of this celebrated although deprived of all content and merely formal principle, there is still a formula containing a synthesis, which from inadvertence, and quite unnecessarily, has been mixed up therein. It is this: "It is impossible that something can and cannot be at the same time." Independent of this, that here the apodictical certainty (by means of the word *impossible*) has been added unnecessarily, which certainty must of itself be yet understood from the proposition; the proposition is thus affected by the determination of time, and says, as it were, a thing, = A, which something is = B, cannot at the same time be non B, but it can very well be both (B as well as non B) in succession. For example, a man who is young, cannot be at the same time old, but the same person can very well be young at one

time,—at another not young, that is, be old. Now the principle of contradiction, as a mere logical principle, must not at all restrict its claims to the relationships of time, and consequently such a formula is quite opposed to its intention. The misapprehension arises simply from this; that we first separate a predicate of a thing from the conception of it, and afterwards, with this predicate, we connect its contrary, which never gives a contradiction with the subject, but only with its predicate, which synthetically is connected with that subject, and then only in fact when the first and second predicate are placed in the same time. If I say a man who is unlearned, is not learned, the condition of, *at the same time*, must be understood; for he who is unlearned at one time, may very well be learned at another. But if I say no unlearned man is learned, the proposition is analytical, since the sign (the unlearnedness), now constitutes the conception of the subject, and then the negative proposition is evident immediately from the principle of contradiction, without it being necessary that the condition, *at the same time*, need be added. This also then is the cause why I have before changed in such a manner the formula of this principle, so that the nature of an analytical proposition thereby is clearly expressed.

OF THE SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE  
PURE UNDERSTANDING.*SECOND DIVISION.*OF THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE OF ALL SYNTHETICAL  
JUDGMENTS.

The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgments is a problem with which general logic has nothing to do, the name of which, even, it need not ever know. But in transcendental logic, it is the most important matter of all, and indeed the only one, provided the question is with respect to the possibility of synthetical judgements *à priori*, together with the conditions and the extent of their validity. For, after the completion of this, it can entirely fulfil its object, namely, that of determining the compass and limits of the pure understanding.

In the analytical judgment, I stop at the given conception, in order to make out something with respect to it. If it is to be affirmative, I merely attribute to this conception, that which was already thought in it. If it is to be negative, I exclude only the contrary thereof from it. But in synthetical judgments, I must go beyond the given conception, in order to consider, in reference to the same, something quite different from that which was thought in it,—which therefore is never either a relationship of identity or of contradiction,—and whereby in the judgment in itself, neither the truth nor the error can be seen.

Granted, therefore, that we must go out beyond a given conception, in order to compare it with another synthesis, a third thing is then necessary, wherein

alone the synthesis of two conceptions can take place. Now what is this third thing as the medium of all synthetical judgments? It is only a complex, wherein all our representations are contained, namely, the internal sense, and the form thereof *à priori*, time. The synthesis of representations rests upon the imagination, but their synthetic unity, (which is requisite for judgments) upon the unity of the apperception. Herein is to be sought, therefore, the possibility of synthetical judgments; and as all three contain the sources of representations *à priori*, herein also is to be sought the possibility of pure synthetical judgments,—indeed they will even be necessary from these principles, provided a cognition of objects is to be effected, which merely reposes upon the synthesis of representations.

If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, is to refer to an object, and to have sense and meaning in respect to it, the object must be able to be given in some way. Without this the conceptions are void, and though we certainly have thought thereby, yet in fact, by this thinking have we cognized nothing, but merely played with representations. To give an object—if this again be not meant to represent in the intuition mediately only but immediately—this is nothing else but to refer the representation of the object to experience, (whether real, or yet possible). Even space and time, pure as these conceptions are from all that is empirical, and also certain as it is that they are fully represented *à priori* in the mind, would still be without objective validity, and without sense and meaning, if their necessary use to objects of experience were not shewn; indeed their representation is a pure schema, which always refers to the reproductive imagination, which calls up the objects of experience, and without which they would have no meaning: and it is thus with all conceptions without distinction.

The *possibility of experience* is therefore that which gives to all our cognitions *à priori* objective reality. Now experience reposes upon the synthetical unity of phenomena, that is, upon a synthesis, according to conceptions of the object of phenomena in general—without which experience would not ever be cognition, but a rhapsody of perceptions, which would not arrange themselves together in any context, according to the rules of an universally connected (possible) consciousness, and consequently also not for a transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Experience, therefore, has lying at its foundation, principles of its form, *à priori*, that is to say, general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena; the objective reality of which, and indeed the possibility thereof, as necessary conditions, can always be shown in experience. But without this reference, synthetical propositions *à priori* are quite impossible, since they have no third thing, that is, no object, in which the synthetical unity of their conceptions could show objective reality.

Although, therefore, we cognize so much *à priori* in synthetical judgments, of space in general, or of the forms which the productive imagination indicates therein, so that we require really no experience for it, yet this cognition would be nothing at all but occupation with a mere chimera, if space were not to be looked upon as the condition of the phenomena, which constitute the matter of external experience. Hence such pure synthetical judgments refer, although only mediately, to possible experience, or rather to the possibility itself of this, and thereupon alone found the objective validity of their synthesis.

As therefore experience, as empirical synthesis in its possibility, is the only mode of cognition which gives to all other synthesis reality, this also as cognition *à priori*, has only thereby truth (accordance with the object), inasmuch as it contains

nothing farther than what is necessary to the synthetical unity of experience in general.

The supreme principle of all synthetical judgments is, therefore, that every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the diversity of the intuition in a possible experience.

In such a way synthetical judgments *à priori* are possible, if we refer the formal conditions of intuition *à priori*, the synthesis of the imagination, and the necessary unity of this in a transcendental apperception, to a possible experience-cognition in general, and say, the conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are, at the same time, conditions of the *possibility of the objects of experience*, and have for this reason objective validity in a synthetical judgment *à priori*.

OF THE SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE  
UNDERSTANDING.*THIRD SECTION.*SYSTEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF ALL SYNTHETICAL  
PRINCIPLES OF THIS PURE UNDERSTANDING.

That in general principles exist any where, is only to be ascribed to the pure understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules, in respect of that which happens, but is even the source of principles, according to which all (that which can come before us only as object) is, necessarily, subject to rules, since without such, cognition could never belong to the phenomena of an object corresponding to them. Even the laws of nature, when they are considered as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, carry with them at the same time an expression of necessity, consequently, the presumption at least of a determination from grounds which are valid *a priori* of themselves, and previously to all experience. But all the laws of nature, without distinction, are subject to higher principles of the understanding, since they only apply such to particular cases of the phenomenon. Consequently these principles alone give the conception, which contains the condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a rule in general;—but experience gives the case which is subject to the rule.

That we should regard mere empirical principles, as principles of the pure understanding, or conversely,



there cannot on this account be properly any danger, for the necessity as to conceptions which distinguishes the latter (*principles of the pure understanding*), and the want of which in every empirical proposition, however generally this may still be valid, is easily perceived, can easily prevent this exchange. But there are pure principles, *à priori*, which I, however, should be unwilling to attribute to the pure understanding in particular; for this reason, that they are not derived from pure conceptions, but from pure intuitions, (although through the medium of the understanding); whilst understanding is the faculty of conceptions. Mathematics have such like—but the application of mathematics to experience, consequently their objective validity, indeed the possibility of their synthetical cognition *à priori*, (the deduction thereof,) ever reposes upon the pure understanding.

On this account I will not reckon amongst my principles those of mathematics; but those, in fact, whereupon is founded their possibility and objective validity *à priori*, and which consequently are to be regarded as the principles of those principles, and which proceed from *conceptions* to intuition, but not from *intuition* to conceptions.

In the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to possible experience, the use of their synthesis is either *mathematical* or *dynamical*; for it is directed partly merely to the *intuition*, and partly to the *existence* of a phenomenon in general. But the conditions *à priori* of the intuition are, in respect of a possible experience, absolutely necessary; those of the existence of the objects of a possible empirical intuition, are only in themselves contingent. Hence the principles of mathematical use are unconditionally necessary, that is, they ring apodictically; whilst those of dynamic use will also certainly carry with them the character of a necessity *à priori*, but only under the condition of empirical thinking in an expe-

rience,—and hence only mediately and indirectly—consequently they do not contain that immediate evidence (although without prejudice to their general certainty referable to experience,) which is proper to the first (*the mathematical principles*). But this may be better judged of at the conclusion of this system of principles.

The table of the categories furnishes us with quite the natural indication for the table of principles, inasmuch as the latter are nothing else but rules for the objective use of the former. All principles of the pure understanding are these.

I.	
Axioms	
of	
Intuition.	
II.	III.
Anticipations of	Analogies of
Perception.	Experience.
IV.	
Postulates of	
Empirical Thinking	
in general.	

I have chosen these denominations with attention, in order not to leave unnoticed the distinction in respect of the evidence, and the exercise of these principles. But it will soon be obvious, that in what concerns, as well the evidence, as the determination of phenomena *à priori*, according to the categories of *quantity* and *quality* (provided we pay attention only to the form of the latter,) the principles of these considerably differ therein from the two others; since the first are capable of an intuitive, and the latter of merely a discursive, although on both hands of a complete, certainty. I will therefore name the former the *mathematical*, the latter the *dynamical* prin-

ciples.\* But it is to be observed particularly, that I here have in view just as little the principles of the mathematics in the one case, as the principles of universal (physical) dynamics in the other—but only those of the pure undersanding, in relation to the internal sense, (without distinction of the therein given representations,) whereby the former jointly receive their possibility. I affix a name to these therefore more in consideration of their application, than on account of their content, and now proceed to their examination, in the allotted order in which they are represented in the table.

## I.

## AXIOMS OF INTUITION.

THEIR PRINCIPLE IS—THAT ALL INTUITIONS ARE  
EXTENSIVE QUANTITIES.

## PROOF.

All phenomena contain, according to form, an intuition in space and time, which lies at the foundation of the whole of them *à priori*. They can, therefore, not be apprehended otherwise, that is, received into empirical consciousness, than through the synthesis of the diverse, whereby the representations of a determined space or time are generated; that is,

\* All *conjunction* (conjunctio) is either *composition* (compositio) or *connexion* (nexus). The first is the synthesis of the diverse, of what does not *necessarily belong to one another*, as, for example, the two triangles into which a square is divided by the diagonal, do not belong necessarily to each other; and such is the synthesis of the *homogeneous* in every thing which can be considered *mathematically*, (which synthesis can again be divided into that of *aggregation* and *coalition*, of which the first is directed to *extensive*, and the other to *intensive* quantities). The second conjunction (nexus) is the synthesis of the diverse, as far as *one thing necessarily belongs to another*,—as for example, accident to a substance, or effect to cause,—consequently is represented as *heterogeneous*, yet conjoined *à priori*, which conjunction since it is not voluntary, I therefore call *dynamic*, because it concerns the conjunction of the *existence* of the diverse, (which again can be divided into the *physical* conjunction of phenomena with one another,—and into the *metaphysical*, their conjunction in the faculty of cognition *à priori*).

by the conjunction of the homogeneous, and the consciousness of the synthetic unity of this diverse, (homogeneous). Now the consciousness of the diverse homogeneous in the intuition in general, so far as the representation of an object is thereby first possible, is the conception of a quantity (*quantit*). Consequently, the perception itself of an object as phenomenon, is possible only by means of the same synthetical unity of the diverse of the given sensible intuition, whereby the unity of the junction of the diverse homogeneous is thought in the conception of a *quantity*,—that is, the phenomena are all quantities, and in fact *extensive quantities*, inasmuch as they must be represented as intuitions in space and time, through the same synthesis as that whereby space and time are determined in general.

I call that extensive quantity, in which the representation of the parts renders possible the representation of the whole, (and consequently necessarily precedes it.) I can represent to myself no line, however small it may be, without drawing it in thought, that is, without generating from one point all the parts one after another, and thereby first of all describing this intuition. The same also takes place with every portion, even the smallest, of time. I think to myself therein only the successive progression from one moment to another, where, by means of all the portions of time and their addition, a determinate quantity of time finally is produced. As the simple intuition in all phenomena is either space or time; each phenomenon is as intuition an extensive quantity, (because only through successive synthesis from part to part can it be recognized in its apprehension.) All phenomena are therefore envisaged already as aggregates (multitude of previously given parts), which is not the same case in every kind of quantity, but only in those which, *extensively* as such, are represented to and apprehended by us.

Upon this successive synthesis of the productive imagination in the generation of figures, mathematics of extension (geometry) are founded, together with their axioms, which express the conditions of sensible intuition *à priori* under which alone the schema of a pure conception of the external intuition can take place; as, for example, "Between two points, a straight line only is possible." "Two straight lines include no space, &c." These are the axioms which properly only concern quantities (*quanta*) as such.

But as to what concerns quantity (*quantitas*), that is to say, the answer to the question, How great something is? in respect of this there are nevertheless no axioms in a proper sense, although many of these propositions are synthetical and immediately certain (*indemonstrabilia*). For the propositions that add even to even or that even being deducted from even gives even, are analytical, because I am immediately conscious of the identity of the generation of one quantity with another. But axioms must be synthetical propositions *à priori*. On the other hand, the evident propositions of the relationship of number are indeed absolutely synthetical but not general; as for instance those of geometry; and precisely on this account also, they cannot be called axioms, but only formulæ of numbers. That  $7 + 5 = 12$  is no analytical proposition. For I do not think number 12, either in the representation of 7 or 5, or in the representation of the junction of both. (That I must think this (*number*) from the *addition* of the two, is not here the point—as in an analytical proposition the question is only whether I think the predicate really in the representation of the subject). But although it is synthetical, yet still it is only an individual proposition. So far as the synthesis of the homogeneous (of unities) is here looked at merely, the synthesis can only take place in one way, notwithstanding the use of those numbers afterwards is general. If I say that by means of

three lines, two of which taken together are greater than the third, a triangle may be described, I have thus here the mere function of the productive imagination, which can draw the lines greater or smaller, and likewise let them meet one another arbitrarily at all kinds of angles. On the contrary the number 7 is only possible in one way. And the number 12 also, which is produced by the synthesis of the first with 5. Such propositions we must therefore not term axioms, (or otherwise there would be an infinity of them) but formulæ of numbers.

This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena affords to our cognition *a priori* great extension. For it is this alone which renders pure mathematics, in their whole precision, applicable to objects of experience, which circumstance, without this principle, might not be so evident of itself, and which indeed has led to much contradiction. Phenomena are no things in themselves. Empirical intuition is only possible, by means of the pure (of space and time), consequently that which geometry says of the latter, is valid also indisputably of the former, and the pretence, as if objects of the senses need not be conformable to the rules of construction in space, (for example, to the infinite divisibility of lines or angles) must fall to the ground. For thereby we deny to space, and with it, at the same time to all mathematics, objective reality, and we know no longer why and how far, these may be applied to phenomena. The synthesis of spaces and times, as the essential form of all intuition, is that which makes possible at the same time the apprehension of the phenomenon—consequently every external experience—consequently also, all cognition of the objects thereof—and that which mathematics manifests in the pure use of the former (*synthesis*), that is valid also necessarily of the latter. All objections to the contrary are only the

cavils of a falsely-taught reason, which erroneously thinks of liberating the objects of the senses from the formal condition of our sensibility, and represents them, although they are mere appearances, as objects in themselves given to the understanding. In which case, certainly, nothing at all *à priori*, consequently also nothing by means of the pure conceptions of space, could be known of them, and the science which determines these, that is to say, geometry, would itself not be possible.

## II.

### ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.

Their principle is—In all phenomena the real, which is an object of sensation, has extensive quantity, that is a degree.

#### PROOF.

Perception is the empirical consciousness, that is, such a one as that wherein sensation is at the same time. Phenomena, as objects of perception, are not pure (merely formal) intuition, like space and time, (for these cannot be perceived at all in themselves). They contain in themselves, therefore, besides the intuition, also the matter for an object in general (whereby something existing in space or in time is represented), that is, the real of the sensation as mere subjective representation, through which we can be conscious only that the subject is affected, and which we refer to an object in general. Now a gradual change from empirical consciousness to pure is possible, when the real thereof entirely disappears, and a merely formal consciousness (*à priori*) of the diverse in space and time remains over: consequently a synthesis likewise of the generation of the quantity of a sensation from its origin—the pure intuition = 0 to an arbitrary quantity of it. Now as sensation in itself is no objective repre-

sensation at all, and neither the intuition of space nor of time is met with in it, no extensive quantity indeed, but still a quantity, will belong to it (and in fact by means of the apprehension of this, in which the empirical consciousness in a certain time, from nothing = 0 can increase to its given measure consequently *an intensive quantity*)—to which sensation, as corresponding to all the objects of perception, in as far as this contains sensation, intensive quantity that is to say, a degree of influence over sense, must be attributed.

We may name all cognition, whereby I can *à priori* know and determine that which belongs to empirical cognition, an anticipation, and without doubt that is the meaning, in which Epicurus used his expression *προληψις*. But as there is something in phenomema which is never known *à priori*, and which therefore also constitutes the proper difference of what is empirical, from cognition *à priori*, namely, sensation, (as matter of perception), it follows that this is properly that which cannot at all be anticipated. On the contrary we might term the pure determinations in space and time, as well in respect of the form as of quantity, anticipations of phenomena, since they represent that *à priori*, which may always be given *à posteriori* in experience. But granted that there is still something in such sensation, as sensation in general (without a particular one being given,) which may be cognized *à priori*, this would deserve to be called anticipation in an extraordinary sense, inasmuch as it appears strange to anticipate experience, in that which precisely concerns the matter of it, and which we can only derive from itself. And yet so it is here really.

Apprehension simply by means of sensation, fills up only one moment, (if, for instance, I do not bring into consideration, the succession of many sensations). As something in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which is no successive synthesis, which



proceeds from parts to the whole representation, it has therefore no extensive quantity. The want of sensation in the same moment would represent such as void—consequently = 0. Now that which in the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation, is reality, (*realitas phenomenon*); that which answers to the want of it, is negation, = 0. But each sensation is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually vanish away. Hence, between reality in the phenomenon, and negation, there is a continual connection of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from one another, is always smaller than the difference between the given one, and zero, or total negation. That is—the real in the phenomenon has always a quantity, but which is not met with in the apprehension, because this takes place by means of the mere sensation in an instant, and not by means of successive synthesis of many sensations, and, consequently, does not proceed from the parts to the whole. The real has therefore certainly a quantity, but no extensive one.

Now I name that, quantity, *intensive quantity*, which is apprehended only as unity, and in which plurality only can be represented by approximation to negation = 0. Therefore reality has in the phenomenon, intensive quantity, that is, a degree. If we consider this reality as *cause*, (whether of the sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon, as for example, of change), we call the degree of the reality as *cause*, a *moment*—as, for example, the moment of gravity—and indeed from this reason, that the degree indicates only the quantity—the apprehension of which is not successive but instantaneous. But this I only touch now incidentally, as I have nothing at present to do with causality.

Thus every sensation, consequently also every reality in the phenomenon, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quantity, which

yet may always be diminished ; and between reality and negation, there is a continual connexion of possible realities and of possible smaller perceptions. Every colour, for example red, has a degree, which, however small it may be, is never the smallest, and it is the same with heat, the moment of weight, &c. generally.

The property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible (no part simple) is called their *Continuity*.—Space and time are, quanta continua, because no part of the same can be given, without including it within limits (points and instants), consequently, only in such a manner that this part itself is again a space, or a time. Space, therefore, only consists of spaces, and time of times. Points and instants are only limits, that is, mere places of their limitation, but places presuppose always those intuitions, which are to limit or to determine themselves, and from mere places, as from constituent parts which could still be given previous to space or time, neither space nor time can be compounded. Such quantities we may also name *flowing*, because the synthesis (of the productive imagination) in their generation is a progression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed particularly to indicate by the expression of the flowing (flowing along).

Thus all phenomena in general are continuous quantities, as well according to their intuition as extensive—as according to their mere perception, (sensation and consequently reality) as intensive quantities. If the synthesis of the diversity of the phenomenon be interrupted, this is then an aggregate of many phenomena, and not properly phenomenon as a quantum, which is not produced by means of the mere continuation of the *productive* synthesis of a certain kind, but by the repetition of an ever ceasing synthesis. If I term thirteen dollars a quantum of money, I denominate it so far correctly that I thereby

understand the contents of a mark of fine silver;—which undeniably is a continuous quantity, in which no part is the smallest, but each part could make a piece of money which would always contain matter, for still smaller pieces. But if under such denomination, I understand thirteen round dollars, as so many coins, (their content of silver may be what you like,) I denominate it improperly by a quantum of dollars, but ought to call it an aggregate, that is, a number of pieces of money. And as in every number unity must still lie at the foundation, the phenomenon is as unity a quantum, and as such always a continuum.

Now if all phenomena, considered extensively as well as intensively, are continuous quantities, then the proposition also that all change (passage of a thing from one state to another) is continuous, could be here shewn easily and with mathematical evidence, provided that causality did not lay a change generally entirely out beyond the limits of a transcendental philosophy, and presuppose empirical principles. For that a cause is possible which alters the state of things—that is, determines them to the opposite of a certain given state—of this the understanding *à priori* gives us no information; not merely on this account that it does not see the possibility thereof, (for this insight is wanting to us in several cognitions *à priori*,) but because the changeableness only affects certain determinations of phenomena, which experience alone can teach, since its cause is to be met with in the unchangeable. But as we have nothing here before us of which we can make use, but the pure fundamental conceptions of all possible experience, under which there must be nothing at all empirical, we cannot without violating the unity of the system anticipate general physics, which are built upon certain fundamental experiences.

We are not however wanting in proofs of the great

influence which this our principle possesses of anticipating perceptions, and indeed so far of supplying the want of them, that it turns the bolt upon all the false conclusions which might thence be derived.

If all reality in the perception has a degree, between that and the negation, an infinite gradation of continually less and less degrees takes place, and nevertheless each sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations, then no perception, consequently also no experience, is possible, which shows a total want of all real in the phenomenon, whether immediate or mediate (whatever may be the round-about-way in which we arrive at the conclusion), that is to say—there can never be deduced from experience a proof of void time or of void space. For the total want of the real in the sensible intuition can, in the first place, not itself be perceived; in the second, it cannot be concluded from any single phenomenon, and the difference of the degree of its reality, nor must it be admitted ever in explanation of the same. For even if the whole intuition of a determinate space or time, is out and out real—that is, no part of it is void—yet since each reality has its degree, which in the unchanged extensive quantity of the phenomenon may diminish through infinite steps to nothing (to the void), there must be infinite different degrees with which space or time is filled, and the intensive quantities must be able to be less or greater in different phenomena, although the extensive quantity of the intuition is the same.

We will give an example of this. Nearly all natural philosophers, as they perceive a great difference of the quantity of matter of different kinds under the like volume, (partly through the moment of heaviness or of weight, partly through the moment of resistance towards other matter in motion) hence conclude with one accord, that this volume (extensive quantity

of the phenomenon) must in all mattter although in different proportions, be void. But who would ever have thought, of these for the most part mathematical and mechanical natural philosophers, that they grounded this their conclusion only upon a metaphysical presupposition, which nevertheless they pretend so much to avoid; (?) since they admit that the *real* is space, (I may not here name it impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) is *every where identical*, and only can be distinguished according to *extensive* quantity, that is to multitude. To this presupposition for which these philosophers could have no foundation in experience, and which therefore is merely metaphysical, I oppose a transcendental proof, which certainly does not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces, but yet entirely does away with the pretended necessity of that presupposition, of being unable to explain the before-mentioned difference otherwise than by means of admitted void spaces—and it has the merit at least of setting the understanding at liberty to think this difference also in another way, in case the physical explanation should render an hypothesis necessary for it. For as we see, that although two like spaces may be completely filled by different matters, so that in neither of them there is a point in which the presence thereof is not to be met with, yet every real has thus in the same quality its degree (of resistance or of weight), which without diminution of the extensive quantity or multitude, can become less and less to infinity, before it passes over into nothingness and disappears. Thus an expansion which fills a space, for example, caloric, and in like manner every other reality (in the phenomenon), without in the least leaving void the smallest part of this space, may decrease in its degrees to infinity, and nevertheless fill the space with these lesser degrees, just as well as another phenomenon with greater. My

intention here is by no means to maintain, that this really is so, in respect to the difference of matter according to its specific gravity, but only to show from a principle of the pure understanding, that the nature of our perceptions renders such a mode of explanation possible, and that we admit erroneously the real of the phenomenon as equal according to the degree, and only different according to aggregation, and the extensive quality of the same, and this in fact pretend-  
edly from a principle of the understanding *à priori*.

This anticipation of perception has, however, to an inquirer accustomed to what is transcendental, and thereby made cautious, always something remarkable about it, and excites some doubt in some respect to it, whether the understanding can anticipate such a synthetical proposition, as that is of the degree of all reality in the phenomena, and consequently of the possibility of an internal difference of the sensation itself, if we make abstraction of its empirical quality; and it is therefore a question not unworthy of solution, how the understanding can herein decide synthetically as to phenomena *à priori*, and can in fact anticipate them in that which is particular and merely empirical—that is to say—in what concerns sensation.

The *quality* of the sensation is always simply empirical, and cannot at all be represented *à priori* (as for example colours, taste, &c.). But the real which corresponds to sensations in general, in opposition to the negation=0 represents only something, the conception of which contains an existence in itself, and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general. In the internal sense for instance, the empirical consciousness can be raised from 0 to every higher degree, so that this extensive quantity of the intuition (for example, an illuminated surface) excites as great sensation as an aggregate of many other surfaces (less illuminated) together. We may

therefore entirely make abstraction of the extensive quantity of the phenomenon, and yet represent to ourselves in the mere sensation in one moment a synthesis of uniform progression from 0 to the given empirical consciousness. All sensations therefore as such, are indeed only given *à posteriori*, but their property, that they have a degree, can be known *à priori*. It is remarkable that we can know nothing as to quantities in general, except a single *quality*, that is to say, continuity, but as to other qualities (the real of phenomena) we can know nothing further *à priori*, except the intensive *quantity* of the same,—namely that they have a degree: all the rest remains consigned to experience.

### III.

#### ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.

The principle of these is—Experience is only possible by means of the representation of a necessary connexion of perceptions.

#### PROOF.

Experience is an empirical cognition—that is, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions which itself is not contained in the perception, but which contains the synthetic unity of the diversity of these, in a consciousness—which unity constitutes what is essential in a cognition of the *objects* of the senses—that is to say, of experience (not merely of the intuition or sensation of the senses). Now in experience, the perceptions indeed refer to one another only contingently, so that no necessity for their connexion is evident from the perceptions themselves, nor can be, because apprehension is only a composition of the diversity of the empirical intuition—but no representation of the necessity of the conjoined

existence of the phenomena which it connects, is met with in space and time in that apprehension. But as experience is a cognition of objects by means of perceptions, the relationship in the existence of the diverse consequently is to be represented in experience, not as the relationship is conjoined in time, but as it is objectively in time: but as time itself cannot be perceived, the determination thus of the existence of objects in time can only take place by means of their conjunction in time in general—consequently only by means of *à priori* connecting conceptions. And as these always carry along with them at the same time, necessity—experience is thus only possible by means of a representation of the necessary connexion of perception.

The three *modi* of time are *perdurability*, *succession*, and *co-existence*. Consequently three laws of all the relationships of time in phenomena, whereby to each its existence in respect of the unity of time can be determined, will precede all experience, and first of all make it possible.

The general principle of all three analogies, rests upon the necessary *unity* of apperception, in regard of all possible empirical consciousness (of perception) *in every time*—consequently, as such unity lies at the foundation *à priori*, the general principle rests upon the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their relationship in time. For the original apperception refers to the internal sense, (to the complex of all representations) and indeed to its form *à priori*—that is, the relationship of the diverse empirical consciousness in time. Now in the original apperception all this diversity is to be united according to its relationships of time, for this the transcendental unity of the same *à priori* declares, under which all stands which is to belong to my (that is to my own) cognitions—consequently which can be an object as to me. This *synthetical unity*, in the time-relationship



of all perceptions, which is *determined* à priori, is therefore the law, that all empirical determinations of time must be subjected to rules of the general determination of time—and the analogies of experience of which we are now about to treat, must be such rules.

These principles have this peculiar to them, that they do not consider phenomena nor the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but merely *existence* and their relationship to one another in respect of this their existence. Now the mode in which something is apprehended in the phenomenon, may be so determined à priori, that the rules of its synthesis may give at the same time this intuition à priori in every existing empirical example—that is to say—thence, operate the same. But the existence of the phenomena cannot be cognized à priori, and although we might in this way succeed as to concluding upon an existence, yet we should not know such determinately, that is to say, we could not anticipate that whereby its empirical intuition differs from others.

The two before-mentioned principles, which I termed mathematical, in consideration of this, that they authorized the application of mathematics to phenomena, referred to these phenomena according to their mere possibility, and taught how they, as well according to their intuition as to the real of their perception, might be generated conformably to the rules of a mathematical synthesis—consequently, numbers in both cases may be used, and with these, the determination of the phenomenon as quantity. Thus, for example, I might be able from perhaps 200,000 illuminations of the moon, to compound and to give determined à priori, the degree of the sensations of the solar light, that is, to construct it. We may therefore call the first principles constitutive.

It must be quite otherwise with such as are to bring the existence of phenomena under rules à priori. For as this *existence* cannot be constructed,

they will only reach to the relationship of existence, and not be able to furnish any other than mere *regulative* principles. As therefore we are neither to think here upon axioms nor upon anticipations, provided a perception is given to us in a relationship of time, with respect to others, (though undetermined) it cannot be said *à priori*, what *other and how great a perception*, but how it, according to its existence, in this *mode* of time, is necessarily conjoined with the first. In philosophy, analogies signify something very different from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulæ, which announce equality of two relationships of quantity, and at all times *constitutive*, so that if two members of a proportion are given, the third is also thereby given,—that is, can be constructed. But in philosophy, the analogy is not the equality of two *quantitative* but of *qualitative* relationships, where from three given members, I can cognize only and give *à priori* the *relationship* to a fourth, but not *this* fourth *member* itself, although I have a rule how to seek for it in experience, and a mark to discover it therein. An analogy of experience will therefore only be a rule, according to which, from perceptions, unity of experience (not the perception itself) as empirical intuition in general, is to spring, and be valid as a principle of objects, (of phenomena,) not *constitutive*, but simply *regulative*. Just the same will hold valid also for the postulates of empirical thought in general, which together concern synthesis of the pure intuition, (form of the phenomenon)—of the perception (matter of the same)—and of experience, (relationship of these perceptions)—namely, that they are only regulative principles, and are separated from the mathematical which are constitutive, not only indeed in the certainty, which is fixed in both *à priori*, but in the mode of evidence,—that is, in the intuitivity thereof (consequently also in the demonstration).

But what has been observed of all synthetical principles and must here be particularly remarked, is this, that these analogies have their general signification and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but merely of the empirical use of the understanding, and consequently can only be demonstrated as such; and that therefore the phenomena, must be subsumed, not under the categories absolutely, but only under their schemata. For if the objects to which such principles are to refer, were things in themselves, it would be quite impossible to know any thing of them synthetically *à priori*. Now they are nothing but phenomena, whose complete cognition, in which all principles *à priori* must still, at last, ever terminate, is only possible experience, consequently such can have for their object nothing, but simply the conditions of the unity of the empirical cognition in the synthesis of phenomena. But this is only thought in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding, of the unity of which as of a synthesis in general, the category contains the function restricted by no sensible condition. We shall therefore be justified by means of these principles, in joining together phenomena according to an analogy only, with the logical and general unity of conceptions, and therefore make use indeed of the category in the principle itself, but in operation (the application to phenomena) we shall set alongside, the schema of this category as the key to its use in place of the one, or rather of the other, as restrictive condition under the title of a formula of the first.

## A.

## FIRST ANALOGY.

## PRINCIPLE OF THE PERDURABILITY OF SUBSTANCE.

In all change of phenomena, the substance is

permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither diminished nor increased.

## PROOF.

All phenomena are in time, in which as substratum, (as permanent form of the internal intuition), *co-existence* as well as *succession* alone can be represented. Time, therefore, in which all change of phenomena is to be thought, remains and changes not, because it is that in which succession and co-existence can be represented only as determinations thereof. Now time cannot be perceived of itself. In the objects of perception, therefore, that is, in the phenomena, the substratum must be met with, which represents time in general, and in which all change or co-existence can be perceived by means of the relationship of phenomena to this substratum in the apprehension. But *substance* is the substratum of all that is real—that is, all belonging to the existence of things, in which substance, all which appertains to existence can be thought only as determination. Consequently the permanent, wherewith in relation all time-relationships of phenomena can alone be determined, is the substance in the phenomenon—that is, the real thereof—which as substratum of all change always remains the same. As this substance therefore cannot change in existence, neither can its quantity in nature be augmented nor diminished.

Our *apprehension* of the diversity of the phenomenon is always successive, and therefore ever changing. We can consequently thereby alone never determine whether this diverse as object of experience is co-existent or successive, when something does not lie at its foundation, which *always* is,—that is to say, something *fixed* and *permanent*, of which all change and co-existence are nothing but so many kinds (modi of time) in which the permanent exists. Only in the permanent are the relationships of time hence possible,

(for simultaneousness and succession are the only relationships in time,) that is—the permanent is that *substratum* of the empirical representation of time itself, in which all determination of time is alone possible. Permanence expresses in general time, as the constant correlative of all existence of phenomena—of all change and of all concomitance. For change concerns not time itself, but only phenomena in time, (as co-existence is not a *modus* of time itself, as in which no parts at all are contemporaneous but all are successive). If we would attribute to time itself, succession, we must think another time still, in which this succession was possible. By means of the permanent alone, the existence acquires in different parts in the successive series of time, a *quantity*, which we call *duration*. For in the mere succession alone, existence is ever vanishing and beginning, and has never the least quantity. Without this permanent, therefore, there is no relation of time. Now time cannot be perceived in itself—therefore this permanent in phenomena is the substratum of all determination of time, consequently also, the condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of the perceptions—that is, of experience,—and in this permanent, all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a *modus* of the existence of that which remains and perseveres. Hence in all phenomena, the permanent is the object itself—that is, the substance (Phenomenon); but all that which changes or can change, belongs only to the *modi* in which this substance or substances exist,—consequently to their determinations.

I find that at all periods, not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has always presupposed this, permanence, as a substratum of all change of phenomena, and likewise will ever admit it as indubitable—only that the philosopher expresses himself upon the point more definitely, inasmuch as he says—that in all changes in the world, the *substance*

remains, and only the *accidents* change. But I meet no where with an attempt even at a proof of this so synthetical a proposition—nay, it stands only rarely, though it is fit that it should, at the head of the pure and entirely *à priori* existing laws of nature. Indeed the proposition, that the substance is permanent, is tautological. For this permanence merely, is the reason why we apply the category of substance to the phenomenon, and we must have shown that in all phenomena there is something permanent, in which the changeable is nothing but the determination of its existence. But as such a proof is never dogmatical, that is, can never be deduced from conceptions, inasmuch as it concerns a synthetical proposition *à priori*, and it was never thought as to this, that such propositions are only valid in reference to possible experience, and consequently also can only be shown by means of a deduction of the possibility of the last, it is thus no wonder, although in fact this (*proof of the proposition*) lies at the foundation of all experience, (since we feel the want of it in empirical cognition), that it never has been demonstrated.

A philosopher was asked : how much does smoke weigh ? He answered: subtract from the weight of the burnt wood, the weight of the remaining ashes, and you have the weight of smoke. He presupposed therefore as undeniable, that even in fire, matter, (substance) does not diminish, but only that the form of it undergoes a change. Just so was the proposition—"from nothing comes nothing," only another consequential proposition from the principle of permanence, or rather of the everlasting existence of the subject proper to phenomena. For, if that in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the substratum proper of all determination of time, so must all existence in the past as well as in the future time, be thereby able to be determined singly and alone. Consequently, we can only give the name of substance to a phenome-

non for this reason, that we presuppose its existence in all time, which is not ever well expressed by the word permanence, because this refers more to future time. But the internal necessity to persevere is yet inseparably conjoined with the necessity always to have been, and the expression may therefore remain. *Gigni de nihilo nihil—in nihil non nil posse reverti*,—were two propositions, which the ancients connected inseparably, and which we separate now occasionally from a misunderstanding, since we represent to ourselves, that they relate to things in themselves, and that the first might be opposed to the dependence of the world upon a supreme cause (even according to its substance,)—which apprehension is unnecessary, because the question here is only as to phenomena, in the field of experience, whose unity would never be possible, if we allowed new things (according to the substance) to arise. For then that would disappear which alone can represent the unity of time,—namely, the identity of the substratum, as that by which all change alone has absolute unity. This permanence is however still nothing, further than the mode of representing to ourselves the existence of things (in the phenomenon).

The determinations of a substance, which are nothing else but its particular modes of existing, are termed *accidents*. They are always real, inasmuch as they concern the existence of the substance, (negations are only determinations which express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now if we attribute a particular existence to this real in the substance, (for example, to motion as an accident of matter), we term the existence, inherence, in contradistinction from existence of substance, which is called subsistence. But hence many mis-conceptions arise, and it is more exactly and correctly expressed, when we denote the accident only, through the manner by which the existence of a substance is posi-

tively determined. However, it is still unavoidable, by virtue of the conditions of the logical use of our understanding, as it were to separate, whilst the substance remains, that which in the existence of a substance can change, and to consider this in reference to the permanent proper, and the radical—consequently therefore, this category remains under the title of relationships, more as their condition, than that it itself contains a relationship.

Now upon this permanence is founded also the correction of the conception of *change*. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which arises or finishes. Change is a mode of existence which follows upon another manner of existing of the self-same object, consequently all that changes is *permanent*, and its state only *varies*. As such change therefore only affects the determinations which may either cease or begin, we may state in a somewhat seemingly paradoxical expression, that only the permanent (the substance) is changed—that the mutable undergoes no change,—only an *alteration*, as some determinations cease, and others commence.

Change can therefore only be perceived in substances, and neither origin nor extinction, absolutely, can be at all a possible perception unless it regard simply a determination of the permanent, because this very permanent itself renders possible the representation of the passage from one state to the other, and from non-being to being, which consequently could only be cognized empirically, as varying determinations of that which persists. If it be admitted that something absolutely begins to be, you must have a point of time in which it was not. But whereon will you fix this, if not to that which already exists? For a void time—that which preceded—is no object of perception—but if you connect this origin, to things which were previously and lasted up to that which begins, the latter is only a determination of the



former, as the permanent. It is precisely the same with extinction, for this pre-supposes the empirical representation of a time, when there is no longer a phenomenon.

Substances (in the phenomenon) are the substrata of all determinations of time. The origin of some and the extinction of others of the same, would annihilate even the only condition of the empirical unity of time, and phenomena would then refer to two times, in which the existence would flow abreast, which is absurd—for there is but *one* time; in which all different times must be placed, not together, but in succession.

Permanence is thus a necessary condition under which alone phenomena, as things of objects, are determinable in a possible experience. But as to what may be the empirical criterium of this necessary permanence, and with this, of the substantiality of phenomena, the sequel will afford us an opportunity of remarking what is necessary.

## B.

### SECOND ANALOGY.

#### PRINCIPLE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF CAUSALITY.

All changes occur according to the law of the connexion of cause and effect.

#### PROOF.

(The preceding principle has shown that the whole of the phenomena of the succession of time, are only *changes*, that is, that they are a successive being and non being of the determinations of the substance which there persits, consequently the being of the substance itself which follows upon its non being, or the non being of the same which follows upon its existence—in other words, that the origin or extinction of the substance itself does not take

place. This might also have been thus expressed—*all alteration (succession) of phenomena is change only*; for origin or extinction of the substance are no changes thereof, because the conception of change presupposes the self-same subject as existing with two opposite determinations—consequently as permanent.—(After this preface the proof succeeds).

I perceive that phenomena follow one upon another, that is, that a state of things is in one time, the contrary whereof was in the former state. I connect therefore properly two perceptions in time. Now connexion is no work of the mere sense and of intuition, but is here the product of a synthetical faculty of the imagination, which determines the internal sense, in respect of the relationship of time. But this (*imagination*) can conjoin the two mentioned states in the same manner, so that the one or the other precedes in time—for time cannot in itself be perceived, and in reference to it, what precedes and what follows, can be determined as it were empirically, in the object. I am therefore only conscious, that my imagination sets one before and the other after, not that in the object the one state precedes the other,—or in other words, through mere perception, the objective relationship of successive phenomena remains undetermined. Now in order that these may be known as determined, the relationship between the two states must be so thought, that thereby it is determined as necessary, which of the same must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetic unity, can only be a pure conception of the understanding, which does not lie in the perception; and that is here the conception of the *relationship of cause and effect*, whereof the former determines the latter in time, as the consequence, and not as something which might simply precede in the imagination, (or not generally be perceived). Only

therefore by this, that we subject the succession of phenomema, consequently all change to the law of causality is experience itself, that is, empirical cognition of them possible, consequently they are only themselves possible as objects of experience, according to this same law.

The apprehension of the diverse in the phenomena is always successive. The representations of parts follow upon each other. Whether these likewise follow one another in the object, is a second point of reflection, which is not contained in the first. Now we may certainly term object every thing, and in fact every representation, so far as we are conscious of it, but what this word (*object*) may mean as to phenomena, not so far as they (as representations) are objects, but only so far as they indicate an object, is of deeper investigation. So far as they are only representations, and at the same time objects of consciousness, they are not at all distinguished from the apprehension, that is, from the reception into the synthesis of the imagination, and we must therefore say, the diversity of the phenomena is always generated successively in the mind. If phenomena were things in themselves, no man could comprehend from the succession of the representations of their diversity, how this could be conjoined in the object. For we have still only to do with our representations, —how things may be in themselves (without reference to representations whereby they affect us) is wholly out of our sphere of cognition. Now although phenomena are not things in themselves, and nevertheless still are the only things which can be given to us for cognition, I am to show what kind of conjunction in time belongs to the diverse in the phenomena themselves, whilst that the representation of this diverse is always successive in the apprehension. Thus, for example, the apprehension of the diversity in the phenomena of a house which

stands in face of me is successive. Now the question is, whether the diversity of this house is also successive in itself,—which certainly no one will grant. But so soon again as I raise my conceptions from an object to the transcendental meaning, the house is nothing at all in itself, but only a phenomenon,—that is, a representation, whose transcendental object is unknown. What then do I understand by the question, How the diversity in the phenomenon itself (which yet is nothing in itself) can be united? In this case, that which lies in the successive apprehension is considered as representation, but the phenomenon which is given to me, notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these representations, as the object thereof—with which my conception, which I deduce from the representations of the apprehension, is to accord. We soon see that, since accordance of the cognition with the object is truth, it here only can be enquired into, concerning the formal conditions of empirical truth; and phenomenon, in counter-relationship with the representations of apprehension, can only thereby be represented as the object of these different therefrom, provided it is subjected to a rule, which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and renders necessary a sort of conjunction of the diverse. That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of the apprehension, is the object.

Now let us proceed to our problem.—*That* something happens, that is, that something is, or a state is which was not previously, cannot be admitted empirically, where a phenomenon does not precede which contains this state in itself, for a reality which follows upon a void time, consequently an origin previous to which no state of things has preceded, can be just as little apprehended as the void time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore

a perception which follows upon another. But since this is the same in all synthesis of the apprehension, as I have before shown in the phenomenon of a house, it does not thereby differ at all from others. But I remark also, that if in a phenomenon which contains an event, I call the preceding situation of the perception, A, and the following, B,—B can only follow A in the apprehension, whilst the perception A cannot follow B, but only precede it. I see, for example, a vessel driving down the stream—my perception of its situation lower down follows upon my perception of this higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of the phenomenon, the vessel should be first perceived lower down, and afterwards higher up the stream. The order in the succession of perceptions in the apprehension is in this case therefore determined; and to this, the latter (*apprehension*) is bound. In the previous example of a house, my perceptions might begin in the apprehension from its roof, and finish with the foundation, but also they might begin from below and terminate above, and likewise apprehend the diversity of the empirical intuition to the right or the left. In the series of these perceptions there was therefore no determinate order, which made it necessary when I must begin in the apprehension, in order to conjoin empirically the diverse. But this rule is always to be found in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of succeeding perceptions (in the apprehension of this phenomenon) *necessary*.

I must therefore in our case derive the *subjective succession* of the apprehension from the *objective succession* of phenomena, inasmuch as otherwise the first of these is wholly undetermined, and distinguishes no one phenomenon from another. Alone this shows nothing of the connexion of the diverse in the object, since it is quite voluntary. The last

(*objective succession*) will consist in the order of the diversity of the phenomenon, according to which the apprehension of the one thing (what happens) follows upon that of the other (what precedes) according to a *Rule*. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the phenomenon itself, and not simply of my apprehension; that in the first a succession is to be met with—which means this—that I cannot place the apprehension otherwise than exactly in this succession.

According to such a rule, therefore, in that which in general precedes an event, the condition for a rule must lie, according to which this event follows always and necessarily, but conversely I cannot go back again from the event, and determine (through apprehension,) that which precedes. For from the succeeding point of time, no phenomenon goes back again to the preceding one, but still it refers to some preceding one—on the contrary, from a given time the progress to a determinate succeeding one is necessary. Consequently, since that which follows is something, I must refer it to something else in general which precedes, and whereupon it follows according to a rule—that is necessarily: so that the event as the conditioned, affords secure indication of some condition,—but this (*the condition*) determines the event.

Let it be supposed that nothing precedes an event according to which such must follow agreeably to a rule, the whole succession of the perception were thus only in the apprehension, that is merely subjectively, but thereby not at all objectively determined, which strictly must be the preceding thing, and which the succeeding thing in the perceptions. We should in such a way only have a play of representations which did not refer at all to any object, that is, one phenomenon would not at all be distinguished by means of one perception from every other, accord-

ing to the relations of time, because the succession in apprehending is every where one and the same, and therefore there is nothing in the phenomenon which determines it in such a way that a certain succession is thereby made objectively necessary. I shall therefore not say, that in the phenomenon two states follow one another, but only, that one apprehension follows upon the other, which is something merely *subjective*, and determines no object, consequently cannot be valid for cognition of any object (even not in the phenomenon).

When we therefore experience that something happens, we thereby presuppose always that something precedes, whereupon this follows according to a rule. For without this I should not say of the object that it follows—because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it is not determined by a rule in reference to something which precedes, authorises no succession in the object. It therefore always happens in respect of a rule, according to which the phenomena in their succession, that is, as they happen, are determined through the previous state—that I make my subjective synthesis (of the apprehension) objective, and merely under this supposition alone is the experience possible of something which happens.

It certainly seems as if this contradicted all the observations which have ever been made as to the march of the use of our understanding, according to which observations we only have been led, first of all by means of the perceived and compared concordant successions of many events with previous phenomena, to discover a rule according to which, certain events always follow upon certain phenomena; and thereby have been first induced to make to ourselves the conception of cause. Upon such a footing, this conception would be merely empirical, and the rule which it furnished, that every thing which happens must have a cause, would be just as contingent as the

experience itself. Its generality and necessity would be then only feigned, and have no true general validity, since they would not be *à priori*, but only founded upon induction. But it is the same with this as with other pure representations *à priori*, (for example, space and time,) which we alone can deduce from experience as clear conceptions on this account, that we have placed them in experience, and perfected such consequently first by means of them. Certainly the logical clearness of this representation of a rule determining the series of events, as of a conception of cause, is then only possible, if we have made use of it in experience; but a regard to the same rule, as condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was still the ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it *à priori*.

The point is therefore to show, from an example, that we never even in experience attribute to an object succession, (as to an event, where something happens which was not previously,) and separate it from the subjective succession of our apprehension, but when a rule lies at the foundation which compels us to observe this order of perceptions rather than another,—in fact, that this necessity is properly that which first of all renders possible the representation of a succession in the object.

We have representations within us, of which also we may be conscious. But this consciousness may extend ever so far, and be ever so exact and particular, still there always only remains representations,—that is, internal determinations of our mind, in this or that relationship of time. Now how do we arrive at this, that we set an object to these representations, or that beyond their subjective reality, as modifications, we still attribute to them I know not what kind of an objective one? Objective meaning cannot consist in the relation to another representation, (of that which one would name the object,) for otherwise



the question renews itself,—how does this representation proceed out again from itself, and acquire still objective meaning over and above the subjective, which is proper to it, as determination of the state of the mind? If we investigate what kind of new quality the *relation to an object* gives to our representations, and what is the dignity that they thereby acquire, we then find that it does nothing more than make the conjunction of the representations in a certain manner necessary, and subject them to a rule: that conversely only from this, that a certain order is necessary in the relationships of time of our representations, is objective meaning allotted to them.

In the synthesis of the phenomena, the diversity of the representations follow upon one another. Now no object at all is represented by this, since through this succession, which is common to all apprehension, no one thing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive, or previously admit, that in this succession there is a reference to a preceding state, from which the representation follows according to a rule, something then presents itself as event or that there happens; that is, I cognize an object which I must place in time in a certain determinate situation, which cannot be allotted to it otherwise according to the previous state. If therefore I perceive that something happens, there is contained, in the first place, in this representation, that something precedes, because in the very relationship to this, the phenomenon obtains its relationship of time, namely of existing according to a preceding time, in which it was not. But its determinate place of time in this relationship it can only thereby receive, because in the preceding state something is presupposed, whereupon it always follows—that is, according to a rule. Whence then it results, firstly that I cannot invert the series, and set that which happens before that whereupon it follows; secondly, that if the state which precedes is

fixed, this determinate event inevitably and necessarily follows. Thus it occurs that there is an order in our representations, in which the present, (so far as it has been) gives indication as to some preceding state, as a correlative although yet undetermined, of this event which is given—which correlative refers determinately to this event as its consequence, and connects it with itself necessarily in the series of time.

Now if it is a necessary law of our sensibility, consequently a *formal condition* of all perceptions, that the preceding time necessarily determines the succeeding (since I cannot arrive at the following, otherwise than by means of the preceding time,) it is also an indispensable *law of the empirical representation* of the series of time, that the phenomena of past time determine every existence in the following, and that the last as events, do not take place except so far as the first determine for them their existence in time—that is to say, fix them according to a rule. For in *phenomena only can we cognize empirically this continuity in the coherence of times.*

To all experience and the possibility of it, understanding belongs; and the first thing which it does for this, is not that it makes the representation of an object clear, but that it makes the representation of an object in general, possible. Now this occurs only in this way, that it transports the order of time to phenomena and to their existence, whilst it assigns to each of the same as succession, in respect of preceding phenomena an *à priori* determinate place in time, without which the phenomenon would not agree with the time itself, which determines to all its parts their places *à priori*. Now this determination of places cannot be derived from the relationship of phenomena to absolute time, (for it is no object of perception) but conversely, the phenomena must determine to each other, their places in time itself, and render these necessary in

the order of time—that is, that which then follows or happens, must, according to a general rule, follow upon that which was contained in the previous state—whence arises a series of phenomena, which, by means of the understanding, produces and renders necessary the self same order and constant connexion in the series of possible perceptions, as is met with *à priori* in the form of the internal intuition (time), wherein all perceptions must have their place.

That something therefore happens, is a perception which belongs to a possible experience, which becomes real by this, provided that I perceive the phenomenon as determined, according to its place in time—consequently as an object, which, according to a rule, may always be found in the connexion of perceptions. But this rule of determining something according to the succession of time is, that in what precedes, the condition is to be met with under which the event always (that is necessarily) follows. Consequently the proposition of sufficient reason is the principle of possible experience, that is to say, of the objective cognition of phenomena, in respect of their relationships in the succession of time.

But the argument for this proposition rests only upon the succeeding moments. To all empirical cognition, the synthesis of the diversity belongs by means of the imagination, which is always successive, that is the representations always succeed one another in it. But the succession is not all determined in the imagination according to order (what must precede and what follow) and the series of one of the consecutive representations may be taken as well backwards as forwards. But if this synthesis is a synthesis of the apprehension (of the diversity of a given phenomenon), the order is thus determined in the object, or to speak more exactly, there is in this an order of the successive synthesis which determines an object, according to which something must neces-

sarily precede, and if this is fixed, the other must necessarily follow. Therefore if my perception is to contain the cognition of an event, as, namely, that something really happens,—it must be an empirical judgment in which we think that the succession is determined; that is, that it presupposes another phenomenon, according to time, whereupon it follows necessarily, or according to a rule. On the contrary, if I suppose the preceding thing, and the event does not follow thereupon necessarily, I must hold it only as a subjective play of my fancy, and if I represented to myself yet something under it as objective, I must term it a mere dream. Therefore the relationship of phenomena is (as of possible perceptions) according to which the succeeding (what happens) is determined by means of something preceding necessarily, according to its existence and to a rule in time, consequently the relationship of cause to effect—the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in respect of the series of perceptions; consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. The principle of the causal-relationship in the succession of phenomena, holds therefore true also of all objects of experience, (under the conditions of succession) since this principle is itself the ground of the possibility of such an experience.

But here again a difficulty manifests itself which must be obviated. The position of causal-connexion amongst phenomena is limited in our formula to the succession of their series, but we still find in the use of the same position that it also suits with their concomitancy, and can be at the same time cause and effect. There is, for instance, warmth in a room, which cannot be met with in the open air. I look about for the cause and find a heated stove. Now this stove as cause with its effect of warmth of the room, are co-existent, therefore there is here no succession of series according to time between cause

and effect, but they are contemporaneous, and nevertheless the law applies. The greatest part of the effective causes in nature are together in time with their effects; and the succession of time in the latter only arises through this, that the cause cannot produce the whole effect in a moment. But in the moment when this first begins, it is always co-existent with the causality of its cause, because if that (*the cause*) had ceased to be a moment previously, this (*the effect*) would not at all have taken place. We must also here particularly observe, that we are here to look at the *order* of time, and not the *flow* of time—the relationship remains, although no time have elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause, and its immediate effect, may be vanishing away, (therefore be co-existent with the effect,) but still the relationship of one to the other, always remains determinable according to time. If I consider a ball which lies upon a stuffed cushion, and makes an impression thereon, as a cause, it is contemporaneous with the effect. But I still distinguish both, through the relationships of time of the dynamic connexion of the two. For if I place the ball upon the cushion, the dent succeeds to its previous smooth shape, but if the cushion have (I know not whence) a dent, a leaden ball does not succeed to that.

Succession is therefore absolutely the single empirical criterium of effect, in reference to the causality of the cause which precedes. The glass is the cause of the rise of water above its horizontal surface, although both phenomena are co-existent. For as soon as I have drawn this water with the glass out of a larger vessel, something ensues, that is to say, change of the horizontal state which it had there (*in the vessel*), into a concave, which it assumes in the glass.

This causality leads to the conception of action; this, to the conception of force, and thereby to the conception of substance. As I do not wish to mix

my critical design, which only regards the sources of synthetical cognition *à priori*, with dissections which look merely to the explanation (not extension) of conceptions, I reserve the circumstantial investigation thereof for a future system of pure reason; notwithstanding that we already meet with such an analysis in an ample degree, in the hitherto known elementary books of this kind. But the empirical criterium of a substance, so far as this substance seems to reveal itself, not by means of the permanence of the phenomenon, but better and easier by action, I cannot leave unnoticed.

Where there is action, consequently activity and force, there also is substance, and in this last alone must the seat of that fruitful source of phenomena be sought. This is very easily said, but if we have to explain ourselves thereupon, with respect to what we understand by substance, and wish in this to avoid a vicious circle, the question is not so easily answered, How shall we conclude from the action directly to the *permanence* of the agent, which however is so essential and particular a characteristic of substance (phenomenon)? But according to what we have said before, the solution of the question still presents no such difficulty, although according to the usual mode (of proceeding merely analytically with our conceptions), it would be quite insoluble. Action already signifies the relationship of the subject of causality to the effect. Now since the effect consists in that which happens, consequently in the mutable—which time indicates according to succession; the last subject of this is the *permanent*, as the substratum of the changeable, that is, the substance. For according to the principles of causality, actions are always the first foundation of all change of phenomena, and cannot therefore lie in a subject which itself changes, because otherwise other actions and another subject which determines this change,

would be required. Now, in consequence of this, action shows, as a sufficient empirical criterium, substantiality, without my holding it to be necessary first of all to seek the permanence of this substance by means of compared perceptions, which in fact, by this way, could not take place with the completeness which is requisite for the quantity and strict universal validity of the conception. For that the first subject of the causality of all origin and extinction cannot itself (in the field of phenomena) arise or perish, is a sure conclusion, which terminates in empirical necessity and permanence in existence, consequently in the conception of a substance as phenomenon.

When something happens, the mere origin, without respect to that which then is originated, is already in itself an object of investigation. The transition from the non-being of a state to this state—it being admitted that this state contained no quality in the phenomenon—is, to begin with, alone necessary to be investigated. This origin does not regard, as we have shown in the number A, the substance, (for this is not originated) but its state. It is therefore mere change and not origin from nothing. If this origin is looked upon as the effect of an extraneous cause, it is called creation, which cannot be admitted amongst phenomena as event, since its possibility alone would already annihilate the unity of experience, although, if I consider all things not as phenomena but as things in themselves, and as objects of the mere understanding, they, notwithstanding they are substances, still may be regarded as dependent upon an extraneous cause, with respect to their existence. But this would then draw after it quite other significations of words, and would not suit phenomena as possible objects of experience.

Now, how in general something can be changed; how it is possible that to a state in one instant of

time, an opposite state may follow in another, of this we have not *à priori* the least conception. The knowledge of real forces is required for this which can only be given empirically; for example, that of moving forces, or, which is the same, that of certain successive phenomena (as motions) which denote such forces. But the form of every change, the condition under which it, as the originating of another state only can occur (whatever may be the content of this, that is, whatever may be the state which is changed,) consequently the succession of the state itself (the thing happened) can still only be considered *à priori*, according to the law of causality and the conditions of time.\*

If a substance pass out of one state, *a*, into another, *b*, the instant of time of the second state is different from that of the first, and follows it. Just so, also, the second state, as reality (in the phenomenon) is different from the former, wherein such was not, as *b* is from zero—that is, if the state, *b*, is different only from the state, *a*, according to quantity, the change is a beginning of *b— $a$* , which was not in the previous state, and in respect of which this is = 0.

The question therefore is, how a thing can pass out of one state, = *a* into another, = *b*. Between two instants, there is a time, and between two states always a difference in these, which has a quantity (for all parts of phenomena are again always quantities). Consequently every passage takes place, from one state to another, in a time which is contained between two instants, of which the first determines the state whence the thing issues, the second that in which it arrives. Both therefore are the limits of the time of a change, consequently of a middle state

\* It is seen particularly that I do not speak of change of certain relations in general, but of the change of state. Therefore if a body moves itself uniformly, it does not thus change its state (of motion) at all, but certainly so, when its motion increases or diminishes.



between two states, and belong as such to the whole change. Now every change has a cause which shows its causality, in the whole time, in which that change happens. This cause, therefore, does not bring about its change suddenly, (at once or in a moment,) but in a time, so that as the time increases, from the first moment  $a$ , to its completion in  $b$ , the quantity of the reality ( $b-a$ ) is generated through all the smaller degrees which are contained between the first and the last. All change, therefore, is only possible by means of a continuous action of causality, which, inasmuch as it is uniform, is called a moment. Change does not consist of these moments, but is produced thereby as their effect.

Now this is the law of continuity of all change, the foundation of which is this ; that neither time nor the phenomenon in time, consists of parts which are the smallest, and yet that the state of things in its change passes through all these parts as elements, to its second state. There is no difference of the real in the phenomenon, as there is no difference in the quantity of the times—not the *smallest*: and thus the new state of the reality, springs up from the first, wherein this reality was not, through all infinite degrees of the same—the differences of which from one another, are altogether less than that between zero and  $a$ .

The question does not concern us, here, as to what utility this proposition may have in physics. But how such a proposition, which seems to enlarge so greatly our cognition of nature, can be perfectly possible à priori, requires very deeply our examination, although it looks as it were, real and correct, and we might well believe the question as to its possibility superseded. But there are so many unfounded pretensions as to the extension of our cognition by means of pure reason, that we must lay it down as a general principle, to be in this respect thoroughly sceptical, and

without documents which can afford a fundamental deduction, even upon the clearest dogmatical proofs, not to believe and admit any thing of the kind.

All increase of the empirical cognition, and each step forwards of perception is nothing, but an extension of the determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression in time, whatever may be the objects, whether phenomena or pure intuitions. This progression in time determines every thing, and is not in itself further determined by any thing, that is, its parts are only given in time, and by means of the synthesis of time, but not previous thereto. On this account each passage in the perception to something which follows in time, is a determination of time, through the generation of this perception—and as that determination of time is always and in all its parts a quantity, it is the generation of a perception as of quantity, through every degree, (of which no one is the smallest,) from zero to its determinate degree. Hence now, the possibility is evident of cognizing *à priori* a law of changes according to their form. We anticipate only our own apprehension, whose formal condition as it dwells within us previous to every given phenomenon, must certainly be able to be known *à priori*.

According to this, precisely as time contains the sensible condition *à priori* of the possibility of a continual progression from the existing to the succeeding, the understanding, by means of the unity of apprehension, contains the condition *à priori* of the possibility of a continual determination of all places for phenomena in this time, through the series of causes and effects, the former of which draw after them inevitably the existence of the latter, and thereby make valid the empirical cognition of the relationships of time, for every time (generally)—consequently objectively.

## C.

## THIRD ANALOGY.

PRINCIPLE OF CO-EXISTENCE ACCORDING TO THE  
LAWS OF RECIPROCITY OR COMMUNITY.

All substances, so far as they can be perceived in space in the same time, are in thorough reciprocalness of action.

## PROOF.

Things are in the same time, if in the empirical intuition, the perception of one can follow upon the perception of the other reciprocally, (which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena, as was shown from the second principle). Thus I can begin my perception first with the moon, and afterwards with the earth, or conversely, first with the earth, and then the moon, and for which reason, since the perceptions of these objects follow one another reciprocally, I say they exist contemporaneously. Now contemporaneousness is the existence of the diverse in the same time. But we cannot perceive time itself, in order thence to conclude, that because things are placed in the same time, perceptions can succeed one another reciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in the apprehension would only indicate each of these perceptions, as such a one as exists in the subject if the other does not, and reciprocally; but not that the objects are co-existent, that is, provided that one is, the other is also at the same time, and that this is necessary, so that the perceptions may succeed one another reciprocally. An understanding-conception is consequently required of the reciprocal succession of determinations of these, independently of each other contemporaneously existing things, in order to say, that the reciprocal succession of perceptions is founded

in the object ; and to represent the contemporaneousness thereby as objective. Now the relationship of substances, wherein one substance contains determinations, the foundation of which is contained in the other, is the relationship of influence, and if such again contain reciprocally the foundation of the determinations of the other, it is the relationship of community or reciprocity. The contemporaneousness of substances in space can therefore not be cognized in experience, except under the presupposition of their reciprocalness with one another. This is likewise, therefore, the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience.

Things are contemporaneous, so far as they exist in one and the same time. But in which way do we know that they are in one and the same time? When the order in the synthesis of the apprehension of this diversity is of no consequence—that is, when it can proceed from A, through B C D E, or retrograde from E to A. For if this order in time were successive, (in the order which begins from A and terminates in E) it is then impossible to begin the apprehension in the perception from E, and proceed backwards to A, because A belongs to past time, and therefore could no longer be an object of apprehension.

Now if it be admitted, that in a diversity of substances as phenomena, each of the same were entirely isolated, that is, that no one operated upon the other, and received from this other reciprocal influence ; I say, then, that contemporaneousness could not be an object of possible perception, and that the existence of the one, by no way of empirical synthesis could lead to the existence of the other. For if you fancy to yourself that these substances were separated by means of a completely void space, the perception which proceeds from one to the other in time, would determine by means of a subsequent perception to this other its existence,

but could not decide whether the phenomenon followed objectively upon the first, or rather were not one in time therewith.

There must therefore be still something besides the mere existence, whereby A determines B its place in time, and conversely also again B that of A, since only under this condition can the conceived substances, as existing contemporaneously, be empirically represented. Now, that only determines to another its place in time, which is the cause of it or of its determinations. Therefore each substance (as it can be consequence only in respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of certain determinations in another, and co-existently the effects of the causality of others within itself; that is, these must stand in dynamic community (immediate or mediate) if the contemporaneous is to be cognized in a possible experience. But all this is necessary in respect of objects of experience, and without it, the experience of these very objects would be impossible. Therefore it is necessary for all substances in the phenomenon, so far as they are co-existent, to stand with one another in general community of reciprocalness.

The word community is equivocal in our (*German*) language, and may mean both *communio* and *commercium*. We make use of it here in the latter sense as of a dynamic community, without which even the local one (*communio spatii*) never could be cognized empirically. In our experiences it is easy to perceive, that only the continual influences in all parts of space, can lead our sense from one object to another—that the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies can produce a mediate community between us and them, and thereby show the contemporaneousness of the latter—that we cannot change any place empirically (perceive this change) unless matter every where

renders possible the perception of our position, and such can prove its contemporaneousness only by means of its reciprocal influence—and thereby, even to the remotest objects, the co-existence of the same (although only mediately). Without community, each perception (of the phenomenon in space) is separated from the other, and the chain of empirical representations, that is, experience, would begin from a new object quite afresh, without that the previous one could be in the least connected therewith, or could stand in the relationship of time. Void space I wish not at all hereby to oppose, for it may still be where perceptions do not at all reach, and consequently empirical cognition of contemporaneousness not take place; but then it is no object at all as to all our possible experience.

In the way of explanation the following may be useful. In our mind, all phenomena, as contained in a possible experience, must stand in community (communio) of apperception, and so far as objects are to be represented connected as existing simultaneously, they must determine their places reciprocally in time, and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective community is to repose upon an objective foundation, or be referred to phenomena as substances, the perception of the one as foundation must render possible the perception of the other, and likewise conversely, so that the succession, which is always in the perceptions as apprehensions, is not attributed to the objects, but these may be represented as existing co-existently. But this is a reciprocal influence, that is, a real community (commercium) of substances, without which, therefore, the empirical relationship of contemporaneousness could not take place in experience. By means of this commercium, phenomena, so far as they stand out of one another, and yet in connexion, constitute a compound, (compositum reale,) and such composita are possible in

several ways. The three dynamic relationships, whence all the others spring, are therefore that of inherence, of consequence, and of composition.

These then are therefore the three analogies of experience; they are nothing else but the principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena in time, according to all three modes of the same, that is, the relationship to time itself as a quantity, (the quantity of existence, that is duration), the relationship in time, as of a series (in succession), lastly also in time itself, as the complex of all existence (contemporaneously). This unity of the determination of time, is wholly dynamic, that is, time is not looked upon as that wherein experience determines immediately to each existence its place, which is impossible, because absolute time is no object of perception whereby phenomena could be compared together; but as the rule of the understanding, by which only the existence of phenomena can obtain synthetical unity according to the relationships of time, it determines to each of them its place in time, consequently *à priori*, and is valid for all and every time.

Under Nature (in the empirical sense) we mean the coherence of phenomena in respect of their existence, according to necessary rules, that is, according to laws. There are therefore certain laws and indeed *à priori*, which first of all make a nature possible. Only, by means of experience, and in fact in consequence of those original laws according to which experience itself is first possible, can empirical laws take place and be discovered. Our analogies consequently represent properly the unity of nature in the connexion of all phenomena under certain exponents, which express nothing else but the relationship of time, (so far as it comprehends all existence in itself,) to the unity of the appercep-

tion, which can only take place in the synthesis, according to rules. They together therefore state that phenomena lie in one Nature and must lie therein, since without this unity *à priori*, no unity of experience were possible, consequently likewise no determination of objects in the same.

But in respect of the kind of argument which we have employed in these transcendental laws of nature, and the peculiarity thereof, there is an observation to be made which must likewise be very important, as a direction for every other attempt at proving intellectual and at the same time synthetical propositions *à priori*. If we had desired to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is, from conceptions; that all which exists is only met with in that which is permanent; that every event presupposes something in a previous state whereupon it follows according to a rule; lastly, that in the diverse, which is co-existent, the states in reference to one another are co-existent according to a rule, (stand in community), all our labour would thus have been entirely in vain. For we cannot at all proceed from one object and its existence to the existence of another, or its manner of existing, by means of mere conceptions of these things, in what ever way we may analyze them. What then remains to us? The possibility of experience as a cognition, wherein finally all objects must be able to be given to us, if their representation is to have objective reality as to us. In this third way then, whose essential form consists in the synthetical unity of the apperception of all phenomena, we have found conditions *à priori* of the general and necessary time-determination of all existence in the phenomenon, without which even the empirical determination of time would be impossible, and we have found rules of the synthetical unity *à priori*, by means of which we could anticipate experience. In default of this method, and from the



conceit of wishing to prove synthetical propositions which the experience-use of the understanding recommended as its principles, dogmatically, it has thus happened that a proof has so often been sought, but always in vain, of the principle of sufficient reason. No one has thought of the other two remaining analogies, although they have always been silently made use of, because the clue of the categories was wanting, which alone can discover and render striking such hiatuses of the understanding, in conceptions as well as principles.\*

## IV.

## THE POSTULATES.

## OF EMPIRICAL THINKING IN GENERAL.

1st. That which accords with the formal conditions of experience (according to intuition and conceptions) is possible.

2nd. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real.

3rd. That whose coherence with the real is determined according to the general conditions of experience, is (exists) *necessarily*.

## ILLUSTRATION.

The categories of modality have this peculiar to themselves, that they do not increase in the least as determination of the object, the conception to which

\* The unity of the universe, in which all phenomena are to be connected, is palpably a mere consequence of the tacitly admitted principle of the community of all substances, which are co-existent; for if they were isolated, they would not as parts constitute a whole, and if their connexion (reciprocalness of the diverse) were not already necessary on account of the contemporaneousness, we could not conclude from such, as mere ideal relationship, to that connexion as a real one. We have however shown in its place, that community is properly the foundation of the possibility of an empirical cognition, of co-existence, and that we may therefore properly conclude back again from this co-existence to that community as its condition.

they are added as predicates, but only express the relationship to the faculty of the cognition. If the conception of a thing is already quite complete, I can still then ask as to this object, whether it is merely possible or also real, and if the last, whether it is also necessary? By this, no determinations more are thought in the object itself, but the question only is, how such refers (together with all its determinations) to the understanding and its empirical use—to empirical judgment—and to reason (in its application to experience)?

Just on this account the principles of modality are nothing more than explanations of the conceptions of possibility, reality and necessity in their empirical use, and therewith at the same time restrictions of all the categories to merely empirical use, without admitting and permitting the transcendental. For if these are not to have a mere logical meaning, and to express the form of *thinking* analytically, but are to concern *things* and their possibility, reality, or necessity, they must then extend to possible experience and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects of cognition are given.

The postulate of the possibility of things, therefore, requires that the conception of them should coincide with the formal conditions of an experience in general. But this, that is to say, the objective form of experience in general, contains all synthesis that is required for the cognition of objects. A conception which embraces a synthesis in itself, is to be held as void, and refers to no object, if this synthesis does not belong to experience, either as borrowed from it, and then it is termed an *empirical conception*, or as such a one, upon which as condition *à priori*, experience in general (the form of it) reposes, and then it is a *pure conception*, which still belongs to experience, since its object can only be met with therein. For whence shall we

derive the character of the possibility of an object, which is thought by means of a synthetical conception *à priori*, if it does not occur from the synthesis, which constitutes the form of the empirical cognition of the objects? That in such a conception no contradiction must be contained, is certainly a necessary logical condition; but not by any means enough for the objective reality of the conception, that is, for the possibility of such an object as is thought by means of the conception. Thus in the conception of a figure, which is contained in two straight lines, there is no contradiction, for the conceptions of two straight lines, and their coincidence, contain no negation of a figure; but the impossibility does not rest upon the conception in itself, but upon the construction of this figure in space, that is, upon the conditions of space and its determinations; but these again have their objective reality, that is to say, they refer to possible things, since they contain in themselves *à priori* the form of experience in general.

And now we will expose to view the extensive utility and influence of this Postulate of possibility. If I represent a thing to myself which is permanent, so that all which there changes belongs simply to its state, I can never know from such a conception alone, that such thing is possible. Or if I represent to myself something which is to be so constituted, that if it is posited something else succeeds thereon always and infallibly, this may certainly be thus thought without contradiction; but whether such property (as causality) is to be met with in any possible thing cannot thereby be judged. Finally, I can represent to myself different things (substances) which are so constituted, that the state of the one draws after it a consequence in the state of the other, and in the same way reciprocally; but whether such relationship can ever belong to things, cannot at all be deduced from these

conceptions, which contain a mere arbitrary synthesis. Only, therefore, from this, that these conceptions express the relationships of perceptions in each experience *à priori*, do we cognize their objective reality; that is, their transcendental truth, and in fact quite independent of experience, but still not independent of all relation to the form of an experience in general, and the synthetic unity, in which alone objects can be known empirically.

But if we wished to make to ourselves quite new conceptions of substances, forces, reciprocities, from the matter which the perception presents to us, without deriving from experience itself the example of their connexion, we should fall into pure chimeras, whose possibility has absolutely no criteria in itself, since we have not taken with respect to them experience for our instructress, nor derived these conceptions from it. Such fictitious conceptions cannot obtain the character of their possibility, like the categories, *à priori*, as conditions from which all experience depends, but only, *à posteriori*, as such as are given by means of experience itself; and their possibility must either be known *à posteriori* and empirically, or not at all. A substance which should be constantly present in space, yet without filling it, (as that middle thing between matter and thinking being, which some persons have wished to introduce)—or a particular fundamental force of our mind to espy the future before hand, (not as it were, simply, to deduce a conclusion)—or lastly, a faculty of this mind to stand with other men in community of thought, (however far distant they might be)—these are conceptions whose possibility is entirely without foundation, since such cannot be based upon experience and its known laws, and without this is an arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, although it contain no contradiction, can yet make no claim to objective reality, consequently to the possibility of

such an object as we wish to think in this case. As to what regards reality, it is impossible to think such in concreto, without taking experience in aid, because it can only refer to sensation as matter of experience, and does not regard the form of the relationship, with which however we might play in fictions.

But I pass by all, the possibility of which only can be deduced from reality in experience, and examine here only the possibility of things by means of conceptions *à priori*, with respect to which I continue to maintain, that they never can take place from such conceptions of themselves alone, but at all times only as formal and objective conditions of an experience in general.

It seems certainly as if from its conception in itself, the possibility of a triangle could be known, (certainly it is independent of experience), for in fact we can give to it an object, entirely *à priori*, that is, construct it. But since this is only the form of an object, it would still always remain only a product of the imagination; of the object of which product the possibility remains still doubtful, and as to which something more is still required,—namely, that such a figure should be thought under the simple conditions upon which all objects of experience repose. Now that space is a formal condition *à priori* of external experiences, and that even this fashioning synthesis, whereby we construct a triangle in the imagination, is entirely identical with that which we exercise in the apprehension of a phenomenon, in order thereof to make to ourselves a conception of experience, this is it alone, which connects with this conception the representation of the possibility of such a thing. And thus the possibility of continuous quantities, indeed of quantities in general, as the conceptions thereof are all synthetical, is never first of all clear from the conceptions themselves,

but from them, as formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience in general. And where should we also desire to seek objects corresponding to conceptions, were it not in experience, by means of which alone objects are given to us?—notwithstanding that we can characterize and cognize the possibility of things without premising even experience itself, merely in reference to the formal conditions under which in this in general, something is determined as object, consequently fully *à priori*; but still only in reference to experience and within its limits.

The postulate, to know the *Reality* of things, requires *perception*, consequently sensation, of which we are conscious, not indeed just immediately of the object itself whose existence is to be cognized, but yet coherence of it with an actual perception, according to the analogies of experience, which expose all real connexion in an experience in general.

In the *mere conception* of a thing, no character at all of its existence is to be met with. For although such may be ever so complete that not the least thing is wanting, in order to think a thing with all its internal determinations, yet existence has nothing to do with all this, but only with the question; whether such a thing is given to us in such a way, that the perception thereof may always precede the conception. For, that the conception precedes the perception, indicates the simple possibility of the same, but the perception which furnishes the matter for the conception, is the only character of the reality. But also before the perception of the thing, and therefore comparatively *à priori*, we can cognize its existence, provided only it coheres with some perceptions, according to the principles of their empirical connexion (the analogies). For then the existence of the thing still coheres with our

perceptions in a certain experience, and we can, according to the clue of those analogies, attain from our own real perception to the thing in the series of possible perceptions. Thus we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of attracted iron filings, although an immediate perception of this matter is impossible to us, according to the property of our organs. For in general, according to the laws of sensibility, and the context of our perceptions, we should, in an experience, fall upon the immediate empirical intuition of this (*magnetic matter*), provided our senses were more acute; the rudeness of which however does not regard the form of possible experience in general. Where therefore perception and its dependence reaches, according to empirical laws, there also extends our cognition of the existence of things. If we do not set out from experience, and if we do not proceed according to the laws of empirical coherence of phenomena, it is in vain that we lay much stress upon wishing to discover or enquire into the existence of a thing. But as *idealism* makes a strong objection to these rules, of showing mediately existence, the refutation of it here is in its right place.

#### REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.

Idealism (I mean the *material*) is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space out of us either for doubtful and undemonstrable, or for false and impossible. The *first* is the *problematical* idealism of *Des Cartes*, who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), namely, "I am," to be undoubted; the *second* is, the *dogmatical idealism* of *Berkeley*, who declares space, with all the things to which it adheres as inseparable condition, as something which was impossible in itself, and consequently

also the things in space for mere imaginations. The dogmatical idealism is inevitable, if we regard space as a property which is to belong to things in themselves, for then it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But the foundation of this idealism has been destroyed by us in the transcendental æsthetick. The problematical idealism which maintains nothing thereon, but only alleges the insufficiency of showing by means of immediate experience, an existence besides our own, is rational and conformable to a fundamental philosophical mode of thinking; that is, of permitting no decisive judgment before a sufficient proof has been found. The desired proof must therefore show that we have *experience*, and not merely *imagination* of external things; which cannot well occur in any other way, than, if we can show, that even our internal, and to *Des Cartes*, indubitable experience, is only possible under the previous assumption of external experience.

## THEOREM.

The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence, proves the existence of objects in space out of me.

## PROOF.

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. Every determination of time presupposes something *permanent* in the perception. \*But this permanent cannot be something in me, because my very existence in time can first of all be determined by means of this permanent. Therefore the perception of this permanent is only possible by means of a *thing* out of me, and not through the mere *repre-*

\* See the Preface.



sentation of a thing out of me. Consequently the determination of my existence in time is only possible by means of the existence of real things which I perceive out of me. Now consciousness in time is necessarily conjoined with the consciousness of the possibility of this determination of time—consequently it is also conjoined with the existence of things out of me, as the condition of the determination of time; that is, the consciousness of my own existence is, at the same time, an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things out of me.

*Observation 1.*—It is easy to perceive, in the preceding proof, that the game which Idealism plays, is played back again upon it with more justice. It admitted that the only immediate experience is the internal, and that thence we can alone *conclude* upon external things, as always but only *uncertainly*, when we conclude from given effects to *determine* causes, inasmuch as the cause of the representations can also lie in ourselves, which we, perhaps erroneously, ascribe to external things. But here it has been shown that external appearance is properly immediate,\* and that only by means of it, is possible not indeed the consciousness of our own existence, but yet its determination in time, that is, internal experience. Assuredly the representation, *I am*, which expresses the consciousness which may accompany all thought, is that which includes in itself the existence of a subject, but yet no *cognition* thereof—consequently also not empirical, that is,

\* The *immediate* consciousness of the existence of external things is not presupposed in the present Theorem, but demonstrated, whether we perceive or not the possibility of this consciousness. The question respecting the latter point (*this possibility*) would be, whether we had an internal sense only but no external one—merely external imagination. But it is clear that only in order to imagine to ourselves something as external, that is to represent it to sense in the intuition, we already must have an external sense, and thereby distinguish immediately the receptivity of an external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every imagination. For to imagine an external sense merely, would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself, which is to be determined by means of the imagination.

experience,—for to this there still belongs, besides the thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case internal intuition, in respect of which, that is to say, time, the subject must be determined, and for which external objects absolutely are requisite, so that consequently internal experience itself is only possible mediately, and by means only of external.

*Observation 2.*—Now with this completely agrees all experience-use of our faculty of cognition in the determination of time. Not alone that we can perceive all determination of time only by means of the change in external relationships (motion), in reference to the permanent in space, (as for example, the motion of the sun, in respect of the objects of the earth,) but we have in fact nothing permanent which we could subject to the conception of a substance, as intuition, except merely *matter*, and even this permanence is not deduced from external experience, but presupposed *à priori*, as necessary condition of all determination of time—consequently also as determination of the internal sense, in respect of our own existence, by means of the existence of external things. The consciousness of myself in the representation, I, is no intuition at all, but a mere *intellectual* representation of the spontaneousness of a thinking subject. This I has not, therefore, also the least predicate of intuition, which as permanent, could serve as correlative to the determination of time in the internal sense,—as, perhaps, *impenetrability* in matter is, as (*predicate*) of empirical intuition.

*Observation 3.*—Because the existence of external objects is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external things includes, at the same time, the existence of them, for such may very well be the mere effect of the imagination (in dreams as well as in insanity);

but it occurs merely by means of the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as have been shown, are only possible through the reality of *external* objects. It had here only to be demonstrated that internal experience in general was only possible through external experience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience is not mere imagination, must be detected according to the particular determinations of the same, and through connexion with the criteria of all real experience.

\* \* \* \* \*

Lastly, in respect of what concerns the third postulate, it thus refers to the material necessity in existence, and not to the merely formal and logical one in the connexion of conceptions. Now, as no existence of objects of the senses can be cognized wholly *à priori*, but still comparatively *à priori* relatively to another already given existence; yet nevertheless then also, can only refer to the existence which must be contained somewhere in the coherence of experience, of which the given perception is a part, the necessity therefore, of the existence can never be required from conceptions, but at all times only from the connexion with that which is cognized according to the general laws of experience. Now there is no existence, which can be cognized as necessary under the condition of other given phenomena, except the existence of effects from given causes, according to the laws of causality. Therefore it is not the existence of things (substances) but of their state, whereof we *alone* are able to cognize the necessity, and in fact from other states, which are given in the perception according to the empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows, that the criterium of the necessity only lies in the law of possible experience; that all which happens is determined through its cause in the phenomenon *à priori*. Consequently we only cognize the necessity of the *effects* in nature,

the causes of which are given to us, and the mark of this necessity in existence reaches no farther than the field of possible experience, and even in this it does not hold valid for the existence of things as substances, since these never can be looked upon as empirical effects, as something which occurs and is originated. The necessity, therefore, only regards the relationships of phenomena, according to the dynamic law of causality, and the possibility grounding itself upon this, of concluding from a given existence (a cause) *a priori*, to another existence (the effect). All that happens is hypothetically necessary—this is a principle which subjects the change in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without which in fact nature would not ever take place. Therefore this proposition, “that nothing occurs through blind chance” (in mundo non datur casus), is a natural law *a priori*, together with this, “no necessity in nature is blind but conditioned,” consequently is intelligent necessity (non datur fatum). Both propositions are those laws by means of which the play of changes is subjected to a nature of things (as phenomena), or, which is the same thing, to the unity of the understanding, wherein they alone can belong to an experience, as the synthetical unity of phenomena. Both these principles belong to the dynamic ones. The first is properly a consequence of the principle of causality (amongst the analogies of experience). The second belongs to the principles of modality, which adds moreover to the determination of causality the conception of necessity, but which is subjected to a rule of the understanding. The principle of continuity prohibits every leap in the series of phenomena (changes) (in mundo non datur saltus), and likewise in the complex of all empirical intuitions in space, all gaps or breaks between two phenomena, (non datur hiatus). For thus we may

express the proposition—that nothing can come into experience which proves, or even only allows a vacuum, as a part of empirical synthesis. For as to what concerns the void, which one may conceive beyond the field of possible experience (the world), this does not belong to the jurisdiction of the mere understanding, which only decides upon questions which regard the using of given phenomena for empirical cognition; and is a problem for idealistic reason which goes beyond the sphere of possible experience, and wishes to judge in respect of that which encompasses and limits the same, and consequently must be considered in transcendental dialectick. These four propositions (in mundo non datur hiatus—non datur saltus—non datur casus—non datur fatum), as well as all principles of transcendental origin, we could easily expose according to their order, agreeably to the order of the categories, and indicate to each its place,—but the already practised reader will do this of himself, or easily discover the clue for that purpose. But they all coincide with one another only in this, to admit nothing in the empirical synthesis which could do injury or prejudice to the understanding, and to the continual coherence of all phenomena, that is, to the unity of its conceptions. For the understanding is that alone, wherein the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their place, is possible.

Whether the field of possibility is greater than the field which contains all that is real, and whether this again is greater than the multitude of that which is necessary, these are interesting questions, and indeed of synthetical solution, but which fall only under the jurisdiction of reason, for they are tantamount nearly to this:—whether all things as phenomena, belong as well in the complex as the context, to a single experience, each given perception of which is a part, which therefore could not be conjoined with

any other phenomena ; or whether my perceptions can belong to more than to a possible experience (in their general coherence). The understanding furnishes *à priori* to experience in general only the rules, according to subjective and formal conditions of sensibility as well as of apperception, which alone make it (experience) possible. Other forms of intuition, (as space and time,) and likewise other forms of the understanding, (as the discursive ones of thinking, or of cognition by conceptions) although they were possible, could we not yet imagine and make intelligible to ourselves in any way ; but even if we could, still they would not belong to experience, as the only cognition wherein objects are given to us. Whether other perceptions than in general belong to our united possible experience, and therefore whether again quite another totally distinct field of matter could take place, the understanding cannot decide. It has only to do with the synthesis of that which is given. Besides, the poverty of our usual deductions, whereby we produce a great empire of possibility, of which all real (every object of experience) is only a small part, is very striking. All real is possible—hence follows naturally, according to the logical laws of conversion, the simple particular proposition:—some possible is real, which then seems as much as to signify, that there is much possible which is not real. It has, in fact, the appearance, as if we thereby could straightway carry further the number of the possible beyond that of the real, since something must be added to the former to constitute the latter. But this addition to the possible, I do not know. For that which beyond this was still to be added, would be impossible. There can only be added to my understanding something beyond the conformity with the formal conditions of experience, that is to say, the synthesis with some perception—yet what is connected with this according to empirical laws, is real, although it is not

immediately perceived. But, that in the universal coherence with what is given to me in the perception, another series of phenomena, consequently more than a single all-embracing experience, is possible, is not to be concluded from that which is given, and still less, unless something is given, inasmuch as without matter itself nothing can at all be thought. That which is only possible under conditions, which themselves are merely possible, is not so in *all respects*. But in this way the question is taken, if we wish to know whether the possibility of things extends further than experience can reach.

I have only made mention of these questions, in order not to leave any gap in that which, according to the common opinion, belongs to the conceptions of the understanding. But, indeed, the absolute possibility (that which is valid in all respects), is no mere conception of the understanding, and can in no way be of empirical use, but it belongs only to reason, which extends out beyond all possible empirical use of the understanding. Consequently here we must be satisfied with a mere critical observation, but as to the rest, leave the matter in obscurity until a further future discussion.

As I am just about to conclude this fourth division, and with it at the same time the system of all the principles of the pure understanding, I must state the reason why I have called the principles of modality precisely postulates. I will not take this expression here in the sense which some modern philosophical authors, contrary to the acceptation of mathematicians, to whom however it properly belongs, have given to it, namely, that to postulate, is in other words, as much as to give out a proposition for immediately certain, without justification or proof. For if we are to admit in synthetical propositions, however evident they may be, that we can attach to them an unconditioned approval without deduction,

upon the authority of their own claim, all critick of the understanding is lost ; and as there is never a scarcity of bold pretensions, which the common belief (but which is no credential) does not refuse, our understanding will thus be exposed to every fancy, without being able to refuse its assent to these claims, which although illegitimate, still ask to be admitted in the self-same tone of confidence as real axioms. If, therefore, a determination *a priori* is added synthetically to the conception of a thing, then if not a proof as to such a proposition, yet at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion must indispensably be thereto added.

But the principles of modality are not objectively synthetical, because the predicates of possibility, reality, and necessity, do not augment in the least the conception as to which these are affirmed, in this respect, that they add something to the representation of the object. But yet although they are still always synthetical, they are only so subjectively, that is, they join to the conception of a thing, (the real), in regard of which they otherwise state nothing, the faculty of cognition, wherein the conception originates and has its seat, so that if it is merely in connexion in the understanding with the formal conditions of experience, its object is termed possible. If it is in connexion with the perception (sensation as matter of sense) and determined through this, by means of the understanding, the object is real. If it is determined according to conceptions by means of the connexion of perceptions, the object is called necessary. The principles of modality, therefore, express nothing as to a conception, but the action of the faculty of cognition, whereby this is produced. Now the practical proposition is termed a postulate in mathematics, which contains nothing but the synthesis, whereby we first give to ourselves an object, and generate its conception, for example: with



a given line, from a given point, to describe a circle upon a surface—and such a proposition can on this account not be demonstrated, because the procedure which it requires is exactly that whereby we first generate the conception of such a figure. We can then with the self same right postulate, the principles of modality, because they do not increase\* its conception of things in general, but only denote the manner in which form the thing in general is conjoined with the faculty of cognition.

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS UPON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.

It is something very worthy of observation, that we cannot perceive the possibility of any thing according to the mere category, but must always have an intuition at hand, in order to show therein the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding. Take, for example, the categories of relation, how something can exist, first, only as *subject*, not as a mere determination of other things, that is, can be *substance*; or how, secondly, because something is, something else must be—consequently how something in general can be cause; or, thirdly, how if several things exist, on this account, because one of these exists, something follows in the others, and reciprocally, and in this manner a community of substances take place—this is not at all to be seen from mere conceptions. The same holds true also of

\* *Through the reality of a thing I assume certainly more than the possibility, but not in the thing, for that can never contain more in the reality than was contained in its complete possibility. But as the possibility was merely a position of the thing in reference to the understanding, (the empirical use of it,) so the reality is at the same time a connexion of this thing with the perception.*

the other categories, for example, how a thing can be identical with several together—that is, can be a quantity, &c. So long, therefore, as intuition is wanting, we do not know whether we think an object by means of the categories, or whether any object can at all belong to them, and so it is confirmed that they are in themselves no *cognitions*, but merely *forms of thought*, for making cognitions from given intuitions. It results also in consequence, that no synthetical proposition can be made from the mere categories—as for example, “in every existence there is substance,” that is, something which can only exist as subject, and not as mere predicate, or “every thing is a quantum,” &c.—in which cases there is nothing at all which can aid us to go out beyond a given conception, and to connect another therewith. Hence the attempt has never succeeded from mere pure conceptions of the understanding, to prove a synthetical proposition, as, for example, the proposition—“all that exists contingently has a cause.” One could never advance any further than to show that without this relationship we do not at all comprehend the existence of the contingent, that is, *a priori*, we could not know through the understanding, the existence of such a thing; but from this it does not follow, that this same relation is also the condition of the possibility of the things themselves. If, therefore, we will look back again to our proof of the principle of causality, we shall be aware that we could only show the same as to objects of possible experience. “All that happens (every event) presupposes a cause,” but in fact in such a way, that we can only prove it as a principle of the possibility of experience, consequently of the *cognition* of an object given in the *empirical intuition*, and not from mere conceptions. Still it is not to be denied that the proposition “every contingent thing must have a cause,” is clear to every body from mere conceptions; but then

the conception of the contingent is already comprehended in such a way, that it does not contain the category of modality (as something whose non-being may be thought,) but that of relation, (as something that can only exist as consequence of another thing,) and then is it certainly an identical proposition, "what can only exist as consequence, has its cause." Indeed if we have to give examples of contingent existence, we appeal always to *changes*, and not merely to the possibility of the *thought* of the *contrary*.<sup>\*</sup> But change is an event which as such is only possible by means of a cause, whose non-being therefore is possible in itself, and thus we cognize the contingency from this, that something can exist only as effect of a cause; consequently if a thing is admitted as contingent, it is an analytical proposition, that is to say, the thing has a cause.

But still more remarkable is it, that in order to understand the possibility of things, according to the categories, and therefore to represent the *objective reality* of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, but even always *external intuitions*. If we, for example, take the pure conceptions of *relation*, we find, first, that in order to give, corresponding to the conception of substance, something *permanent* in the intuition, (and thereby to prove the objective reality of this conception,) we require an intuition in space (of matter), since space alone determines permanently; whilst time, consequently all which is

<sup>\*</sup> We may easily think the non-being of matter, but still the ancients did not conclude from this, its contingency. But even the alteration of being and non-being of a given state of a thing in which alteration all change consists, does not at all show the contingency of this state, as it were from the reality of its contrary,—for example, the repose of a body which follows upon its motion, does not, on this account, show the contingency of the motion of the same body, because the former is the contrary of the latter. For this contrary is here only logical, not really *opposed* to the other. We must show, in order to prove the contingency of its motion, that *instead* of motion in the preceding point of time, it was possible that the body *then* had rested, not that it rested *afterwards*, as then the two contraries may very well subsist together.

in the internal sense, flows constantly. Secondly, that in order to represent *change* as the corresponding intuition to the conception of *causality*, we must take, for example, motion as change in space; nay, in fact, thereby alone can we render perceptible to ourselves changes, whose possibility no pure understanding can comprehend. Change is conjunction of contradictory opposing determinations one to another, in the existence of one and the same thing. Now how it is possible, that from a given state an opposite one to it should follow of the same thing, pure reason cannot, not only without an example, render conceivable, but without intuition, not even intelligible, and this intuition is that of the motion of a point in space, the existence of which point in different places, (as a consequence of opposite determinations), first alone makes change visible to us; for, in order afterwards to render imaginable even internal changes, we must make comprehensible to ourselves time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively, by means of a line, and the internal change by means of the drawing of this line (motion)—consequently the successive existence of ourselves in different states, by means of external intuition,—whereof the particular ground is this; that all change necessarily presupposes something permanent in the intuition, in order itself to be perceived only as change, although in the internal sense no permanent intuition at all is met with. Lastly, the category of *community* is, according to its possibility, not possible to be comprehended by means of mere reason, and therefore the objective reality of this conception, without intuition, and this indeed, external in space, is not possible to be seen. For how can we conceive the possibility, that if several substances exist, something (as effect) can follow from the existence of the one to the existence of the other reciprocally,

and that therefore, because there was something in the former, something must also be in the other, which, from the existence of the latter alone, cannot be understood? For this is required for community, but is not at all comprehensible amongst things which isolate entirely each one by means of its subsistence. *Leibnitz*, therefore, as he attributed a community to the substances of the world, such as the understanding only thinks them, required a Divinity as a means; as from their existence alone, the community seemed to him, with propriety, to be incomprehensible. But we can very well make intelligible to ourselves the possibility of community, (of substances as phenomena,) if we represent them to ourselves in space, consequently in the external intuition. For this space contains in itself already, *à priori*, formal external relations, as conditions of the possibility of the real ones (in action and re-action, consequently of community). In the same way it may easily be proved, that the possibility of things as *quantities* and therefore the objective reality of the category of quantity, can also only be exposed in the external intuition, and by means of it alone also afterwards be disposed in the internal sense. But in order to avoid prolixity, I must leave the example as to this to the reflection of the reader.

The whole remark is of the greatest importance, not only for confirming our previous refutation of idealism, but still more, in order to indicate to us, if the question arise respecting *self-cognitions* from mere internal consciousness, and the determination of our nature without the aid of external empirical intuition, the limits of the possibility of such a cognition.

The final consequence from the whole of this section is, therefore, that all principles of the pure

understanding, are nothing more than principles à priori of the possibility of experience; and all synthetic principles à priori, relate to this last alone, nay, their possibility itself rests entirely upon this relationship.

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE  
FACULTY OF JUDGMENT,  
(OR ANALYTICK OF PRINCIPLES.)

*THIRD CHAPTER.*

OF THE GROUNDS OF THE DISTINCTION OF ALL OBJECTS  
IN GENERAL, INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA.

We have now not only travelled through the region of the pure understanding, and taken into view each portion of it, carefully, but we have also measured it, and determined to each thing therein its place. But this region is an island, and enclosed by nature itself in unchangeable limits. It is the region of truth, (an engaging title,) surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the particular seat of false appearance, where many banks of clouds, and masses of ice ready to melt away, deceitfully indicate new countries; and whilst it continually deludes the sailor roving about in search of discoveries, with vain hopes, it engages him in adventures which he never can desist from, and still can never bring them to an end. But before we venture ourselves upon this sea, in order to explore it in all its dimensions, and to be certain whether there is any thing to be hoped for therein, it will be advantageous, previously still to cast a look upon the chart of the country that we are just about to leave, and first to enquire whether we could not in any case rest satisfied with that which it contains, or of necessity whether we must not be content, if

there should else be no other point whereupon we could settle ; and secondly, under what title we then possess this land itself, and can maintain ourselves, secured against all hostile pretensions. Although we have answered these questions already sufficiently in the course of the Analytick, yet a summary recapitulation of their solutions may in this way strengthen the conviction that it unites the moments of such in one point.

We have seen, for instance, that all which the understanding derives from itself, without borrowing it from experience, it still possesses, for no other advantage, than for the use of experience alone. The principles of the pure understanding whether *à priori* constitutive (as the mathematical), or merely regulative (as the dynamical), contain nothing, as it were, but the pure schema only for possible experience ; for such has its unity, simply from the synthetical unity which the understanding imparts of itself and originally, to the synthesis of the imagination in reference to the apperception, and to which the phenomena, as data of a possible cognition, must already stand in relation and accordance. But now, although these rules of understanding are not only true *à priori*, but even the source of all truth, that is, of the accordance of our cognition with objects, because of this, that they contain in themselves the foundation of the possibility of experience, as the complex of every cognition wherein objects may be given, it appears to us still not enough merely to propound what is true, but that which we desire to know. If, therefore, by means of this critical investigation, we learn nothing more than what we of ourselves should have executed by the mere empirical use of the understanding, without so subtle an enquiry, it appears that the advantage which we derive from it is not worth the expense and preparation. To this it may certainly be answered, that no curiosity is more dis-



advantageous to the enlarging of our cognition, than that which will thus know always before hand the utility, previously to entering upon enquiries, and before we could form to ourselves the least conception of this utility, provided it were also placed before our eyes. But there is still an advantage which may be made comprehensible to the most exceptious and reluctant tyro in such transcendental enquiry, and at the same a constraining one,—which is this, that the understanding, occupied merely with its empirical use, which does not reflect upon the sources of its proper cognition, may certainly very well get on, but cannot effect one thing, that is to say to determine for itself the limits of its use, and to know what may lie within and what without of its whole sphere; for in respect to this, the deep investigations are required which we have instituted. But if the understanding cannot decide whether certain questions do or do not lie within its horizon, it is never sure either as to its pretensions and possession, but must likewise reckon upon many humiliating corrections, should it continually overstep the limits of its territory, (which is unavoidable,) and lose itself in fancies and delusions.

That the understanding therefore can make of all its principles *à priori*, in fact of all its conceptions, none other than an empirical, but never a transcendental use, is a proposition which, if it can be cognized to conviction, tends to the most important consequences. The transcendental use of a conception in any principle is this, that it is referred to things in *general*, and to *itself*, but the empirical use, when merely to *phenomena*, that is, to objects of a possible *experience*. And that the last case can only generally occur is seen from this. To each conception is required, first, the logical form of a conception (of thinking) in general, and then, secondly, also the possibility of offering an object to the conception to which it refers. Without this last (*the object*) it (*the conception*)

has no ~~sense~~, and is quite void of content, although it may still always contain the logical function for forming a conception from certain data. Now the object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than in the intuition, and if a pure intuition is even possible *à priori* before the object, yet such still can receive its object, consequently objective validity, only, by means of the empirical intuition, of which it is the mere form. Therefore all conceptions, and with them all principles, however much they may be possible *à priori*, still refer to empirical intuitions, that is, to data of possible experience. Without this, they have no objective validity at all, but are a mere play either of the imagination or the understanding, respectively, with their representations. Let us take, for example, only the conceptions of mathematics, and first of all in their pure intuitions. "Space has these dimensions." "Between two points there can be only a straight line," &c. Although all these principles, and the representation of the object with which this science (*mathematick*) occupies itself, are entirely generated in the mind *à priori*, yet they would mean nothing at all, could we not always expose their meaning in phenomena (empirical objects). Consequently it is requisite also to *make sensible* a separate conception, that is, to expose the object corresponding to it in the intuition, since without this object the conception (as they say) would remain without *sense*, that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfil this condition by means of the construction of figure, which is a phenomenon present to the senses, (although produced *à priori*). The conception of quantity seeks even in science its support and sense, in number, and this in the fingers,—the corals (*counters*) of a calculating table, or in the lines and points which are exposed to our view. The conception always remains generated *à priori*, together with the synthetical principles

or formulæ from such conceptions ; but the use of these, and reference to supposed objects, can, finally, never be sought any where but in experience, the possibility of which (according to the form) they contain *a priori*.

But that this is also the case with all the categories and the thence spun principles, is evident from this, that we cannot at all define one of them real, that is to say, make the possibility of its object to be understood, without submitting ourselves immediately to the conditions of sensibility, consequently to the form of phenomena, as to which, as their only objects, they (*the categories*) must consequently be limited ; because if we remove this condition, all meaning, that is to say, reference to the object, falls away, and one cannot make conceivable to oneself by any example, what kind of a thing properly is then meant under the like conceptions.

No one can explain the conception of quantity in general, except perhaps in this way, that it is the determination of a thing, whereby it can be thought, how many times one can be placed in it. But this how many times, is founded upon successive repetition, consequently upon time, and the synthesis (of the homogeneous) therein. Reality we can only then explain in opposition to negation, provided we think a time, (as the complex of all being,) which either is filled therewith or is void. If I omit permanence, (which is an existence in all time,) there remains to me for the conception of substance, nothing more than the logical representation of the subject, which I believe to realize from this, because I represent to myself something which can take place merely as subject, (without being a predicate of it.) But not only do I not know any conditions at all under which then this logical prerogative is proper to a thing, but there is likewise nothing further thence to be made, and not the least consequence to

be drawn, inasmuch as thereby no object at all of the use of this conception is determined, and consequently we do not in fact know whether it generally means any thing. With respect to the conception of cause, (if I omit time, in which something follows upon something else, according to a rule,) I should find nothing further in the pure category, than that there is thus something, whence it may be concluded as to the existence of something else, and thereby would cause and effect not only not at all be able to be separated from one another, but since this capability of conclusion still immediately requires conditions of which I know nothing, the conception would then have no determination as to the way it agrees with an object. The pretended principle, "all that is contingent has a cause," presents itself certainly with tolerable gravity, as if it had its own value in itself. But if I ask, what do you understand by contingent? and you answer, that whose non-being is possible, I would willingly learn by what you would cognize this possibility of non-being, if you do not represent to yourself a succession in the series of phenomena, and in this succession an existence, which follows upon a non-existence, (or conversely,) consequently a change. For that the non-being of a thing does not contradict itself is a poor appeal to a logical condition, which is certainly necessary for the conception, but which is a long way from being sufficient for the real possibility; as I then may annihilate every existing substance in thought without contradicting myself, but cannot at all thence conclude as to the objective contingency of the same in its existence, that is, the possibility of its non-being in itself. As to what regards the conception of community, it is easy to appreciate that, as the pure categories of substance as well as causality admit of no explanation determining the object, reciprocal causality in the relationship of substances to one another (commer-

cium) is just as little capable of it. Possibility, existence, necessity, no one would be able to explain otherwise than by a manifest tautology, if we would deduce their definition only from the pure understanding. For the illusion of substituting the logical possibility of the *conception* (where it does not contradict itself,) for the transcendental possibility of things, (where an object corresponds to the conception) can only deceive and satisfy the inexperienced.\*

Now it hence follows incontestably, that the conceptions of the pure understanding can never be of *transcendental*, but at all times only of *empirical* use, and that the principles of the pure understanding in relation to the general conditions of a possible experience, can be referred only to objects of the senses, but never to things in general, (without paying regard to the manner in which we may envisage them).

Transcendental analytick has therefore this important result, that the understanding can never *a priori* do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience in general; and that as that which is not phenomenon can be no object of experience, the understanding can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an *Ontology*, which pretends to give synthetical cognition *a priori* of things in general, in a systematic doctrine, (for example, the principle of causality) must give place to the unpretending name of a simple analytick of the pure understanding.

Thinking is the action of referring a given intuition to an object. If the kind of this intuition is in no

\* In a word, all these conceptions are not to be *supported* by means of any thing, and thereby their real possibility demonstrated, if all sensible intuition (the only one which we have) is taken away; and there then only remains besides the *logical possibility*, that is, that the conception (thought) is possible, but as to which it is not the question, but whether the conception refers to an object, and therefore signifies something.

way given, the object is then simply transcendental, and the conception of the understanding has none other than transcendental use—namely, the unity of the thought of a diversity in general. Now by means of a pure category, in which abstraction is made of all condition of sensible intuition as the only one which is possible to us, no object is therefore determined, but only the thinking of an object in general expressed, according to different *modes*. But, to the use of a conception there still belongs a function of the judgment, by which an object is subsumed under the conception, consequently the formal condition at least, under which something can be given in the intuition. If this condition of judgment (schema) is wanting, all subsumption then falls away, for nothing is given which may be subsumed under the conception. The mere transcendental use, therefore, of the categories is in fact no use at all, and has no determined object, nor even one determinable only as to the form. It hence follows that the pure category also does not belong to any synthetical principle *à priori*, and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical but never of transcendental use, and that beyond the field of possible experience there cannot be, at all, any synthetical principles *à priori*.

It may, therefore, be advisable thus to express ourselves. The pure categories, without formal conditions of sensibility, have mere transcendental meaning, but are of no transcendental use, since this is impossible in itself, because all conditions of any use (in judgments) leave them, that is, the formal conditions of the subsumption of a supposed object under these conceptions. As, therefore, (as mere pure categories) they are not to be of empirical use, and cannot be of transcendental, they are of no use at all, if we separate them from all sensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to any supposed object. They are rather simply the pure form of the use of

the understanding in respect of objects in general, and of thinking, without however by means of these alone our being able to determine or think an object.

There lies nevertheless at the bottom of this a deception, difficult to be avoided. The categories are grounded according to their origin, not upon the sensibility, like the *intuition-forms*, space and time, and they seem, therefore, to allow of an application extended beyond all objects of sense. But they are on their part again nothing but *forms of thought*, which contain merely the logical faculty of uniting à priori in a consciousness what is given diversely in an intuition ; and if we then take away from them the only intuition possible to us, they may have still less meaning than the pure intuition-forms spoken of, by means of which however at least an object is given ; whereas, a mode of conjunction of the diverse peculiar to our understanding means nothing at all, if the intuition wherein this diverse alone can be given is not added. Nevertheless it still lies already in our conception, when we name certain objects as appearances, beings of sense (*phænomena*)—distinguishing the mode in which we envisage them, from their quality in itself, that either we set up these beings agreeably to this last quality, although we do not see it in them, or yet other possible things, which are not at all objects of our senses, as objects merely thought by means of the understanding—as it were in opposition to the first (*phænomena*)—and call them beings of the understanding (*noumena*). And the question is now, whether our pure understanding-conceptions might not have meaning in respect of these last (*noumena*), and if there might not be a mode of cognizing them.

But immediately at the outset a confusion manifests itself, which may lead to great misapprehension, that since the understanding, if it names an object in a relationship merely phenomenon, makes to itself at the same time, besides this relation,

a representation of an *object in itself*, and thence supposes it can also make to itself *conceptions* of such like object, and since the understanding furnishes none else except the categories, the object at least in the last sense, must have been able to be thought by means of these pure understanding-conceptions; but thereby is it led to hold the whole undetermined conception of an understanding-being, as a something in general out of our sensibility, to be a *determined* conception of a being, which we by means of the understanding could in some way know.

If we understand by noumenon, a thing so far as it is not an *object of our sensible intuition*, in making abstraction of our mode of intuition of the same, this is then a noumenon in a *negative* sense. But if we understand by it an *object of non sensible intuition*, we thus assume a particular mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, but which is not our mode—the possibility of which we cannot even see, and this would be a noumenon in a *positive* sense.

Now the doctrine of sensibility is at the same time the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding itself must think without this reference to our mode of intuition; consequently not merely as phenomena, but as things in themselves; but of which the understanding at the same time comprehends in this separation, that it cannot make use of its categories in this way of considering them, because these only have meaning in relation to the unity of the intuitions in space and time, and even this unity also, by reason of the mere ideality of space and time, they can only determine *a priori* through general conceptions of conjunction. Where this unity of time cannot be met with, consequently in the noumenon, there the whole use, nay even all meaning of the categories totally ceases, for even the possibility of things which are to answer to the categories is not at all to be seen—touching which



I need only appeal to that which I have adduced in the general observation of the preceding chapter, immediately at the beginning. But then the possibility of a thing can never be shown merely from the non-contradiction of its conception, but only from this, that we demonstrate this by means of an intuition corresponding to it. If we, therefore, would apply the categories to objects which are not considered as phenomena, we must lay at the foundation another intuition than the sensible one, and then the object would be a noumenon in the *positive sense*. But as such an intuition, namely, the intellectual one, lies absolutely out of our faculty of cognition, the use of the categories also can thus by no means extend beyond the limits of objects of experience; and if beings of the understanding correspond to beings of the senses, there may likewise be beings of the understanding to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatever—but our understanding-conceptions, as mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, do not extend in the least to these. What therefore is called by us noumenon, must as such only be understood in a *negative* meaning.

If I take away all thought (through the categories) from an empirical cognition, there then remains no cognition at all of an object, for by means of mere intuition nothing at all is thought, and because this affection of the sensibility is in me, there is not constituted any relation at all of such a representation to an object. But if on the contrary I take away all intuition, the form of thought still remains, that is, the manner of determining an object to the diversity of a possible intuition. Hence the categories thus extend themselves much farther than the sensible intuition, because they think objects in general without yet looking to the particular way (sensibility), in which they may be given. But they do not determine thereby a larger sphere of objects, because we cannot admit,

that such could be given without supposing a kind of intuition, other than a sensible one, as possible, but in which we are not by any means justified.

I term a conception problematical which contains no contradiction, and which as a limit of given conceptions is connected with other cognitions, but the objective reality of which cannot be cognized in any way. The conception of a *noumenon*, that is, of a thing which is to be thought, not at all as object of the senses, but as thing in itself (only by means of a pure understanding), is not at all contradictory, for we cannot yet maintain of the sensibility, that it is the only possible mode of intuition. This conception, besides, is necessary in order not to extend the sensible intuition beyond the things in themselves, and therefore to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition; (for the rest, where such (*sensible intuition*) does not extend, are called on that very account noumena, in order that we may thereby denote, that these cognitions cannot extend their territory beyond all that the understanding thinks.) But after all, the possibility of such *noumena* is still not at all to be seen, and the circle beyond the sphere of phenomena is (as to us) void, that is, we have an *understanding* which extends itself problematically further than that sphere, but no intuition, nay, even, not ever a conception of a possible intuition, whereby objects can be given to us out of the field of sensibility, and the understanding used *assertorically* beyond the same. The conception of a noumenon is therefore a *limiting conception*, in order to circumscribe the pretensions of sensibility, and therefore only of negative use. But nevertheless it is not arbitrarily imagined, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without yet being able to place any thing positive out of its circumscription.

The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a sense-world and an

understanding-world, can therefore not at all be granted in a *positive meaning*, although conceptions certainly admit the division into sensible and intellectual; for we can determine no object to the last, and consequently not give them out as objectively valid. If we abandon the senses, how shall we make it understood, that our categories (which would be the only remaining conceptions for noumena) still signify any thing at all, as for their reference to an object something more still than merely the unity of thought must be given, namely, a possible intuition, whereupon those could be applied. The conception of a noumenon, merely problematically taken, remains, notwithstanding not only admissible, but as a conception fixing the sensibility within limits, inevitable. But then this is not a particular *intelligible object* for our understanding—and even an understanding to which it belonged is itself a problem—namely, to cognize its object not discursively by means of the categories, but intuitively, in an intuition which is not sensible, and regarding which object we cannot make to ourselves the least representation as to its possibility. Now our understanding receives in this way a negative extension, that is, it is not limited by means of the sensibility, but rather limits the same, inasmuch as it terms noumena things in themselves, (not considered as phenomena). But it also sets limits in fact immediately to itself, not to cognize these noumena by means of categories, and consequently to think them only under the name of an unknown something.

I find, however, in the writings of the moderns, quite another use of the expression of a *mundus sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*,\* which totally varies from the

\* We must not, instead of this expression, use that of an *intellectual world*, as they are accustomed to do in German treatises, for *cognitions* only are intellectual or sensitive. But only that which can be an *object* of one or the other mode of intuition—the objects therefore (in spite of the harshness of the sound) must be called intelligible or sensible.

sense of the ancients, and in which it certainly presents no difficulty, but where nothing but an empty display of words is to be found. According to this, it has pleased some persons to name the world of the senses, the complex of phenomena so far as this is envisaged, but so far as its connexion according to the general laws of the understanding is thought, to call it the world of the understanding. Theoretic astronomy, which proposes the mere observation of the starry heaven, would represent the first; on the other hand, contemplative astronomy (explained perhaps according to the Copernican system, or likewise to Newton's system of gravitation) would represent the second—that is to say, an intelligible world. But such a perversion of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge in order to avoid a troublesome question, in such a way that each modifies their meaning to his own convenience. In respect of phenomena, understanding and reason may certainly be used, but the question is, whether these have still a use, if the object is not phenomenon (is noumenon), and in this sense it is taken, if it is thought in itself as merely intelligible—that is, as given to the understanding only, and not at all to the senses. There is also a question whether, besides such empirical use of the understanding, (even in the Newtonian representation of the system of the world,) a transcendental one also is possible which refers to the noumenon as an object; which question we have answered negatively.

If we, therefore, say, the senses represent to us the objects as they appear, but the understanding as they are, the last is not to be taken in a transcendental, but in a mere empirical signification, namely, how they, as objects of experience, must be represented in the universal connexion of phenomena, and not according to that which they may be, independent of the relation to possible experience—and consequently

to the senses in general—consequently as objects of the pure understanding. For this will ever remain unknown to us, so much that it even remains unknown whether such a transcendental (extraordinary) cognition is in any way possible, at least as such a one as stands under our usual categories. *Understanding* and *sensibility* can only determine objects in us, in *conjunction*. If we separate them, we have intuitions without conceptions, or conceptions without intuitions, but in both cases representations, which we cannot refer to any determinate object.

If any person yet hesitate, after all these explanations, to relinquish the mere transcendental use of the categories, let him make a trial of them in any synthetical proposition. For an analytical one does not advance the understanding farther, and as he is only concerned (*in such a proposition*) with that which is already thought in the conception, he thus leaves it in abeyance, whether this conception refers in itself to objects, or only signifies the unity of thought in general, (which unity makes abstraction entirely of the manner in which an object is given). It is enough for him to know what lies in his conception—that which the conception itself may refer to, is indifferent to him. Let him try it therefore with any synthetical and supposed transcendental principle—as, “all that is, exists as substance or a dependent determination of it,” “all that is contingent, exists as effect of some other thing,” that is to say, “of its cause,” &c. Now, I ask, whence will he derive these synthetical propositions, as the conceptions are not to be valid in reference of possible experience, but of things in themselves (noumena). Where is here that third thing, which is always required in a synthetic proposition, in order to connect with one another in the same conception, things which have no logical (analytical) relation with each other? He will never be able to demonstrate his proposition—

may, what is still more, never be able to justify as to the possibility of such a pure assertion, without having recourse to the empirical use of the understanding, and thereby giving up judgment entirely pure and independent of the senses. Thus then the conception of pure mere intelligible objects, is wholly void of all principles of its application, because we cannot imagine in which way these are to be afforded, and the problematical thought which yet leaves a place open for them, serves only as a void space, for circumscribing empirical principles, without however containing in itself, and showing any other object of cognition out of the sphere of the last.

## APPENDIX.

OF THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS  
OF REFLECTION,

FROM

EXCHANGING THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE UNDER-  
STANDING FOR THE TRANSCENDENTAL.

Reflection (*reflexio*) has nothing to do with the objects themselves in order to obtain conceptions of them exactly, but it is the state of the mind in which we first, for that purpose, set ourselves, in order to discover the subjective conditions under which we may attain to conceptions. It is the consciousness of the relationship of given representations to our different sources of cognition, by which consciousness alone their relationship with each other can be correctly determined. The first question before any further enquiry into our representations is this: to what faculty of cognition do they, together, belong? Is it the understanding or the senses by which they are conjoined or compared? Many a judgment is admitted by custom, or connected by inclination, but as no reflection precedes, or at least critically follows thereupon, it is valid as such a one as has obtained its origin in the understanding. All judgments do not require an *investigation*, that is, attention to the foundation of the truth, for if they are immediately certain, as, for example, that "between two points, there can only be one straight line," no still nearer mark of the truth can be declared with respect to them, than that which they themselves express. But all judgments, all comparisons, require *reflection*—that is, a distinguishing of

the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong. The action whereby I connect the comparison of representations in general with the faculty of cognition, wherein such is made, and wherewith I distinguish whether these representations are compared with one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to the sensible intuition, I term *transcendental reflection*. But the relationship wherein conceptions may belong to one another in a state of mind—are those of *identity* and *difference*—*accordance* and *opposition*—of *internal* and *external*—and lastly of the *determinable* and the *determination* (matter and form). The right determination of this relationship rests upon this, in what faculty of cognition these conceptions belong to each other *subjectively*, whether to the sensibility or the understanding. For the difference of the latter makes a great difference as to the manner in which we must think of the first.

Before all objective judgments we compare the conceptions in order to arrive at *identity* (of several representations under one conception) in behalf of *general judgments*—or the *difference* of these, for the generation of *particular judgments*,—at *accordance*, whence are *affirmative judgments*—and *opposition*, whence are negative judgments, &c. From these grounds we ought, as it appears, to term the conceptions now mentioned, conceptions of comparison, (*conceptus comparationis*). But since, if the question does not regard the logical form, but the matter of the conception—that is, whether the things themselves are identical or different, accordant or in opposition, &c.,—the things may have a double relationship to our faculty of cognition, that is to say, to the sensibility and to the understanding, but as to the place (*faculty*) to which they belong, the manner arises in which way they are to belong to each other, transcendental reflection, thus, that is, the relationship of given repre-



sentations to one or the other faculty of cognition, will alone be able to determine their relationship with one another ; and whether the things are identical or different, accordant or opposite, &c., will not be able to be made out immediately from the conceptions themselves by means of mere comparison (*comparatio*), but first of all through the distinguishing of the faculty of cognition to which they belong, by means of transcendental reflection. We may therefore indeed say, that *logical reflection* is a mere comparison, for we make abstraction in it wholly of the faculty of cognition, to which the given representations belong, and they are therefore, so far as to their place in the mind, to be treated as homogeneous ; but *transcendental reflection* (which refers to the objects themselves,) contains the foundation of the possibility of the objective comparison of representations with one another, and is therefore very different from the last (*logical reflection*), as the faculty of cognition to which they belong, is not even the same. This transcendental reflection is an obligation from which no one can exempt himself, if he will judge *à priori* any point with respect to things. We will now take this in hand, and thereby draw from it not a little light as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding.

1. *Identity and Difference*.—If an object is presented to us several times, but every time with the self-same internal determinations, (*qualitas et quantitas*,) it is the same thing,—if it is valid as an object of the pure understanding, it is ever the very same—and not several—but only one thing, (*numerica identitas*) ; but if it is phenomenon, the point is not at all then as to the comparison of conceptions, and however identical all may be in respect to the same, still the difference of the places of this phenomenon at the same time is a sufficient ground for the *numerical* difference of the object itself (of the senses). Thus

in two drops of water we can entirely make abstraction of all internal difference (of quality and quantity), and it is enough that they can be perceived in different places contemporaneously, in order to hold them as numerically different. *Leibnitz* took phenomena for things in themselves, consequently for intelligibilia, that is, objects of the pure understanding (although on account of the confusion of their representations he gave them the name of phenomena), and then his principle of the *indistinguishable* (principium identitatis indiscernibilium) certainly could not be contested: but as they are objects of sensibility, and the understanding in respect thereof, is not of pure, but of simply empirical use, plurality and numerical difference is thus already given through space itself, as the condition of the external phenomena. For a part of space, although indeed it may be entirely similar and equal to another, is still out of it, and precisely thereby a part different from the first, which is added to it, in order to make up a greater space,—and thence this must hold true of all which is at the same time in the various places of space, however else such may be similar and equal to itself.

2. *Accordance and Opposition*—If reality is only represented to us by means of the pure understanding (realitas noumenon), no opposition can be thought between the realities, that is, such a relationship as that these conjoined in a subject, destroy mutually their consequences, and  $3-3$ , is  $=0$ . On the other hand, the real in the phenomenon (realitas phænomenon) may certainly be in opposition with one another; and united in the same subject, one annihilates *the consequence of the* other wholly, or in part, as two moving forces in the same straight line, so far as they draw or force a point in an opposite direction,—or also pleasure which balances with pain.

3. *The Internal and External.*—In an object of the pure understanding, that only is internal, which has no relation at all (according to existence) to any thing different from it. On the other hand, the internal determinations of a substantia phenomenon in space are only relationships, and it itself (*substantia phenomenon*) wholly a complex of pure relations. Substance in space we only know by means of forces, which are real in this space either to urge others on therein (attraction), or to restrain from forcing into it, (repulsion and impenetrability). Other properties we do not know, which constitute the conception of substance which appears in space, and which we name matter. Every substance, on the other hand, as object of the pure understanding must have internal determinations and forces, which refer to the internal reality. But what kind of internal accidents can I think to myself, except those which my internal sense offers to me? namely, that which either itself is a *thought*, or is analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, from all substances, as he represented them to himself as Noumena, even from the component parts of matter, after he had taken away in idea all that may signify external relation, consequently *composition* also, produced simple subjects invested with powers of representation—in a word—*Monads*.

4. *Matter and Form.*—These are two conceptions which are laid at the foundation of all other reflection, so very inseparably are they joined with every use of the understanding. The first signifies the determinable in general. The second, the determination of it, (both in a transcendental sense, as we make abstraction of the difference of that which is given, and of the manner in which it is determined). Logicians formerly called the universal, matter, but the specific difference, form. In each judgment we may name the given conceptions, logical matter (for judgment), their relationship, (by means of the

copula) the form of the judgment. In every being, the constituent parts (essentialia) of it are matter, the mode in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form. In respect of things in general, unlimited reality was also regarded as the matter of all possibility, but the limitation thereof (negation) as that form, whereby a thing distinguished itself from another, according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding, that is, requires, first, that something is given (at least in the conception) in order to be able to determine it in a certain manner. Consequently matter precedes form in the conception of the pure understanding; and *Leibnitz* first admits on this account things (monads), and internally a representation-force belonging to them, in order afterwards to found thereupon their external relationship, and the community of their states, (that is, of the representations.) Hence, space and time were possible, as causes and consequences, the first only by means of the relationship of substances, the latter through the connexion of their determinations with one another. And so in fact would it likewise be, if the pure understanding could be referred immediately to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things in themselves. But if they are only sensible intuitions in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, then the form of the intuition (as a subjective quality of the sensibility) precedes all matter,—the sensations,—consequently space and time precede all phenomena, and all data of experience—or rather it makes experience first of all possible. The intellectual philosopher could not permit that the form would precede the things themselves, and determine their possibility; a censure entirely correct, if he admitted that we see things as they are (although in confused representation). But as the sensible intuition is wholly a particular subjective condition, which lies at the foundation, *a priori*, of all

perception, and the form of which is original, the form thus of itself alone is given, and so far from its being the case, that matter (or the the things themselves which appear) is to lie at the foundation, (as one must judge according to mere conceptions), its own possibility pre-supposes rather a formal intuition (time and space) as given.

### SCHOLIUM

#### TO THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.

Let it be allowed to me to term *transcendental place*, the situation we assign to a conception, either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding. The deciding in such a way upon that situation which belongs to every conception, according to the difference of its use, and the indication for determining this place to all conceptions, according to rules, would be a *transcendental Topic*, a system which would thoroughly guarantee us from the subreptions of the pure understanding, and the thence arising delusions; since it at all times distinguishes to which faculty of cognition the conceptions properly belong. We may term each conception, each title, under which many cognitions range themselves, a *logical place*. Hereupon the *logical topic* of Aristotle was founded, of which heads of schools and rhetoricians were enabled to make use, in order to examine, amongst certain titles of thinking, what suited itself best to the matter proposed, and thereupon to refine with an appearance of solidity, or to prate fluently.

*Transcendental topic* contains, on the other hand, nothing more than the adduced four titles of all comparison and all distinction, which are separated from the categories in this, that through the first, not the object according to that which constitutes its

conception, (quantity, reality) but only the comparison of the representations, which precedes the conception of things, is presented in all its variety. But this comparison requires, first of all, a reflection, that is, a determination of that place to which the representations of things belong, which are to be compared—whether the pure understanding thinks, or the sensibility gives such in the phenomenon

Conceptions can be logically compared without on that account troubling ourselves, as to what place their objects belong, whether as noumena to the understanding, or as phenomena to the sensibility. But if we wished with these conceptions to proceed to the objects, transcendental reflection is previously necessary, to decide as to what faculty of cognition they are to be objects, whether for the pure understanding or sensibility. Without this reflection, I make a very uncertain use of these conceptions, and there arises pretended synthetical principles, which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and which are founded only upon a transcendental amphiboly, that is, upon an exchange of the object of the pure understanding for the phenomenon.

Wanting such a transcendental topic, and consequently deceived by means of the amphiboly of the conception of reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz erected *an intellectual system of the world*, or rather believed himself to cognize the internal quality of things, whilst he compared all objects with the understanding only, and the separate formal conceptions of his thought. Our table of the conceptions of reflection, procures for us the unexpected advantage of placing before us what is distinctive in his system in all its parts, and at the same time, the guiding motive of this particular mode of thinking, which principle rested upon nothing but a mis-conception. He compared all things with each other, merely by means of conceptions, and found as was natural, no

other differences, but those by means of which the understanding distinguishes its pure conceptions from one another. The conditions of the sensible intuition, which carry along with them their own distinctions, he did not regard as original, for sensibility was to him only a confused mode of representation, and no particular source of representations. Phenomenon was to him the representation of the thing in itself, although different from the cognition through the understanding, according to the logical form, inasmuch, namely, as the first (*sensibility*) in its usual want of analysis, draws a certain mixture of collateral representations into the conception of the thing which the understanding knows how to separate therefrom. In one word, Leibnitz *intellectualized* the phenomena, as Locke *sensualized* all the conceptions of the understanding, according to his system of *Noogony*, (if I may be allowed to make use of this expression;) that is, he gave them out to be, nothing but empirical or separated conceptions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and the sensibility two quite distinct sources of representations, but which only in *conjunction* can judge of things objectively-validly, each of these two great men held only to one of the two sources which, according to their opinion, referred immediately to things in themselves, whilst the other source did nothing but disturb or order the representations of the first.

Leibnitz hence compares the objects of the senses with one another, as things in general in the understanding, only, *in the first place*, so far as these are to be judged identical or different from it. As he therefore considered only conceptions of them and not their places in the intuition, wherein alone objects can be given, and left entirely out of consideration the transcendental place of these conceptions, (whether the object is to be reckoned amongst phenomena, or amongst things in themselves,) it could not other-

wise happen, than that he should also extend his principle of the indistinguishable, which merely holds valid of the conceptions of things in general, to the objects of the senses, (*imundus phœnomenon*) and he believed thereby to have procured no small extension of the cognition of nature. Certainly, if I know a drop of water as a thing in itself, according to all its internal determinations, I cannot admit one of these drops as different from the other, if the whole conception of this (*drop*) is identical with it. But if it is *phœnomenon* in space, it has its place not merely in the understanding, (amongst conceptions) but in the sensible external intuition (in space), and there the physical places are quite indifferent, in regard to the internal determinations of things, and a place  $= b$  can equally as well receive a thing which is entirely similar and equal to another in a place  $= a$ , as if it were from this ever so different internally. The difference of places renders the plurality and difference of objects, as *phœnomena*, without other conditions, not only already in themselves possible, but also necessary. That apparent law (*principium identitatis indiscernabilium*) is therefore no law of nature. It is only an analytical rule of the comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.

*Secondly*—the principle that realities (as simple affirmations) never logically contradict one another, is a proposition quite true of the relationship of conceptions, but it signifies not the least, either in respect of nature, or generally in respect of any thing in itself, (as to which we have no conception). For the real contradiction every where takes place, where  $A - B = 0$  is ; that is, where one reality conjoined in a subject with another, one destroys the effect of the other,—which all obstacles and re-actions in nature constantly show us, but which, as they rest upon forces, must be called *realitatis phœnomena*. Universal mechanick may even furnish



in a rule, *à priori*, the empirical condition of this contradiction, whilst it looks to the opposition of directions,—a condition of which the transcendental conception of reality knows absolutely nothing. Although Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with the solemnity precisely of a new principle, yet he still made use of it for new positions, and his successors introduced it expressly into their Leibnitz-Wolfian system. According to this principle, for example, all evils are nothing but the consequences of the limits of created beings, that is, negations, because these are the only opposing thing to reality, (and in the mere conception of a thing in general it is really so, but not in things as phenomena). The followers of Leibnitz do not likewise deem it only possible, but also natural, to unite in one being all reality, without any opposition which is to be feared, since they do not know any other but that of contradiction, (by which the conception of a thing itself is annihilated)—but they do not know that of mutual detriment, when one principle of reality destroys the effect of another, and as to which we meet only in the sensibility with the conditions for representing to ourselves such a one.

*Thirdly*—the Leibnitzian monadology has no other foundation at all, except that this philosopher represented the difference of the internal and the external, merely in reference to the understanding. Substances in general must have something *internal*, which is therefore free from all external relationships, consequently also from composition. The simple is therefore the foundation of the internal of the thing in itself. But the internal of its state also cannot consist in place, form, contact or motion, (which determinations are all external relationships,) and we cannot therefore attribute to substances any other internal state than that, whereby we determine internally our sense itself, namely, the *state of the*

*representations*. In this way, then, the monads were ready, which were to constitute the fundamental matter of the universe, but whose active force only consists in representations, whereby they are properly merely effective in themselves.

But precisely on this account also, must his principle of the possible *community of substances* with one another be a predetermined *harmony*, and could be no physical influence. For, since all is occupied only internally, that is to say, with its representations, the state of the representations of one substance could not thus stand in the least effective conjunction with that of another; but there required a third cause influencing all together, to render their states corresponding one with another, not indeed by means of occasional support and particularly applied in each individual case, (*systema assistentiæ*),—but by means of the unity of the idea of a cause valid for all, in which these substances generally must obtain at the same time their existence and permanence, consequently also mutual correspondence with one another, according to general laws.

*Fourthly*—the famous *system* of this same individual with regard to time and space, wherein he intellectualized these forms of the sensibility, sprang simply from the self same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I wish to represent to myself through the mere understanding, external relationships of things, this can only so occur by means of a conception of their reciprocal action; and if I am to join one state of the same thing with another, this can only occur in the order of grounds and consequences. Thus Leibnitz thought, therefore, space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamic consequence of their states. But that which is proper to them and is independent of things, and which both seem to have in themselves, he ascribed to the *confusion* of these

conceptions, which caused that, what is only a mere form of the dynamic relationships was held to be a particular intuition, existing of itself, and preceding the things themselves. Consequently space and time were the intelligible form of the conjunction of things (of substance and their states) in themselves. But things were intelligible substances (*substantiæ noumena*). He desired however to make these conceptions hold true for phenomena, since he accorded to sensibility no particular mode of intuition, but sought in the understanding all, even the empirical representation of objects, and left to the senses nothing but the despicable occupation of confounding and disfiguring the representations of the former, (*the understanding*).

But, if even we could say something of *things in themselves* synthetically, by means of the pure understanding, (which however is impossible,) this again still could not at all be referred to phenomena which do not represent things in themselves. In this latter case, therefore, I must at all time, in the transcendental reflection, compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensibility, and thus space and time would not be determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. I do not know what things may be in themselves, nor yet have I occasion to know it, because a thing can never be presented to me otherwise than in the phenomenon.

Thus I proceed also with the remainder of the conceptions of reflection. Matter is, *substantia phænomenon*. What belongs to it internally, I seek in all the parts of space which it occupies, and in all the effects which it produces, and which certainly can only always be phenomena of the external senses. I have therefore in fact nothing absolutely, but merely comparatively-internal, which itself again consists in external relationships. But the absolute, according to the pure understanding, internal of matter, is moreover

a mere chimera, for this matter is not at all an object for the pure understanding; but the transcendental object which may be the foundation of this phenomenon, which we call matter, is a mere something, with regard to which we should not ever understand what it is, even if any one could state it to us. For we can understand nothing, except that which carries along with it in the intuition, a corresponding thing to our expressions. If the complaint—*we do not at all see the internal of things*, signifies as much as this, that we comprehend nothing by means of the pure understanding, as to what the things as they appear to us, might be in themselves, it is an unjust and unreasonable complaint, for it would be to desire, that we should be enabled without the senses, nevertheless to cognize things,—consequently to envisage them, and therefore that we should have a faculty of cognition, wholly different not merely according to the degree, but even in respect of intuition and of kind, from that which is human—consequently that we should not be men, but beings with regard to which we cannot even assume, whether they are possible at all, much less how they are constituted. Observations and analysis of phenomena penetrate into the internal of nature, and we cannot know how far these may advance with time. But for all this, those transcendental questions which go out beyond nature, we should still never be able to answer, although the whole of nature were unveiled to us, because it is never given to us to observe our own mind, with another intuition than that of the internal sense. For in this mind lies the secret of the origin of our sensibility. The reference of which to an object, and what the transcendental foundation of this unity is, lies undoubtedly too deeply concealed, as that we, who even only know ourselves by means of the internal sense, consequently as phenomenon, could

use so unsuitable an instrument of our investigation for that purpose, to discover any thing except phenomena over and over again, whose non-sensible cause however we would willingly penetrate.

What renders this critick of conclusions from the mere operations of reflection extremely useful, is, that it clearly proves the nullity of all the conclusions with respect to objects, which we compare with each other in the understanding only, and at the same time confirms what we have particularly inculcated, that although phenomena are not to be comprehended as things in themselves amongst the objects of the pure understanding, still they are those alone in which our cognition can have an objective reality—that is to say, where the intuition corresponds to the conceptions.

If we reflect merely logically, we compare only our conceptions with one another in the understanding, as to whether both contain the self-same thing—whether they contradict one another or not—whether something is contained intrinsically in the conception or is added to it; and which of the two as given, which only as a mode of thinking that which is given, is to be held valid. But if I apply these conceptions to an object in general, (in the transcendental sense) without determining this further, whether it is an object of sensible or intellectual intuition, limitations present themselves immediately (not to go out of this conception) which overturn all empirical use of these conceptions, and prove precisely thereby, that the representation of an object as thing in general, is not for instance merely *insufficient*, but without sensible determination of the same, and independent of all empirical condition, is in itself *contradictory*—that we therefore either must make abstraction of every object (in logic), or if we admit one, must think it under conditions of sensible intuition—consequently that

the intelligible would require quite a particular intuition which we have not, and in default of the same, would be nothing as to us,—but on the other hand, also, phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For if I think merely things in general, the difference of external relationships cannot thus certainly constitute a difference of things themselves, but rather presupposes this ; and if the conception of the one, is not at all different internally from that of the other, I only then set one and the same thing in different relationships. Moreover, by the addition of one mere affirmation (reality) to another, the positive is in fact increased, and nothing is withdrawn from it, or set aside. The real therefore in things in general cannot contradict one another, &c.

The conceptions of reflection have, as shown by means of a certain misconception, such an influence upon the use of the understanding, that they have been able to betray even one of the acutest of all philosophers into a pretended system of intellectual cognition, which professes to determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. Precisely on this account the development of the deceiving causes of the amphiboly of these conceptions, occasioned by false principles, is of the greatest utility, to determine and to secure with certainty the limits of the understanding.

We must certainly say, what belongs to a conception in general or contradicts it, that also belongs to or contradicts all that is particular, which is contained under that conception, (*dictum de Omni et Nullo*) : but it were absurd to change this logical principle to this ; that it should so run, that what is not contained in a general conception, that also is not contained in the particular one which stands under the same, for these are on this very account particular conceptions, because they contain more in

them than is thought in the general one. Still however, upon this last principle the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is really constructed. It falls to the ground, therefore, at the same time with this principle, together with all the ambiguity arising from it, in the use of the understanding.

The principle of the indistinguishable is founded properly upon the presupposition, that if in the conception of a thing in general, a certain difference is not met with, it is not to be met with in the things themselves,—consequently that all things are entirely identical (*numero eadem*), which do not already differ from one another in their conception (according to quality or quantity). But since in the mere conception of a thing, abstraction has been made of several necessary conditions of an intuition, through a singular precipitancy, that whereof abstraction is made, is taken in this way, that it is not to be met with at all, and nothing is accorded to the thing, except what is contained in the conception.

The conception of a cubic foot of space is always in itself identical, let me think this wherever and however often I will. But two cubic feet are still different in space, merely by means of their places (*numero diversa*). These are conditions of the intuition, wherein the object of this conception is given, which do not belong to the conception, but still to the whole sensibility. In like manner there is no contradiction at all in the conception of a thing, if nothing negative is conjoined with an affirmative, and merely affirmative conceptions can, in conjunction, effect no extinction at all.—But in the sensible intuition wherein reality (for example, motion) is given, there are conditions (opposing directions) of which abstraction was made in the conception of motion in general, which render possible a contradiction, which certainly is not logical, namely, from the simple positive, a zero = 0; and we cannot say, thereby, that all reality is together in accordance;

because no contradiction is to be met with amongst its conceptions.\* According to mere conceptions, the internal is the substratum of all relationship or external determinations. If I therefore make abstraction of all conditions of intuition, and attach myself only to the conception of a thing in general, I can thus make abstraction of all external relationship, and there must still remain a conception of that, which in fact signifies no relationship but merely internal determinations. It appears now that there results from this in every thing (substance) there is something which is absolutely internal, and which precedes all external determinations, since first of all it makes them possible—consequently this substratum is then something which contains no external relationships more in itself—consequently is *simple*, (for corporeal things are yet always only relationships,—at least of parts independently of one another), and since we know no absolutely internal determinations, but those by means of our internal sense, this substratum is not thus only simple, but likewise (according to the analogy with our internal sense) determined through *representations*,—that is, all things would be properly *monads*, or simple beings endowed with representations. This also would all hold correct, if nothing more than the conception of a thing in general belonged to the conditions, under which alone objects of external condition can be given to us, and of which the pure conception makes abstraction. For it is obvious, that a permanent phenomenon in space (impenetrable extension) may contain pure intuitions, and nothing at all absolutely internal, and still be the first substratum

\* If we were desirous of making use of the usual subterfuge, that at least *realitatis Noumena* cannot act opposed to each other, we must then still adduce an example of such like reality pure and independent of the senses, so that we might understand, whether such a one in general represents something or nothing at all. But no example can any where else be taken than from experience, which never offers more than *Phænomena*, and thus this proposition signifies, nothing more, than that the conception which contains pure affirmations does not contain any thing negative,—a proposition respecting which we never have doubted



of all external perception. By means of mere conceptions, I can certainly think nothing external without something internal, precisely from this, that conceptions of relationship still presuppose absolutely given things, and are not possible without them. But as something is contained in the intuition which does not at all lie in the mere conception of a thing in general, and this something furnishes the substratum which could not at all be cognized through mere conceptions, namely, a space, which with all that it contains, consists in pure formal or yet real relationships, I cannot say, because without an absolute-internal, no *thing* can be represented by *means of pure conceptions*, so, likewise, there is nothing external in the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and in their *intuition*, as to which something absolutely-internal does not lie at the foundation. For if we have made abstraction of all conditions of intuition, nothing certainly then remains to us over in the mere conception, but the internal in general, and the relationship of one internal with another, whereby alone the external is possible. But this necessity, which is grounded alone upon abstraction, does not take place in things, so far as they are given with such determinations in the intuitions, which express mere relationships, without having any thing internal at the foundation, because they are not things in themselves, but only phenomena. What we know of matter only now is pure relationships, (that which we term internal determinations thereof is only comparatively internal,)—but there are amongst them some self-subsistent and permanent, whereby a determined object is given to us. That provided I make abstraction of these relationships, I have nothing at all further to think, does not destroy the conception of a thing as phenomenon, and not even the conception of an object in abstracto, but certainly all possibility of such a one as is determinable according to mere conceptions,

that is, of a noumenon. Assuredly it is startling to hear that a thing is to consist wholly of relationships ; but yet such a thing is mere phenomenon, and cannot at all be thought by means of pure categories. It consists, itself, in the pure relationship of something in general to the senses. Just so we cannot, if we begin with mere conceptions, well think relationships of things in abstracto, otherwise than that one thing is the cause of the determinations in the other, for that is our understanding-conception of relationships themselves. But as we then make abstraction of all intuition, a whole mode thus falls away in which the diverse can determine their places one to another—that is to say, the form of the sensibility (space)—which yet precedes all empirical causality.

If under mere intelligible objects we understood those things which are thought through the pure categories without any schema of sensibility, such are then impossible. For the condition of the objective use of all our conceptions of the understanding, is simply the mode of our sensible intuition, whereby objects are given to us, and if we make abstraction of the latter (*this mode of sensible intuition,*) the first (*the conceptions of the understanding*) have thus no relation at all to an object. Indeed, if we would even admit a mode of intuition other than this our sensible one, then all our functions of thinking in respect to the same, would still have no signification. If we only understand thereby (*by intelligent objects*) objects of a non-sensible intuition, with respect to which our categories indeed certainly are not valid, and with respect to which we therefore can never have any cognition at all (neither intuition nor conception), so must noumena assuredly be admitted in this merely negative signification ; as then they say nothing else, but that our mode of intuition does not refer to all things, but merely to the objects of our senses—consequently its objective validity is limited, and therefore there is room for another kind of intuition,

and therefore also for things as objects of it. But, then, the conception of a noumenon is problematical—that is, the representation of a thing, with respect to which we can neither say that it is possible, nor that it is impossible; inasmuch as we know of no other kind of intuition, but our own sensible one, and no other kind of conceptions but the categories; yet neither of the two is adapted to an extra-sensible object. Still we cannot, on this account, therefore, positively extend the field of the objects of our thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and admit, besides phenomena, objects of pure thought—that is, noumena—because those objects would have no declarable positive signification. For it must be allowed of the categories, that they alone do not yet suffice for the cognition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility would be mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding, but without object. Thought is in itself, indeed, no product of the senses, and so far also is not limited by means of them, but is not on that account, at once of its own and of pure use, without the concurrence of sensibility, since in such case it is without an object. And we cannot term such an *object*, noumenon, for this signifies precisely the problematical conception of an object belonging to quite another intuition, and to an understanding quite different to our own, which itself, consequently, is a problem. The conception of noumenon is, therefore, not the conception of an object, but the problem inevitably connected with the limitation of our sensibility, whether there may not be objects, quite freed from such intuition of them, which question can only be answered indeterminately: namely; that since the sensible intuition does not refer to all things without distinction, there remains place for more and other objects—and they therefore cannot be absolutely denied; but from want of a determined conception (as

no category is suitable for this purpose) they cannot also be affirmed as objects of our understanding.

The understanding, hence, limits the sensibility, without on this account extending its own field, and whilst it cautions sensibility that it should not pretend to extend to things in themselves, but only to phenomena, it thinks an object in itself, but only as transcendental object, which is the cause of the phenomenon, (consequently itself not phenomenon,) and cannot be thought either as quantity, or as reality, or as substance, &c. (because these conceptions always require sensible forms, in which they determine an object), whereof, therefore, it is wholly unknown, whether it is to be met with in us, or out of us—whether it would be annihilated at the same time with the sensibility—or whether, if that were taken away, it would still remain. If we wish to term this object noumenon, on this account that the representation of it is not sensible, we are at liberty to do so. But as we cannot apply thereto any of our conceptions of the understanding, this representation thus remains void for us, and serves for nothing but to denote the limits of our sensible cognition, and to leave a space which we cannot fill up, neither through possible experience, nor through the pure understanding.

The Critick of pure understanding does not therefore allow of creating for itself a new field of objects beyond those which can appear to it as phenomena, and of launching into intelligible worlds, not even ever in their conception. The fault which leads to this, in the most specious manner of all, and certainly excuses, although such cannot be justified, lies in this, that the use of the understanding rendered transcendental contrary to its destination and the objects—that is, possible intuitions—must regulate themselves according to conceptions, and not conceptions according to possible intuitions—(as upon

which alone their objective validity rests.) But the reason thereof again is, that the apperception, and with it the thought, precedes all possible determined arrangement of the representations. We think, therefore, something in general, and determine one-sidedly sensibly, but still we distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object, from this manner of perceiving it. There now remains to us only one mode of determining it, merely by thought, but which indeed is a mere logical form without content, but which still appears to us to be a mode in which the object can exist of itself (noumenon) without looking to the intuition, which is limited to our senses.

Before we abandon the transcendental analytick, we must yet add something, which although of itself of no particular importance, still might appear requisite to the completeness of the system. The highest conception from which we are accustomed to begin a transcendental philosophy, is usually the division into the possible and impossible. But as all division presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must be given, and this is the conception of an object in general, (problematically taken and not decided whether it is something or nothing). Since the categories are the only conceptions which refer to objects in general, the distinction of an object, whether it be something or nothing, will thus proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.

1st. To the conception of all, many, and one, that is opposed which annihilates every thing—that is, *none*; and thus the object of a conception, to which no declarable intuition corresponds, = nothing—that is, a conception without object, as the noumena, which cannot be reckoned amongst the possibilities, although on this account they must still not be given out for impossible, (*ens rationis*)—or, perhaps, as certain new

fundamental forces, which are indeed thought without contradiction, but also without example from experience, and consequently must not be numbered amongst the possibilities.

2nd. Reality is *something*—negation is *nothing*—that is to say, a conception of the want of an object, as shadow, cold, (*nihil privativum*).

3rd. The mere form of the intuition without substance is no object in itself, but the mere formal condition of it (as phenomenon) as pure space, pure time, which are certainly something as forms to perceive, but themselves are no objects that are perceived (*ens imaginarium*).

4th. The object of a conception which contradicts itself is nothing, since the conception is nothing—the impossible, as for instance, the rectilinear figure of two sides, (*nihil negativum*).

The table of this division of the conception of *nothing* (for the division parallel to this, of something, follows of itself) must therefore thus be laid down.

### NOTHING.

as

1.

VOID CONCEPTIONS WITHOUT OBJECT.

*ens rationis*.

2.

VOID OBJECT OF A CONCEPTION.

*nihil privativum*.

3.

VOID INTUITION WITHOUT OBJECT.

*ens imaginarium*.

4.

VOID OBJECT WITHOUT CONCEPTION.

*nihil negativum*.

We see that the thing of thought (No. 1) is different in this way from the nonentity (No. 4); that the first

is not to be reckoned amongst the possibilities, because it is mere fiction, (although not contradictory), but the latter is opposed to possibility, since the conception ever annihilates itself. But both are void conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum (No. 2), and ens imaginarium (No. 3), are void data for conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, one cannot then represent to oneself any darkness also, and if extended beings cannot be perceived, we can represent to ourselves no space. The negation, as well as the mere form of the intuition, are without a real—are no objects.

## OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

## SECOND DIVISION.

## TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

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INTRODUCTION.

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## I.

## OF TRANSCENDENTAL APPEARANCE.

We have before termed dialectick in general, a *logic of appearance*. This does not mean that it is a doctrine of *probability*, for this is truth, but cognized through insufficient grounds, the cognition of which therefore is indeed defective, but on that account still not false, and consequently must not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must *phenomenon* and *appearance* be held to be identical. For truth or appearance are not in the object, so far as this is envisaged, but in the judgment with regard to it, so far as it is thought. We may therefore indeed say correctly, that the senses do not err, but not on this account, that they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all. Consequently truth as well as error, therefore also appearance as the inducement to the latter, are only to be met with in judgment—that is, only in the relationship of the object to our understanding. In a cognition which coincides absolutely with the laws



of the understanding, there is no error. In a representation of the senses, (since it contains no judgment at all,) there is also no error. But no force of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Consequently neither the understanding of itself alone, (without influence of another cause), nor the senses of themselves, would err; the first not on this account, because if it act merely according to its laws, the effect (the judgment) must necessarily coincide with these laws. But in the accordance with the laws of the understanding the Formal of all truth consists. In the senses there is no judgment at all, neither a true nor a false one. But now since we have no other sources of cognition besides these two, it follows then that the error is only effected through the unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding, whereby it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgment confound themselves with the objective, and cause the latter to deviate from their destination,\* in the same way as a moved body would in fact of itself for ever keep the straight line in the same direction, but if another force influence it at the same moment, according to another direction, it strikes into a curvilinear motion. In order to distinguish the particular action of the understanding from the force which therewith mixes itself, it will be thence necessary to look upon erroneous judgment as the diagonals between two forces, that determine the judgment according to two different directions, which as it were form an angle; and to resolve that compound effect into the simple one of the understanding and of sensibility, which thing must take place in pure judgments *à priori* by means of transcendental reflection, whereby (as was already

\* Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object whereon this understanding applies its functions, is the source of real cognitions. But this same sensibility, so far as it influences the action of the understanding itself, and determines it to judgments, is the foundation of error.

shown,) to each representation its place in the faculty of cognition conformable to it is assigned—consequently also the influence of the latter upon the former is distinguished.

It is not our business here to treat of empirical appearance, (for example of optical,) which is found in the empirical use of the otherwise just rules of the understanding, and through which the faculty of judgment is misled by the influence of the imagination; but we have alone to do with the *transcendental appearance* which influences principles, the use of which is never placed upon experience, as in such case, we should still at least have a *touchstone* of their correctness; and which transcendental appearance even carries us away entirely beyond the empirical use of the categories, contrary to all the admonitions of critick, and amuses us with the chimera of an extension of the *pure understanding*. We will term *immanent*, those principles, the application of which confines itself entirely within the limits of possible experience, but those which are to exceed these limits, we term *transcendent* principles. But I do not understand amongst these last the *transcendental* use or abuse of the categories, which is a mere fault of the faculty of judgment not duly restrained by critick, that has not paid enough consideration as to the limits of the territory, whereupon alone play is permitted to the pure understanding; but I understand those real principles which require of us to pull down all the boundary posts, and to lay claim to quite a new ground, which recognizes no demarcation at all. Thus, *transcendental* and *transcendent* are not the same. The principles of the pure understanding, which we have previously propounded, are to be merely of empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, one reaching out beyond the limits of experience. But a principle which removes these limits, which even commands them to be overstepped,

is called *transcendent*. If our critick can succeed so far as to expose the appearance of these pretended principles, the principles in question of mere empirical use, in opposition to the last, may be termed *immanent* principles of the pure understanding.

Logical appearance, which consists in the mere imitation of the form of reason, (the appearance of false conclusions,) springs only from a want of attention to the logical rule. Consequently so soon as this is sharpened to the proposed case, the appearance disappears entirely. Transcendental appearance, on the other hand, nevertheless does not cease, although it have already been exposed, and its nothingness clearly seen by means of transcendental critick, (as, for example, the appearance in the proposition, "the world must have a beginning according to time.") The cause thereof is this, that in our reason, (considered subjectively, as a human faculty of cognition) fundamental rules and maxims of its use lie, which have entirely the look of objective principles, and whereby it occurs that the subjective necessity of a certain connexion of our conceptions in favour of the understanding, is accounted as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. An *illusion* which is not at all to be avoided; as little, indeed, as we can prevent the sea from not appearing to us more elevated in the middle than near the shore, since we see that middle by higher rays of light, than this *the sea in the other case*, or still more, as little as the astronomer even can prevent the moon from not seeming larger in rising,—although he is not deceived by this appearance.

Transcendental dialectick will thereupon satisfy itself with exposing the appearance of transcendental judgments, and at the same time preventing it from deceiving; but that (like logical appearance) it should in fact disappear and cease to be an appearance, this, transcendental dialectick can never

effect. For we have to do with a *natural and unavoidable illusion*, which itself reposes upon subjective principles, and substitutes them for objective, whilst logical dialectick has in the solution of false conclusions only to do with an error, in the following up of principles, or with an artful appearance in the imitation of the same. There is therefore a natural and unavoidable dialectick of pure reason, not one in which, for instance, a blockhead from want of knowledge, involves himself, or which a sophister has artfully imagined, in order to torment reasonable people, but which irresistibly adheres to human reason, and even when we have discovered its delusion, still will not cease to play tricks upon reason, and to push it continually into momentary errors which always require to be obviated.

## II.

### OF PURE REASON AS THE SEAT OF TRANSCENDENTAL APPEARANCE.

#### A.

#### OF REASON IN GENERAL.

All our cognition begins from the senses—proceeds thence to the understanding—and finishes in reason, beyond which nothing higher is met with in us to elaborate and to bring under the highest unity of thought the matter of the intuition. As I now have to give an explanation of this highest cognition-faculty, I thus find myself in some difficulty. There is a merely formal, that is to say, logical use of it, as well as there is of the understanding, since reason makes abstraction of all content of cognition;—and there is also a real use, as it itself contains the origin of certain conceptions and principles, which it neither derives from the senses, nor from the understanding. Now the first faculty has certainly long since been explained by logicians, as the faculty of

concluding mediately (as a distinction from immediate conclusions, *consequentis immediatis*), but the second faculty, which itself generates conceptions, is still not thereby known. Now as a division of reason into a logical and transcendental faculty, here presents itself, a higher conception of these sources of cognition must be then sought, which comprehends both conceptions under it, whilst we may expect, according to the analogy with the conceptions of the understanding, that the logical conception will afford, at the same time, the key to the transcendental one, and that the table of the functions of the first, will give coexistently the scale of descent of the conceptions of reason.

We explained, in the first part of our transcendental logic, the understanding, as the faculty of rules. We here distinguish reason from it by this, that we would term reason the *faculty of principles*.

The expression of a principle is ambiguous, and commonly only signifies a cognition, which can be used as principle, although in fact in itself, and according to its proper origin, it is no principle. Every general proposition, even although it may be derived from experience, (by induction), can serve as a major in a syllogism, but it is not on that account itself a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can only be a straight line between two points) are indeed in general cognitions *a priori*, and therefore with propriety are termed principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But still on this account I cannot say that I know this property of the straight line in general and in itself from principles, but only in the pure intuition.

I would term therefore cognition from principles, that, where I cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions. Every syllogism is thus a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle.

For the major always furnishes a conception, which causes that all which is subsumed under the condition of it, is known from it, according to a principle. Now as every general cognition can serve as a major in a syllogism, and the understanding furnishes such general propositions *à priori*, these also then, in respect of their possible use, may thus be termed principles.

But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in themselves, according to their origin, they are any thing but cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be once possible *à priori*, did we not hereby draw in pure intuition (in mathematics), or conditions of a possible experience in general. That all which happens has a cause, cannot at all be concluded from the conception of that which happens generally. The principle rather shows how we first of all can acquire from that which happens, a determinate experience-conception.

The understanding therefore cannot at all procure synthetical cognitions from conceptions, and it is these properly, which absolutely I term principles; inasmuch as all universal propositions in general may be termed comparative principles.

It is a very old wish, and one which, who knows how late, may perhaps sometime be accomplished, that, for once, instead of the endless variety of civil laws, we might investigate their principles, for therein alone the secret consists of simplifying Legislation, as it is called. But the laws are here still only limitations of our liberty upon conditions under which it continually accords with itself—consequently they refer to something, which is entirely our own work, and whereof we, through those conceptions, ourselves may be the cause. But how objects in themselves—how the nature of things stands under principles, and is to be determined according to mere conceptions is, if not something impossible, still at least very strange. But however this may be (for the enquiry

respecting it remains yet to be made) it at least thence is evident, that cognition from principles (in themselves) is something quite other than mere understanding-cognition, which certainly indeed may precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself, (so far as it is synthetical,) does not rest upon mere thought, nor contain in itself something general according to conceptions.

The understanding may be a faculty of the unity of phenomena by means of rules ; reason is thus the faculty of the unity of the rules of the understanding under principles. Reason, therefore, never refers directly to experience, or to an object, but to the understanding, in order to give to the diverse cognitions of this, unity *à priori* by means of conceptions, which may be termed unity of reason, and which is of quite another kind to that which can be derived from the understanding.

This is the general conception of the faculty of reason, so far as it has been able to be made comprehensible in a total want of examples, which are first to be given in the sequel.

## A

## OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.

We make a difference between that which is known immediately, and that which is only concluded. That in a figure, which is limited by three straight lines, there are three angles, is known immediately—but that these angles are equal to two right angles, is only concluded. Since we require constantly a conclusion, and thereby finally become quite accustomed to it, we do not at last thus remark any more this distinction, and frequently, as in the so-called delusion of the senses, hold something as perceived immediately, which we yet have only concluded. In every syllogism there is one proposition which lies at the

foundation, and another, namely, the consequence, which is deduced from the first, and finally the conclusion (consequence), according to which the truth of the latter infallibly is connected with the truth of the former. If the concluded judgment, already so lies in the first, that it can be thence deduced without the intervention of a third representation, the conclusion is thus called immediate (*consequentia immediata*), I would rather call it the conclusion of the understanding. But if, independently of the cognition laid at the foundation, there is still another judgment necessary, in order to effect the consequence, the conclusion is then termed a conclusion of reason. In the proposition—*all men are mortal*, the propositions already lie,—some men are mortal ; some mortals are men ; nothing that is immortal is a man ; and these therefore are immediate deductions from the first one. On the contrary, the proposition ; all learned persons are mortal ; does not lie in the subjected judgment (for the conception of learned does not at all occur in it,) and it only can be deduced from this, by means of an intermediate judgment.

In every syllogism I first think a rule (major), by means of the *understanding*. Secondly, I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (minor), by means of the *faculty of judgment*. Lastly, I *determine* my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (*conclusio*), consequently à priori by *reason*. The relationship, therefore, which the major represents as the rule between a cognition and its condition, constitutes the different kinds of syllogisms. They are, hence, just threefold, as all judgments in general ; so far as they distinguish themselves in the manner whereby they express the relationship of cognition in the understanding, namely ; *categorical*, or *hypothetical*, or *disjunctive* syllogisms.

If, as it happens for the most part, the conclusion is given as a judgment, in order to see whether it does



not flow from judgments already given, by which, namely, a totally different object is thought, I thus seek in the understanding the assertion of this conclusion, whether such does not find itself in the understanding under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and the object of the conclusion may be subsumed under the given condition, this conclusion then is deduced from the rule, which *also is valid for other objects of cognition*. Whence we see that reason, in concluding, endeavours to reduce the great diversity of the cognition of the understanding to the smallest number of principles (general conditions), and thereby to effect the highest unity of the same.

## C.

## OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.

Can we isolate reason, and is it then still a peculiar source of conceptions and judgments which spring only out of it, and whereby it refers to objects; or is it a mere subaltern faculty for giving a certain form to given cognitions which is termed logical, and through which the cognitions of the understanding only are subjected to one another, and inferior rules to others higher, (the condition of which embraces the condition of the former in its sphere), so far as it will let itself be effected by a comparison of the same? This is the question with which we now will first occupy ourselves. In fact, variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of reason, in order to bring the understanding into constant coherence with itself, just as the understanding brings the diversity of the intuition under conceptions, and thereby this intuition into connexion. But such a principle prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain the ground of the possibility of cognizing and determining them as such in general, but is merely a

subjective law of economy with the stock of our understanding, by means of comparison of its conceptions, for bringing the general use of these to their smallest possible number, without that, on this account, we are justified in demanding as to the objects themselves, such an accordance, as to contribute to the connexion and extension of our understanding, and at the same time to give objective validity to the maxim alluded to. In a word the question is, whether reason in itself, that is, pure reason *à priori*, contains synthetical principles and rules, and wherein these principles may consist?

The formal and logical procedure of the same (*reason*) in syllogisms, already affords us in respect of this a sufficient guidance as to what foundation the transcendental principle thereof will rest upon in synthetical cognition, by means of pure reason.

*Firstly*, the syllogism does not apply to intuitions, in order to bring the same under rules (as the understanding with its categories), but to conceptions and judgments. If, therefore, pure reason refer to objects, yet has it thus no immediate relation to these and to their intuition, but only to the understanding and its judgments, which address themselves directly to the senses and their intuition, in order to determine as to these their object. The unity of reason is, therefore, not unity of a possible experience, but essentially different from this, as from the unity of the understanding. That all which happens has a cause, is indeed no principle cognized and prescribed by means of reason. It renders the unity of experience possible, and borrows nothing from reason, which, without this relationship to possible experience, would not have been able, from mere conceptions, to command any such synthetical unity.

*Secondly*, reason, in its logical use, seeks the general condition of its judgment (of conclusion), and the syllogism is itself nothing else but a judgment by

means of the subsumption of its condition under a general rule (the major). Now, as this rule is again exposed to the very same proof of reason, and thereby the condition of the condition (by means of a pro-syllogism) must be sought as long as it can, we thus see plainly that the particular principle of reason in general (in the logical use) is, to find for the conditioned cognitions of the understanding, the non-conditioned (*the absolute*), wherewith the unity of this is completed.

But this logical maxim cannot otherwise be a principle of *pure reason*, excepting we thereby admit, that if the conditioned be given, the whole series of conditions, subjected one to another, is likewise then given, which series itself consequently is unconditioned, (that is to say, contained in the object and its connexion.)

But such a principle of pure reason is evidently *synthetical*, for the condition certainly refers analytically to a condition, but not to the unconditioned. There must arise also from this different synthetical propositions, of which the pure understanding knows nothing, as it has only to do with objects of possible experience, the cognition and synthesis of which are at all times conditioned. But the unconditioned, when it really has place, will be considered particularly according to all the determinations which distinguish it from every conditioned, and must thereby afford matter for many synthetical propositions *à priori*.

But the fundamental principles arising from this highest principle of pure reason will be, in respect of all phenomena, *transcendent*, that is, no empirical use of them will ever be able to be made adequate to this principle. It will therefore be entirely distinguished from all principles of the understanding (whose use is wholly *immanent*, since they have only the possibility of experience for their thema). Now,

whether that principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena or of the taking of things in general also) reaches to the unconditioned, has its objective truth or not;—what consequences thence result to the empirical use of the understanding, or, rather, whether there is not any such objectively valid proposition of reason at all, but merely a logical precept in rising to higher and higher conditions to approach to the completeness thereof, and thereby to bring the highest unity of reason possible to us into our cognition; whether, I say, this requirement of reason, through a misunderstanding, has been held for a transcendental principle of pure reason, which precipitately postulates such an unlimited completeness of the series of conditions in the objects themselves—and also in this case, what misconceptions and plausibilities may have crept in into syllogisms, whose major is deduced from pure reason, (and which is, perhaps, more a *petitio* than a postulate,) and which ascend from experience upwards to their conditions; this it will be our business to explain in the transcendental dialectick, which we wish now to develope from its sources that are deeply concealed in human reason. We will divide it into two principal parts, the *first* of which is to treat of the *transcendental conceptions* of pure reason; the second, of *transcendent and dialectical syllogisms*.

## TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

## FIRST BOOK.

## OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.

Whatever the case may be as to the possibility of conceptions from pure reason, still are they not thus merely reflected, but concluded conceptions. Conceptions of the understanding are also thought à priori before experience and in its favour; but they contain nothing more than the unity of the reflection with regard to phenomena, in so far as they (*the phenomena*) are necessarily to belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through these (*the conceptions*) alone is cognition and determination of an object possible. They, therefore, first afford matter for conclusion, and no conceptions à priori of objects precede them, from which they could be concluded. Still, on the other hand, their objective reality rests solely upon this, that whilst they constitute the intellectual form of all experience, their application must at all times be able to be shown in experience.

But the denomination of a conception of reason already indicates before hand, that it will not let itself be limited within experience, since it concerns a cognition, of which each empirical one is only a part, (perhaps the whole of possible experience, or of its empirical synthesis,) and as far as which no effective experience, indeed, ever fully extends, although still it always belongs to it. Conceptions of reason serve for *comprehending*, as conceptions of understanding do for *understanding* (of perceptions). If they contain the unconditioned, they then concern something to which all experience belongs, but which itself is never an

object of experience ; something towards which reason leads in its conclusions from experience, and according to which it appreciates and measures the degree of their empirical use ; but never forms a member of the empirical synthesis. If like conceptions possess, in spite of this, objective validity, they may be then termed, *conceptus ratiocinati* (rightly concluded conceptions) where not, they have thus crept in at least by means of an appearance of conclusion, and may be called, *conceptus ratiocinantes* (sophistical conceptions). But as this for the first time can be made out in the chapter of the dialectical conclusions of pure reason, so we cannot yet pay attention to it ; but we will, in the mean time, just as we termed the pure conceptions of the understanding, categories, invest the conceptions of pure reason with a new name, and term them transcendental ideas ; this denomination we will, however, now explain and justify.

#### *FIRST SECTION*

#### OF THE FIRST BOOK OF TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

#### OF IDEAS IN GENERAL.

Notwithstanding the great richness of our language, the reflecting mind oftentimes finds itself embarrassed by reason of an expression which suits exactly with its conception, and from wanting such, cannot thus be rendered properly intelligible either to others, or, indeed, to itself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in speech which seldom succeeds ; and before recurring to this desperate means, it is advisable to look out in a dead and learned language, whether this conception, together with its corresponding expression, is not there to be

found; and if the ancient use of this is also become, through the inattention of its author, somewhat uncertain, it is then still better to confirm the meaning that was especially proper to it (even if it remained doubtful whether formerly it had had exactly the same sense), than thereby to spoil the matter in hand, from the circumstance, that we rendered ourselves unintelligible.

On this account, if perchance we found for a certain conception only a single word which exactly suits in the hitherto received signification this conception, the distinguishing of which from other kindred conceptions is of great importance, it is then advisable not to employ it prodigally, or merely for change to use it, instead of others, synonymously, but to preserve unto it carefully its especial meaning, as otherwise it easily happens, that whilst the expression does not particularly occupy the attention, but is lost amongst a crowd of others of very different meaning, the thought also is lost, which the expression only might have preserved.

Plato made use of the expression *idea* in such a way that we easily see he thereby understood something, which not only is never derived from the senses, but which in fact quite rises above the conceptions of the understanding, with which Aristotle concerned himself, since in experience never any thing congruous therewith is to be found. Ideas in his view are the archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences, like the categories. According to his opinion they flow from the highest reason, whence they are imparted to the human one, but which now no longer exists in its original state, but which must recal by reminiscence (which is called philosophy) with difficulty, the original but now very obscure ideas. I will not here enter into any literary investigation, in order to make out the meaning which this distinguished philosopher connected

with this expression. I only remark that it is not at all unusual, both in common language and in writings, by means of the comparison of the thoughts which an author expresses with respect to his object, to understand him even better than he understood himself, since not having sufficiently determined his conception, he on that account sometimes speaks or even thinks contrary to his own view.

Plato very properly remarked, that our cognition-faculty feels a much higher want than to simply spell phenomena, according to synthetical unity, in order to be able to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally elevates itself to cognitions, which extend much farther than that any object that experience can give, should ever agree with them, but which nevertheless possess their reality, and by no means are mere fancies of the brain.

Plato found his ideas, especially in all that is practical,\* that is, which reposes upon liberty; which on its part stands under cognitions, which are a particular product of reason. He who would derive the conceptions of virtue from experience, he who would make (as in reality many have done,) that as exemplar for the source of cognition, which in any case can only serve as an example of imperfect explanation, the same would make of virtue an equivocal nothing, changeable according to time and circumstances, and not serviceable for any rule. On the other hand, every one is aware, that if some one be represented to him as a pattern of virtue, he still has always the true original merely in his own head, wherewith he compares this proposed pattern, and only esteems it accordingly.

\* He extended certainly his conception also to speculative cognitions, if they were only pure and consequently given *à priori*; and even to mathematick, although such had its object no where but in *possible* experience. But I can follow him in this as little as in the mystical deduction of these ideas, or the exaggerations, whereby, as it were, he hypostalized them, although the elevated language which he made use of in this field is very well capable of a milder interpretation, and suited to the nature of things.



But this is the idea of virtue, in respect of which all possible objects of experience serve indeed as examples (proofs of the feasibility of that, in a certain degree, which the conception of reason demands); but not as archetypes. That a man never can act adequately to that which the pure idea of virtue contains, does not at all prove any thing chimerical in this thought. For all judgment is still only possible by means of this idea with respect to moral worth, or the contrary; consequently it lies necessarily at the foundation of each advancement towards moral perfection, how ever far, according to their degree, the indeterminable obstacles in human nature may keep us removed from it.

*The Platonic Republic* is become proverbial as a pretended striking example of imaginary perfection, that can have its seat only in the brain of the idle thinker; and *Brucker* esteems it ridiculous that the philosopher should maintain, that a Prince would never govern well, if he were not participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this thought further, and (where this distinguished man leaves us without assistance) by fresh efforts to bring it to light, than to set it aside as useless, under the very miserable and shameful pretence of impracticability. A constitution of the *greatest human liberty*, according to laws which cause *that the liberty of each may subsist together with that of others* (not of the greatest happiness, for this will already follow of itself), is at least a necessary idea, that must lie not merely at the foundation in the first sketch of the constitution of a state, but also of all laws, and whereby in the outset, abstraction must be made of the existing obstacles, which perhaps may not spring so much from human nature inevitably, as rather from the neglect of true ideas in legislation. For nothing more prejudicial and more unworthy of a philosopher can be found, than the vulgar appeal to a pretended contrary ex-

perience—which even would not at all exist, if those institutions had been formed at a suitable time, according to ideas, and if in place of these, conceptions which are rude precisely on this account, that they were drawn from experience, had not rendered vain every good intention. The more accordant legislation and government were constituted with this idea, so much the more rare, certainly, would punishments become, and it is then quite reasonable, (as Plato maintains,) that in a perfect arrangement thereof, such things would not at all be necessary. Now, although the latter case may never happen, still the idea is thus quite just, which fixes this *Maximum* for the archetype, in order to bring agreeably to this, the legal government of men nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For what may be the highest degree at which humanity must stand still, and how great therefore the chasm which remains necessarily between the idea and its realization, this no one can or ought to determine, for this reason, that it is liberty, which can exceed all assigned limits.

But not merely in that wherein human reason shows true causality, and where ideas become effective causes (of actions and their objects), that is to say, in what is moral, but also in respect of nature itself, Plato correctly saw clear proofs of its origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular disposition of the universe, (probably, therefore, also the whole order of nature,) show clearly that they are possible only according to ideas; that, in fact, no individual creature under the individual conditions of its existence, agrees with the idea of the most perfect of its kind (as little as man does with the idea of humanity, which he himself in fact bears in his soul as the archetype of his actions), that still the ideas in question in the highest understanding are individually, unchangeably, and universally determined, and are the original causes of things, and that only the whole of their conjunction in

the universe is solely and alone fully adequate to such idea. If we separate that which is exaggerated in expression, the spring of mind then in the philosopher to ascend from the ectypal consideration of the physical in the order of the universe, to the architectonic conjunction of this according to design, that is, according to ideas, is an effort which merits esteem and imitation; but in respect of that which concerns the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where the ideas first of all render possible experience itself (of the good), although therein they can be never fully expressed, it is quite a peculiar merit, which on this account simply we do not cognize, because it is only decided upon, through those very empirical rules, the validity whereof as principles, precisely by means of these ideas, was to have been annihilated. For in respect of nature, experience affords us the rule, and is the source of truth; but in regard of moral laws, experience, (alas!) is the parent of appearance; and it is highly reprehensible to deduce, or thereby to wish to limit the laws in respect of that which *I should* do, from that which *is done*.

In place of these considerations, the suitable execution of which in fact constitutes the peculiar dignity of philosophy, we now concern ourselves with not so shining, but also with still not less meritorious an occupation, namely, that of making the foundation of those majestic moral buildings even and firm, in which foundation mole-runs every where are found of reason digging in vain, but with great confidence, after treasures—yet which render that building very insecure. The transcendental use of pure reason, its principles and ideas, are therefore that which it is incumbent upon us now to know exactly, in order to be able to estimate and to determine suitably the influence of pure reason and the value of it. Still, before I lay aside this preliminary introduction, I request those who have philosophy at heart

(which is more than is commonly met with), provided they should find themselves convinced from this and from what follows, to take under their protection the expression, idea, according to its primary meaning, so that henceforward it may not fall amongst those other expressions whereby usually all sorts of representations are designated in careless disorder, and science thereby suffer. Still, there is no want of expressions which are suited properly to every kind of representation, without its being necessary for us to encroach upon the property of another. This is their scale. The class is, *Representation* in general (representatio). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A *perception* which refers only to the subject, as the modification of its state, is *sensation* (sensatio). An objective perception, is *cognition* (cognitio). This is either *intuition* or *conception* (intuitus vel conceptus). The former refers immediately to the object, and is single; the latter mediately, by means of a mark which may be common to several things. The conception is either an *empirical* or *pure conception*; and the pure conception, so far as it has only its origin in the understanding, (not in the pure image of the sensibility,) is called *Notio*. A conception from notions, which oversteps the possibility of experience, is the *idea* or the conception of reason. To one who has once been accustomed to this distinction, it must be intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red termed idea. It is not even to be called notion—(conception of the understanding.)

## SECOND SECTION

### OF THE FIRST BOOK OF TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

#### OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

Transcendental analytick, furnished us an example, in which way the mere logical form of our cogni-

tion might contain the origin of pure conceptions à priori, which represent objects prior to all experience, or rather denote the synthetical unity, which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgments (changed into a conception of the synthesis of intuitions,) produced the categories, which direct all use of the understanding in experience. Just so may we expect that the form of syllogisms, if we apply this to the synthetical unity of intuitions, in pursuance with the categories, will contain the origin of particular conceptions à priori, which we may term pure conceptions of the understanding, or *transcendental ideas*, and which will determine, according to principles, the use of the understanding in the whole of limited experience.

The function of reason in its conclusions consists in the *generality* of the cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined à priori, in the whole circumscription of its condition. The proposition, "Caius is mortal," I might also derive from experience, simply by means of the understanding. But I seek a conception which contains the condition under which the predicate (assertion in general) of this judgment is given, (that is to say, in this case, the conception of man,) and after I have subsumed under this condition, taken in its whole extent, ("all men are mortal,") I thus determine accordingly the cognition of my object, ("Caius is mortal.")

Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism, we restrict a predicate to a certain object, after we have thought it previously in the major under a certain condition in its whole extent. This completed quantity of extent, in reference to such a condition, is termed *universality* (universalitas). To this, in the synthesis of the intuitions corresponds *wholeness* (universitas), or *totality* of the conditions. Consequently the transcendental conception of reason is nothing else but that of the *totality*

*of conditions* for a given conditioned. Now, as the *unconditioned* alone renders possible the totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of conditions itself is always unconditioned, a pure conception of reason in general may thus be explained by means of the conception of the unconditioned, so far as it contains a ground of the synthesis of the conditioned.

Now, as many kinds of relationship as there are, which the understanding represents to itself by means of the categories, so many pure conceptions are there also of reason ; and consequently there is *first* to be sought an *Unconditioned* of the *categorical* synthesis in a *subject* ; *secondly*, of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a series ; *thirdly*, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.

There are to be found also just as many kinds of syllogisms, each of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned—the first to the subject which itself is no longer predicate—the second to the presupposition which no longer presupposes any thing—and the third to an aggregate of the members of the division, to which nothing further is required in order to complete the division of a conception. Hence the conceptions of pure reason of the totality in the synthesis of conditions, are necessary at least as problems, to continue the unity of the understanding, where it is possible, up to the unconditioned, and are grounded in the nature of human reason, although these transcendental conceptions may be wanting in a use, in concreto, adapted to them ; and they consequently have no other utility than to bring the understanding into the direction wherein its use, whilst it is extended to the utmost, is made at the same time absolutely in accordance with itself.

Whilst we here speak of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned as of the common title of all

conceptions of reason, we thus again fall upon another expression which we cannot spare, and yet which we cannot use with safety, in consequence of an ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse. The word *absolute* is one of the few words which was adapted in its original signification to a conception, to which no other word whatsoever after this, in the same language exactly suited, and the loss of which, or what is just the same thing, its fluctuating use, must consequently draw after it the loss also of the conception itself, and of a conception indeed, which, since it engages very particularly reason, cannot be dispensed with without great disadvantage to all transcendental judgment. The word *absolute* is now often used, in order merely to indicate that something is valid of a thing considered *in itself*, and consequently *internally*. In this signification, *absolutely possible* would mean that which is possible in itself (*interne*), which in fact is the *least* that one can say of an object. On the other hand, it is also sometimes used in order to show that something is valid (unlimitedly) in every relationship, (for example, absolute rule); and *absolutely possible* would signify in this meaning, that which is possible in all respects and *in all relationship*, which again is the most that I can say as to the possibility of a thing. Now these significations frequently in fact are united. For example, what is internally impossible, is also impossible in all relationship, consequently absolutely so. But in most cases they are infinitely wide of each other, and I can by no means conclude that, because something in itself is possible, it is also, on that account, in all relationship, consequently, absolutely possible. Nay, with respect to absolute necessity, I will show in the sequel that it by no means, in all cases, depends upon that which is internal, and therefore must not be regarded as synonymous with this. That whose contrary is internally impossible, whose contrary is decidedly, in all respects, impossible, is consequently itself also

absolutely necessary ; but I cannot conclude conversely that to be absolutely necessary, whose contrary is *internally impossible*, that is, that the *absolute* necessity of things is an *internal* necessity ; for this internal necessity is, in certain cases, a mere empty expression with which we cannot conjoin the smallest conception. On the other hand, the conception of the necessity of a thing, in respect of every thing (of all possible), carries with it quite particular determinations. Now, since the loss of a conception of wide application in speculative science can never be indifferent to the philosopher, I thus hope the determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends, will also not be indifferent to him.

I will then make use of the word *absolute* in this extended signification, and set it in opposition to the valid, merely comparatively, or in a particular respect, for this last is restricted by conditions, but the first is valid without restriction.

The transcendental conception of reason at all times only looks to absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions, and never terminates except in the absolutely, that is, in every respect, unconditioned. For pure reason leaves every thing to the understanding, which refers immediately to the objects of the intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. It reserves to itself only the absolute totality in the use of the conception of reason, and seeks to carry out the synthetical unity which is thought in the category, to the absolutely unconditioned. We may consequently term this the *unity of reason* of phenomena, as we may term the other, which the category expresses, the *unity of the understanding*. Reason hence thus only refers to the use of understanding, and not so far indeed as this contains the ground of possible experience (for the absolute totality of conditions is no conception to be used in an experience, because no experience is unconditioned); but in order to prescribe to it the direction



towards a certain unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and it (*reason*) tends to this, to embrace all actions of the understanding, in respect of every object, in an *absolute whole*. Consequently the objective use of the pure conceptions of the understanding is always *transcendent*, whilst that of the pure conceptions of the understanding, according to its nature, must always be *immanent*, since it is limited to possible experience.

I understand under idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no congruous object in the senses can be given. Consequently our pure conceptions of reason now considered, are *transcendental ideas*. They are conceptions of pure reason, for they consider all experience-cognition as determined through an absolute totality of the conditions. They are not arbitrarily imagined, but given by means of the nature of reason itself, and refer therefore necessarily to the whole use of the understanding. They are finally transcendent, and overstep the limits of all experience, in which, therefore, an object can never present itself which is adequate to the transcendental idea. If we give the term idea, we then say *very much* with respect to the object (as an object of the pure understanding), but in respect of the subject (in respect of its reality, under empirical condition) *very little* precisely on this account, because it, as the conception of a maximum, can never be given congruous in concreto. Now, since this last is properly the whole end in the merely speculative use of reason, and the approximation to a conception, but which in the execution still can never be attained, is just the same as if the conception had entirely failed, it is said of such a conception; it is only an idea. We might thus say, the absolute whole of all phenomena is only an idea; for since we can never draw such in the image, it thus always remains a *problem* without solution. On the contrary, whilst in the practical use of reason we have wholly only to do with the execution according to

rules, so the idea of practical reason can be always given real, although only in part, in concreto ; nay, it is the indispensable condition of every practical use of reason. The exercise of it is always limited and defective, but under not determinable limits, consequently always under the influence of the conception of an absolute completeness. The practical idea is, therefore, always highly fruitful, and, in respect of real actions, indispensably necessary. In it pure reason has even causality, to produce that effectively which its conception contains ; consequently we cannot say of wisdom, as it were disparagingly, *it is only an Idea* ; but exactly on this account, that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible ends, it must then serve for the rule, as an original or at least limiting condition to all that is practical.

Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason that they are only *ideas*, still we are not thus on any account, to look upon them as superfluous and void. For if no object yet can be determined thereby, still at the bottom and unobserved, they serve the understanding for a canon of its extended and harmonious use, whereby certainly it cognizes no object more than it would cognize according to its conceptions ; but still is led better and farther in this cognition. Not to say, that they perhaps render possible a passage from the conceptions of nature to the practical ones, and may in such a manner procure for the moral ideas themselves, support and connexion with the speculative cognitions of reason. With respect to all this, we must wait the explanation in the sequel.

But conformably to our intention, we here set aside the practical ideas, and consequently consider reason only in the speculative, and in this still more restricted use, namely, in the transcendental one only. And we must here strike into the same way which we before took in the deduction of the categories, namely, con-

sider the logical form of the cognition of reason, and see whether perhaps reason thereby may not also be a source of conceptions, for looking at objects in themselves as synthetically determined *à priori*, in respect of one or the other function of reason.

Reason, considered as faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of concluding,—that is to say, of judging mediately (by means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given one). The given judgment is the general rule (the major). The subsumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule, is the minor. The real judgment which declares the assertion of the rule to the subsumed case, is the conclusion. The rule, namely, expresses something general under a certain condition. Now, the condition of the rule takes place in a case which presents itself. Consequently that which is valid under the general condition, is also to be regarded as valid in the case which presents itself (that carries with it this conditioned). It is easily to be seen that reason attains to a cognition by means of the actions of the understanding, which constitute a series of conditions. If I only attain to the proposition, “all bodies are changeable,” from this cause, that I begin from the more remote cognition (wherein the conception of body does not still present itself, but which yet contains the condition thereof), “all that is compounded is changeable,” and from this proceed to one that is nearer, which stands under the condition of the first, “bodies are compounded,” and first of all, from this to a third which now connects the distant cognition (the changeable) with the one before us; “bodies therefore are changeable,” I am arrived by means of a series of conditions (premises) at a cognition (conclusion). Now, every series, whose exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgment) is given, may be continued; consequently

the self-same action of reason leads to *ratiocinatio polysyllogistica*, which is a series of conclusions, that may be continued to an indefinite extent, either on the part of the conditions (per prosyllogismos), or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos).

But one is soon aware that the chain or series of prosyllogisms, that is, of cognitions followed up on the part of principles, or of conditions to a given cognition—in other words, the *ascending series* of syllogisms, must demean itself with respect to the faculty of reason still differently to the *descending series*, that is, the progression of reason on the part of the conditioned by episyllogisms. For, as in the former case, the cognition (conclusio) is only given as conditioned, we cannot thus attain to it by means of reason, otherwise at least than under the presupposition that all members of the series, on the part of the conditions, are given, (totality in the series of the premises), since only under their presupposition is the judgment before us, *à priori*, possible. On the contrary, on the part of the conditioned, or of consequences, only a *becoming series*, and not one already *wholly* presupposed or given, is thought—consequently only a potential progression. Hence, if a cognition be looked upon as conditioned, reason is then compelled to regard the series of the conditions in an ascending line as completed, and as given according to its totality. But if this same cognition is looked upon at the same time as condition of other cognitions, which form with one another a series of consequences in a descending line, reason may thus be quite indifferent how far this progression extends itself, *à parte posteriori*, and whether, altogether, totality of this series is possible; because it does not require such a series for the conclusion before it, as this is already sufficiently determined and secured by means of its grounds, *à parte priori*. Now, it may be, that on the part of the conditions, the series of premises may have a *First* as supreme condition or

not, and therefore be *à parte priori*, without limits; still must it contain totality of the condition, even admitting that we never should be able to arrive at embracing it; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is to be looked upon as a consequence resulting therefrom, is to be held as true. This is a requirement of reason, which presents its cognition either as determined *à priori* and as necessary in itself, and then it requires no foundation, or in case it be deduced, as a member of a series of principles, which series itself is unconditionally true.

### THIRD SECTION

#### OF THE FIRST BOOK OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

##### SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

We have not any thing here to do with a logical dialectick, that makes abstraction of all content of cognition, and only unveils false appearance in the form of syllogisms; but with a transcendental one, which is to contain wholly *à priori*, the origin of certain cognitions from pure reason, and of concluded conceptions, the object of which cannot at all be given empirically, and which therefore lie entirely out of the faculty of the pure understanding. We have observed, from the natural relationship that the transcendental use of our cognition, as well in conclusions as judgments, must have to the logical use, that there can only be three kinds of dialectical conclusions, which refer to three modes of conclusion, by means of which reason can attain from principles to cognitions; and that in every thing its business is, to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which the understanding always remains bound, to the unconditioned, which this understanding can never reach.

Now, that which is general in all relationship that our representations can have, is—1st, the reference to the subject; 2nd, the reference to objects, either in fact as phenomena, or as objects of thought in general. If we connect this subdivision with the one that has preceded, all relationship of representations of which we either can make to ourselves a conception or an idea, is thus threefold; 1st, the relationship to the subject; 2nd, to the diverse of the object in the phenomenon; 3rd, to all things in general.

Now, all pure conceptions in general have to do with the synthetical unity of representations; but conceptions of pure reason (transcendental ideas) with the unconditioned synthetical unity of all conditions in general. Consequently all transcendental ideas may be brought under three *classes*, of which the *first* contains the absolute (unconditioned) *unity* of the *thinking subject*; the *second*, the absolute *unity* of the *series of the conditions of the phenomenon*; the *third*, the absolute *unity of the condition of all objects of thought* in general.

The thinking subject is the object of *Psychology*; the complex of all phenomena (the world) is the object of *Cosmology*; and the thing which contains the supreme condition of the possibility of every thing that can be thought (the essence of all essences), is the object of all *Theology*. Consequently, pure reason furnishes the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul (*psychologia rationalis*), of a transcendental science of the world (*cosmologia rationalis*), and finally also of a transcendental cognition of God (*theologia transcendentalis*.) The mere delineation of one as well as the other of these sciences, is not at all derived from understanding, even although this were connected with the highest logical use of reason, that is, with all imaginable conclusions for proceeding from an object thereof (phenomenon) to all others, even in the remotest members of the empirical synthesis; but it is

only a pure and genuine product or problem of pure reason.

What *Modi* of the pure conceptions of reason stand under these three titles of all transcendental ideas, will be laid down fully in the following chapter. They follow the thread of the categories. For pure reason never refers directly to objects, but to the conceptions of the understanding, in respect of them. Equally so likewise, when the matter has been fully treated, only will it be made clear, how reason, solely by means of the synthetical use of the self-same function of which it makes use for categorical syllogisms, must necessarily attain to the conception of the absolute unity of the *thinking subject*—how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas must draw after it, that of the absolutely-unconditioned in a *series* of given conditions, and lastly, the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism, the highest conception of reason—of an essence of *all essences*,—a thought which, at first sight, appears to be extremely paradoxical.

No *objective deduction* of these transcendental ideas, such as we were able to furnish of the categories, is strictly possible. For in fact they have no relation to an object that could congruously be given to them, precisely because they are only ideas. But a subjective derivation of them, from the nature of our reason we could undertake, and this in fact has been done in the present chapter.

We readily perceive that pure reason has no other thing in view than the absolute totality of the synthesis, *on the part of conditions*, (whether of adherence, or dependence, or concurrence,) and that it has nothing to do with the absolute wholeness *on the part of the conditioned*. For it only requires this, in order to presuppose the whole series of conditions, and thereby to give it, *à priori*, to the understanding. But if there be once a complete (and unconditioned) given condition, there is then no longer required a conception of reason with

regard to the continuation of the series, since the understanding of itself makes each step backwards from the condition to the *conditioned*. In such a way transcendental ideas serve only to *rise* in the series of conditions up to the unconditioned, that is, to principles. But in regard to *descending* to the conditioned, there is certainly a very wide extended logical use, which our reason makes of the laws of the understanding, but not at all a transcendental one; and if we make to ourselves an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (of progressus), as, for example, of the whole series of all future changes of the world, this is then an ideal thing (*ens rationis*) which is only arbitrarily thought, and not necessarily presupposed by means of reason. For to the possibility of the conditioned, the totality in fact of its conditions, but not of its consequences, is presupposed. Consequently such a conception is no transcendental idea, with which however, we have at present only to do.

Finally, we are also aware, that amongst the transcendental ideas themselves, a certain connexion and unity manifests itself, and that pure reason, by means thereof, brings all its cognitions into a system. To proceed from the cognition of oneself (of the soul) to the cognition of the world, and by means of this to the first Being, is so natural a progression, that it seems similar to the logical march of reason from premises to conclusions.\* Now, whether in this case really a connexion of the kind like that between the logical

\* Metaphysick has for the particular object of its enquiry only three ideas; *God*, *Freedom*, and *Immortality*, in such a way, that the second conception conjoined with the first, must lead to the third as a necessary consequence. Every thing with which this Science otherwise occupies itself, serves it simply as a means for the purpose of arriving at these ideas and their reality. It does not require them in favour of natural science, but in order to issue out beyond nature. The insight into the same would render *Theology*, *Morals*, and, by the junction of both, *Religion*, consequently the highest objects of our existence, dependent merely upon the speculative faculty of reason, and nothing else. In a systematic representation of such ideas, the stated order as the *synthetical* one would be the most suitable; but in the labour which must necessarily precede



and transcendental procedure, lies secretly at the foundation, is also one of those questions, the answer to which must only first be expected in the progress of these enquiries. We have already in the mean time attained our end, as we have withdrawn from this equivocal position the transcendental conceptions of reason, which else usually are mixed up with others in the theory of philosophers, without their once separating them from those belonging to the conceptions of the understanding. We have been enabled to indicate their origin, and thereby at the same time their determined number, beyond which there can none more be given,—and to represent them in a systematic connexion, whereby a particular field for pure reason is marked out and enclosed.

it, the *analytical* which inverts this order would be more adapted to the end, in order, since we proceed from that which experience immediately furnishes us, from *Psychology*, to *Cosmology*, and thence to the cognition of *God*, to complete our great design.

## TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

*SECOND BOOK.*

## OF THE DIALECTICAL CONCLUSIONS OF PURE REASON.

We may say that the object of a mere transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although this idea has been generated necessarily in reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, no conception of the understanding is even possible, of an object that should be adequate to the requirement of reason, that is, such a one as can be shown and rendered perceptible in a possible experience. We should express ourselves, however, better, and with less danger of misunderstanding, if we said that we can have no acquaintance with the object that corresponds to an idea, although we can have a problematical conception.

Now, the transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure conceptions of reason rests at least upon this, that we are brought by means of a necessary conclusion of reason to such ideas. There are, consequently, conclusions of reason which contain no empirical premises, and by means of which we conclude from something that we know, as to something else whereof we yet can have no conception, and to which, notwithstanding, by means of an unavoidable appearance we grant objective reality. Such conclusions in respect of their result, are, consequently, rather to be termed *sophistical* than *rational* conclusions, although on account of the occasion of them, they may well assume the latter term, because still they are not fictitious, nor have they been originated accidentally, but have arisen out of the nature of reason. They are *sophistications*

not of men, but of pure reason itself, from which the wisest of mankind cannot free himself, and although perhaps after much trouble, indeed, he may avoid error, yet can he never be rid of the appearance, that continually torments and sports with him.

There are consequently only three kinds of these dialectical syllogisms; the same number just as the ideas are into which their conclusions run. In the reasonings of the *first class (the categorical)*, I conclude from the transcendental conception of the subject, which contains nothing of what is diverse, as to the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I have in this way no conception at all. I shall term this dialectical conclusion, the transcendental paralogism. The *second class (the hypothetical)* of sophistical conclusions, is based upon the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon in general; and I thence conclude, since I have of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series on the one side, always a self-contradicting conception, as to the correctness of the opposing unity, of which, however, still I have no conception. I shall term the state of reason in these dialectical conclusions, the *Antinomy* of pure Reason. Lastly, according to the third kind (*the disjunctive*) of sophistical conclusions, I conclude, from the totality of conditions for thinking objects in general, so far as they can be given to me, as to the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that is to say, from things which I do not know, according to their mere transcendental conception, I conclude upon a Being of all beings, which I know through a transcendental conception still less, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can make to myself no conception. This dialectical conclusion of reason I shall term the *Ideal* of pure reason.

## TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

## SECOND BOOK.

## FIRST CHAPTER.

## OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON.

The logical paralogism consists in the erroneousness of a syllogism, according to form, whatever besides its content may be. But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, of concluding falsely according to the form. In such a way, a like false conclusion will have its foundation in the nature of human reason, and will carry along with itself an inevitable, although not insoluble illusion.

We now come to a conception that has not been previously indicated in the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be added thereto, without however on that account changing the table in question in the least, or declaring it to be wanting. This is the conception, or, if we like it better, the judgment, "*I think.*" But we readily perceive that it is the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently also of the transcendental; and, therefore, is at all times comprehended under these, and thence is also equally transcendental, but can have no particular title, since it only serves for this—to introduce all thinking as belonging to consciousness. Yet, however pure it is of all that is empirical, (of impression of the senses,) still it serves for the purpose, from the nature of our faculty of representation, of distinguishing two kinds of objects. I, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called Soul. That which is an object of internal sense, is called Body. Thence the expression, I, as a thinking being, signifies already the

object of psychology, which may be termed the rational doctrine of the soul, provided I desire to know nothing farther of the soul than what can be concluded from this conception I, so far as it presents itself in all thinking, independent of all experience (which determines me more nearly, and in concreto.)

Now the *rational* doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this kind; for if the least that is empirical in my thinking, if any particular perception of my internal state were also mixed up amongst the cognition-foundations of this science, it would then no longer be rational, but empirical psychology. We have therefore at once a pretended science before us, which is built upon the single proposition, "*I think*," and the foundation or the want of foundation of which we can here very properly and agreeably to the nature of a transcendental philosophy, investigate. One must not take alarm, that I still have in this proposition which expresses the perception of oneself, an internal experience, and that consequently rational psychology which is built thereon, is never pure, but grounded partly upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception "*I think*," which in fact makes all transcendental conceptions possible, wherein it is said, "*I think the substance, the cause*," &c. For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relationship to another perception, without any particular difference thereof or determination being empirically given, cannot be looked upon as empirical cognition, but must be considered as cognition of the empirical in general, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which altogether is transcendental. The least object of perception (for example, merely pleasure or pain) that should be added to the general representation of self-consciousness, would change immediately rational into empirical psychology.

“ I think,” is the sole text of rational psychology, from which it must develop its whole doctrine. We see easily that this thought, if it is to be referred to an object (myself) can contain nothing else but transcendental predicates of such, since the least empirical predicate would taint the rational purity and independence of the science from all experience.

But here we shall have merely to follow the thread of the categories, only as in this case, first a thing, I, as thinking being is given, so shall we not indeed change the previous order of the categories with each other as it is represented in their table; but will here still begin, from the category of substance, whereby a thing in itself is represented, and thus follow its series backwards. The Topic of rational psychology, whence all the rest that it must contain, must be derived, is then the following:—

1.

The soul is SUBSTANCE.

2.

According to its quality SIMPLE.

3.

According to the different times in which it exists numerically-identical, that is UNITY, (not plurality).

4.

In the relationship to all POSSIBLE objects, in space.\*

From these elements spring all conceptions of pure psychology, solely by means of combination, without

\* The reader who, from these expressions in their transcendental abstraction, does not so readily discover their psychological sense, and why the last attribute of the soul belongs to the category of *Existence*, will find this, in the sequel, sufficiently explained and justified. Besides, I have to adduce, as an apology for the Latin expressions that have been introduced against good taste in writing, instead of the synonymous German ones, as well in respect of this chapter as also in reference to the whole work, that I have chosen rather to give up something of the elegance of language, than been willing to render, through the slightest unintelligibility, the usage of the schools more difficult.

in the least cognizing another principle. This substance, merely as object of the internal sense, gives the conception of *Immateriality*; as simple substance, of *Incorruptibility*; the identity of it as intellectual substance gives *Personality*; all these three parts together, *Spirituality*; the relationship to objects in space, gives commercium with bodies; consequently it represents the thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is to say, as Soul (anima), and as the foundation of *Animality*,—this limited by spirituality, *Immortality*.

Now hereunto four paralogsms of a transcendental psychology refer, which is considered wrongly as a science of pure reason in respect of the nature of our thinking being. We can lay at the foundation thereof nothing else but the simple, and in itself as to content, wholly void representation, I—of which we cannot even say that it is a conception, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all conceptions. By means of this I, or He, or It, (the thing) that thinks, nothing farther now than a transcendental subject of thought is represented =  $x$ , which is only cognized by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, isolated, we can never have the least conception; and round about which, consequently, we turn in a continual circle, because we must always make use of its representation in order to judge something respecting it,—an inconvenience which is not to be separated therefrom, since consciousness in itself is not so much a representation that distinguishes a particular object, as a form of this representation in general, so far as it is to be called cognition,—as from it alone can I say, that I thereby think something.

But it must, directly at the outset, appear extraordinary that the condition under which I think in general, and which consequently is merely a property of my subject, is to be valid at the same time for

every thing which thinks, and that we can arrogate to ourselves the founding upon a proposition appearing empirically, an apodictical and general judgment, that is to say, that every thing which thinks is so constituted, as the pretension of self-consciousness declares it in me. But the cause thereof lies in this, that we must attribute to things *à priori*, all the properties necessarily, that constitute the conditions under which we alone think them. Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being by means of any external experience, but only by means of self-consciousness. Consequently, such objects are nothing more than the carrying over of this my consciousness to other things, which only thereby are represented as thinking beings. But the proposition, "I think," is hereby taken only problematically, not so far as it may contain a perception of an existence, (the Cartesian *cogito, ergo sum*,) but according to its mere possibility, for the purpose of seeing what properties may flow from so simple a proposition as to its subject, (such may or may not exist.)

If there lay at the foundation of our pure cognition of reason of thinking beings in general, more than the *cogito*, if we were likewise to take in aid the observations upon the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived natural laws of the thinking self, an empirical psychology would thus arise, that would be a kind of *Physiology* of the internal sense, and perhaps might serve for explaining the phenomena of this, but never for discovering such properties as do not belong to possible experience (as those of the simple), nor for teaching *apodictically* any thing which concerns the nature of thinking beings in general. It therefore would be no rational psychology.

Now, as the proposition "*I think*," (taken problematically) contains the form of every judgment of the understanding in general, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is then clear that the con-



clusions from this can contain a mere *transcendental* use of the understanding, that excludes all mixture of experience, and of the march of which, according to what has been before shewn, we cannot already make to ourselves before hand any advantageous conception. We will therefore follow this, through all the predicaments of pure psychology with a critical eye, although, for the sake of brevity, we will continue its examination in an uninterrupted connexion.

First of all, the following general observation may quicken our attention as to this kind of conclusion. Not from this, because I merely think, do I cognize an object ; but only from this, because I determine a given intuition in respect of the unity of consciousness wherein all thinking consists, can I cognize any object. I do not therefore cognize myself from this, that I am conscious of myself as thinking, but provided I am conscious to myself of the intuition of myself, as determined in respect of the function of thinking. All *modi* of self-consciousness in thinking, in itself, are consequently still no conceptions of the understanding of objects (categories), but merely logical functions, that give to the thinking no object at all to cognize, consequently also not me myself, as object. The object is not the consciousness of the *determining*, but only of the *determined* self, that is, of my internal intuition (so far as its diversity can be conjoined, agreeably to the general condition of the unity of the apperception in the thinking.)

First.—In all judgments, I am ever now the *determining subject* of that relationship which constitutes the judgment. But that I who think, always must be valid in the thought as *subject*, and can be considered as something which does not merely adhere, as predicate, to thought, is an apodictical and even *identical proposition*, but it does not mean that I, as object of myself, am a *self-subsisting being*, or *sub-*

*stance.* The last case extends very far, consequently also requires data, which are not at all to be met with in thought, perhaps, (so far as I consider the thinking being merely as such) more than I any where (in this) shall ever meet with.

*Secondly*—That the I of the apperception, consequently in each thought, is a *singular*, which cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and therefore denotes a logical simple subject, lies already in the conception of the thought; and is consequently an analytical proposition; but that does not mean that the thinking I is a simple *substance*, which would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of substance refers always to intuitions which never can be any thing but sensible in me, and lie therefore entirely out of the field of the understanding, and its thinking; respecting which, however, here properly we only speak, when it is said that the I in thinking, is simple. It would in fact be surprising, if I should give here exactly in the poorest representation of the whole, as it were by revelation, what otherwise requires so much preparation, in order to distinguish, in that which the intuition presents, what therein is substance—and still more whether this also could be simple (as in the parts of matter).

*Thirdly*—The proposition of the identity of myself, in all diversity of which I am conscious, is equally a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves—consequently an analytical proposition; but this identity of the subject, whereof I can be conscious in all its representations, does not concern the intuition of this subject whereby it is given as object, and cannot therefore signify the identity of the person by which the consciousness of the identity of its own substance is understood as thinking being in all change of circumstances; for which, in order to demonstrate it, nothing is effected by the mere analysis of the proposition, “I think;”—but different synthetical

judgments that are grounded upon the given intuition, would be required.

*Fourthly*—I distinguish my own existence as of a thinking being from other things external to me (to which also my body belongs), is equally an analytical proposition, as other things are those which I think as different from me. But whether this consciousness of myself without things external to me, whereby representations are given to me, is even possible, and whether therefore I can exist merely as thinking being (without being man), I thereby do not at all know.

There is consequently not the least gained by means of the analysis of the consciousness of myself in thinking in general, in respect of the cognition of myself as object. The logical exposition of thinking in general, is erroneously held to be a metaphysical determination of the object.

It would be a great stumblingblock, indeed a complete one, against our whole Critick, if there were a possibility of demonstrating *à priori*, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and as such, therefore, (which is a consequence from the same argument,) carry inevitably along with them personality, and are conscious of their existence separated from all matter. For in this way, we should still have made a step out beyond the sensible world, we should have trodden in the field of *noumena*, and no one would deny to us the right of extending ourselves farther in the same,—to build there,—and accordingly as his good star favoured each person, therein to take possession. For the proposition “every thinking being as such, is simple substance,” is a synthetical proposition *à priori*, because it, in the first place, goes out, beyond the conception laid at the foundation of it, and adds to thinking in general the *mode of existence*; and secondly it joins to such conception, a predicate (of simplicity) which cannot at all be given in any experience. Synthetical propositions *à priori*, are not

thus merely, as we have maintained, feasible and admissible, in reference to objects of possible experience, and in fact, as principles of the possibility of this experience itself; but they may likewise extend to things in general and in themselves, which consequence makes an end of the whole of this Critick, and would command us to acquiesce in the ancient doctrine. But the danger is in this case not so great, when we approach the matter nearer.

In the procedure of rational psychology there reigns a paralogism which is represented in the following Syllogism.

That which cannot be thought otherwise than as Subject, exists also not otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.

Now a thinking being, merely considered as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.

Therefore it (*the thinking being*) also only exists as such, that is, as substance.

In the major, the question is as to a being which can be thought generally in every respect, consequently also, so as it may be given in the intuition. But in the minor, the question respecting the same being is only so far as it considers itself as subject merely relatively to thinking, and to the unity of consciousness, but not at the same time in reference to the intuition, whereby such is given as object to thought. Thus *per sophisma figure dictionis*, consequently by means of a fallacious consequence, the conclusion ensues.\*

\* The thinking in the two premises is taken in quite a different meaning. In the major, as it refers to an object in general (consequently as it may be given in the intuition); but in the minor, only as it consists in reference to self-consciousness, whereby consequently no object at all is thought upon, but only the reference is represented to itself as subject (as the form of thinking.) In the first, the question is of things which cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects,—but in the second, not of *things* but of *thinking* (since we make abstraction of all objects,) in which the I, always serves as the subject of consciousness,—hence cannot it follow in the conclusion; I cannot exist otherwise than as subject, but only, I can in the thinking of my existence make use of myself as the subject of judgment—which is an identical proposition, and which explains absolutely nothing as to the mode of my existence.

That this solution of the celebrated argument in a paralogism is thus entirely correct, is clearly manifested, if we will look with respect to it, at the general scholium to the systematic representation of principles, and to the chapter upon noumena, where it is shown, that the conception of a thing that can exist of itself as subject, but not as mere predicate, still comes along with it no objective reality at all ; that is, we cannot know whether an object at all can belong to it, since we do not perceive the possibility of such a mode of existing—consequently that it can give absolutely no cognition. If therefore it is to denote under the denomination of a substance, an object which can be given—if it is to become a cognition—then a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of the objective reality of a conception—namely, that whereby alone the object is given—must be laid at the foundation. But we have now in the internal intuition nothing at all permanent, for the I, is only the consciousness of my thinking ; and consequently there is wanting, if we stop short simply at thinking, the necessary condition for applying the conception of substance, that is, of a self-subsisting subject, to itself as thinking being ; and the therewith conjoined simplicity of substance entirely falls away, together with the objective reality of the conception, and is changed into a mere logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thinking in general,—whether the subject be composed or not.

#### REFUTATION OF THE MENDELSONIAN ARGUMENT OF THE PERMANENCE OF THE SOUL.

This acute philosopher soon perceived in the usual argument by which it is to be shown, that the soul, (if we admit that it is a simple being,) cannot cease to be by means of *division*, a want of completeness in

regard to securing to it necessary continuance, inasmuch as a cessation of its existence might be admitted through *vanishing away*. Now in his *Phædo* he sought to ward off this transitoriness from it, which would in fact be positive annihilation, in this way, that he believed himself to have shown, that a simple being cannot at all cease to be, since as it cannot be at all diminished, and therefore lose something step by step of its existence, and thus by degrees be changed into nothing, (because it has no parts, consequently no plurality in itself,) between a moment wherein it is, and the other wherein it no longer is, no time at all would be met with—which is impossible. But he did not consider, that although we accord to the soul this simple nature, namely, that it contains no diversity separate from one another,—consequently no extensive quantity—we cannot still refuse to it any more than to any thing existing, intensive quantity, that is to say, a degree of reality in respect of all its faculties—and in fact in general of all that constitutes existence—which degree may decrease through all infinitely many smaller degrees; and thus the pretended substance (the thing whose permanence besides does not already stand secure), may be changed into nothing, although not through division, but through gradual diminution (*remissio*) of its forces, (consequently by languishment, if it be permitted to me to make use of this term). For even consciousness has always a degree which may still ever be diminished\*—consequently likewise the faculty of being conscious of

\* Clearness is not, as the logicians say, the consciousness of a representation, —for a certain degree of consciousness, but which does not suffice for remembrance, must itself be met with in several obscure representations, inasmuch as without all consciousness, we should make no difference in the conjunction of obscure representations, which we are able still to do, in the signs of several conceptions (as that of justice and equity, and of the musician when he touches at the same time several notes in a fantasia). But a representation is clear in which the consciousness suffices for the *consciousness of the difference* of the same from others; should indeed this *consciousness* suffice for the difference, but not for the consciousness of the different, the representation must still be termed obscure. Consequently there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness up to its disappearance.

oneself,—and so all the other faculties. The permanence of the soul therefore remains as of a mere object of the internal sense, undemonstrated and even indemonstrable, although its permanence in life is clear in itself, as the thinking being (as man) is at the same time an object of the external senses; but with this, sufficient does not at all take place for the rational psychologist, who undertakes to show from mere conceptions, the absolute permanence of the same soul even out beyond life.\*

\* Those persons who, in order to establish a new possibility, believe they have done enough already, when in respect to this they have challenged any one to shew them a contradiction in their suppositions, (as such generally they are who believe they see the possibility of thought, whereof they have only an example in human life by empirical intuitions, also after its termination) may by means of other possibilities, that are not in the least more bold, be brought into great embarrassment. Such is the possibility of the division of a *simple substance* into several substances, and conversely, the aggregation (coalition) of several into a simple. For although divisibility presupposes a compound, still does it not necessarily require a compound of substances, but merely of degrees (of several powers) of one and the same substance. Now just as one may imagine all forces and powers of the soul, even that of consciousness, as diminished by the half, still in such a way that substance always remains over, one can thus represent to oneself without contradiction, this extinguished half as maintained, though not in, but out of it—only that, as in this case all that is in it, is always real, consequently has a degree, and the whole existence of the same therefore that nothing be wanting thus is halved—then a particular substance would spring up without of it. For the plurality which has been divided was already previously,—but not as plurality of substances, but of each reality as quantum of the existence therein, and the unity of the substance was only a manner of existing, which by means of this division alone was changed into a multiplicity of subsistence. But thus also several other simple substances could flow together into one, whereby nothing would be lost but merely the multiplicity of the subsistence, since the one contained in itself the degree of the reality of all the preceding together, and perhaps the simple substances that give us the phenomenon of matter, (certainly indeed not by means of a mechanical or chemical influence upon one another, but still by means of one unknown, whereof the first was only the phenomenon), might through the like *dynamic* division of the souls of parents, as *intensive quantities*, produce the souls of children, whilst the former supply their loss again by means of coalition with new matter of the same kind. I am far removed from granting to such fancies of the brain the least value or validity, and the preceding principles of analytic have sufficiently inculcated making no other than an experience-use of the categories, (as of substance). But if the rationalist, from the mere thinking faculty, without any permanent intuition whereby an object would be given, is bold enough to make a self-subsisting being, simply because the unity of the apperception in thinking allows him no explanation from the compounded,—instead of which he would do better to confess, he does not know how to explain the possibility of a thinking nature,—why should not the *materialist*, although he can as little adduce experience in behalf of his possibilities, be justified in a like boldness, to make use of his principle in maintaining the formal unity of the first (*the rationalist's*) for a contrary use?

Now if we take our foregoing propositions in *synthetical* connexion, and as they must be taken as valid for all thinking beings in rational psychology as a system, and if we proceed from the category of relation in the proposition, "all thinking beings are as such substances," through the series of these backwards, until the circle is concluded, we thus stumble at last upon their existence, of which they themselves (*the thinking beings*) in this system, independent of external things, are not only conscious, but are also able from themselves to determine such (in respect of the permanence which necessarily belongs to the character of substance). But it follows from this, that *Idealism*, at least the problematical, in the very same rational system, is unavoidable, and if the existence of external things be not at all required for the determination of its own (*the thinking being's*) in time, the first likewise will be admitted entirely in vain only, without ever being able to give a proof thereof.

If we follow, on the other hand, the *analytical* procedure, since the "I think," as a proposition, which already includes within itself an existence as given, and consequently modality, lies at the foundation—and if we analyze this proposition in order to cognize its content, namely, whether and how this I, in space or time, thereby simply determines its existence; the propositions of rational psychology would then begin, not from the conception of a thinking being in general, but from a reality: and from the manner in which this is thought after all that is empirical with respect to it has been separated, that which belongs to a thinking being in general will be deduced, as the following table shews:—



1.

I think.

2.

As subject.

3.

As simple subject.

4.

As identical subject  
in each state of my thinking.

Now since here in the second proposition it is not determined, whether I can exist and be thought only as subject, and not also as predicate of another, the conception of a subject is thus taken in this case merely logically, and it remains undetermined whether substance is to be understood or not under this. But in the third proposition, the absolute unity of the apperception, the simple I in the representation, whereunto all conjunction or separation that constitutes the thinking refers, is also important in itself, although I have not yet decided any thing as to the quality or subsistence of the subject. The apperception is something real, and its simplicity already lies in its possibility. Now in space nothing is real that is simple, for points, (which constitute the only simple thing in space,) are merely limits, but never even any thing which seems to constitute space as part. Consequently there follows from this, the impossibility of an explanation of my quality, as mere thinking subject, from principles of *materialism*. But since my existence in the first proposition is considered as given, since it does not say, every thinking being exists, (which at the same time would state absolute necessity), and therefore state too much respecting them (*these beings*) ; but only, I *exist* thinking, it is thus empirical, and contains the determinateness of my existence, merely in respect of my representations in time. But as I again, for this, first, require something permanent, and such, so far as I think myself, is not at all given to me in the internal intuition, the man-

ner in which then I exist, whether as substance or accident, it is not at all possible to determine by means of this simple self-consciousness. Consequently, if *materialism* is unfit, as a mode of explanation of my existence, so is *spiritualism* just equally insufficient for the same, and the conclusion is, that we cannot in any way, whatever it may be, cognize any thing as to the quality of our souls, which concerns the possibility of their separate existence in general.

And how should it indeed be possible, by means of the unity of consciousness, which we even only know from this, because we have indispensably need of it for the possibility of experience, to reach out and beyond experience (our existence in life); and thus in fact to extend our cognition as to the nature of all thinking beings in general by means of the empirical, but in regard to all kinds of intuition, the indeterminate proposition "I think"?

There is, therefore, no rational psychology as *Doctrine*, which procures for us an addition to our self-cognition, but only as *Discipline*, which sets impassable limits in this field to speculative reason; in order on the one side not to cast itself into the bosom of a heartless materialism, and on the other side, not to lose itself in beating about in a spiritualism without foundation for us in life; but this discipline rather reminds us to look upon this refusal of our reason, to afford a satisfactory answer to speculative questions extending beyond this life, as a hint from it, to divert our self-cognition from fruitless extravagant speculation, to fruitful practical use—which, although it is always directed only to objects of experience, still takes up its principles at a higher point, and thus determines its conduct, as if our destiny extended infinitely far beyond experience, and consequently beyond this life.

We see from all this, that a mere misunderstanding gives to rational psychology its origin. The unity of consciousness, that lies at the foundation of the

categories, is here taken for intuition of the subject as object, and the category of substance thereto applied. But it is only the unity in the *thinking* by which alone no object is given, whereunto the category of substance, as it always pre-supposes given *intuition* therefore cannot be applied,—consequently this subject not at all be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot from this therefore, that it thinks these, receive a conception of itself as an object of the categories—for in order to think these, it must lay at the foundation, its own pure self-consciousness, which yet has to be explained. Just so the subject, in which the representation of time has originally its foundation, cannot thereby determine its own existence in time, and if this last cannot be, then the former also, as determination of itself, (as thinking being in general,) cannot take place by means of the categories.\*

Thus then vanishes away in disappointed expectation, a cognition sought for out of and beyond the limits of experience and yet appertaining to the highest interest of humanity, so far as this is to be indebted to speculative

\* The "I think" is, as already stated, an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition "I exist" in itself. But I cannot say; all that thinks exists, for then the property of thinking would make into necessary beings, all beings which possess this. And consequently my existence cannot be looked upon as concluded from the proposition "I think," as Des Cartes held, (since otherwise the major, "all which thinks exists," must precede), but it is identical with it. The proposition expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that is, perception, (consequently it still shows that sensation which consequently belongs to sensibility, already lies at the foundation of this proposition of existence,) but it precedes experience, which is to determine the object of the perception by means of the categories in respect of time; and existence here is still no category which has reference to an undetermined given object, but only such a one of which we have a conception, and concerning which one wishes to know if it is placed out of this conception or not. An undetermined perception signifies here only something real that is given, and indeed only to thinking in general, consequently not as phenomenon, even not as thing in itself, (noumenon,) but as something which indeed exists, and in the proposition, I think, is indicated as such. For it is to be observed, that when I have termed the proposition, "I think," an empirical proposition, I did not mean to say that I, in this proposition, is an empirical proposition, it is rather purely intellectual, since it belongs to thinking in general. But without an empirical representation, which affords the matter for thinking, the act, "I think," would not take place, and that which is empirical, is only the condition of the application, or of the use of the pure intellectual faculty.

philosophy ; whereby although the severity of Critick, in this way itself, at once shows the impossibility of deciding any thing dogmatically as to an object of experience beyond the limits of experience, yet affords to reason, in this its interest, the to it not unimportant service of placing it equally in safety against all possible assertions to the contrary, which cannot take place in any mode but this : either that we demonstrate our proposition apodictically, or if this does not succeed, that we enquire into the sources of this incapability, which, provided they lie in the necessary limits of our reason, must then subject every opponent precisely to the same law of abandonment of all pretensions to dogmatic assertions.

The right, however, nay even the necessity of the admission of a future life, according to the principles of practical, conjoined with the speculative use of reason, is not in the least hereby lost, for the mere speculative proof has without this never been able to exercise an influence upon the general reason of mankind. It is so placed upon a hair's point, that even the School can only so long maintain it there, as it lets it turn unceasingly about itself like a top, and consequently furnishes to its own eyes, no permanent bases whereon any thing could be built. The proofs which are made use of in the world, remain hereby in all their undiminished force, and gain rather in clearness and unartificial conviction, from the rejection of the dogmatic pretensions in question, since they place reason, in its particular sphere, namely, the order of ends, which is also at the same time an order of nature—but then this reason at the same time as practical faculty in itself, without being limited to the conditions of the latter (*the order of nature*), is justified in extending the former (*the order of ends*), and with it our own existence, out beyond the limits of experience and of life. To judge according to *analogy with the nature*

of living beings in this world, in which reason must admit it necessarily as a principle, that no organ, no faculty, no impulse, therefore nothing superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, consequently nothing uncomformable with its end, is to be met with, but that all is adapted exactly to its destination in life; man who yet can alone contain within himself the final end of all this, must be the only creature that was excepted therefrom. For his natural dispositions, not merely in respect of talents and impulses to make use thereof, but especially the moral law in him, extend so far beyond all the utility and advantage which he could thence derive in this life, that the last (*the moral law*) teaches to estimate above every thing, the mere consciousness of rectitude of intention, under the loss of every advantage, even indeed of the vain shadow of posthumous fame,—and he feels himself inwardly called upon to make himself fit, by reason of his conduct in this world, in renouncing many advantages, to become a citizen of a better one, which he has in idea. This weighty and never-to-be-refuted argument, accompanies by means of a constantly increasing cognition of conformableness to ends in all that we see before us, and by means of a view into the immensity of creation, consequently likewise by means of the consciousness of a certain unlimitedness in the possible extension of our cognition and an impulse corresponding thereto, and ever still exists, although we should be compelled to abandon our seeing from the mere theoretic cognition of ourselves—the necessary duration of our existence.

#### CONCLUSION OF THE SOLUTION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PARALOGISM.

The dialectical appearance in rational psychology, rests upon an exchange of an idea of reason, (of a pure intelligence) with the undetermined conception

on all points of a thinking being in general. I think me myself, by favour of a possible experience, whilst I yet make abstraction of all real experience, and thence conclude that I can be conscious of my existence also out of experience, and its empirical conditions. Consequently I exchange the possible *abstraction* of my empirically-determined existence, with the supposed consciousness of a *separated* possible existence of my thinking-self, and I believe I cognize the substantial in me, as the transcendental subject, whilst I merely have in thought the unity of consciousness, which lies at the foundation of all determination, as the mere form of cognition.

The problem of explaining the community of soul with body, does not properly belong to the psychology whereof we are now speaking, since it has for its object to show us also the personality of the soul independently of this community (after death), and therefore is *transcendent* in the proper meaning, although it is occupied with an object of experience; but only so far as it ceases to be an object of experience. Still, as to this, a sufficient answer can also be given according to our system. The difficulty which this problem has occasioned, consists, as it is known, in the presupposed dissimilitude of the object of the internal sense (the soul), with the objects of external senses, as to the first, time, only belongs, and to the last, space, as the formal condition of their intuition. But if we reflect that both kinds of objects do not differ herein from one another internally, but only so so far as one *appears* externally to the other, consequently, that what lies at the foundation of the phenomenon of matter, as thing in itself, might not perhaps be so heterogeneous, this difficulty disappears, and there remains none other but this, how a community of substances generally is possible: to solve which lies entirely out of the field of psychology; and as the reader, after what has been said in the

Analytick of fundamental principles and faculties, will easily judge, it lies also undoubtedly out of the field of all human cognition.

### GENERAL OBSERVATION,

#### CONCERNING THE TRANSITION FROM RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY TO COSMOLOGY.

The proposition "I think," or I exist thinking, is an empirical proposition. But an empirical intuition, consequently also, the thought object as phenomenon, lies at the foundation of such a proposition, and thus it appears as if, according to our theory, the soul were itself entirely changed in thinking into phenomenon, and that in such a way our consciousness itself as mere appearance, must in fact refer to nothing.

Thinking, taken in itself, is merely the logical function, consequently pure spontaneity of the conjunction of the diversity of a mere possible intuition, and does not present the subject of consciousness by any means as phenomenon, simply on this account, because it pays no regard to the intuition, whether it be sensible or intellectual. I represent myself to myself thereby neither as I am, nor as I appear to myself; but I think myself only as every object generally, whose kind of intuition I make abstraction of. If I represent myself here as *subject* of the thoughts, or as the *foundation* of thinking, these kinds of representations do not thus signify the categories of substance or of cause, for these are the functions of thought alluded to (judgment) already applied to our sensible intuition, which certainly would be required, provided I wished to cognize myself. But if now I wish only to be conscious of myself as thinking, and set aside how my own self is given in the intuition, then could it be merely phenomenon to me who think, but not inasmuch as I think. In the consciousness of myself in the

mere thinking, I am *the being itself*, but as to this, still thereby nothing certainly is given to me for the thinking.

But the proposition, "I think," so far as it says as much as that I *exist* thinking, is not merely logical function, but determines the subject (which is then at the same time object) in respect of existence, and cannot take place without the internal sense, the intuition of which at all times furnishes the object, not as thing in itself, but merely as phenomenon. In the proposition, therefore, it is not already simple spontaneity of thinking, but also receptivity of the intuition, that is, the thinking of myself applied to empirical intuition of the self-same subject. Now the thinking self must then seek in this last (*the intuition*) the conditions of the use of its logical functions for the categories of substance, cause, &c.; not in order to denote itself, as object in itself, merely through the I, but also to determine the mode of its existence, that is, to cognize itself, as noumenon; but this is impossible, since the internal empirical intuition is sensible, and affords nothing as data for phenomenon, which phenomenon cannot furnish any thing for the object of pure *consciousness*, as to the knowledge of its isolated existence, but can only serve in behalf of experience.

But granted, that there was found in the result, not in experience, but in certain laws (yet not mere logical rules) of the use of the pure reason, established *à priori*, concerning our existence, occasion to presuppose ourselves wholly *à priori*, in respect of our own *existence* as legislating, and also as determining this existence itself, a spontaneity would thus be thereby disclosed, by which our reality would be determinable, without requiring for this the conditions of empirical intuition; and we should in this case be aware, that in the consciousness of our existence *à priori*, something was contained, that may serve to determine our existence, generally determinable only sensibly, yet in



respect of a certain internal faculty, in relation to an intelligible (certainly only thought) world.

But this nevertheless would not in the least advance all the efforts of rational psychology. For I should have, by means of that wonderful faculty which the consciousness of the moral law first of all reveals to me, a principle indeed of the determination of my existence, which is partly intellectual, but by means of what predicates? Through none other than those which must be given to me in the sensible intuition, and thus I should again find myself where I was in rational psychology, that is to say, in want of sensible intuitions, in order to give value to my understanding-conceptions, substance, cause, &c., whereby alone I can have cognition of myself. But such intuitions can never raise me out beyond the field of experience. Still, however, I should be justified in respect of the practical use, which is always directed to objects of experience, conformably to the analogical meaning in the theoretical use, in applying these conceptions to liberty and to the subject of it, since I understand thereby merely the logical functions of the subject, and of the predicate of the principle and consequence, according to which, the actions or the effects are so determined, according to the laws in question, that they, together with the laws of nature, may be explained at all times, agreeably to the categories of substance and cause, although they spring from quite another principle. This required to be mentioned only as a protection against the misunderstanding to which the doctrine of our self-intuition as phenomenon, is easily exposed. Subsequently we shall have an opportunity of making use of it.

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## SECOND DIVISION

## OF THE SECOND BOOK OF

## TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

## THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

We have shown in the Introduction to this part of our work, that all transcendental appearance of pure reason rests upon dialectical conclusions, the schema of which logic affords in the three formal kinds of syllogisms in general, in the same way, perhaps, as the categories meet with their logical schema in the four functions of all judgments. *The first kind* of these sophistical conclusions refers to the unconditioned unity of the *subjective* conditions of all representations generally (of the subject or of the soul), in correspondence with the *categorical* syllogisms, whose major as principle, expresses the relationship of a predicate to a *subject*. The *second kind* of dialectical argument will, therefore, have for its content, according to analogy with *hypothetical* syllogisms, the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon, as the *third kind*, which will appear in the following division, has for thema the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general.

But it is remarkable that the transcendental paralogism effected a mere one-sided appearance in respect of the idea of the subject of our thinking, and that for the assertion of the contrary not the smallest appear-

ance will be found from the conceptions of reason. The advantage is wholly on the side of Pneumatism, although this cannot disclaim the hereditary vice, notwithstanding all its favourable appearance, of being dissolved into pure air by the fiery ordeal of Critick.

It happens quite otherwise, if we apply reason to the *objective synthesis* of phenomena, where it purposes making valid with much appearance, its principle of unconditioned unity, but soon involves itself in such contradictions, that it is compelled in a cosmological point of view to desist from its pretension.

A new phenomenon, namely, manifests itself here, of human reason, that is to say, quite a natural Antithetick, as to which no one requires to beat his brains and artfully to lay hold of, but into which reason falls of itself, and, in fact, unavoidably, and thereby preserves itself, indeed, from the slumber of an imaginary conviction which a mere one-sided appearance produces, but at the same time is led into the temptation either of abandoning itself to a sceptical hopelessness, or of assuming a dogmatical pride and of carrying its head stiffly as to certain assertions, without according a hearing or justice to the reasons for the contrary. Both cases are the death of a sound philosophy, although the first might, however, perhaps, be termed *Euthanasia*, that is to say, the honourable death of pure reason.

Before we expose the scene of dissension and disorder which this opposition of the laws (antinomy) of pure reason induces, we will give certain explanations which may elucidate and justify the method that we make use of in handling our object. All transcendental ideas, inasmuch as they concern the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, I term *cosmical conceptions*, partly on account of this very unconditioned totality whereupon the conception also of the whole world reposes, which itself is only an

idea, partly because these only refer to the synthesis of phenomena, consequently the empirical, whilst on the contrary the absolute totality, in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things in general, will occasion an ideal of pure reason, which is totally different from the cosmical conception, although it stands in relationship to it. Hence, just as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, thus will the antimony of pure reason expose to view the transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology, not in order to find it valid and to appropriate it to ourselves, but, as the term of an opposition of pure reason already denotes, in order to exhibit it as an idea, which in its brilliant but false appearance is not to be reconciled with phenomena.

#### OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

##### FIRST SECTION.

##### SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS.

In order then to be able to enumerate these ideas agreeably to a principle, with systematic precision, we must *first* remark, that it is only the understanding from which pure and transcendental conceptions can arise ; that reason properly does not generate any conception whatever, but only in any case, frees the *understanding-conception* from the unavoidable limitations of a possible experience, and seeks to extend this conception, therefore, beyond the bounds of the empirical, but still in connexion with it. This occurs in this way, that reason requires absolute totality on the side of the conditions (to which the understanding subjects all phenomena of the synthetical unity) for a given conditioned, and thereby makes the category into a transcendental idea, in order to give to the empirical

synthesis, through the continuation of the same up to the unconditioned (which is never found in experience but only in the idea), absolute completeness. Reason requires this according to the principle: *provided the conditioned is given, then also is given the whole sum of conditions, consequently the absolutely Unconditioned*, whereby the first alone is possible. *Firstly*, therefore, the transcendental ideas will be nothing properly, but categories extended to the unconditioned, and such may be brought into a table that is arranged agreeably to the titles of these last. *Secondly*, however, still all the categories will not even suit for this purpose, but only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series, and, indeed, one of conditions, subordinate (not co-ordinate) one with another, to a conditioned. Absolute totality is only so far required by reason, as it regards the ascending series of conditions to a given conditioned, consequently not, if the question is, as to the descending line of consequences, nor yet as to the aggregate of co-ordinate conditions for these consequences. For conditions are in respect of the given conditioned already presupposed, and to be looked upon also as given therewith, whilst on the other hand, as the consequences do not make their conditions possible, but rather presuppose them, we may be indifferent in the progression to consequences, (or in descending from the given condition to the conditioned) whether the series cease or not,—and the question generally as to the totality thereof is no presupposition at all of reason.

In this way, we necessarily think likewise as given, a time wholly elapsed up to a given moment, (although not determinable by us). But as to what regards the future, since it is not the condition for arriving at the present, it is quite immaterial in order to comprehend this last, in which way we are disposed to act in respect of future time, whether we will let it cease somewhere; or allow it to run on to infinity. Let the series

be  $m : n : o$  : wherein  $n$  as conditioned, is given in respect of  $m$ , but at the same time as condition of  $o$ , the series goes upwards from the conditioned  $n$  to  $m$  ( $l k i$  &c.) at the same time that it goes downwards from the condition  $n$  to the conditioned  $o$  ( $p q r$  &c.)—I thus must presuppose the first series, in order to look at  $n$  as given, and  $n$  is according to reason (the totality of the conditions) only possible by means of the first series, but its possibility does not rest upon the following series  $o p q r$ , which consequently could not be looked upon as given, but only as, *dabilis*, that is, giveable.

I will call the synthesis of a series on the part of conditions, consequently of that which is the nearest to the given phenomenon, and so on to the remoter conditions, the *regressive*; but that which on the part of the conditioned advances from the nearest consequence to the more distant, the *progressive* synthesis. The first proceeds by *antecedentia*, the second by *consequentia*. The cosmological ideas, therefore, concern themselves with the totality of the regressive synthesis, and proceed by *antecedentia*, and not by *consequentia*. If this last take place, it is then an arbitrary, and not a necessary problem of pure reason, inasmuch as we require for the complete comprehensiveness of that which is given in the phenomenon, grounds, certainly, but not consequences.

In order to arrange the table of ideas according to the table of the categories, we thus first take the two original *quanta* of all our intuition, time and space. Time is in itself a series, (and the formal condition of all series), and consequently in it, in respect of a given present, the *antecedentia*, as conditions, (the past,) are to be distinguished *a priori* from the *consequentia*, (the future). Consequently the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given conditioned, refers only to a past time. According to the idea of reason, the whole elapsed time is thought necessarily as given, as condition of the

given moment. But as to what regards space, there is in it, in itself, no difference of progressus from regressus, since it constitutes *an aggregate but no series*, inasmuch as its parts altogether are coexistent. I could only consider the present point of time, in respect of past time, as conditioned, but never as the condition thereof, because this moment only, first of all, arises by means of elapsed time, (or rather through the elapsing of the preceding time). But as the parts of space are not subordinate to one another, but co-ordinate, one part is not thus the condition of the possibility of the other, and it does not form in itself, like time, a series. But the synthesis of different parts of space whereby we apprehend it, is still successive; it occurs, therefore, in time, and contains a series. And as in this series of aggregated space, (as for example, of feet in a rood) from a given one, those farther thought in addition are always the *condition of the limits* of those preceding, the *measure* of a space is also thus to be looked upon as a synthesis of a series of a conditions for a given conditioned; only that the side of the conditions is not in itself different from the side on which the conditioned depends, consequently *regressus* and *progressus* in space appears to be identical. Since, however, one part of space is not given by means of the other, but only limited, we must look thus upon every limited space so far as conditioned also which presupposes another space as the condition of its limits, and so on. In respect of the limitation, the progress in space is, therefore, also a regressus, and the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of conditions likewise concerns space, and I can just as well ask as to the absolute totality of the phenomenon in space, as of that in elapsed time. But whether, likewise, generally, an answer is possible as to this, will hereafter be determined.

Secondly, reality thus in space, that is to say,

matter, is a conditioned whose internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts the distant conditions; so that here a regressive synthesis takes place, whose absolute totality reason demands, which cannot take place otherwise than by means of a completed division, whereby the reality of matter disappears either in nothing, or yet in that which is no more matter, that is to say, the simple. Consequently there is here, likewise, a series of conditions, and a progression to the unconditioned.

Thirdly, as to what concerns the categories of the real relationship amongst the phenomena, the category of substance with its accidents does not thus accord with a transcendental idea, that is, reason has no foundation in respect of it, to proceed regressively to conditions. For accidents are (so far as they adhere to a certain substance) co-ordinate with one another, and constitute no series. But in regard of substance they are not properly subordinate to the same, but are the mode of existing of the substance itself. That which in this case might yet seem to be an idea of transcendental reason, would be the conception of the *substantial*. But as this signifies nothing else but the conception of an object in general which subsists, so far as we think in it simply the transcendental subject without any predicate, yet, as in this case, the question is as to the unconditioned in the series of phenomena, it is then clear that the substantial can constitute no member thereof. The same is valid also of substances in community, which are mere aggregates and have no exponent of a series, whilst they are not subordinate to one another as conditions of their possibility, which we might certainly say of spaces, the limit whereof was never determined in itself, but always by means of another space. There remains, therefore, only the category of *causality*, which presents a series of causes for a given effect, in which we can ascend from the latter, as the con-



ditioned, to the former as conditions, and reply to the question of reason.

Fourthly, the conceptions of the possible, real and necessary, lead to no series, only except so far as the *contingent* in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and according to the rule of the understanding points to a condition, under which it is necessary to refer this to a higher condition, until reason finds in the totality only of this series the unconditioned *Necessity*.

There are then not more than four cosmological ideas according to the four titles of the categories, if we take away those which carry along with them necessarily a series in the synthesis of the diverse.

## 1.

THE ABSOLUTE COMPLETENESS  
OF THE  
COMPOSITION

Of the given Whole of all Phenomena.

## 2.

THE ABSOLUTE COMPLETENESS  
OF THE  
DIVISION

Of a given Whole in the Phenomenon.

## 3.

THE ABSOLUTE COMPLETENESS  
OF THE  
ARISING

Of a Phenomenon in General.

## 4.

THE ABSOLUTE COMPLETENESS  
OF THE  
DEPENDENCY OF THE EXISTENCE

Of the Changeable in the Phenomenon.

It is here to be remarked, in the first place, that the idea of absolute totality concerns nothing else but the exposition of *phenomena*, consequently not the pure understanding-conception of a whole of things

in general. Phenomena, therefore, are here considered as given, and reason demands the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility, so far as these constitute a series, consequently an absolutely (that is to say in all respects) complete synthesis, whereby the phenomenon may be exposed according to laws of the understanding.

Secondly, it is properly only the Unconditioned which reason seeks in this, by series, and in fact regressively continued synthesis of conditions, and, as it were, completeness in the series of premises, which together presuppose no others farther. Now this *unconditioned* is always contained in the *absolute totality of the series*, when we represent it to ourselves in the imagination. But this absolutely completed synthesis is again only an idea, since we cannot know, at least beforehand, whether such a one is even possible in phenomena. If we represent to ourselves every thing by means of pure understanding-conceptions, without conditions of sensible intuition, we may justly say, that for a given conditioned, the whole series also of conditions subordinate to one other is given, for the first is only given by means of the last. But in phenomena, a particular limitation of the mode in which conditions are given is to be found, that is to say, by means of the successive synthesis of the diversity of the intuition, which is to be complete in the regressus. Now, whether this completeness is sensibly possible is still a problem. But the idea of this completeness lies, nevertheless, in reason, irrespective of the possibility, or impossibility, of connecting therewith adequate empirical conceptions. Consequently, as in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the diversity in the phenomenon (according to the guide of the categories which represent it as a series of conditions to a given conditioned), the unconditioned is necessarily contained, leaving it, as we may, undecided whether, and how, this totality is to be accomplished ;

reason, in this case, thus, adopts the way of setting out from the idea of totality, although it has properly for its end the *unconditioned*, whether of the whole series or a part thereof.

Now we may think this unconditioned either as consisting simply in the whole series, in which, therefore, all the members without exception would be conditioned, and only the whole of the same absolutely unconditioned, and then the regressus is termed infinite,—or the absolute unconditioned is only a part of the series, to which the other members thereof are subordinate, which part itself stands under no condition.\* In the former case, the series is a *parte priori*, without limits, (without beginning,) that is, infinite, and yet wholly given, but the regressus therein is never completed, and can only be termed potential, that is possibly infinite. In the second case there is a First in the series which is termed, in respect of elapsed time, the *commencement of the world*, in respect of space, the *limit of the world*, in respect of parts of a given whole in its limits, the *simple*, in respect of causes, absolute *spontaneousness*, (freedom,) in respect of the existence of changeable things, the absolute *necessity of nature*.

We have two expressions, *World* and *Nature*, which sometimes run into one another. The first means the mathematical whole of all phenomena, and the totality of their synthesis in great as well as in small, that is, equally in the progress of the same by composition as by division. But this very same world is termed nature,† so far as it is considered as a dynamic whole,

\* The absolute Whole of the series of conditions for a given conditioned is always unconditioned, since, independent of it, there are no more conditions in respect of which it could be conditioned. But this absolute whole of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problematical conception, the possibility of which must be investigated, and in reference, in fact, to the mode in which the unconditioned as the proper transcendental idea in question, may be therein contained.

† Nature taken adjectively (formaliter) signifies the connection of the determinations of a thing according to an internal principle of causality. On the other hand, we understand by nature substantively (materialiter), the complex of

and we do not look at the aggregation in space or time, in order to constitute it as a quantity, but to unity in the *existence* of phenomena. Now as the condition of that which happens is termed the cause, and the unconditioned causality of the cause in the phenomenon, freedom, the conditioned on the other hand is termed, in a narrower sense, the natural cause. The conditioned in existence in general, is termed contingent, and the unconditioned necessary. The unconditioned necessity of *phenomena* may be termed natural necessity.

The ideas with which we now concern ourselves, I have before termed cosmological ideas, partly on this account, because under world the complex of all phenomena is understood, and our ideas also are only directed to the Unconditioned amongst phenomena; partly likewise because the word world in a transcendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of the complex of existing things, and we direct our attention alone to the completeness of the synthesis, (although only strictly in the regressus to the conditions). In consideration of this, that, moreover, these ideas altogether are transcendent, and that although they do not certainly overstep the object, that is to say, phenomena as *to the kind*, but only have to do with the sensible world (not with noumena), they still push the synthesis to a degree which transcends all possible experience, we may, therefore, in my opinion, term them all quite properly *cosmical conceptions*. In respect of the difference of the mathematically, and the dynamically unconditioned, to which the regressus tends, I should, however, term the two first, in a more contracted sense, cosmical conceptions, (of the world in great and small,) but the two others, *transcendent natural concep-*

phenomena, so far as these, by means of an internal principle of causality, cohere universally. In the first sense we speak of the nature of fluid matter, of fire, &c. and make use of this word only adjectively; on the contrary, if we speak of the things of nature, we have thus in thought, a subsisting whole.

*tions.* This difference is at present not of any particular weight, but it may be more important hereafter.

#### OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

##### SECOND SECTION.

##### ANTITHETICK OF PURE REASON.

If every complex of dogmatical opinions is Thetick, I then understand by Antithetick, not dogmatical assertions of the contrary, but the opposition of dogmatical cognitions as to appearance, (thesin cum antithesi) without our conceding a particular claim of approbation to one rather than to the other. Antithetick does not occupy itself, therefore, at all with partial assertions, but considers general cognitions of reason only according to the opposition of the same with one another, and the causes of this transcendental antithetick is an investigation as to the antinomy of pure reason, the causes, and the result of the same. If we apply our reason, not merely for the use of the principles of the understanding, to objects of experience, but venture to extend such, out beyond the limits of the last, sophistical theorems thence arise which neither need look for confirmation in experience, nor fear opposition, and each of which is not only in itself without contradiction, but, in fact, finds in the nature of reason conditions of its necessity; only that, unfortunately, the contrary has equally as valid and as necessary grounds of affirmation on its side.

The questions which naturally present themselves in such a dialectick of pure reason, are, therefore, 1st. In what propositions properly then is pure reason infallibly subjected to an antinomy. 2d. Upon what causes does this antinomy rest. 3d. Whether and in what mode, nevertheless, a road to certainty remains open to reason amidst this contradiction.

A dialectical theorem of pure reason must, therefore have in itself, this, distinguishing it from all sophistical propositions, that it does not concern an arbitrary question, which we propose with a certain object at pleasure, but such a one, as each human reason must necessarily fall upon in its progress ; and, secondly, that it carries along with it, together with its contrary, not merely an artificial appearance that instantly vanishes when we look at it, but a natural and unavoidable appearance, which even when we are no longer betrayed by it, still always beguiles, although it does not impose upon us, and, therefore, certainly may be rendered innocuous, but never can be annihilated.

Such a dialectical theorem will refer not to the unity of the understanding in conceptions of experience, but to the unity of reason in mere ideas, the conditions of which, as it, first, as synthesis agreeably to rules, is to agree with the understanding, and yet at the same time as absolute unity thereof, with reason, in case it is adequate to the unity of reason, will be too great for the understanding, and if it is adapted to the understanding, too small for reason,—whence then an opposition must arise which cannot be avoided, in whatever way we may begin.

These sophistical assertions open, therefore, a dialectical arena, where each party obtains the upper hand who has permission to make the attack, and he certainly is kept under, who is obliged to act merely on the defensive. And hence valiant champions, whether they contend for the good or bad cause, are sure to carry away the crown of victory, provided they are only careful as to this, that they have the right of making the last attack, and are not bound to sustain a new assault from their opponent. We may easily suppose that this arena, in all ages, has been often trodden, that many victories have been gained upon both sides, but in respect to the last who decided the matter, it

was always so provided, that the champion of the good cause only maintained his place from this circumstance, that it was forbidden to his opponent longer to make use of his weapons. As impartial judges we must set the thing quite aside, as to whether it is the good or the bad cause in respect of which the contending parties fight, and let them first settle their business between themselves. Perhaps, when they have rather tired out than hurt one another, they may of themselves see the vanity of their contention, and separate like good friends.

This method of looking at a contest of assertions, or rather of inducing it, not in order to decide it for the advantage of one or the other party, but in order to enquire whether the object of such, may not perhaps be a mere delusion, whereat each catches in vain, and whereby he can gain nothing, although he were not at all to be opposed, this proceeding, I say, may be termed the *sceptical method*. It is entirely different from *Scepticism*, a principle of artful and scientific ignorance, which undermines the foundations of all cognition, in order, where it is possible, to leave no reliance and security anywhere in respect of this. For the sceptical method looks to certainty in this way, that it seeks to discover in such a contention well-intended on both sides, and conducted with intelligence, the point of misunderstanding, in order to draw for itself instruction, as wise legislators do from the embarrassment of judges in suits, as to what is wanting and not sufficiently defined in their laws. The antinomy which manifests itself in the application of the laws is, in our limited wisdom, the best touchstone of Nomothetick, in order thereby to render reason, which is not easily aware of its failings in abstract speculation, attentive to the moments, in the determination of its principles.

But this sceptical method is only essentially proper to transcendental philosophy, and may, perhaps, be

omitted in every other field of investigation, only not in this. In mathematics its use would be absurd, since therein no false assertions can be concealed and rendered invisible, because the proofs must always proceed according to the thread of the pure intuition, and at all times, in fact, by means of evident synthesis. In experimental philosophy a doubt of suspension may certainly be useful, but still, at least, there is no misunderstanding possible, which could not be easily obviated, and in experience, the ultimate means finally must still exist for the decision of the contest, whether found soon or late. Morals may give, at least in possible experiences, all their principles also in concreto, together with the practical consequences, and thereby avoid the misunderstanding of abstraction. On the other hand, transcendental assertions which arrogate to themselves views extending beyond the field of all possible experiences, are not in the position, that their abstract synthesis could be given in an intuition *à priori*, nor so constituted, that the misunderstanding could be discovered by means of an experience. Transcendental reason, therefore, allows no other touchstone, but the attempt at the union of its assertions amongst themselves, and consequently prior to the free and unhindered contest of the same with one another ; and this will we now institute.\*

\* The antinomies follow each other according to the order of the adduced transcendental ideas.



## THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

## FIRST CONTRADICTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

## THESIS.

The world has a beginning in time, and is also enclosed in limits as to space.

## ANTITHESIS.

The world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, as well in respect of time as of space, infinite.

## PROOF.

For, if we admit that the world has no commencement as to time—an eternity then has elapsed up to each given point of time, and consequently an infinite series of states of things following upon one another in the world, has passed away. But now the infinity of a series consists in this very thing, that it can never be completed by successive synthesis. Consequently an infinite elapsed cosmological series is impossible—therefore, a beginning of the world, a necessary condition of its existence,—which first was to be shown.

In respect of the second point, if we again admit the contrary—the world will thus be an infinite given whole of contemporaneously existing things. Now we cannot think the magnitude of a Quantum\* which

## PROOF.

Let it then be supposed, that it has a beginning. As the beginning is an existence, which a time preceded, wherein the thing is not; a time must thus have gone before, wherein the world was not—that is, a void time. But now in a void time no origin of anything is possible, because no part of such a time has in itself prior to another, any distinctive condition of existence, rather than that of non-existence, (whether we admit that this condition arises of itself, or through another cause). Several series of things can, therefore, indeed, begin in the world, but the world itself can have no beginning, and, therefore, is in respect of elapsed time, infinite.

As to what concerns the second point, let us first take the contrary, that is to say, that the world, in respect of space is infinite and limited: it finds itself, in this way, in a void space which is not limited. There would, therefore, be met

\* We can envisage an undetermined

added thereto. Consequently an infinite given quantity—consequently, also, (in respect of the elapsed series, as well as of extension), an infinite world is impossible. It is, therefore, in both ways limited. I might, in such a way, have adduced my proof; but this conception does not accord with that which we understand by an infinite whole. It is not, thereby, represented so great as it is—consequently also its conception is not the conception of *unum*, but only thereby its relationship to an arbitrarily to be adopted unity is thought, in respect of which this relationship is greater than all number. Now, accordingly as unity is admitted greater or less, the infinite would be greater or less; but infinity as it consists merely in the relationship to this given unity, would remain ever the same, although certainly the absolute quantity of the whole, thereby would not be at all known—but as to which it is not here the question.

The true (transcendental) conception of infinity is, that the successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a quantum can never be completed.\* Hence, it follows, quite certainly, that an eternity of real states following upon

\* This (the *Quantum*) thereby contains a multiplicity (of given unity), which is greater than all number, which is the mathematical conception of the infinite.

sible objects. Things, therefore, as phenomena, determine certainly space, that is, under all possible predicates thereof, (quantity and relationship) they so operate, that these or those belong to reality; but conversely, space as something which subsists of itself, cannot determine the reality of things in respect of the quantity or form, because in itself it is nothing real. Consequently a space (whether full or void)\* may very well be limited by phenomena, but phenomena can never be limited by means of a void space external to them. The same is also valid as to time. But all this being granted, it is, still, nevertheless indubitable, that we must absolutely admit two non-entities, void space out of the world, and void time before the world, provided we admit a limit to the world, whether in respect of space or time.

For as to what regards the subterfuge by which we strive to avoid the consequence, agreeably to which we say, that if the world (according to time

\* It is easy to be observed, that hereby it is intended to say, that *void space so far as it is limited by phenomena*—consequently that such *within the world* does not, at least, contradict the transcendental principles, and may, therefore, be admitted in respect of the same, (although its probability is not, on that account, directly maintained).

one another can never have elapsed up to a given (the present) point of time—consequently the world must have a beginning.

In regard to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty certainly disappears of an infinite and yet elapsed series, for the diversity of an infinite world as to extension is given *co-existently*. But in order to think the totality of such a multiplicity, since we cannot appeal to limits which constitute the totality of itself in the intuition, we must render an account of our conception, which in such a case cannot go from the whole to the determined multiplicity of the parts, but must show the possibility of a whole by means of the successive synthesis of the parts. Now as this synthesis must form a never to be completed series, we cannot thus think a totality prior to it, and consequently also, not through it. For the conception of totality itself is in this case the representation of a completed synthesis of parts, and this completion, and consequently the conception thereof, is impossible.

and space) have limits, the infinite void must determine the existence of real things in respect of their quantity; it consists thus only in this, that we think to ourselves instead of a *sensible world*, some sort of an intelligible world, and instead of a first beginning, (an existence previous to which a time of non-being precedes) an existence generally is imagined which *pre-supposes no other condition* in the world, and instead of boundaries of extension, limits are conceived of the universe, and thereby avoidance is made of time and space. But here the question is only as to *mundus phenomenon* and its magnitude, in respect of which we can, by no means, make abstraction of the stated conditions of sensibility without annihilating the essence of it. The sensible world, if it be limited, lies necessarily in the infinite void. If we will omit this, and consequently space in general as condition of the possibility of phenomena *à priori*, the whole sensible world then disappears. In our problem this alone is given us. The *mundus intelligibilis* is nothing but the universal conception of a world in general, in which conception we make abstraction of all conditions of the intuition of this world; and in respect of this conception, no synthetic proposition, either affirmative or negative, is possible.

is not given within certain limits of every intuition, in any other way than through the synthesis of the parts, and the totality of such a quantum, only through the completed synthesis, or through repeated addition of unity to itself.\* Hence, in order to think the world, which fills all space as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world must be looked upon as completed, that is, an infinite time must be looked upon as elapsed in the enumeration of all co-existent things; which is impossible. Consequently an infinite aggregate of real things cannot be looked upon as a given whole, and therefore not as given *contemporaneously*. Thus a world is *not*, in respect of its extension in space, *infinite*, but enclosed in limits: which was the second point.

quantum as a whole if it is enclosed in limits, without requiring to construct the totality thereof by measurement, that is, the successive synthesis of its parts. For the limits determine already the completeness, since they cut off all that is more.

\* The conception of totality is, in this case, nothing else but the representation of the completed synthesis of its parts, since as we cannot deduce the conception from the intuition of the whole, (which in this case is impossible), we can only comprehend this by means of the synthesis of the parts, up to the completion of the infinite, at least in idea.

with, not only a relationship of things in *space*, but also of things *to space*. Now as the world is an absolute whole, without of which; no object of intuition, and consequently no correlative of the world is found, wherewith the same stands in relationship—the relationship of the world to void space would thus be a relationship thereof to *no object*. But such a relationship, and, therefore, the limitation of the world by void space is nothing: consequently the world in respect of space is not at all limited, that is to say, in regard to extension it is infinite.\*

\* Space is merely the form of the external intuition, (formal intuition, but no real object that externally can be envisaged). Space before all things which determine it, (fill or limit,) or rather which afford an *empirical intuition* according to its form, is under the name of absolute space, nothing else but the mere possibility of external phenomena, so far as they either exist of themselves, or can yet be added to given phenomena. The empirical intuition is, therefore, not composed of phenomena and space, (perception and void intuition.) One is not correlative of the synthesis of the other, but only conjoined in one and the same empirical intuition, as matter and form thereof. If we will place one of these two points out of the other, (space out of all phenomena,) there arises thence all kind of void determinations of the external intuition, which still are not possible perceptions. For example, motion or rest of the world in infinite void space—a determination of the relationship of the two with one another, which never can be perceived, and is, therefore, likewise the predicate of a mere ideal thing.

## OBSERVATION

## UPON THE FIRST ANTINOMY.

## 1. UPON THE THESIS.

I have not sought after deceptions in these mutually contradictory arguments, in order, for instance, (as it is termed) to advance an advocate's proof, who avails himself of the imprudence of his opponent for his own advantage, and willingly sanctions his appeal to a misunderstood law, in order to establish his own unjust pretensions upon the refutation of it. Each of these proofs is deduced from the nature of things, and the advantage is set aside, which the erroneous conclusions of dogmatists could afford us on both parts.

I might, likewise, have been able to demonstrate according to appearance, the thesis, by reason of this, that I premised agreeably to the custom of the dogmatists, an erroneous conception as to the infinity of a given quantity. A quantity is infinite, beyond which no greater (that is, beyond the therein contained multiplicity of a given unity) is possible. Now no multiplicity is the greatest, inasmuch as always one or more unities can still be

## OBSERVATION.

## 2. UPON THE ANTITHESIS.

The proof of the infinity of the given cosmological series, and of the cosmological whole, rests upon this: that in the opposite case, a void time as well as a void space must constitute the limits of the world. Now I am not ignorant, that against this consequence excuses are sought for, inasmuch as it is pretended, that there is a limit of the world in respect of time and space quite possible, without its being even requisite to admit an absolute time before the beginning of the world, or an absolute extended space out of the real world: which is impossible. I am entirely satisfied with the last part of this opinion of the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school. Space is merely the form of the external intuition, but no real object which can be envisaged externally, and no correlative of phenomena, but the form of phenomena themselves. Space, therefore, cannot absolutely (of itself alone) occur as something determining in the existence of things, since it is no object at all, but only the form of pos-

at, as the complex of all possible experiences—thus nothing at all simple any where is given therein.

This second proposition of the antithesis goes much further than the first, which only banishes the simple from the intuition of the compounded, whilst on the contrary this last excludes it from all nature; and consequently it could not have been proved from the conception of a given object of external intuition, (of the compounded), but from the relationship thereof to a possible experience in general.

## OBSERVATION

## UPON THE SECOND ANTINOMY.

## 1. UPON THE THESIS.

If I speak of a whole which necessarily consists of simple parts, I then understand, thereby, only a substantial whole, as the compositum proper—that is, the accidental unity of the diverse that is given *separated* (at least in thought) is placed in a reciprocal conjunction, and thereby constitutes unity. We ought, properly, to term space not Compositum, but Totum, since the parts of it are only possible in the whole, and not the whole by means of the parts. In any event it might be termed a *compositum ideale*, not *reale*. Still this is a subtlety. As space is no com-

## OBSERVATION.

## 2. UPON THE ANTITHESIS.

Objections against this proposition of an infinite division of matter, the demonstration of which is purely mathematical, are advanced by the *Mondists*, who to begin with, from this cause are brought into suspicion, that they will not admit to be valid the clearest mathematical proofs, as insights into the property of space, so far as in fact it is, the formal condition of the possibility of all matter, but they only look upon them as conclusions from abstract but arbitrary conceptions, that could not be referred to real things. Just as if it were even only possible

pound from substances, (not even from real accidents), if I annihilate all composition in it, nothing, not even a point, then must remain, for this is only possible as the limit of a space, (consequently of a compound). Space and Time, therefore, do not consist of simple parts. That which only belongs to the state of a substance, although it have a quantity, (for example—change), does not likewise consist of the simple, that is, a certain degree of change does not arise by means of an addition of many simple changes. Our conclusion from the compounded to the simple is only valid, for things existing of themselves. But accidents of the state do not exist of themselves. We may, therefore, easily invalidate the proof of the necessity of the simple as constituent parts of all substantial compound, and, thereby, in general its case—if we extend it too far, and will make it valid for all that is compounded without distinction, as it has really already occurred several times.

Besides, I speak here only of the simple, so far as it is necessarily given in the compounded, since this last can be therein resolved as into its constituent parts. The proper signification of the word *Monas*, (according to Leibnitz's use), ought certainly only to refer to the simple, which is given *immediately* as simple substance,

to think another kind of intuition than that which is given in the original intuition of space, and that the determinations of this *a priori*, did not concern at the same time everything, which thereby alone is possible, because it fills this space. If one listened to them, we must think besides the mathematical point, which is simple, yet is no part but simply the limit of a space, physical points besides; which certainly are likewise simple, but have the preference as parts of space, through their mere aggregation of filling the same. Without repeating here the ordinary and clear contradictions of this absurdity, which we meet with in multitudes, as it is then quite in vain by means of mere discursive conceptions to wish to reason away the evidence of mathematics, I only, therefore, remark, that if philosophy in this case cavils with mathematics, it arises on this account, that it forgets that the question here concerns only *phenomena*, and the condition thereof. But in this case it is not enough for the *pure understanding-conceptions* of the compound, to find the conception of the simple, but for the *intuition* of the compounded (matter) the intuition of the simple:—and this according to the laws of the sensibility, and consequently in respect of objects of the senses, is quite impossible. It may, therefore, ever be valid of a Whole from sub-

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

## SECOND CONTRADICTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

## THESIS.

Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists everywhere nothing but the simple, or that which is compounded from it.

## PROOF.

For if we admit that compound substances do not consist of simple parts, then if all composition were done away with in thought, no compound part, and (as there are no simple parts) none simple, and, therefore, nothing at all, would remain over, consequently no substance have been given. Either, therefore, all composition is impossibily annihilated in thought, or there must remain over, after its annihilation something still subsisting without any composition, that is, the simple. But, in the former case, the compounded would not consist again of substances, (because in these the composition is only an accidental relation of substances, without which, these must subsist as permanent substances in themselves.) Now, as this case contradicts the pre-suppo-

## ANTITHESIS.

No compound thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing anywhere therein simple.

## PROOF.

Let it be supposed, a compound thing, (as substance,) consists of simple parts. Since all external relationship, consequently also all composition from substances, is possible only in space, so the compound must consist of as many parts, as just the space also consists of many parts, which that occupies. Now space consists not of simple parts, but of spaces. Consequently each part of the compound must occupy a space. But the absolutely first parts of every compound are simple. Therefore the simple occupies a space. Now as every real which occupies a space comprises within itself, a diversity of parts existing externally to each other, consequently is compounded, and, in fact, as a real compound, not from accidents, (for these cannot be external to one another with-



sition, the second then only remains, namely, that the substantial compound in the world consists of simple parts.

Hence it immediately follows, that the things of the world are all simple substances; that composition is only an external state of them, and that although we can never fully isolate, and place the elementary substances out of this state of conjunction, yet reason must think them as the first subjects of all composition, and consequently, prior to the same, as simple beings.

out substance,) consequently from substances,—the simple would thus be a substantial compound,—which contradicts itself.

The second proposition of the antithesis, that in the world nothing at all simple exists, must here mean only this—that the existence of the absolutely simple can be proved from no experience or perception, neither external or internal, and that the absolutely simple is, therefore, a mere idea, whose objective reality can never be shown in any possible experience; consequently, in the exposition of phenomena, is without any application and object. For if we will admit that there may be an object of experience for this transcendental idea, then the empirical intuition of an object must be cognized, as such a one as absolutely contains nothing of what is diverse, external to each other, and conjoined in unity. Now, as no conclusion is valid from the non-consciousness of such a diversity, as to the entire impossibility of it in any intuition of an object, but this conclusion is thought necessary for absolute simplicity, it thus follows that this last cannot be concluded from any perception, whatever it may be. Since, therefore, something can never be given as an absolutely simple object in any possible experience, and the sensible world must be looked

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

## THIRD CONTRADICTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

## THESIS.

Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only one from which all the phenomena of the world can be derived. There is, besides, a causality through liberty necessary to be admitted for the explanation of the same.

## ANTITHESIS.

There is no liberty, but every thing in the world occurs only according to laws of nature.

## PROOF.

If it be admitted that there is no other causality but according to the laws of nature, every thing then *which happens* presupposes a previous state, whereupon this inevitably follows according to a rule. But this previous state must now itself be something that has happened (become in time what it was not previously), inasmuch as had it always been, its consequence also would never first of all have arisen, but would have always been. Therefore the causality of the cause, by means of which something happens, is itself something happened, which presupposes, according to a law of nature, a

## PROOF.

Granted that there is *Liberty* in a transcendental sense, as a particular kind of causality, according to which the events of the world might happen, that is to say, a faculty of beginning absolutely a state, consequently also a series of consequences thereof — not only will a series thus begin absolutely by means of this spontaneity, but the determination of this spontaneity itself for the production of the series that is, causality, — so that nothing precedes, whereby this occurred action is determined according to constant laws. But every commencement of acting presupposes a state of

previous state and the causality of it, and this state another still anterior, and so on. If, therefore, all occurs according to mere laws of nature, there is in this way always only a subaltern, but never a first beginning, and therefore also no completeness of the series on the part of causes resulting from one another. But now the law of nature just consists in this, that without a cause sufficiently determined *a priori*, nothing happens. Consequently the proposition—as if all causality were only possible according to the laws of nature—contradicts itself in its unlimited generality, and this causality can therefore not be admitted as the only one.

According to this, a causality must be admitted by means of which something happens without the cause being determined still further through a preceding cause, agreeably to necessary laws, that is to say, an *absolute Spontaneity* of causes—a series of phenomena which proceeds according to natural laws, beginning *from itself*—consequently transcendental liberty—without which even in the course of nature, the successive series of phenomena is never complete on the part of causes.

the yet non-acting cause, and a dynamical first beginning of the action, a state, which has no dependence at all of causality upon the preceding one of the self-same cause—that is it does not in any way follow from it. Transcendental liberty is, therefore, opposed to the causal law, and such a conjunction of the successive states of effective causes, according to which no unity of experience is possible, and which therefore is not met with in any experience is consequently a mere ideal thing.

We have, therefore, nothing but *Nature* in which we must seek the coherence and order of events in the world. Liberty (independence) from the laws of nature, is indeed a *liberation* from *constraint*, but at the same time from the *thread* of all rules. For we cannot say that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of liberty enter into the causality of the course of the world, since if this were determined according to laws, it would not be liberty, but itself nothing else but nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental liberty, differ from one another as lawfulness and license, whereof the first indeed fatigues the understanding with the difficulty of seeking always higher up the line of events in the series of causes, because the causality in them is always conditioned; but it promises as a compensation, general and

(for example, in self-consciousness,) and not as element of the compounded, which we might rather term Atom. And as I only wish to demonstrate simple substances in respect of the compounded, as elements thereof, I might term the antithesis of the second antinomy the transcendental *Atomistick*. But as this word has been long ago already used for the indication of a particular mode of explanation of corporeal phenomena, (*molecularum*), and hence presupposes empirical conceptions, it may rather be termed the dialectical principle of *Monadology*.

stances, which is merely thought by means of the pure understanding, that we must have the simple before all composition of this whole, yet this does not hold good of the *totum substantiale phenomenon*, which, as empirical intuition in space, carries along with it the necessary property, that no part of the same is simple, for this reason, that no part of space is simple. The monadists, however, have been acute enough to wish to avoid the difficulty in this way, that they do not presuppose space as a condition of the possibility of the objects of external intuition, (of bodies), but these, and the dynamical relationship of substances in general, as the condition of the possibility of space. Now we have only a conception of bodies as phenomena, but as such they presuppose space as the condition of the possibility of every external phenomenon necessarily, and the subterfuge is, therefore, vain, as it has been done away with sufficiently before in the transcendental æsthetick. If such were Things in themselves, the proof of the monadist would then be absolutely valid.

The second dialectical assertion has this peculiar to itself, that it has against it a dogmatical assertion, which amongst all the sophistical ones is the only one, which takes upon itself to show decidedly in an object of experience the reality of that which we before merely

reckoned with the transcendental ideas, namely, the absolute simplicity of the substance, that is to say, that the object of the internal sense, the I, which there thinks, is an absolutely simple substance. Without entering now into the matter, (as it has been previously fully considered), I then only remark, that if something is thought merely as object without adding thereto any synthetic determination of its intuition, (as, in fact, this occurs by means of the entirely naked representation, I), certainly nothing diverse, and no composition then can be perceived in such a representation. As, moreover, the predicates, whereby I think this object are mere intuitions of the internal sense, so nothing can likewise therein occur which shows a diversity of one part external to another, consequently real composition. Self-consciousness, therefore, only requires this, that since the Subject which thinks, is at the same time its own Object, it cannot divide itself, (although it may the determinations adherent to it); for in respect of itself every object is absolute unity. Nevertheless if this subject be considered *externally* as an object of intuition, it would then still certainly show in itself composition in the phenomenon. But it must always so be considered, if we will know whether there is in it or not, a diverse, one part *external* to another.

first beginning according to time, but according to causality. If (for example) I am now perfectly free, and without the necessary determining influence of natural causes, I rise up from my chair, a new series thus absolutely commences in this event, together with the natural consequences thereof to infinity, although according to time, this event is only the continuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and fact lies not at all in the derivation of the mere effects of nature, and is not a mere continuation of the same, but the determining natural causes cease entirely higher up above the same, in respect of this event, which certainly follows upon them, but does not follow from them, and, therefore, certainly not as to time, though yet in respect of causality, must be termed an absolutely first beginning of a series of phenomena.

The confirmation of the requirement of reason, to appeal in the series of natural causes to a first beginning from liberty, is shown very clearly in this, that (the Epicurean school excepted) all philosophers of antiquity saw themselves compelled to admit, for the explanation of the motions of the world, a *first mover*, that is, a free acting cause, which began this series of states first and of itself. For, from mere nature, they did not attempt to render a first beginning comprehensible.

nomena necessarily determining one another, which we term Nature, and with this the sign of empirical truth, which distinguishes experience from dreaming, would for the most part disappear. For with such an unbridled faculty of liberty, no nature can hardly any more be imagined, since the laws of this last are changed unceasingly by the influence of the former, and the play of phenomena which would be according to mere nature, regular and uniform, is, thereby, rendered confused and unconnected.

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

## FOURTH CONTRADICTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

## THESIS.

Something belongs to the sensible world, which either as its part, or its cause, is an absolutely necessary being.

## ANTITHESIS.

There exists no where any absolutely necessary being, neither in the world nor out of the world, as its cause.

The sensible world, as the whole of all phenomena, contains, at the same time, a series of changes. For without this, even the representation of the succession of time as a condition of the possibility of the sensible world would not be given to us.\* But every change is subject to its condition, which precedes, according to time, and under which condition, it is necessary. Now every conditioned that is given in respect of its existence, presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely-unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Consequently

\* Time precedes certainly as formal condition of the possibility of changes, objectively, anterior to this, but subjectively, and in the effectivity of consciousness, this representation is still, as every other, only given by occasion of the perceptions.

Let it be supposed that the world itself, or in it, there is a necessary being, there would then be in the series of its changes either a beginning which was unconditionally necessary, consequently without cause, which is opposed to the dynamical laws of the determination of all phenomena in time; or the series itself would be without any beginning, and although contingent and conditional in all its parts, yet in the whole, absolutely necessary and unconditioned, which contradicts itself, since the existence of a multitude cannot be necessary, if no single part of the same possess necessary existence in itself.

Let it be supposed, on the other hand, that there is an absolutely necessary cause of the world out of the world, then this cause is the highest

legitimate unity of experience, whilst, on the contrary, the illusion of liberty promises, rest indeed, to the understanding enquiring into the chain of causes, inasmuch as it leads it to an unconditioned causality, which begins to act of itself, but which, as it itself is blind, breaks off from that thread of rules, agreeably to which alone a universally connected experience is possible.

## OBSERVATION

## OBSERVATION.

## UPON THE THIRD ANTIMONY.

## 1. UPON THE THESIS.

The transcendental idea of liberty is far from constituting the whole content of the psychological conception of this name, which in a great degree is empirical, but only that of the absolute spontaneity of action, as the proper ground of the imputability of the same, but still it is the particular stumbling block of philosophy, which meets with insurmountable difficulties in admitting the like kind of unconditioned causality. That, therefore, in the question, as to the liberty of the will, which has hitherto placed speculative reason in so great a difficulty, is properly *transcendental* only, and refers solely to this, whether a faculty must be admitted of beginning *of itself*, a series of successive things or states. How such a one is possible, it is not even then necessary to

## 2. UPON THE ANTITHESIS.

The supporter of the omnipotence of Nature, (transcendental Physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of liberty, would maintain his proposition against the sophistical conclusions of this last, in this way: *if you admit no mathematical first in respect to time in the world, you then do not also find it necessary to seek a dynamical first as to causality.* Who has commanded you to think an absolutely first state of the world, and consequently an absolute beginning of the gradually flowing series of phenomena, and in order that you may procure a resting point to your imagination, to set limits to unlimited nature? Since substances have always been in the world, at least the unity of experience renders necessary such a presupposition, there is thus no difficulty in



be able to answer, because we must equally well in respect of causality, according to natural laws, be thereby satisfied to know *a priori* that such must be presupposed; although we do not in any way comprehend the possibility how, by means of a certain existence, the existence of another can be posited, and we must on this account keep ourselves solely to experience. Now we have proved this necessity of a first beginning of a series of phenomena from liberty, only in fact properly so far as is required for the comprehension of an origin of the world, whilst all the following states may be taken for a derivation according to mere natural laws. But, nevertheless, inasmuch as thereby once the faculty of beginning a series in time wholly of itself is shown (though not seen), it is likewise now thus permitted to us to allow in the course of the world different series, as to causalities, to begin of themselves, and to attribute to the substances thereof a faculty of acting from liberty. But in this let us not be embarrassed by a misunderstanding, that since a successive series in the world namely, can only have a comparative first beginning, because a state of things in the world ever still precedes, no absolute first beginning of the series is perhaps possible during the course of the world. For we do not speak here of the absolute

admitting also that the change of their states, that is, a series of their changes has always been, and consequently no first beginning, neither mathematical nor dynamical, need be sought. The possibility of such an infinite derivation, without a first member, in respect of which all the rest is merely successive, is not as to its possibility comprehensible. But if for this reason you will reject these enigmas of nature, you will thus find yourself compelled to reject many synthetical fundamental qualities, (primitive forces), which you can comprehend just as little; and even the possibility of a change in general must be repulsive to you. For, if you do not find, by means of experience, that it is real, you would thus never be able to imagine *a priori*, in what way such a perpetual succession of existence and non-existence is possible.

And if even a transcendental faculty of liberty were at all events conceded for beginning the changes in the world, this faculty must yet still be only out of the world, (although it always remains a bold pretension to admit still an object, out of the whole of all possible intuitions, which object cannot be given in any possible perception). But in the world itself, to attribute such a faculty to substances can never be permitted, because then the connexion according to general laws of phe-

something absolutely-necessary must exist, provided a change exists as its consequence. But this necessary itself belongs to the sensible world. For granted that it is out of the same, the series of changes in the world would thus derive its beginning from it, without, however, this necessary cause itself belonging to the sensible world. Now this is impossible. For as the beginning of a succession of time can only be determined through that which precedes as to time, so the highest condition of the beginning of a series of changes in the world must exist, when yet this series was not, (for the beginning is an existence before which a time precedes, wherein the thing which begins, yet was not). The causality of the necessary cause of changes, consequently also the cause itself, belongs therefore, to a time, consequently to the phenomenon, (wherein the time alone as the form thereof is possible), therefore cannot it be thought separated from the sensible world as the complex of all phenomena. Hence, there is contained in the world itself something absolutely-necessary, (whether this may be the whole cosmical series itself, or a part thereof).

member in the *series of causes*, of changes in the world first commences the existence of the last, and their series.\* But still then it must also begin to act, and its causality would belong to time, but precisely on such account, to the complex of phenomena, that is to the world, which contradicts the supposition. Consequently, neither in the world nor out of it, (but with it in causal conjunction,) is there an absolute necessary being.

\* The expression, to begin, is taken in a double signification. The first is *active* when the cause begins (infit) a series of states as its effect, the second *passive*, when the causality begins (fit) in the cause itself. I here conclude from the first to the last.

## OBSERVATION

## UPON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY.

## 1. UPON THE THESIS.

In order to prove the existence of a necessary being, I am required, in this case, to use no other than the cosmological argument, which, for instance, rises from the conditioned in the phenomenon to the unconditioned in the conception, so far as we look upon this, as the necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series. To seek the proof from the mere idea of a supreme of all beings, belongs to another principle of reason, and such a one must consequently be particularly brought forward.

Now, the pure cosmological proof cannot prove the existence of a necessary being otherwise, than as it at the same time leaves undecided whether the same is the world itself, or a thing different from it. For in order to resolve this last, such principles will for this purpose be required, as are no longer cosmological and do not proceed in the series of phenomena, but conceptions of contingent beings in general, (so far as they are considered merely as objects of the understanding,) and a principle for connecting such by means of mere conceptions with a necessary

## 2. OBSERVATION.

## UPON THE ANTITHESIS.

If, in ascending in the series of phenomena, we fancy we meet with difficulties against the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme cause, these likewise must not then be grounded upon mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a thing in general, and, consequently, not be ontological; but must arise from the causal conjunction with a series of phenomena, in order to take for the same a condition which itself is unconditioned, consequently must be deduced cosmologically and according to empirical laws. It must, for instance, be obvious, that the ascending in the series of causes, (in the sensible world,) can never finish in an empirically unconditioned condition, and that the cosmological argument from the contingency of the states of the world, according to their changes, occurs contrary to the admission of a first cause and one absolutely first commencing a series.

But there is manifested in this antinomy, a singular contrast, namely, that from the same proof whence in the thesis the existence of a primitive being would be concluded,

being—all of which belongs to a *transcendent* philosophy in respect of which this is not yet the place.

But if we once begin the proof cosmologically, in laying at the foundation, the series of phenomena and the regressus therein, according to the empirical laws of causality, we cannot then afterwards rid ourselves of it, and proceed to something, which does not at all belong to the series as a member. For in the very same sense something must be looked upon as condition, in which the relation of the conditioned to its condition would be taken in the series, which series was to lead to the highest condition in continuous progression. Now, if this relationship be sensible, and belong to the possible empirical use of the understanding, the highest condition or cause can thus only conclude the regressus according to the laws of sensibility, consequently only as belonging to the series of time, and the necessary being must be looked upon as the highest link of the cosmical series.

However, the liberty has been taken of making such a spring (*μεταβασις εις άλλο γένος*) For instance, it has been concluded from the changes in the world as to the empirical contingency, that is, the dependence of the same from empirically determined causes; and an ascending series of empirical

in the antithesis the non-being of the same, and in fact each with equal acuteness. First, it is said, "*There is a necessary being*" because the whole elapsed time comprises in itself the series of all conditions, and with this, likewise, therefore, the unconditioned (necessary). Again, it is said, "*There is no necessary being*", precisely on this account, because the whole elapsed time comprises in itself the series of all conditions, (which consequently all again are conditioned). The cause thereof is this: the first argument looks only at the *absolute* totality of the series of conditions, of which one determines the other in time, and acquires thereby an Unconditioned and Necessary. The second, on the other hand, takes into consideration the *contingency* of all that is determined in the *succession of time*, (since before everything a time precedes, wherein the condition itself must be determined again as condition), whereby then all that is unconditioned, and all absolute necessity entirely disappears. In the meantime the mode of conclusion in both is quite adapted even to ordinary human reason, which frequently falls into the case of being in contradiction with itself, accordingly as it considers its object from two different points of view. M. de Meiran deemed the dispute between two cele-

conditions obtained, which was in fact quite correct. But as they could not meet in this with a first beginning and no supreme member, they therefore abandoned suddenly the empirical conception of contingency, and took the pure category, which then induced a mere intelligible series, the completeness of which rested upon the existence of an absolutely necessary cause, which now, as it was bound to no sensible conditions, would also be freed from the condition of time, for beginning its causality itself. But this proceeding is quite illegitimate, as we may conclude from what follows.

Contingent, in the pure sense of the category is, that whose contradictory opposite is possible. Now we cannot at all conclude from the empirical contingency as to the intelligible one alluded to. That which is changed, the contrary of which (of its state) is at another time real, is, consequently, also possible; consequently, this is not the contradictory opposite of the previous state, for which it is required, that at the same time in which the previous state was, the contrary of the same might have been in place of it, which, from the change cannot be at all concluded. A body which was in motion = A comes into rest = non A. Now, because an opposite state from the state A follows upon this, it cannot hence at all be con-

brated astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty as to the choice of a point of view, to be a phenomenon sufficiently remarkable for composing upon such subject an especial treatise. The one concluded for instance thus: *The moon turns upon its axis*—from this reason that it presents constantly the same side to the earth. The other: *The moon does not turn upon its axis* precisely on this account, that it constantly does turn the same side to the earth. Both conclusions were correct, accordingly as the point of view was taken, from which we would consider the motion of the moon.

cluded that the contradictory opposite of A is possible—consequently A contingent—for it would be required in respect of this, that in the same time that the motion existed, instead of it, rest might have been.—Now we know nothing more, but that rest was real in the following time, consequently also possible. But motion at one time, and rest at another time, are not contradictorily opposed to each other. Consequently the succession of opposite determinations, that is, change, does not by any means prove contingency according to conceptions of the pure understanding, and, therefore, also, cannot lead to the existence of a necessary being according to pure understanding-conceptions. Change shows only empirical contingency, that is, that the new state of itself, without a cause, that belongs to the former state, could not at all have taken place, agreeably to the law of causality. The cause, and provided it is admitted also as absolutely necessary, must, in this way, still be met with in time, and belong to the series of phenomena.

## THIRD SECTION

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

## OF THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THIS ITS OPPOSITION.

We possess then now the whole dialectical play of the cosmological ideas, which do not at all allow that an object congruous with them may be given in any possible experience, in fact not even that reason thinks them consonant with the general laws of experience—which however are still not thought arbitrarily, but to which reason is led necessarily in the continuous progress of the empirical synthesis, if it will free from condition, and embrace in its unconditioned totality, that which at all times can be determined only conditionally according to the laws of experience. These sophistical assertions are so many endeavours, for solving four natural and unavoidable problems of reason, of which there can be only just this number, neither more nor less, because there are no more serieses of synthetic suppositions, which limit the empirical synthesis *à priori*.

We have exhibited the striking pretensions of reason extending its territory beyond all the limits of experience only in dry formula, which merely comprehend the foundation of its just claims, and, as it befits a transcendental philosophy, we have cleared these from all that is empirical, although the whole pomp of the assertions of reason can only shine forth in connexion with the same. But in this application and in the progressing extension of the use of reason, whilst it sets out from the field of experiences and raises itself up gradually to these elevated ideas, philosophy manifests a dignity, which if it could only maintain

its pretensions, would leave far beneath it, the value of all other human science, inasmuch as it promises foundations to our greatest expectations and views, as to the ultimate ends wherein all the efforts of reason must finally meet. The question, whether the world has a commencement and any limit of its extension in space—whether there is not somewhere and perhaps in my thinking self, an indivisible and indissoluble unity, or nothing but the divisible and the transient—whether I am free in my actions, or like other beings am led by the thread of nature and of fate—whether, lastly, there is a supreme cause of the world, or whether the things of nature and the order thereof, constitute the last object, at which in all our considerations we must stop—these are questions for the solution of which the mathematician would willingly give up his whole science, for this cannot still procure to him, in respect of the highest and most important objects of humanity, any satisfaction. Even the very dignity of Mathematick (this pride of human reason) rests upon this, that since it affords the guide to reason to look at nature in great as well as in small, in its order and regularity, together with the wonderful unity of its moving forces, far beyond all expectation of philosophy based upon common experience, it thereby itself affords inducement and encouragement to the use of reason extended beyond all experience, as well as it provides philosophy, occupied as to the same, with excellent materials for supporting its enquiry, so far as the quality thereof permits it, by means of suitable intuitions.

Unfortunately for speculation, (but perhaps luckily for the practical destination of man,) reason in the midst of its greatest expectations sees itself so enveloped in a strait of grounds and counter-grounds, that as it is not feasible, equally on account of its honour as its very security also, to draw back and look upon this contest as a mere sham fight, and still less, absolutely



to offer peace ; since the object of the strife is highly interesting, nothing remains but to reflect upon the origin of this disaccordance of reason with itself ; whether perchance a mere misconception was not in fault, upon the elucidation of which perhaps the vain pretensions on both sides would in fact disappear, and in place thereof, an enduring tranquil reign of reason commence over understanding and sense.

We will still for the present somewhat delay this fundamental explanation, and previously take into consideration, upon which side we would certainly most willingly strike, if we were perchance compelled to take a part. As in this case we do not consult the logical touchstone of truth, but merely our interest, so such an investigation, although it decides nothing in respect of the conflicting right of both parties, will yet have the advantage of making it comprehensible, why the participators in this contest have fought rather on one side than on the other, without a particular insight into the object having been the cause of it, and likewise of explaining other subordinate things ; as for example, the zealous warmth of the one party and the cold assertion of the other ; why they willingly shout with eager approbation for one party, and why they are beforehand prejudiced irreconcilably against the other.

But there is something, which in this previous judgment determines the point of view, from which alone it can be instituted with suitable foundation, and this is the comparison of the principles, whence both parties set out. We remark under the assertions of the antithesis, a perfect uniformity in the mode of thinking and complete unity of maxims—namely, a principle of pure *Empirism*, not only in the explanation of the phenomena in the world, but also in explanation of the transcendental ideas of the universe itself. On the other hand, the affirmations of the thesis lay at the foundation, besides the empirical

mode of explanation within the series of phenomema, intellectual points of departure, and the maxim is so far not simple. From its essential distinctive sign, I will term this, the *Dogmatism* of pure reason.

On the part therefore of *dogmatism* in the determination of the cosmological ideas of reason, or of the *thesis*, there is obvious—

*Firstly*, a certain practical *Interest* in which every right-minded person, if he understand his own true advantage, heartily takes part. That the world has a beginning—that my thinking self is of a simple and consequently incorruptible nature—that this at the same time is free in its arbitrary actions, and raised above the compulsion of nature—and finally, that the whole order of things which constitute the world emanates from an original Being, from whom everything borrows its unity and connexion conformable to its end—these are so many foundation stones of morality and religion. The antithesis robs us of all these supports, or at least appears to rob us of them.

*Secondly*, a *speculative interest* of reason manifests itself also on this side. For if we adopt and make use of transcendental ideas in such a manner, so may we embrace entirely *à priori* the whole chain of conditions, and comprehend the derivation of the conditioned, since we begin from the unconditioned, which the antithesis does not afford, and which thereby recommends itself very ill, inasmuch as it can give no answer to the question with respect to the conditions of its synthesis, that does not leave interminably always something more to be demanded. According to it we must ascend from a given beginning to a still higher one ; each part leads to a still smaller part ; every event has always another event above it as cause, and the conditions of existence in general rest always again upon others, without ever obtaining unconditioned maintainance and support, in a self-subsisting thing as original being.

*Thirdly*, this side has also the advantage of *Popularity*, which does not certainly constitute the least portion of recommendation to it. The common understanding does not find in the ideas of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis, the least difficulty, as moreover it is better accustomed to proceed downwards to consequences, than to ascend to principles, and has in the conceptions of the absolute First (as to the possibility of which it does not trouble itself) a convincing and at the same time a fixed point, in order thereon to attach the leading string of its steps; whilst on the contrary it can find no satisfaction in the perpetual ascending from conditioned to condition, with one foot continually in the air.

On the part of *Empirism* in determination of the cosmological ideas, or the *antithesis*, there is *firstly* no such practical interest from the pure principles of reason as morality and religion carry along with them. Mere empirism seems rather to take away from both, all force and influence. If there be no original being distinct from the world—if the world be without beginning, and therefore also without author, our will not free, and the soul of like divisibility and corruptibility with matter, *moral* ideas and principles thus also lose all validity, and fall together with the *transcendental* ideas which constitute their theoretical support.

But *on the other hand*, Empirism offers advantages to the speculative interest of reason, which are very alluring and far surpass those which the dogmatical teacher of reason-ideas can promise. According to it, the understanding is always upon its own territory, namely, the field of pure possible experiences, whose laws it can investigate, and by means of the same extend without end, its sure and comprehensible cognition. Here it can and ought to expose its object as well in itself, as in its relationships to intuition, or yet in conceptions, the image of which can be shown

clear and distinctly in given similar intuitions. Not only has it then no necessity to quit this chain of the order of nature, in order to attach itself to ideas whose objects it knows not, since they never can be given as things of thought, but it is not ever allowed to it to quit its work, and under the pretence that it is now brought to an end, to pass over into the domain of idealising reason and to transcendent ideas—where it has no farther necessity to consider and to enquire according to the laws of nature, but only to think and to imagine, certain that it could not be opposed by the facts of nature, since it is not even bound by its testimony, but may evade it, or even subject it itself, to a higher authority, namely that of pure reason.

The empirist will therefore never allow of taking any epoch of nature for the absolutely first, or any limit of his view in the circumscription thereof as the extremest, or of passing over from the objects of nature, which he can solve by observation and mathematics and determine synthetically in the intuition (in the extended), to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever exhibit *in concreto* (in the simple), nor allow that even we lay at the foundation in *nature*, a faculty of acting independent of the laws of nature (liberty), and thereby diminish for the understanding its work of investigating by the thread of necessary rules the origin of phenomena,—nor finally concede, that we seek any where for this, the cause out of nature, (the author,) since we know nothing further than this nature, as it is it alone which furnishes us with objects, and can instruct us as to their laws.

Certainly, if the empirical philosopher with his antithesis, had no other object than to destroy the forwardness and temerity of reason, mistaking its true destination, which is proud of *insight* and *knowledge* there, where, properly, insight and knowledge cease, and will give out that which we allow to be valid in respect of practical interest, for an advancement of speculative

reason, in order where it is suitable to its convenience, to break the thread of physical enquiries, and under the pretence of extension of cognition, to join this to transcendental ideas, by means of which we only properly cognize that we know nothing—if, I say, the empirist were satisfied with this, his principle would then be a maxim of moderation in pretensions—of modesty in assertions—and at the same time of the greatest possible extension of our understanding, by means of the instructor properly allotted to us—that is to say, experience. Then, in such case *intellectual presuppositions* and belief, in favor of our practical concern, would not be taken away;—only we could not let them be exhibited under the title and pomp of science and insight of reason, since proper speculative science generally can find no other object than that of experience, and if we overstep its limits, synthesis which seeks cognitions new and independent of it, has no substratum of intuition upon which it can be exercised.

But if in this way, empirism in respect of the ideas (as it frequently happens) becomes itself dogmatical, and denies boldly that which is above the sphere of its intuitive cognitions, it then falls itself into the fault of want of modesty, which in this case is so much the more blameable, because thereby an irreparable disadvantage is caused to the practical interest of reason.

This is the opposition of *Epicurism*\* to *Platonism*.

\* It is, however, still a question whether Epicurus has ever proposed these principles as objective assertions. If they, perhaps, were nothing more than maxims of the speculative use of reason, he therein thus manifested a more worthy philosophical spirit than any of the sages of antiquity. That in the explanation of phenomena we must so proceed, as if the field of enquiry were not cut off by any limits or beginning of the world—so adopt the matter of the world as it must be, if we will be instructed as to it, by experience—that no other generation of events than are determined by the unchangeable laws of nature, and finally no cause different from the world must be used—are still now, very just—yet little considered principles for enlarging speculative philosophy, as well as for discovering the principles of morality, independent of extrinsic sources of help, that on this account he who desires to be *ignorant* of such dogmatical propositions, so long as we are occupied with mere speculation, ought not for that reason to be charged with wishing to *deny* them.

Each of the two says more than he knows, yet in such a way that the first rouses and encourages knowledge, although to the disadvantage of what is practical; the second certainly affords to what is practical, excellent principles, but precisely thereby, allows reason in respect of every thing wherein a speculative knowledge is allowed to us, to indulge in idealistic explanations of the phenomena of nature, and on that account to neglect physical investigation.

As to what concerns finally the third moment, whereon we may look in respect of the preliminary choice between the two contending parties, it is thus particularly surprising that empirism is wholly opposed to popularity, although one would believe, that the common understanding would seize greedily a project that promised to satisfy by means of nothing but cognitions of experience and their connexion conformable to reason; whilst on the other hand, transcendental dogmatick compels it to ascend to conceptions which far surpass the penetration and the reasoning faculty of heads most exercised in thought. But this very thing is its motive. For it there finds itself in a state in which even the most learned man can arrogate to himself nothing above it. If it understand little or nothing as to the matter, so likewise can no one boast of understanding much more about it, and although it may not reason thereupon so scholastically as others, still it can subtilize thereupon infinitely more, since it wanders about amongst pure ideas, with regard to which we may be most eloquent, for this very reason, because we *know nothing in respect thereof*: whilst, on the contrary, it must be quite dumb and allow its ignorance in respect of the investigation into nature. Convenience and vanity are therefore to begin with, a strong recommendation of these principles. Besides this, although it is very hard for a philosopher to admit any thing as principle, without being able to give a reason for it, or in fact to intro-

duce conceptions, the objective reality of which cannot be seen—yet nothing is however more usual to the ordinary understanding. It will have something from which it can start with confidence. The difficulty of itself comprehending such a presupposition troubles it not, because the same never enters into the mind (which does not know what is termed, to comprehend), and it holds that to be known which is familiar from frequent use. But finally, all speculative interest disappears in it before the practical, and it imagines seeing and knowing that, which its apprehensions or hopes urge it to admit or to believe. Thus the empirism of transcendental idealizing reason is wholly deprived of all popularity, and however much disadvantageable it may contain, contrary to the highest practical principles, still it is not at all to be apprehended, that it will ever overstep the limits of the schools, and obtain amongst the ordinary portion of mankind, even a certain degree of consideration and a certain favour with the great multitude.

Human reason is as to its nature architectonical, that is, it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system, and thence admits also only such principles, as do not render a proposed cognition incapable of existing together with others in a system. But the positions of the antithesis are of the kind, that they render the completion of an edifice of cognitions quite impossible. According to them, there is beyond one state of the world always another still older—in each part, always other parts again divisible—before every event another which again was equally generated at another time—and in existence in general every thing always only conditioned, without acknowledging an unconditioned and first existence. Since therefore the antithesis no where concedes a First, and no beginning which could serve absolutely as foundation to the building, a complete edifice of cognitions under such presuppositions is thus wholly impossible. Hence the

architectonical interest of reason (which does not require empirical but pure unity of reason *à priori*,) carries along with it, a natural recommendation in favour of the assertions of the thesis.

But if a man could free himself from all interest, and take into consideration the assertions of reason, indifferent as to consequences, merely according to the value of the grounds thereof, such a one would then be in an unceasingly vacillating state, it being admitted that he knew no means of escaping from the difficulty, excepting that he committed himself to one or other of the conflicting doctrines. To-day it would appear to him convincing, that the human will was free; to-morrow, if he considered the indissoluble chain of nature, he would be of opinion that liberty was nothing but self-deception, and every thing mere *nature*. But now, if it came to doing and to acting, this play of mere speculative reason would, like the shadowy image of a dream, then disappear, and he would choose his principles merely according to practical interest. But still since it is proper for a thinking and enquiring being, to dedicate certain times solely to the investigation of his own reason, yet therein to do away wholly with partiality, and in this mode to impart publicly his observations to others for examination, so no one can be blamed for, still less prevented from exhibiting the propositions and counter-propositions in such a way, as these, intimidated by no threat, can justify themselves before a jury of his own order, (that is to say the order of weak men.)



*FOURTH SECTION*

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS OF PURE  
REASON, IN SO FAR AS THEY MUST  
ABSOLUTELY BE RESOLVABLE.

To pretend to resolve all problems, and to answer all questions, would be a shameless boasting, and such an extravagant self-conceit, that thereby one must straightway destroy all confidence. There are, however, sciences, the nature of which so requires it, that each therein occurring question must be absolutely answerable from that which we know, since the answer must spring from those sources whence the question arises, and where it is in no way permitted, to allege an inevitable ignorance, but where the solution may be demanded. What in all possible cases is right or wrong we must be able to know, since this concerns our obligation, and we have in fact no obligation as to that which we cannot know. In the explanation of the phenomena of nature much must however remain uncertain to us, and many questions insoluble, because that which we know as to nature, is not in all cases by any means sufficient for that which we have to explain. The question then is, whether in transcendental philosophy any question that concerns an object proposed to reason, is unanswerable by means of this same pure reason, and whether we can with justice be excused from a decisive answer in respect to it, from this cause, that we number it amongst those as absolutely uncertain (from every thing that we can cognize)—as to which we

certainly possess so far a conception as to propose a question, but are entirely deficient in the means or faculty for ever answering the same.

I maintain now, that transcendental philosophy possesses amidst all speculative cognition peculiarly this, that no question at all, which concerns a given object of pure reason, is insoluble for this same human reason, and that no excuse of an inevitable ignorance and of an unfathomable depth of the problem, can relieve from the obligation of answering it thoroughly and completely, since this very conception which places us in the situation of questioning, must absolutely also render us capable of answering this question, because the object is not at all met with out of the conception (as in right and wrong.)

There are in transcendental philosophy none else but only the cosmological questions, in respect of which we may demand with propriety a satisfactory answer that concerns the quality of the object, without its being permitted to the philosopher to refuse the same for this reason, that he alleges impenetrable obscurity, and that these questions only concern cosmological ideas. For the object must be empirically given, and the question refers only to the suitability of the same with an idea. If the object be transcendental, and therefore itself unknown—for example, whether the something, the phenomenon of which (in ourselves) is thought, (soul,) is a simple being in itself—whether there is a cause of all things altogether which is absolutely necessary, &c., we must thus seek an object for our idea, in respect of which we may confess that it is unknown to us, but still not on that account impossible.\* The cosmological ideas only

\* We can certainly give no answer to the question, what quality a transcendental object has, that is to say, *what it is*, but certainly that the *question* itself is *nothing*, for this reason, because no object thereof has been given. Consequently all questions of transcendental psychology are likewise answerable and really answered, for they concern the transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which, itself, is not phenomenon, and, therefore, not given as object,

have this peculiar to themselves, that they can presuppose their object and the empirical synthesis requisite for the conception thereof as given ; and the question which arises from them, only regards the progression of this synthesis so far as such is to contain absolute totality, which last is no more empirical, since it can be given in no experience. But as now the question is only as to a thing, as object of a possible experience, and not of a thing in itself, the answering of the transcendent cosmological question can lie no where else out of the idea, because it concerns no object in itself ; and in respect of possible experience it is not enquired into, as to that which can be given *in concreto* in any experience, but what lies in the idea, which the empirical synthesis is merely to approach—consequently it must be resolvable out of the idea only, for this is a mere creature of reason, which therefore cannot remove the responsibility from itself, and throw it upon the unknown object.

It is not so extraordinary as it at first appears, that a Science in respect of all the questions belonging to its complex (*quæstiones domesticæ*), can demand and require purely *certain* solutions, although still perhaps they are as yet not found. Besides transcendental philosophy, there are yet two pure sciences of reason, one of purely speculative, the other of practical content, *pure Mathematics* and *pure Ethics*. Has any one ever in fact heard, that, as it were, on account of a necessary ignorance of the conditions, it has been given out as uncertain, what relationship the diameter bears quite exactly to the circumference in rational or irrational numbers ? As this cannot be given at all congruously by means of the first, and by means

and as to which none of the categories, (as to which still the question properly is posited), concern conditions of their application. Therefore, here it is the case, that the common expression holds true, that no answer is an answer, that is to say, that a question as to the quality of this something which can be thought by means of no determined predicate, as it is placed wholly out of the sphere of objects which can be given to us, is entirely null and void.

of the second it is not yet found, we judge that at least the uncertainty of such a solution can be known with certainty, and Lambert gave a proof thereof. In the general principles of morals nothing can be uncertain, inasmuch as the propositions are either entirely null and devoid of sense, or must flow merely from our conceptions of reason. On the contrary, there is in the science of nature an infinity of conjectures, in respect of which certainty can never be expected, since the phenomena of nature are objects which are given to us, independent of our conceptions, and as to which, therefore, the key neither lies in us, nor in our pure thought, but out of us, and precisely on this account cannot in many cases be found—consequently no sure explanation be expected. I do not here reckon the questions of transcendental analysis which concern the deduction of our pure cognition, because we now only treat of the certainty of judgments in respect of objects, and not in respect of the origin of our conceptions themselves.

We shall not be therefore able to avoid the obligation of, at least, a critical solution of the proposed questions of reason, from this circumstance, that we raise complaints as to the narrow limits of our reason, and avow with the appearance of a humble self-knowledge, that it is beyond our reason to decide whether the world is from eternity or has a beginning—whether the universe is filled with beings to infinity, or enclosed within certain limits—whether any thing in the world is simple, or whether every thing must be divided to infinity—whether there is a creation and production from liberty, and whether all depends upon the chain of the order of nature—and finally whether, there is any wholly unconditioned and in itself necessary being—or whether every thing as to existence is conditioned, and consequently externally dependent and contingent in itself. For all these questions concern an object which can be given no where but in our

thoughts, that is to say, the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of phenomena. If we can decide and say nothing certain thereon from our own conceptions, we should not then throw the fault upon the thing which is hidden from us—inasmuch as such a thing (since it is not met with any where out of our idea) is not at all given, but we must seek the cause in our idea itself, which is a problem that allows of no solution, and which still we have obstinately taken up, as if a real object corresponded to it. A clear exposition of the dialectick which lies in our conception itself, would lead us soon to a perfect certainty as to that which we have to judge in respect of such a question.

One may oppose to your pretence of uncertainty, in regard of this problem, first, this question, which, at least, you must answer clearly : Whence do the ideas come to you, the solution of which involves you here in such difficulty ? Are they peradventure phenomena, the explanation of which you require, and whereof, in consequence of these ideas, you have only to seek the principles, or the rule of their exposition ? Admit that nature be quite laid open before you—that to your senses and to consciousness, all that is exposed to your intuition be not concealed ; still you will not be able to cognize through a single experience the object of your ideas *in concreto*, (for there is yet required besides this perfect intuition, a complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute totality, which is not possible through any empirical cognition), consequently your question cannot by any means be proposed in explanation of any occurring phenomenon necessarily, and, therefore, as it were, through the object itself. For the object can never occur to you, because it cannot be given by means of any possible experience. With all possible perceptions you ever remain under *conditions*, confined either in space or time, and come to nothing unconditioned,

in order to decide whether this unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the synthesis, or an absolute totality of the series without any beginning. But the all in an empirical meaning, is at all times only comparative. The absolute all of quantity, (the universe,) of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence in general, together with all questions, whether it is to be accomplished by means of a finite or an infinite continuing synthesis, does not regard in any way a possible experience. You would, for instance, not be able, in the least, to explain better, nor even otherwise, the phenomena of a body, whether you admit that it consists of simple or of always absolutely compound parts, for there can never appear to you any simple phenomenon, and equally as little likewise, any infinite composition. Phenomena ask only to be explained, so far as the conditions of their explanation are given in the perception. But every thing which may ever be given in them as compounded in an *absolute whole*, is itself no perception. Yet this All properly is it, the explanation of which is required in the transcendental problems of reason.

As, therefore, even the solution of these problems can never occur in experience; you cannot thus say, that it is uncertain, what in this respect, may be attributed to the object. For your object is merely in your brain, and cannot be given out of the same; you have only, therefore, to provide for this, to be in accordance with yourself, and to avoid the amphiboly that makes your idea into a supposed representation of something empirically given, and, consequently, likewise into an object cognizable according to the laws of experience. The dogmatical solution is, therefore, not perchance uncertain, but impossible. But the critical one which may be wholly certain, considers the question not at all objectively, but in regard of the foundation whereupon it is based.

*FIFTH SECTION*

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

SCEPTICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE COSMOLOGICAL  
QUESTIONS BY MEANS OF ALL THE FOUR  
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

We should willingly refrain from the demand of seeing our questions answered dogmatically, if we already could comprehend previously, that the answer turning out whatever it might be, would still only increase our uncertainty, and precipitate us from one incomprehensibility into another—from one obscurity into another yet greater—and, perhaps, even into contradiction. If our question be fixed simply upon affirmation, or negation, it is then acting prudently to leave undecided the probable grounds of the answer for a time, and, first, to consider as to what we should gain, if the answer turns out on the one side, and what on its opposite. Now, if it happen, that in both cases a pure non-sense results, we have thus a founded challenge for examining critically our question and seeing, whether it does not rest upon a groundless supposition, and plays with an idea, which betrays its erroneousness more in the application, and by means of its consequences, than in its abstract representation. This is the great utility that the sceptical mode possesses of treating questions, which pure reason puts to pure reason, and whereby we do away, at little cost, with a great dogmatical waste, in order to substitute in place of this, a modest Critick, which, as a true catharticon, will successfully carry off presumption, together with its accompaniment, polymathy.

If, consequently, I could previously perceive as to a cosmological idea, that on whatever side of the con-

ditioned of the regressive synthesis of the phenomena it also turned, it would for every *conception of the understanding* either be *too great* or *too small*, I then must comprehend that, as such idea, nevertheless, has only to do with an object of experience, which is to be adapted to a possible conception of the understanding, it must be quite void, and without meaning, since the object did not accord with it, accommodate, however I will, this object to the same. And this is really the case with all cosmological conceptions, which also on this very account involve reason, so long as it depends upon them, in an unavoidable antinomy: for admit—

*Firstly*, that *the world has no beginning*, it is then too *great* for your conception, for this, which consists in a successive regressus, can never reach the whole elapsed eternity. Granted, that *it has a beginning*, it is thus again for your conception of the understanding in the necessary empirical regressus, *too small*. For since the beginning still always presupposes a time which precedes, it is then, yet not unconditioned; and the law of the empirical use of the understanding imposes it upon you, to enquire after a still higher condition of time, and the world is, therefore, palpably too small for this law.

It is the same thing in respect of the double answer to the question, as to the magnitude of the world, according to space. For *is this infinite* and unlimited, it is then too *great* for all possible empirical conceptions. Is it *finite* and limited, you ask then with reason, what determines these limits? Void space is not of itself a subsisting correlative of things, and can be no condition at which you could stop, still much less an empirical condition, that constitutes a part of a possible experience. (For who can have an experience of an absolute-void?) But for the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis, it is at all times required, that the unconditioned is a conception of ex-



perience. Consequently a *limited* world is too *small* for your conception.

*Secondly*, if every phenomenon in space (matter) consists of *infinitely many parts*, the regressus of the division is thus always too *great* for your conception, and if the *division* of space is to *cease* in a member of it, (the simple), it is then too *small* for the idea of the unconditioned. For this member still always leaves a regressus to further parts contained therein.

*Thirdly*, if you admit, that in everything which happens in the world, there is nothing but consequence according to the laws of *nature*, causality of the cause is thus ever again something that happens, and renders necessary your regressus to a still higher cause, consequently the prolongation of the series of phenomena a *parte priori*, unceasingly. The mere acting *nature* is hence too *great* for all your conception, in the synthesis of the events of the world.

If you suppose events effected *of themselves*, backwards and forwards, consequently generation from *liberty*, you then follow up the why, according to an unavoidable law of nature, and necessitate yourself to go out beyond this point, according to the causal law of experience, and you find that such totality of the connexion is too *small* for your necessary empirical conception.

*Fourthly*, if you suppose an *absolutely necessary* being, (whether the world itself, or something in the world, or the cause of the world), you thus place it in a time, infinitely removed from every given point of time, as otherwise it would be dependent upon another and older existence. But then this existence is insufficient for your empirical conception, and too *great*, as that you ever could attain thereto through any continued regressus.

But if, according to your opinion, everything which belongs to the world, (whether conditioned, or as condition), is *contingent*, then every existence given to

you for your conception is too *small*. For it compels you still to seek always after another existence, upon which it depends.

We have said, in all these cases, that the *cosmical idea* for the empirical regressus, consequently for every possible conception of the understanding, is either too great, or again too small for the same. Why have we not conversely expressed ourselves, and said, that in the first case, the empirical conception is always too small for the idea, but in the second too great, and consequently, as it were, that the fault lay in the empirical regressus; instead of our blaming the cosmological idea, that it deviated too much, or too little, from its end, namely, possible experience? The reason was this: possible experience is that, which alone can give reality to our conceptions, wanting this, all conception is only idea, without truth and reference to an object. The possible empirical conception was, therefore, the measure whereby the (*cosmical*) idea must be judged, whether it was mere idea and a thing of thought, or met with its object in the world. For we say merely of it, that it is, relatively to some other thing, too great or too small, which only by reason of this last thing is admitted, and must be regulated thereby. This question belonged also to the playthings of the ancient dialectical schools. If a ball cannot pass through a hole, what are we to say? Is the ball too large, or the hole too small? In this case it is indifferent how you would answer, for you do not know which of the two exists on account of the other. On the other hand, you will not say the man is too tall for his coat, but the coat is too short for the man.

We are, therefore, at least, led into the founded suspicion, that the cosmological ideas, and with them all sophistical assertions conflicting with one another, have, at their foundation, perhaps, a void, and merely

imaginary conception as to the manner in which the object of these ideas is given, and this suspicion may, to begin with, put us upon the right trace for discovering the illusion which has so long led us astray.

#### SIXTH SECTION

#### OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

#### OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF COSMOLOGICAL DIALECTICK.

We have sufficiently shown in the transcendental *Æsthetick*, that all which is perceived in space or time, consequently all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena, that is mere perceptions, which, so far as they are represented as extended beings, or series of changes, have no existence founded in itself, independent of our thoughts. I term this system transcendental *Idealism*.\* The realist, in the transcendental sense, forms from these modifications of our sensibility, things subsisting of themselves, and hence, *mere representations* into things in themselves.

It would be doing us an injustice, if it were wished to attribute to us the empirical idealism so long since discredited, which, whilst it admits the proper reality of space, denies, or at least considers therein as doubtful, the existence of extended beings, and allows between dreaming and truth in this point, of no sufficiently demonstrable difference. As to what concerns the phenomena of the internal sense in

\* I have sometimes, likewise, otherwise termed it *formal* idealism, to distinguish it from the *material*, that is, from the common, which doubts or denies the existence of external things themselves. In many cases it seems to be advisable to make use rather of this, than of the previously named expressions, in order to guard against all misunderstanding.

time, in respect of these as real things, it finds no difficulty, nay it even maintains that this internal experience shows singly and alone sufficiently, the real existence of its object, (in itself,) (with all this determination of time.)

Our transcendental idealism on the contrary admits, that the objects of external intuition are also really, just so as they are envisaged in space, and all changes in time such as the internal sense represents them. For, as space is already a form of that intuition which we term the external, and that without objects in the same, there would be no empirical representation at all, we can and must admit therein extended beings as real, and it is precisely the same, likewise, with time. Still that space itself, together with this time, and co-existently with both all phenomena, are yet no *things* in themselves, and nothing except representations, and cannot at all exist out of our mind; and even the internal and external intuition of our mind, (as object of consciousness), whose determination is represented through the succession of different states in time, is not also the proper self, as it exists in itself, or the transcendental subject, but only a phenomenon which has been given to the sensibility of this, to us, unknown being. The existence of this internal phenomenon, as a thing thus existing of itself, cannot be accorded, because its condition is time, which cannot be any determination of a thing in itself. But, in space and time, the empirical truth of phenomena is enough secured, and distinguished sufficiently from its affinity with dreaming, if both are connected together, correctly and generally, in an experience according to empirical laws.

Thus, the objects of experience are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and do not at all exist out of the same. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no man has ever

perceived them, must certainly be admitted ; but it only signifies this much, that we might fall upon them in the possible progress of experience, for all is real which stands in a context with a perception according to the laws of the empirical progress. They, (*these objects*) therefore, are then real, if they stand with my real consciousness in an empirical coherence, although they are not on this account real in themselves, that is, independent of this progress of experience.

Nothing real is given to us, but the perception and the empirical progression from this to other possible perceptions. For, in themselves phenomena, as mere representations, are only real in the perception, which, in fact, is nothing else but the reality of an empirical representation, that is, phenomenon. Anterior to the perception, to term a phenomenon a real thing, either means, that we must in the progress of experience fall upon such a perception, or it has not any meaning. For that it exists in itself, without reference to our senses and to possible experience, could certainly be said, if the question were as to a thing in itself. But the question is merely as to a phenomenon in space and time, both of which are no determinations of things in themselves, but only of our sensibility—consequently that which is in them, (phenomena,) is not in itself something, but they are mere representations, which, if they are not given in us, (in perception,) are no where at all to be met with.

The sensible faculty of intuition is properly only a receptivity to be affected in a certain manner by representations, the relationship whereof to one another is a pure intuition of space and time, (pure forms of sensibility,) and which, so far as they are determinable and connected in this relationship (in space and time) according to the laws of the unity of experience, are called *objects*. The non-sensible cause of these

representations is wholly unknown to us, and this we cannot, therefore, envisage as object; for a like object would necessarily neither be represented in space nor time, (as mere conditions of the sensible representation); but without which conditions we cannot think any intuition at all. We may, however, term the mere intelligible cause of phenomena in general, the transcendental object, simply in order that we may have something that corresponds to to the sensibility as a receptivity. We may attribute this transcendental object, all circumscription and coherence of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given in itself, before, all experience. But the phenomena are given conformable to it, not in themselves, but only in this experience, since they are mere representations, which only as perceptions, signify a real object; provided, that is, this perception be connected with all others according to the rules of the unity of experience. Thus we can say; the real things of past time are given in the transcendental object of experience, but they are, as to me, only objects and in past time real, so far as I represent to myself that a regressive series of possible perceptions, (whether according to the thread of history, or the traces of causes and effects,) according to empirical laws—in a word, the course of the world leads to an elapsed time as condition of the present time; which time yet is only then represented as real in the connexion of a possible experience, and not in itself, so that all passed events, from an unconceivable time downwards before my existence still mean nothing else, but the possibility of the prolongation of the chain of experience from the present perception to the conditions upwards, which determine this in respect to time.

If I, then, represent to myself all existing objects of the senses in all time, and in all spaces together, I do not set such prior, to experience in the

two, but this representation is nothing else but the thought of a possible experience in its absolute completeness. In it alone are such objects (which are nothing but mere representations) given. But when it is said, they exist prior to all my experience, it only means, that they are to be found in the part of experience to which I, starting from perception, must first of all advance. The cause of the empirical conditions of this advance, consequently as to what members, and likewise how far I can fall upon the like in the regressus, is transcendental, and, consequently, necessarily unknown to me. But with respect to this also, there is nothing to do, but only with the rule of the progression of experience, in which the objects, namely, phenomena, are given to me. It is also quite the same as to the result, whether I say, I can in the empirical progression in space, meet with the stars, that area hundred times further removed than the most distant that I see, or I say, that there are, perhaps, some of them to be met with in the universe, although man never had perceived or will perceive them, for although they were given in general as things in themselves, without reference to possible experience, still they are thus nothing as to me, consequently no objects, except so far as they are contained in the series of the empirical regressus. Only in another relationship, provided these same phenomena are to be used for the cosmological idea of an absolute whole and provided therefore it regards a question which goes out beyond the limits of possible experience, is the distinction of manner, of importance, in respect of which one takes the reality of the before-named objects of sense, in order to obviate that fallacious opinion which must inevitably spring from the misunderstanding of our own conceptions of experience.

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## SEVENTH SECTION

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

CRITICAL DECISION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL CONTEST  
OF REASON WITH ITSELF.

The whole Antinomy of pure reason rests upon the dialectical argument—Provided that the condition is given, the whole series also of all conditions of the same is then given. But objects of sense are given as conditioned, consequently, &c. &c. Through this syllogism then, the major of which appears so natural and clear, just as many cosmological ideas now are introduced, according to the difference of the conditions, (in the synthesis of phenomena) so far as they constitute a series, as postulate the absolute totality of these series, and precisely by this means place reason unavoidably in contradiction with itself. But before we expose that which is fallacious in this sophistical argument, we must set ourselves in a position for that purpose, by means of the correction and determination of certain conceptions occurring therein.

*First*, the following proposition is clear and undoubtedly certain, that, if the condition be given, precisely thereby a regressus in the series of all conditions for such is *given* to us; for the conception of the conditioned carries this along with it, that thereby something is referred to a condition, and if this again is conditioned, to a further condition, and so through all the members of the series. This proposition is, therefore, analytical, and is elevated beyond all apprehension from a transcendental critick. It is a logical postulate of reason—to follow and to continue as far as possible, that connexion of a conception with its conditions, by



means of the understanding, which connexion already adheres to the conception itself.

*Farther*, if the conditioned as well as its condition are things in themselves, provided the first has then been given, not only the regressus to the second is given, but this second is thereby already really therewith *given*; and since this is valid as to all members of the series, the complete series of conditions, consequently also the unconditioned, is thus at the same time given, or rather presupposed from this, that the conditioned which was only possible through the series in question is given. In this case the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, is a synthesis of the mere understanding, which understanding represents the things as they are, without looking whether and how, we may arrive at the knowledge of the same. On the contrary, if I have to do with phenomena, which as mere representations are not at all given, if I do not attain to an acquaintance with them, (that is to these themselves, since they are nothing but empirical acquirements), I cannot, then, in the same sense say, provided the conditioned is given, so are all conditions likewise (as phenomena) for the same given, and cannot conclude, therefore, by any means, as to the absolute totality of the series of them. For *phenomena* are in the apprehension themselves, nothing else but an empirical synthesis, (in space and time), and are, therefore, only given in such. Now it does not at all follow, that if the conditioned, (in the phenomenon) is given, the synthesis, likewise, which constitutes its empirical condition, is thereby together given and presupposed; for this synthesis takes place, first of all in the regressus, and never without the same. But we may certainly say, in such a case, that a *regressus* to conditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis on this side, is commanded or given, and that conditions cannot be wanting, which are given by means of this regressus.

Hence it appears, that the major of the cosmological syllogism takes the conditioned in the transcendental sense of a pure category, but the minor in an empirical sense of a conception of the understanding, applied to mere phenomena,—consequently that the dialectical deception is therein met with, which is termed *Sophisma figurae dictionis*. But this deception is not artificial, but quite a natural illusion of ordinary reason. For through the same, we presuppose (in the major,) the conditions and their series, as it were *unseen*, when something is given as conditioned, since this is nothing else but the logical demand to adopt complete premises for a given conclusion, and as no order of time is to be met with in the connexion of the conditioned with its condition, they are presupposed in themselves as given *simultaneously*. Farther, it is equally natural (in the minor) to look upon phenomena as things in themselves, and also equally as objects given to the mere understanding, as it occurred in the major, where I made abstraction of all conditions of the intuition under which alone objects can be given. But we had then overlooked in such case, a remarkable difference between the conceptions. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, and the whole series of the latter (in the major,) carried along with it, nothing at all of limitation by means of time, and no conception of succession. On the contrary, the empirical synthesis, and the series of conditions in the phenomenon, (which is subsumed in the minor,) is necessarily successive, and only given in time after one another; consequently, I could not here, (*in the minor*,) the same as there (*in the major*,) presuppose the absolute totality of the synthesis, and the thereby represented series, since, there, all the members of the series are given in themselves, (without condition of time,) but here, they are only possible through the successive regressus; which only is given through this, that really we execute it.

After the conviction of such an error in the argument usually laid at the foundation, (of cosmological assertions,) the two contending parties may with propriety be dismissed, as such, as found their claim upon no valid title. But by this, their strife is not yet so far terminated that they are convinced, that they, or that one of them was wrong in the matter itself which he maintained (in the conclusion), although he knew not how to build upon suitable proofs. However, nothing seems clearer than that with respect to two parties, one of which maintains ; the world has a beginning, the other, the world has no beginning, but is from all eternity ; one must still be right. But if this be the case, so is it nevertheless impossible, inasmuch as the perspicuousness is equal on both parts, ever to make out on which side the right exists, and the contest continues subsequently as before, although the parties have been sent before the tribunal of reason for peace. There remains, therefore, no means of ending the contest thoroughly, and to the satisfaction of both parties, except this, that as they still can so well oppose each other, they are at last convinced, they contend about nothing, and that a certain transcendental appearance has there pictured to them a reality, where none was to be met with. We will now strike into such way, for the compromise of a contest not to be adjudicated decisively.

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Zeno the Eleatic, a subtle dialectician, has been already very much blamed by Plato as a mischievous sophister, on this account, that he, in order to show his art, endeavoured to demonstrate one and the same proposition by means of plausible arguments, and immediately afterwards again to subvert it by others equally powerful. He maintained, that God (probably with him this was nothing but the world) is neither finite nor infinite—is neither in motion nor in repose—is neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing. It appeared to those who judged him in respect of this, that he wished

wholly to deny two mutually contradicting propositions, which is absurd. But I do not find, that this can with justice be laid to his charge. I shall soon more particularly examine the first of these propositions. As to what concerns the others, if he *understood* by the word *God*, the *Universum*, he must in this way certainly say, that this (*the universe*) is neither permanently present (in repose) in its place, nor changes the same (moves itself), because all places are only in the universe, —consequently *this* itself is *in no place*. If the universe embrace in itself all that exists, it is thus likewise neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing, since out of it, there is *no other thing* with which it could be compared. If two mutually contradicting judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, they fall in this way both of them to the ground, notwithstanding their opposition (which however is no proper contradiction), because the condition falls away, under which alone, each of these propositions was to be valid.

If any one said, every body either smells well, or does not smell well, a third term then occurs, namely, that it does not smell at all (has evaporated), and in this way two opposite propositions may be false. If I say, it is either sweet smelling, or it is not sweet smelling (*vel suaveolens vel non suaveolens*), both judgments are thus contradictorily opposed to each other, and only the first is false, but its contradictory opposite, that is to say, some bodies are not sweet smelling, embraces in itself also the bodies which do not smell at all. In the previous opposition (*per disparata*), the accidental condition of the conception of body (the smell) still remains in the conflicting judgment, and would not therefore be annihilated through it; consequently the last was not the contradictory opposite of the first.

Hence if I say, the world is as to space either infinite or it is not infinite (*non est infinitus*); if the first proposition is thus false, its contradictory opposite; the world is not infinite, must be true. By this I should only an-

nihilate an infinite world, without positing another, that is, the finite. But if it be said, the world is neither infinite nor finite (not infinite), both may be thus false. For I then look upon the world as determined in itself, according to its magnitude, whilst I take away not only in the contrary the infinity, and with this perhaps its whole separate existence, but I add besides a determination to the world, as to a real thing in itself, which may be just equally false, if, for instance, the world should not be given at all as a *thing in itself*, consequently also, not as to its magnitude, neither as infinite nor as finite. Let it be conceded to me, that I must term such opposition the *dialectical*, but that of contradiction, the *analytical opposition*. Consequently, of two dialectical judgments opposed to one another, both may be false, from this cause, that one does not merely contradict the other, but says something more than is requisite for the contradiction.

If we look at the two propositions—the world is as to magnitude infinite—the world is as to magnitude finite, as contradictorily opposed to each other—we suppose in this way that the world (the whole series of phenomena) is a thing in itself. For it (*the world*) remains, though I do away with the infinite or finite regressus in the series of its phenomena. But if I take away this presupposition, or this transcendental appearance, and deny that it is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition of both assertions then changes itself into a purely dialectical one; and since the world does not at all exist in itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it thus exists neither as an infinite nor as a finite whole in itself. It is only to be found in the empirical regressus of the series of phenomena, and not at all of itself. Consequently, if this series is conditioned, so is it never wholly given, and the world is therefore no unconditioned whole and it does not therefore exist as such, either with infinite or finite magnitude.

What has been here said of the first cosmological idea, that is to say, of the absolute totality of the quantity in the phenomenon, is valid also of all the rest. The series of conditions is only to be met with in the regressive synthesis itself, but not in itself in the phenomenon, as in a particular thing given before all regressus. Consequently, I must also say, the multitude of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself neither finite nor infinite, because phenomenon is nothing existing in itself, and the parts first of all are given through the regressus of the decomposing synthesis, and in the same; which regressus is never given absolutely wholly, either as finite or as infinite. This is equally valid as to the series of causes, ordered one with regard to another; or of the conditioned up to the unconditioned necessary existence, which according to its totality can never be looked at in itself, as finite or as infinite, since it consists as series of subordinate representations only in dynamical regressus—but prior to the same and as an of itself subsisting series of things, cannot at all exist in itself.

The Antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas is accordingly done away with through this, that it is shown that it is purely dialectical and an opposition of appearance, which springs from this, that the idea of absolute totality that is only valid as a condition of things in themselves, has been applied to phenomena, which only exist in the representation, and when they constitute a series, in successive regressus, but otherwise not at all. But we may likewise, conversely, deduce from this antinomy a real, certainly not dogmatical, but yet a critical and doctrinal advantage—namely, of shewing thereby the transcendental ideality of phenomena indirectly, if any one perchance had not been satisfied as to this, in the transcendental *Æsthetick*. The proof would consist in this dilemma. If the world is an, in itself,

existing whole, it is thus either finite or infinite. Now the first as well as the second is false (according to the before-adduced proofs of the antithesis on the one side, and of the thesis on the other). Consequently, it is likewise false, that the world (the complex of all phenomena) is an, in itself, existing whole. Whence then it follows, that phenomena in general, independent of our representations, are nothing; which is precisely just what we would say through the transcendental ideality of the same.

This observation is of importance. We see from this, that the above proofs of the quadruple antinomy were not deceptions, but were fundamental; under this presupposition, namely, that phenomena, or a sensible world which comprehends them all in itself, were things in themselves. But the opposition of the thence derived propositions discovers, that a falsehood lies in the proposition, and thereby brings us to a discovery of the true quality of things, as objects of the senses. Transcendental dialectick consequently does not by any means afford aid to scepticism, though certainly to the sceptical method, which can manifest in it, an example of its great utility, if we allow the arguments of reason in its greatest latitude to confront one another; which, although they may not afford finally what we seek after, nevertheless will at all times still afford something useful and serviceable for the correction of our judgments.

#### OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

##### *EIGHTH SECTION.*

#### REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF PURE REASON IN RESPECT OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS.

Since by means of the cosmological principle of Totality, no maximum of the series of conditions in a sensible world is given as a thing in itself, but can be given merely in the regressus of the same; so the before-

mentioned principle of pure reason, in its thus corrected signification, still maintains its true validity, certainly not as *axiom* for thinking the totality in the object as real, but as a *problem* for the understanding, consequently for the subject, for the purpose of establishing and continuing, conformably to the completeness in the idea, the regressus in the series of conditions to a given conditioned. For in the sensibility—that is, in time and space—every condition to which we can attain in the exposition of given phenomena is again conditioned, because such are again no objects in themselves, in which the absolutely-unconditioned could in any case take place, but merely empirical representations, that must always find in the intuition their condition, which determines them according to space or time. The principle of reason is therefore properly only a *rule*, which in the series of conditions of given phenomena prescribes a regressus, in which it is never allowed to stop at an absolutely-unconditioned. It is, therefore, no principle of the possibility of experience, and of the empirical cognition of the objects of the senses, consequently no principle of the understanding; for each experience is enclosed in its limits (agreeably to the given intuition); also no *constitutive principle* of reason, for extending the conception of the sensible world beyond all possible experience, but a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension of experience, according to which no empirical limit must be valid as absolute limit—consequently a principle of reason, which as *rule*, postulates what is to occur from us in the regressus, and does not *anticipate* what is given in itself, in the *object*, before all regressus. I therefore term it, a *regulative principle* of reason; whilst, on the contrary, the principle of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions as given in itself in the object (in the phenomena), would be a constitutive cosmological principle, the nullity of which I have wished to show, and thereby to hinder, through this very distinction, that



we should attribute objective reality, as else it unavoidably happens (through transcendental subreption), to an idea which merely serves as a rule.

In order duly to determine the sense of this rule of pure reason, it is then previously to be remarked, that it cannot state *what the object is*, but how the empirical *regressus* is to be established, in order to attain to the complete conception of the object. If the first took place, it would be thus a constitutive principle, such as is never possible from pure reason. We cannot, therefore in any way from this, have the intention of saying, that the series of conditions for a given conditioned is in itself finite or infinite; for thereby a mere idea of absolute totality, which only is generated in itself, would think an object that can be given in no experience, since an objective reality, independent of the empirical synthesis, would be conferred upon a series of phenomena. The reason-idea will prescribe, therefore, only a rule to the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which rule, it proceeds from the conditioned by means of conditions subordinate to one another, to the unconditioned, although this last never can be attained. For the absolutely-unconditioned is never at all met with in experience.

For this end the synthesis of a series is now first to be exactly determined, so far as it is never complete. Two expressions usually are made use of with this view, which are to determine something different therein, yet without our knowing how to expose correctly the grounds of this distinction. Mathematicians speak only of a *progressus in infinitum*. Enquirers into conceptions (philosophers) will, in place of this, only allow to be valid the expression of a *progressus in indefinitum*. Without dwelling upon the examination of that scruple which has recommended to these parties such a distinction, and the good or bad use thereof, I shall seek to determine these conceptions exactly in reference to my object.

We may say of a straight line, with propriety, that it may be prolonged to infinity, and the distinction here of the difference of the infinite and of the indeterminably extended progress (*progressus in indefinitum*) would be a mere subtlety. For, although, if it be said, a line is continued, it certainly sounds more correctly, if we add, in *indefinitum*, than when it is said, in *indefinitum*, inasmuch as the first means nothing more than, prolong it as far as you like, but the second, that *you ought* never to cease to prolong it (which in this case is not the point); yet if the question is only as to *being able*, the first expression is, in this way, quite correct, for you can always make it greater to infinity. And it is the same also in all cases where we speak of the *progressus*, that is, of the passage from the condition to the conditioned, for this possible passage proceeds in the series of phenomena to infinity. From two ancestors you may proceed in a descending line of generation without end, and likewise very well suppose that this proceeds really so in the world. For in this case reason never requires absolute totality of the series, since it does not suppose such as condition and as given (*datum*), but only as something conditioned which is only giveable (*dabilis*), and is added to without end.

It is quite otherwise with the problem—how far the *progressus* extends, which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions in a series; whether I can say, it is a *retrogradation to infinity*, or only an *undeterminably wide (in indefinitum) extending itself retrogradation*; and whether I can ascend therefore from the men now living, upwards to infinity in the series of their ancestors; or whether it can only be said, that so far also as I have gone backwards, an empirical foundation is never found for holding the series any where as limited; so that I am justified, and at the same time bound to seek out, though not precisely to presuppose for each of the ancestors, his forefather still farther back.

I say then, if the whole has been given in the empirical intuition, the regressus thus proceeds in the series of its internal conditions to infinity. But if only a member of the series is given, from which the regressus is first of all to proceed to the absolute totality, a regressus then only takes place in undetermined extent (in *indefinitum*). Thus it must be said of the division of a matter given within its bounds, (of a body), it proceeds to infinity. For this matter is wholly, consequently with all its possible parts, given in the empirical intuition. Now, as the condition of this whole is its part, and the condition of this part, the part of the part, and so on; and as in this regressus of decomposition, an unconditioned (indivisible) member of this series of conditions is never met with, not only thus is there no where an empirical ground for stopping in the division, but the remoter members of the continuing division are themselves given empirically before this farther progressing division, that is, the division goes on to infinity. On the other hand, the series of ancestors of a given man, is given in no possible experience in its absolute totality, but the regressus still proceeds from each member of this generation to a higher one, so that no empirical limit is to be found, which presents a member as absolutely unconditioned. But as however also the members which could give the condition for this, do not lie already in the empirical intuition of the whole prior to the regressus, such does not in this way proceed to infinity (in the division of the given), but in indeterminable extent, in the search after more members for the given, which again at all times are only given conditioned.

In neither of the two cases, equally in the *regressus in infinitum*, as in that in *indefinitum*, is the series of conditions, ever looked at as given infinitely in the object. They are not things, which in themselves, but only phenomena, which, as conditions of

one another, are given in the regressus itself. The question therefore is no longer, how great the series of conditions is in itself, whether finite or infinite, for it is nothing in itself, but how we should institute the empirical regressus, and how far we should continue it. And there is then an important difference in respect of the rule of this continuation. If the Whole have been empirically given, *it is thus possible* to go back *to infinity* in the series of its internal conditions. But if that whole be not given, but first of all is to be given through the empirical regressus, I can then only say; it is *possible* to proceed to still higher conditions of the series *to infinity*. In the first case I might say, there always exist more members and empirically given, than I attain to through the regressus, (of decomposition), but in the second, I can still always proceed further on in the regressus, because no member is given empirically as absolutely unconditioned, and consequently ever admits a higher member as possible, and the enquiry therefore in respect of the same as necessary. There (*in the first case*) it was necessary to *meet with* more members in the series, but here (*in the second*) is it always necessary to *enquire* after more, because no experience limits absolutely. For you have either no perception, which absolutely limits your empirical regressus, and then you must hold your regressus as not completed, or you have such a perception limiting your series, and then this cannot be a part of your pervaded series (since that which limits must be distinguished from that which thereby is limited); and you must therefore also continue further your regressus to this condition, and so on.

The following section will set these observations, by reason of their application, in their true light.

## OF THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

## NINTH SECTION.

## OF THE

EMPIRICAL USE OF THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF  
REASON IN RESPECT OF ALL COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS.

As there is, as we have several times shown, no transcendental use, whether of pure understanding or pure reason-conceptions—as the absolute totality of the series of conditions in the sensible world rests only upon a transcendental use of reason, which requires this unconditioned completeness as to that which it presupposes as thing in itself; but as the sensible world does not contain the like, the question can thus never be more, as to the absolute quantity of the serieses in this (*the sensible world*), whether these may be limited or unlimited in themselves—but only, how far we should go back in the empirical regressus, by the re-conducting of experience to its conditions, in order according to the rule of reason to stop at no other answer to the questions, than that adapted to the object of this reason.

There is therefore only the validity of the *principle of reason*, as a rule of *continuation* and quantity of a possible experience, which alone remains to us, inasmuch as we have sufficiently shown its invalidity, as a constitutive principle of phenomena in themselves. If also we can indubitably show such validity, the contest of reason with itself is entirely terminated, since by means of critical solution, not only the appearance which set this reason at variance with itself has been done away with, but in place of this, the sense in which reason accorded with itself, and the misconstruction of which sense alone, occasioned the contest, is disclosed, and an otherwise *dialectical* principle is

changed into a *doctrinal* one. Indeed, if this principle according to its subjective condition, can be confirmed, in determining the greatest possible use of the understanding in experience, conformable to the objects thereof, it is then just precisely the same, as if it, as an axiom (which is impossible from pure reason) determined the objects in themselves *à priori*; for this could not have, in respect of the objects of experience, any greater influence upon the extension and rectification of our cognition, than as it shows itself effective in the most extensive empirical use of our understanding.

## 1.

SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA  
OF THE  
TOTALITY OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE PHENOMENA OF A UNIVERSE.

Here, as well as in the remaining cosmological questions, the foundation of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition; that in the empirical regressus no *experience of an absolute whole*, consequently, of no condition which as such is *empirically absolutely unconditioned*, can be met with. But the reason of this is, that such an experience must contain in itself, a limitation of the phenomena through nothing or the void, whereupon the continued regressus could fall by means of a perception, which is impossible.

Now this proposition which states precisely this, that I, in the empirical regressus, always only arrive at a condition, which itself again must be looked as empirically conditioned—contains the rule in terminis—that, however far I might even be arrived therewith in the ascending series, I must always enquire after a higher member of the series, whether the same be known or not to me by means of experience only.

Now for the solution of the first cosmological problem

nothing farther is required, but only to decide, whether in the regressus to the unconditioned magnitude of the whole universe, (according to time and space,) this never limited ascending, can be termed a *regression to infinity* or only an *indeterminably continued regressus*, (in indefinitum.)

The mere general representation of the series of all past states of the world, together with the things which are co-existent in the space of the world, is itself nothing else but a possible empirical regressus, which I think, although still undeterminedly, and whereby the conception of such a series of conditions to the given perception alone can arise.\* Now I have always the universe only in the conception, but by no means (as a whole) in the intuition. Therefore I cannot conclude from its magnitude as to the magnitude of the regressus, and determine this last magnitude agreeably to the first, but I must first of all make to myself a conception of the magnitude of the world by means of the magnitude of the empirical regressus. But as to this, I never know anything more, but that I must always advance empirically from each given member of the series of conditions to a still higher (more distant) member. Consequently the magnitude of the whole of the phenomena is thereby not at all absolutely determined, and, therefore, we cannot say that this regressus proceeds to infinity, since this would anticipate the members wherein the regressus has not arrived, and would represent their number so great that no empirical synthesis could attain thereto, and, consequently would determine the magnitude of the world, prior to the regressus, (although only negatively,) which is impossible. For this is not at all

\* This cosmical series can, therefore, also be neither greater nor less than the possible empirical regressus upon which alone its conception rests. And as this regressus can give no determined infinite, and also just as little, a determined finite (absolutely limited,) it is thence evident, that we can neither admit the magnitude of the world as finite nor infinite, since the regressus (whereby that magnitude is represented) admits neither of the two.

given to me through any intuition, (according to its totality,) and, consequently also, not its magnitude prior to the regressus. Hence, we cannot in any way state anything as to the magnitude of the world in itself, and not even that in it; a regressus in infinitum occurs, but we must seek, according to the rule which determines the empirical regressus in it, the conception of its magnitude. But this rule says nothing more, but that however far we may have reached in the series of empirical conditions, we must admit an absolute limit nowhere, but we must subordinate every phenomenon as conditioned to another as its condition, and to this, therefore, we must farther advance, which is the regressus in indefinitum, which, whilst it determines no magnitude in the object, is clearly enough to be distinguished from that in infinitum.

I cannot, therefore, say, the world is *infinite* in respect of elapsed time, or in respect of space. For such a conception of magnitude, as of a given infinity is empirical, consequently also in respect of the world as an object of the senses, impossible absolutely. I will not, moreover, say, the regressus onwards from a given perception to everything which limits it in a series, equally in space as in elapsed time, proceeds to *infinity*; for this presupposes the infinite magnitude of the world; nor will I say, it is *finite*, for the absolute limit is likewise empirically impossible. I shall, therefore, be able to say nothing of the whole objects of experience, (the sensible world,) but only of the rule, according to which, experience conformably to its object is to be established and continued.

As to the cosmological question, therefore, in respect of the magnitude of the world, the first and negative answer is, the world has no first beginning as to time, and no outermost limit as to space.

For in the contrary case, it would be limited on the one hand by void time, and on the other by void



space. Now since as phenomenon, it cannot be either of the two in itself, for phenomenon is no thing in itself, a perception of the limitation through absolutely void time or void space, must thus be possible, by means of which these extremities of the world would be given in a possible experience. But such an experience, as entirely void of content, is impossible. Therefore an absolute limit of the world is empirically—consequently also absolutely impossible.\*

Hence, then follows, at the same time, the affirmative answer—the regressus in the series of the phenomena of the world, as a determination of the magnitude of the world, goes on in indefinitum, which is just the same as to say; that the sensible world has no absolute magnitude, but that the empirical regressus, (whereby it (*the sensible world*) on the part of its conditions alone can be given,) has its rule, that is, to advance always from every member of the series, as a conditioned, to a still more remote one, (either through its own experience, or the thread of history, or the chain of effects and causes,) and ever to dispense with the extension of the possible empirical use of its understanding; which is indeed then the peculiar and sole business of reason in its principles.

A determined empirical regressus that proceeded unceasingly in a certain kind of phenomena is not hereby prescribed; as for example, that we must always from a man living, proceed upwards in a series of ancestors without expecting a first couple, or in the series of the heavenly bodies without admitting an ultimate sun; but the continuation is only commanded from phenomena to phenomena, although

\* It will be observed that the proof is adduced here in quite another manner to the dogmatical one, previously, in the antithesis of the first antinomy. There we held as valid the sensible world, according to the ordinary and dogmatical mode of representation, as a thing which was given in itself according to its totality, prior to all regressus, and we denied to it, in general, if it did not fill all time and all space, any determined space in either. Consequently the conclusion also was different to that here, that is to say, the real infinity of the same world was concluded upon.

these even should afford no real perception, (if it is too weak according to its degree for our consciousness, in order to become experience,) since, notwithstanding this, they still belong to a possible experience.

All beginning is in time, and all limits of the extended, in space. But space and time are only in the sensible world. Consequently phenomena are only *in the world* conditionally limited, but *the world* itself neither conditioned, nor in an unconditioned manner.

Just on this account, and since the world can never be *wholly given*, and not even the series of conditions for a given conditioned, as cosmical series, the conception of the magnitude of the world is only given through the regressus, and not previous to it, in a collective intuition. But the regressus consists always only in the *determining* of the magnitude, and affords therefore no *determined* conception,—consequently also no conception of a magnitude, which is infinite in respect of a certain measure,—consequently, does not proceed to infinity, (as if it were given,) but in undetermined extent, in order to give a magnitude (to experience), which first of all becomes real by means of this regressus.

## II.

### SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA

#### OF THE

#### TOTALITY OF THE DIVISION OF A GIVEN WHOLE

#### IN THE INTUITION.

If I divide a Whole which is given in the intuition, I proceed in this way from a conditioned to the conditions of its possibility. The division of parts (*subdivisio* or *decompositio*) is a regressus in the series of

these conditions. The absolute totality of this *series* would only then be given, if the regressus could reach to the *simple* parts. But if all parts in a continually proceeding decomposition are ever again divisible, the division thus proceeds, that is, the regressus, from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum; since the conditions (the parts) are contained in the conditioned itself, and as this is wholly given in an intuition enclosed within its limits, they altogether also are therewith given. The regressus must hence not merely be termed a regression in indefinitum, as this the previous cosmological idea alone allowed, where I was to proceed from the conditioned to its conditions, which were given out of this, consequently not thereby co-existently, but which first of all were added in the empirical regressus. Yet notwithstanding this, it is still not by any means allowable to say of such a whole, that is divisible to infinity; that it *consists of infinitely many parts*. For although all parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, still *the whole division* is not thus contained therein, which only consists in the continuing decomposition, or the regressus itself, that first renders the series real. Now as this regressus is infinite, so certainly are all the members (parts) to which it attains—contained in the given whole as *aggregate*—but not the *whole series of the division*, which is successively infinite and never entire, consequently can exhibit no infinite multitude, and no conjunction of the same in a whole.

This general observation may very easily first be applied to space. Each space envisaged in its limits is such a whole, the parts of which in all decomposition are again always spaces, and it is therefore divisible to infinity.

Hence follows also very naturally the second application, to an external phenomenon (body) enclosed in its limits. The divisibility of this is grounded upon the divisibility of space, which constitutes the possibility

of the body as of an extended whole. This *body* is, therefore, divisible to infinity, without still on this account consisting of infinitely many parts.

It certainly seems, that since a body must be represented as substance in space, it will, as to what concerns the law of the divisibility of space, herein be different from this space, for we may certainly very well concede, that the decomposition in this last never can do away with all composition, since then even all space, which has else nothing self-subsisting, would cease, (which is impossible,)—but that provided all composition of matter were abolished in thought, nothing at all would remain over, does not seem to be reconcilable with the conception of a substance, which should be *the subject properly* of all composition, and which must exist still in its elements, although the connexion thereof in space, whereby they formed a body, were annihilated. But it is not the same case, with that which in the *phenomenon* is termed substance, as one would certainly think it of a thing in itself, by means of a pure conception of the understanding. The first (*such substance*) is not absolute subject, but permanent image of the sensibility and nothing but intuition, in which everywhere nothing unconditioned is found.

But now, although this rule of progression to infinity takes place, without any doubt, in the subdivision of a phenomenon as a mere filling of space, yet still it does not hold true, if we would extend it also to the multitude of the parts already separated in a certain way in the given whole, whereby these constitute a quantum discretum. To admit, that in each membered (organized) whole, each part is again membered, and that in such a way, in the breaking up of parts to infinity, we find always new artificial parts—in a word, that the whole is membered to infinity, does not allow itself at all to be thought, although certainly that the parts of matter in their decomposition to infinity, could be membered. For the infinity of the division

of a given phenomenon in space, grounds itself alone upon this, that through such, merely the divisibility, that is, an in itself absolutely undetermined multitude of parts is given, and yet that parts themselves are only determined and given by means of the subdivision; in short, that the Whole is not already divided in itself. The division therefore can determine in the same a multitude, which extends as far as we will advance in the regressus of the division. On the contrary, in a membered organized body to infinity, the whole is already represented by this very conception as divided, and a multitude of parts in itself determined but infinite, is found therein, prior to all regressus of the division; whereby we contradict ourselves; since this infinite envelopment is looked upon, as a never to be completed series, (infinite,) and yet, notwithstanding, as completed in a composition. The infinite division denotes only the phenomenon as quantum continuum, and is inseparable from the filling of space, because precisely in this lies the ground of the infinite divisibility. But so soon as something is adopted as quantum discretum, the multitude of unities is thus therein determined, consequently likewise at all times equal to a number. How far, therefore, organization may go in a membered body, experience can only make out, and, although, it has not attained with certainty to any inorganic part, such must still, at least, lie in possible experience. But how far the transcendental division of a phenomenon in general extends, is no concern at all of experience, but a principle of reason, never to hold the empirical regressus in the decomposition of the extended, according to the nature of this phenomenon, as absolutely completed.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION  
TO THE SOLUTION  
OF THE MATHEMATICAL-TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS,  
AND PREFACE TO THE SOLUTION  
OF THE DYNAMICAL-TRANSCENDENTAL ONES.

As we represented in a table, the antinomy of pure reason through all the transcendental ideas, and as we indicated the ground of this opposition, and the only means of obviating it, which consisted in this, that both of the contradictory assertions should be explained as false; we have thus everywhere represented the conditions as belonging to their conditioned, according to relationships of space and time, which is the usual supposition of the ordinary human understanding, and whereupon also then such opposition wholly rested. In this respect, likewise, all dialectical representations of totality in the series of conditions to a given conditioned, were absolutely of the like *kind*. It was always a series, wherein the condition with the conditioned, as members of it, were connected, and thereby *homogeneous*, as then the regressus was never to be thought as completed; otherwise, if this were to happen, an in itself conditioned member must be taken erroneously as a first one, and consequently as unconditioned. Certainly, therefore, the object, that is, the conditioned, was every where considered, but yet the series of conditions for this, was not simply according to their quantity, and therein consisted the difficulty, which could not be done away with by any compromise, but only by means of a complete cutting of the knot, in this way, that reason made it *either too long or too short* for the understanding, so that this (*the understanding*) could never come equal to the idea of that (*reason*).

But we have, here,\* overlooked an essential difference that reigns amongst the objects, that is, amongst

the conceptions of the understanding, which reason seeks to elevate into ideas, inasmuch as, namely, according to our preceding table of the categories, two thereof signify a *mathematical*, but the other two a *dynamical* synthesis of phenomena. And up to this point this might very easily occur, because, in the same way, as in the general representation of all transcendental ideas, we have always stopped at conditions in the *phenomenon*, precisely so had we likewise in the two mathematical-transcendental ones, no other *object* than that in the *phenomenon*. But, now, that we proceed to the *dynamical* conceptions of the understanding, so far as they are to agree with the ideas of reason, the distinction in question becomes important, and opens to us quite a new view, as regards that contest wherein reason is entangled, and which, as it was based before on both sides upon false suppositions was *set aside*, now that, perhaps, in the dynamical antinomy such a supposition occurs, as may co-exist with the pretension of reason—and as the judge supplies the want of argument that had been, on both sides, misunderstood, satisfaction may be *afforded* on both parts, which was not to be effected in the contest of the mathematical antinomy.

The series of conditions are certainly so far all homogeneous, that we only see from the *extension* thereof, whether they are conformable to the ideas, or whether these ideas are too great for those conditions or too small. But the understanding-conception that lies at the foundation of these ideas, contains either only a *synthesis of the homogeneous*, (which is presupposed in every quantity—in the composition as well as in the division of the same,) or yet of the *heterogeneous*; which may, at least, be conceded in the dynamical synthesis, as well of the causal conjunction as of that of the necessary with the contingent.

Hence it happens, that in the mathematical connexion of the series of phenomena, none other than

*sensible* condition can occur, that is, such a one, as itself is a member of the series; whilst on the contrary the dynamical series of sensible conditions admits yet moreover an heterogeneous condition, which is not a part of the series, but as intelligible merely, lies out of the series, whereby satisfaction is then afforded to reason, and the unconditioned is set before phenomena, without thereby disturbing the series of the last as always conditioned, and breaking it off, as contrary to the principles of the understanding.

Now, from this, that the dynamical ideas allow a condition of phenomena independent of their series, that is, such a one as is not itself phenomenon, something takes place, which is quite distinct from the consequence of the antinomy. This antimony for instance caused, that both dialectical opposite assertions must be declared to be false. On the contrary, the absolutely-conditioned of the dynamical serieses which is inseparable from them as phenomena—connected indeed with the empirically unconditioned, but also *nonsensible* condition—satisfies the *understanding* on the one hand, and *reason* on the other;\* and whilst the dialectical arguments fall away, that sought unconditioned totality in mere phenomena, in one or the other manner—on the other hand, the propositions of reason in the, by this means, corrected sense, *may be both true*, which can never take place in the cosmological ideas that concern mere mathematical unconditioned unity, because in them no condition of the series of phenomena is met with but that which is itself also phenomenon, and as such therewith constitutes a member of the series.

\* For the understanding allows amongst *phenomena* no condition, which itself should be unconditioned. But if an *intelligible* condition which hence did not also belong in the series of phenomena as a member to a conditioned (in the phenomenon) is conceivable, without however thereby interrupting in the least the series of empirical conditions; such a one might thus be admitted as *empirically unconditioned*, so that no interruption thereby occurred anywhere to the empirical continuing regressus.



## III.

SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS  
OF THE TOTALITY OF THE DEDUTION OF THE EVENTS  
OF THE WORLD FROM THEIR CAUSES.

We can only imagine two kinds of causality in respect of that which happens, either according to *nature*, or from *liberty*. The first is the connexion of a state with a preceding one in the sensible world, whereupon such state succeeds according to a rule. Now as the *causality* of phenomena rests upon conditions of time, and the previous state, if it had always been, would still have produced no effect, which first of all arises in time, causality of the cause of that which happens or commences, has thus also *commenced*, and again requires itself, according to the principles of the understanding, a cause.

On the contrary, I understand by liberty, in the cosmological sense, the faculty of beginning of oneself a state, the causality whereof, therefore, does not stand according to the laws of nature, again under another cause, which determines it according to time. Liberty is in this meaning a transcendental idea, which, firstly, contains nothing borrowed from experience, and the object of which, secondly, can be given determined in no experience, since it is a general law, even of the possibility of all experience, that everything which happens must have a cause: consequently also the causality of the cause, which *itself has happened* or arisen, again must have a cause: whereby then the whole field of experience, however far it may extend, is changed into a complex of mere nature. But, as in such a way no absolute totality of the conditions in causal relationship is hence to be obtained, reason thus creates for

itself the idea of a spontaneity, that might begin to act from itself, without that another cause need be premised, to determine this again to action according to the law of causal connexion.

It is especially remarkable, that upon this *transcendental* idea of *liberty*, its practical conception is grounded, and the one, (*the idea*) constitutes in the other (*liberty*) the particular moment of difficulties that have ever encompassed the question, as to its possibility. *Liberty*, in the *practical* sense, is the independence of the will from *necessity*, through impulses of sensibility. For a will is *sensible* so far as it is *pathologically* affected, (by means of impelling causes of the sensibility;) it is termed *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*,) if it can be pathologically necessitated. The human will is certainly, an *arbitrium sensitivum*, but not *brutum*, but *liberum*, since sensibility does not render its action necessary, but a faculty dwells in man, for determining of himself, independent of compulsion from sensible impulses.

We see easily, that if all causality were mere nature in the sensible world, each event would then be determined by means of another in time, according to necessary laws, and consequently, as the phenomena so far as they determine the will, must render necessary every action as their natural consequence, the doing away with transcendental liberty would in this way annihilate at the same time all practical liberty. For this last presupposes, that although nothing has happened, it still might have happened; and its cause in the phenomena, therefore, was not so determining, that a causality did not lie in our will independent of the natural causes alluded to, and even against their power and influence for producing something, which is determined in the order of time according to empirical laws—consequently for beginning a series of events *wholly of itself*.

There happens, therefore, in this case, what is

generally met with in the opposition of reason, venturing itself out beyond the limits of possible experience, that the problem is not properly *physiological* but *transcendental*. Consequently the question as to the possibility of liberty attacks in fact Psychology, but as it reposes upon dialectical arguments of mere pure reason, the solution altogether thereof must only engage transcendental philosophy. And, in order to place this, which can never refuse a satisfactory answer as to the point, in a state for that purpose, I must first endeavour by means of an observation, to determine more exactly its procedure in this question.

If phenomena were things in themselves—consequently space and time forms of the existence of things in themselves—the conditions would then with the conditioned as members, always belong to one and the same series, and hence likewise in the present case, the antinomy would arise, which is common to all transcendental ideas, that the series unavoidably must result too great or too small for the understanding. But the dynamical conceptions of reason, wherewith we occupy ourselves in this and the following section, have this in particular, that, as they have not to do with an object, considered as quantity, but only with its *existence*, we may make abstraction of the quantity of the series of conditions; and the point is in respect of them, merely as to the dynamical relationship of the condition to the conditioned, so that in the question as to nature and liberty, we already meet with the difficulty, whether liberty is possible, even generally, and if it be so, whether it can subsist together with the universality of the natural law of causality; consequently, whether it is a correct disjunctive proposition, that each effect in the world must arise from nature or from liberty, or whether, perhaps, they may not take place at the same time in different relationship, in one and the same event. The correctness of such proposition, as to the general dependence of all

events in the sensible world, according to immutable natural laws, stands firm already as a principle of transcendental Analytick, and suffers no exception. The question, therefore, is only, whether, notwithstanding this, in respect of the very effect which is determined according to nature, liberty can also take place, or whether this is not excluded by that inviolable rule. And here the general indeed, but deceitful presupposition of the *absolute reality* of phenomena manifests immediately its disadvantageous influence in embarrassing reason. For if phenomena be things in themselves, liberty is then not to be defended. Nature is then the complete, and in itself sufficiently determining cause of every event, and the condition thereof is always contained only in the series of phenomena, which, together with their effect, are necessary from the law of nature. If, on the other hand, phenomena are valid for nothing more than they in fact are, that is to say, not for things in themselves, but mere representations that cohere according to empirical laws, they must, themselves, in this way yet have grounds which are not phenomena. But such an intelligible cause in respect of its causality, is not determined through phenomena, although its effects appear, and thus might be determined through other phenomena. It is, therefore, together with its causality, out of the series—but, on the contrary, its effects are found in the series of the empirical conditions. The effect, therefore, in respect of its intelligible causes, may, therefore, be looked upon as free, and still at the same time in respect of phenomena, as consequence therefrom, according to the necessity of nature, a distinction which, provided it is propounded in general and wholly abstractedly, must appear extremely subtle and obscure, but which explains itself in the application. Here, have I only wished to make the observation, that as the general coherence of all phenomena in a context of nature is a continual law, this must

overthrow necessarily all liberty, if we would adhere obstinately to the reality of phenomena. Consequently also, those who follow the common opinion therein, never have been able to attain this, to reconcile Nature and Liberty with one another.

POSSIBILITY OF CAUSALITY  
THROUGH LIBERTY  
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GENERAL LAW OF THE  
NECESSITY OF NATURE.

I name that *intelligible* in an object of the senses, which itself is not phenomenon. If, therefore, that which must be looked at in the sensible world as phenomenon, have also in itself a faculty which is no object of sensible intuition, but whereby still it may be the cause of phenomena, we may thus consider the *causality* of this being in two respects, as *intelligible* as to its *action*, as of a thing in itself, and as *sensible* as to the *effects* thereof, as of a phenomenon in the sensible world. We would then make of the faculty of such an object, an empirical and at the same time also an intellectual conception of its causality, which occur together in one and the same effect. Such a double way of thinking the faculty of an object of the senses, contradicts none of the conceptions that we have to make to ourselves of phenomena, and of a possible experience. For, as to these, since they are no things in themselves, a transcendental object must lie at their foundation, that determines them as mere representations, nothing then prevents that we should not attribute to this transcendental object, independent of the property whereby it appears, also a *causality* which is not phenomenon, although its *effect* still is found in the phenomenon. But every effective cause must have a *character*, that is, a law of its causality, without which

it would not at all be cause. And then we should have in a subject of the sensible world, first, an *empirical character* whereby its actions as phenomena would stand absolutely in dependence with other phenomena according to constant laws of nature, and could be deduced therefrom as their conditions, and, therefore, in connexion with these formed members of an only series of the order of nature. Secondly, we must besides accord to it an *intelligible character*, whereby it is certainly the cause of such actions as phenomena, but itself is subjected to no conditions of sensibility, and is not even phenomenon. We might term the first, the character of such a thing in the phenomenon, the second, the character of the thing itself.

Now this acting Subject would, according to its intelligible character, stand under no conditions of time, as time is only the condition of phenomena, but not of things in themselves. In it, no *action* would *arise* or *vanish*, consequently also would it not be subjected to the law of all determination of time—of all that is changeable: that *Every thing which happens* meets with its cause *in the phenomena* (of the preceding state.) In a word, the causality of the same, so far as such is intellectual, does not stand at all in the series of empirical conditions, which render the event in the sensible world necessary. This intelligible character could, in fact, never be known immediately, because we can perceive nothing except so far as it appears, but it must be thought nevertheless conformably to the empirical character, in the same way, as we must in general lay in thought, a transcendental object at the foundation of phenomena, although we certainly know nothing of it, as to what it may be in itself.

According to its empirical character this subject would therefore as phenomenon, be subjected according to all laws of the determination, to causal conjunction, and it would be so far, nothing but a part of the sensible world, the effects of which in the

same way as every other phenomenon, inevitably flowed from nature. As external phenomena influence this subject—as its empirical character, that is, the law of its causality, was known by experience—all the actions of it must be explicable according to natural laws, and all requisites for a perfect and necessary determination of them, must be found in a possible experience.

But, according to the intelligible character of the same (although we certainly can have nothing thereof except, merely, the general conception of it,) this subject must still be declared free from all influence of sensibility and determination through phenomena, and as nothing occurs in it, so far as it is *noumenon*, nor any change which requires dynamical determination of time, consequently no connexion is found with phenomena as causes, this active being would so far thus be free and independent of all natural necessity, as this is met with only in the sensible world. We should say very properly of it, that it begins of itself its actions in the sensible world, without the action beginning in it itself; and this would be valid, without that the effects in the sensible world need on this account to begin of themselves, since they are previously always determined therein, by means of empirical conditions in the previous time, but still only by means of the empirical character, (which is simply the phenomenon of the intelligible,) and only are possible, as a continuation of the series of natural causes. Thus then liberty and nature, each in its complete signification, are found in the self-same actions co-existently and without any contradiction, accordingly as we compare them with their intelligible or sensible cause.

EXPLANATION  
OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF A LIBERTY  
IN CONJUNCTION  
WITH THE GENERAL NECESSITY OF NATURE.

I have thought it well to sketch, first, the contour of the solution of our transcendental problem, so that thereby we might better observe the march of reason in the solution of it. Now we will expose the moments of its decision, as to which the question strictly is, and we will take into consideration each, particularly.

The law of nature, that every thing which happens has a cause, that the causality of this cause, or the *action*, since it precedes in time and in consideration of an effect, which inasmuch as *having arisen*, may itself not always have been but must have *happened*, has also its cause amongst the phenomena whereby it is determined,—and that consequently all events are empirically determined in an order of nature; this law, by means of which phenomena first of all can constitute a *Nature* and give objects of experience, is a law of the understanding, from which it is permitted to deviate under no pretence, or therefrom to substract any phenomenon—as otherwise we should place such out of all possible experience, and thereby separate them from all objects of possible experience, and make them into a mere thing of thought and a chimera of the brain.

But although in this case the question is only looked at according to a chain of causes, which does not allow at all, in the regressus to its conditions, of any *absolute totality*, this difficulty still does not in any way restrain us, for it has already been obviated in the general examination of the antinomy of reason, when it proceeds in the series of phenomena to the unconditioned. If we would yield to the deception



of transcendental Realism, there then remains neither nature nor liberty. In this case the question only is, whether, if we acknowledge in the total series of all events, pure natural necessity, it is still possible to consider the same, which on the one side is mere natural effect, still on the other, as effect from liberty, or whether between these two kinds of causality an exact contradiction is met with.

Amongst causes in the phenomenon, there can surely be nothing which could begin a series absolutely and of itself. Every action, as phenomenon, so far as it produces an event, is itself event or occurrence, which presupposes another state, wherein the cause is met with, and thus every thing that happens, is only a continuation of the series; and no beginning which occurs of itself, is possible in the same. Consequently, all the actions of the natural causes in the succession of time are themselves again effects, which presuppose also equally their causes in the succession of time. An *original* action, whereby something happens that was not previously, is not to be expected from the causal connexion of phenomena.

But is it then also necessary, that, if the effects are phenomena, the causality of their cause, which (*i.e.* which cause) is itself also phenomenon, must be only empirical? and is it not rather possible, that although for each effect in the phenomenon, a connexion with its cause is certainly according to the laws of empirical causality required, still this empirical causality itself, without interrupting in the least its coherence with natural causes, might still be an effect of a non-empirical but intelligible causality? that is, of an original action of a cause, in respect of phenomena, which, therefore, so far is not phenomenon, but is according to this faculty intelligible, although as to what is besides, it must entirely be reckoned with the sensible world, as a member of the chain of nature.

We require the principle of the causality of phenomena amongst one another, in order to seek and to be able to furnish natural conditions for natural events, that is, causes in the phenomenon. If this be admitted and weakened by no exception, the understanding, which, in its empirical use, sees nothing but nature in all occurrences, and likewise is therein justified, has thus every thing that it can find, and physical explanations proceed without interruption. It does not then do the least detriment to it, granted even moreover that it should be merely fiction, when it is admitted that amongst the natural causes there are also some which possess a faculty which is intelligible only, since the determination thereof to action never rests upon empirical conditions, but upon mere principles of the understanding—yet still so, that the *action in the phenomenon* of this cause is conformable to all the laws of empirical causality. For in this way the acting subject would, as *causa phaenomenon*, be linked with nature in inseparable dependence of all its actions, and only the phenomenon of this subject, (with all causality thereof in the phenomenon,) would contain certain conditions which, if we wish to ascend from the empirical object to the *transcendental*, must be considered as merely intelligible. For, if we only follow the rule of nature in that which may be cause amongst phenomena, we may thus be unconcerned as to what is thought in the transcendental subject, which to us is empirically unknown, as a foundation of these phenomena and their coherence. This intelligible foundation does not disturb at all the empirical questions, but concerns, perhaps, merely thought in the pure understanding, and although the effects of this thought and this action of the pure understanding are met with in phenomena, still nevertheless, these must thus be quite explicable from their cause in the phenomenon, according to natural laws, inasmuch as we follow their merely empirical character as

the ultimate ground of explanation, and pass by the intelligible character, which is the transcendental cause of the other, as wholly unknown, only except so far as it is given through the empirical one, as its sensible sign. Let us apply this to experience. Man is one of the phenomena of the sensible world, and so far, likewise, one of the natural causes, the causality of which must be subjected to empirical laws. As such he must, therefore, possess an empirical character, as well as all other things of nature. We remark the same by means of forces and faculties which he manifests in his operations. In unanimated, or merely brute-like animated nature, we find no ground for thinking any faculty in ourselves, otherwise than merely conditioned. But the man who else knows the whole of nature simply only by means of the senses, cognizes himself also through mere apperception, and, in fact in actions and internal representations, which he cannot at all refer to the impression of the senses, and is himself assuredly, on the one hand phenomenon, but on the other, namely, in respect of certain faculties, a mere intelligible object, because the action of such cannot be referred at all to the receptivity of the sensibility. We term these faculties understanding and reason; the latter especially is distinguished quite peculiarly and in a pre-eminent manner from all empirical conditioned forces, inasmuch as it considers its objects merely according to ideas, and determines the understanding accordingly, which then makes an empirical use of its (in fact, even pure) conceptions.

Now that this reason has causality, at least that we represent to ourselves such a one therein, is clear from the *Imperatives* which we assign as rules to the forces exercised in all that is practical. The word *ought* expresses a kind of necessity and connexion with grounds that does not else occur in the whole of nature. The understanding can only cognize as to

this nature what *is*, or has been, or will be. It is impossible that something therein *ought to be*, different from that which it indeed is, in all these relationships of time—nay, the *ought*, if we have merely the course of nature in view, has no meaning at all. We cannot at all enquire, what ought to happen in nature, just as little as, what properties the circle should have—but what does happen therein, (*in nature*,) and what properties the latter (*the circle*) has.

Now this *ought* expresses a possible action, whereof the ground is nothing but a mere conception, whilst on the other hand, the ground of a mere action of nature must always be a phenomenon. The action then must certainly be possible under natural conditions, if the ought is directed to it, but these natural conditions do not concern the determination of the will itself, but only the effect and the consequence of it in the phenomenon. There may ever so many natural grounds which compel me to *will*, ever so many sensible encouragements, yet cannot they produce the *ought*, but only a will, still far from necessary, but at all times conditioned—to which, on the contrary, the ought which reason proclaims, sets up in opposition, moderation and a term, nay, in fact, interdiction and authority. If there be an object of mere sensibility, (the agreeable,) or even of pure reason, (the good,) reason does not give place to that ground which is empirically given, and does not follow the order of things, so far as they are exhibited in the phenomenon, but makes to itself, with complete spontaneousness, a particular order according to ideas, in which it adapts the empirical conditions, and agreeably to these it thus, in fact, declares actions as necessary which have not yet happened, and perhaps will not happen, but yet premises as to all, that reason may have causality in reference to them, for without that, it would not expect from its ideas, effects in experience.

Now let us stand still at this point, and at least admit it as possible, that reason has really causality in respect of phenomena—thus, however much it may be reason, it must still show of itself an empirical character, because every cause presupposes a rule whereupon certain phenomena follow as effects, and every rule requires a uniformity of effects which founds the conception of the cause, (as of a faculty,) which conception we can term, so far as it must be manifest from mere phenomena, its empirical character, which is constant, since the effects according to the difference of the accompanying, and in part limiting conditions, appear in changeable forms.

Even man then has thus an empirical character of his arbitrament, which is nothing else but a certain causality of his reason, so far as this evidences in its effects a rule, whereupon we may admit the grounds of reason and the actions thereof according to their kind and their degrees, and judge the subjective principles of our will. Since this empirical character itself must be derived from the phenomena as effect, and from the rule thereof which experience affords, all actions of man are thus determined in the phenomenon from his empirical character, and other co-operating causes according to the order of nature, and if we could investigate all phenomena of his will to the foundation, there would be no single human action that we could not predict with certainty, and cognize as necessary from its previous conditions. In respect of this empirical character there is therefore no liberty, and yet according to such alone can we consider man if we only *observe*, and as it happens in anthropology, we will investigate physiologically the impelling causes of his actions.

But if we consider these self-same actions in reference to reason, and not in fact that which is speculative, in order to *explain* such, in respect to their origin, but entirely only, sofar as reason is the

cause of itself *producing* them—in a word, if we compare them with this reason in a *practical* view, we, in this way, find quite another rule and order, than what is the order of nature. For then, perhaps, *ought* all that *not to have happened*, which, notwithstanding, according to the course of nature *has happened*, and must happen infallibly, according to its empirical grounds. But sometimes we find, or at least we believe we find, that the ideas of reason have really shown causality in respect of the actions of man, as phenomena; and that these have happened for this reason, not because they were determined through empirical causes—no, not at all, but because they are determined through grounds of reason.

Granted now that we could say, reason has causality in respect of the phenomenon—the action thereof might then well be termed free, as in the empirical character of it (the sensible mode) it is exactly determined and necessary. This character is again determined in the intelligible one (the mode of thought). But the last we do not know, but designate it by means of phenomena, which properly give the sensible mode only (the empirical character) to be cognized.\* Now the action, so far as it is attributed to the mode of thought as its cause, still does not at all result therefrom according to empirical laws, that is, in such a way, that the conditions of pure reason *precede*, but only so, that the effects thereof do, in the phenomenon of the internal sense. Pure reason, as a mere intelligible faculty is not subjected to the form of time, and consequently also to the conditions of the succession of time. The causality of reason does not *originate* in the intelligible character, or

\* The particular morality of actions (merit and blame) therefore remains wholly concealed from us, even that of our own conduct. Our imputations can only be referred to the empirical character. But how much pure effect thereof is to be attributed to liberty, how much to mere nature, and to the innocent defect of temperament or the fortunate property of it (*merito fortunæ*) no one can investigate thoroughly, nor thence also decide with perfect justice.

does not for instance begin at a certain time, in order to produce an effect. For otherwise would it be itself subjected to the law of nature of phenomena, so far as this determines the series of causes according to time, and causality would then be nature and not liberty. Consequently we might say—if reason can have causality in respect of phenomena, it is thus a faculty, by means of which the sensible condition of an empirical series of causes first begins. For the condition which lies in reason is not sensible, and therefore begins not of itself. Hence then that takes place which we missed in all empirical serieses; that the *condition* of a successive series of events itself could be empirically unconditioned. For the condition is here out of the series of phenomena (in the intelligible), and consequently subject to no sensible condition, and to no determination of time, by means of preceding causes.

This self-same cause, however, still belongs also in another respect to the series of phenomena. Man is himself phenomenon. His will has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is not any of the conditions which determine man according to this character, which was not contained in the series of natural effects and obeyed the law of the same, according to which law, no empirical unconditioned causality is at all met with of that which occurs in time. Consequently, no given action (since it only can be perceived as phenomenon) can absolutely begin of itself. But we cannot say of reason, that before that state wherein it determines the will, another precedes wherein this state itself is determined. For, as reason itself is no phenomenon, and is not subjected to any conditions of sensibility, no succession of time thus takes place therein, even in respect of its causality, and the dynamical law of nature, therefore, which determines the succession according to rules, cannot be applied to it.

Reason is, consequently, the permanent condition of all arbitrary actions under which man appears. Each of these is previously determined in the empirical character of man, even before it happens. In respect of the intelligible character of which the other is only the sensible schema; no *before* nor *after* is valid, and every action, irrespective of the relationship of time wherein it stands with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason, which therefore acts freely, without being dynamically determined in the chain of natural causes, by means of external or internal, yet according to time, preceding grounds, and this its liberty we cannot only look at negatively as independence from empirical conditions, (for thereby the faculty of reason would cease being a cause of phenomena), but also indicate positively, by means of a faculty of beginning of itself a series of events, in such a way, that in it itself nothing begins—but as unconditioned condition of every arbitrary action, it does not allow above it, according to time, any previous conditions, notwithstanding that its effect still begins in the series of phenomena, but therein can never constitute an absolutely first beginning.

In order to illustrate the regulative principle of reason, by means of an example from the empirical use of the same, not in order to confirm it (for such proofs are unsuitable for transcendental assertions), let us thus take an arbitrary action—for example, a wicked lie, by means of which a man has effected a certain confusion in society, and which we first investigate according to its determining causes, as to how it has arisen, and judge thereon, how it together with its consequences, can be imputed to him. With the first view, we go through his empirical character up to the sources of the same, which we seek for in bad education, evil company, partly also in the malignancy of a natural disposition insensible to shame—partly we



throw it upon levity and inconsiderateness—in this also, we do not leave out of consideration the inducing causes of opportunity. In the whole of this we act, then, as generally in the investigation of the series of determining causes for a given natural effect. Now, although we believe the action to be determined thereby, nevertheless we still blame the agent, and not in fact on account of his unfortunate natural disposition—not on account of circumstances operating upon him—nay, not even indeed on account of his previously bad course of life, for we presuppose that one could wholly set aside the way this was constituted, and the elapsed series of conditions as not happened—and regard this act as wholly unconditioned in respect of the previous state—as if the agent commenced thereby a series of consequences wholly of himself. This reproach grounds itself upon a law of reason, whereby we look upon this reason as a cause, which could and should have determined otherwise the conduct of the man, irrespective of all the stated empirical conditions. And in fact, we do not look at the causality of reason, perhaps, merely as a concurrence, but in itself as perfect, although the sensible motives were not at all in favour, but certainly quite opposed—the action is attributed to his intelligible character—he is then at the instant when he lies, wholly to blame—consequently reason, in spite of all the empirical conditions of the fact, is wholly free, and this act is wholly to be attributed to the neglect of reason.

We see readily in this imputed judgment, that we thereby think reason is not at all affected by means of the sensibility in question, that it does not change (although its phenomena, that is to say, the way in which it manifests itself in its effects, change), that in it, no state precedes, which determines the following—consequently, that it does not belong at all to the series of sensible conditions, which render phenomena neces-

sary according to the laws of nature. It, *reason*, is present and the same, in all the actions of man in all the circumstances of time, but it is not itself in time, and peradventure falls into a new state, wherein it was not previously—it is *determining* in respect of this, but not *determinable*. Consequently, we cannot say why has not reason otherwise determined itself? but only why has it not otherwise determined phenomena by means of its causality? But no answer is here possible. For another intelligible would have given another empirical character, and if we say, that in spite of his whole course of life hitherto led, the liar might still have avoided the lie, this only signifies this, that it (*the lie*) stands immediately under the power of reason; and reason in its causality is subjected to no conditions of phenomenon and course of time—and the difference of time might, indeed, make a main difference in phenomena respectively one with another, but as these are no things—consequently also are not causes in themselves—no difference of the action in reference to reason.

We can, therefore, in the judging of free actions in respect of their causality, reach only to the intelligible cause, but not beyond this—we can know that it is free, that is, determined independently of the sensibility, and in such a manner, may be the sensibly unconditioned condition of phenomena. But why the intelligible character gives these phenomena and this empirical character under existing circumstances—to answer this, surpasses as far every faculty of our reason, nay, all right to ask even as to the same, as if we enquired, wherefore the transcendental object of our external sensible intuition precisely affords *intuition* only in *space*, and not any other. But the problem which we had to solve does not at all compel us to this, for it was only this—whether liberty opposes natural necessity in one and the same action; and

this we have sufficiently answered when we showed, that as in respect to the former (*liberty*), a relation to quite another kind of conditions is possible than in respect of the other (*natural necessity*), the law of the last does not affect the first—consequently both may take place independent of and undisturbed by one another.

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We must remark particularly, that we have not intended by this to prove the *reality* of liberty, as of one of the faculties which contain the causes of the phenomena of our sensible world. For, besides that this would not have been any transcendental consideration, which has merely to do with conceptions, it could not thus moreover succeed, as we never can conclude from experience as to something, which must not at all be thought according to the laws of experience. And besides, we have not at all even wished to show the *possibility* of liberty, for this likewise would not have succeeded, since we cannot cognize in general the possibility of any real ground and of any causality, from mere conceptions *à priori*. Liberty is here treated only as a transcendental idea, whereby reason thinks of beginning absolutely the series of conditions in the phenomenon by means of the sensibly-unconditioned, but thereby involves itself in an antinomy with its own laws, which it prescribes to the empirical use of the understanding. Now, that this antinomy rests upon a mere appearance, and that at least nature does not *contradict* causality from liberty; this was the only thing which we could effect, and was the matter which solely and alone concerned us.

## 4.

## SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA

## OF THE

## TOTALITY OF THE DEPENDENCE OF PHENOMENA ACCORDING TO THEIR EXISTENCE IN GENERAL.

In the preceding number we considered the changes of the sensible world in their dynamic series, as each one is subjected to another, as its cause. And this series of states only serves us as a guide, in order to arrive at an existence, which may be the highest condition of all that is changeable, namely, the *necessary being*. The question in this case is not with respect to the unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned existence of the substance itself. Consequently the series which we have before us, is properly only that of conceptions, and not of intuitions, so far as the one is the condition of the other.

But we easily see, that as every thing is changeable in the complex of phenomena, consequently is conditioned in existence, there can be no where in the series of dependent existence any unconditioned member, whose existence would be absolutely necessary, and that consequently, if phenomena were things in themselves, precisely from this that their condition with the conditioned always belonged to one and the same series of intuitions, a necessary being, as condition of the existence of phenomena of the sensible world, never could take place.

But the dynamic regressus has this peculiar to itself and distinct from the mathematical—that as this last has only to do with the composition of parts for a whole, or with the decomposition of a whole into its parts, the conditions of this series must be re-

garded always as parts thereof—therefore as homogeneous, and consequently as phenomena—instead of which in the first regressus, as the matter is not as to the possibility of an unconditioned whole from given parts, or of an unconditioned part for a given whole, but only as to the deduction of a state from its cause, or of the accidental existence of the substance itself from the necessary one—the condition need not even necessarily constitute an empirical series with the conditioned.

There therefore remains to us, in the apparent antinomy that lies before us, still a way open, inasmuch as, namely, the whole of the two contradictory propositions may be coexistently true in different relationship—in such a way, that all the things of the sensible world may be absolutely contingent, consequently also, always only have empirically-conditioned existence, although still from the whole series, a non-empirical condition likewise, that is, an unconditioned necessary being takes place. For this being, as intelligible condition, would not at all belong to the series as a member of the same (not even as the highest member), and also not make any member of the series empirically unconditioned, but would leave the whole sensible world in its empirically-conditioned existence proceeding through all the members. Hence, this manner of laying at the foundation of phenomena an unconditioned existence, would therein differ from the empirically-unconditioned causality (from liberty) in the preceding article, inasmuch as with liberty, the thing itself as cause (*substantia phenomenon*) still belonged to the series of conditions, and only its *causality* would be thought as intelligible—but here, the necessary being must be thought wholly out of the series of the sensible world (as *ens extramundanum*) and merely intelligible—whereby alone it can be avoided, that it is not even subjected to the law of contingency and dependence of all phenomena.

The *regulative principle* of reason, therefore, in respect of this our problem is—that every thing in the sensible world has empirically conditioned existence, and that there is no where in it, in respect of any property, an unconditioned necessity—that there is no member of the series of conditions, of which we must not always expect, and seek as far as possible, the empirical condition in a possible experience—and that nothing justifies us in deriving any existence of a condition out of the empirical series, or yet holding it in the series itself, as itself absolutely independent and self-subsisting—but nevertheless thereby not at all denying, that the whole series may not be founded in an intelligible being (which on this account is free from all empirical condition, and rather contains the ground of the possibility of all these phenomena).

But in this, it is not all the intention to prove the unconditioned necessary existence of a being, or only even thereupon to found the possibility of a mere intelligible condition of the existence of the phenomena of the sensible world, but only just in the same way as we limit reason, that it may not quit the thread of empirical conditions and run itself into transcendent grounds of explanation, and incapable of exposition in *concreto*, we therefore also, on the other hand, therein limit the law of the mere empirical use of the understanding, so that it does not decide as to the possibility of things in general, and declare the Intelligible—although it is not to be used by us for the explanation of the phenomena—*not*, on that account *to be impossible*. It is consequently only thereby shown, that the universal contingency of all natural things, and of all their (empirical) conditions, may very well subsist, together with the arbitrary supposition of a necessary yet indeed mere intelligible condition—consequently no true contradiction is to be found between these positions—consequently they *both may be true*. Though an absolutely necessary

understanding-being in itself be ever impossible, such nevertheless can by no means be thus concluded from the general contingency and dependence of all that belongs to the sensible world, nor from the principle of stopping at no single member of the same world, so far as it is contingent, and of appealing to a cause external to the world. Reason takes its course in the empirical use, and its particular course in the transcendental one.

The sensible world contains nothing but phenomena, but these are mere representations, which always again are sensibly conditioned, and as we in this case have never things in themselves for our objects, so is it not to be wondered at, that we are never justified in making a spring from one member of the empirical series, whatever it may be, out of the connection of the sensible world, like as if there were things in themselves which existed out of their transcendental motive, and which we could quit in order to seek the cause of their existence out of them—which certainly finally must happen with respect to *contingent* things, but not to mere *representations* of things, the contingency of which even is only phenomenon, and can lead to no other regressus than that which determines the phenomena, that is, which is empirical. But to think an intelligible ground of phenomena—that is of the sensible world, and the same freed from the contingency of the latter, is neither opposed to the unlimited empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, nor to their absolute contingency. But this also is the only thing which we had to perform, for the doing away with the apparent antinomy, and which only can be effected in such way. For, if condition every time for each conditioned (in respect of existence) is sensible, and precisely on that account belongs to the series, it is thus itself again conditioned (as the antithesis of the fourth antinomy shows). There must remain, there-

fore, either a conflict with reason, which requires the unconditioned, or such must be placed out of the series, in the intelligible, whose necessity neither requires nor permits empirical condition—and consequently in respect of phenomena is unconditionally necessary.

The empirical use of reason (in respect of the conditions of existence in the sensible world) is not affected through the admission of a mere intelligible being, but proceeds, according to the principle of absolute contingency, from empirical conditions to higher ones, which always are equally empirical. But this regulative principle excludes also, just as little, the admission of an intelligible cause that is not in the series, provided the question is, as to the pure use of reason (in respect of ends). For then such cause signifies only, the to us merely transcendental and unknown ground of the possibility of the sensible series in general—whose existence, independent of all the conditions of the last (*the sensible series*) and in respect thereof unconditionally necessary, is not at all opposed to the unlimited contingency of the first (*the objects of experience*), and for this reason also, to the never ended regressus in the series of empirical conditions.

#### CONCLUDING OBSERVATION TO THE WHOLE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON.

So long as we have for object with our conceptions of reason, merely the totality of the conditions in the sensible world, and what can happen in respect thereof to the advantage of reason, our ideas in this way are certainly transcendental, but yet *cosmological*. But so soon as we lay down the unconditioned (respecting which the question in fact particularly is) in that which is entirely out of the



sensible world, consequently of all possible experience, the ideas then become *transcendent*; they do not serve merely for the completion of the empirical use of reason (which always remains an idea never completed, but still to be followed up), but they separate themselves wholly therefrom, and make to themselves objects, the matter of which is not taken from experience, and whose objective reality also does not rest upon the completion of the empirical series, but upon pure conceptions *à priori*. The like transcendental ideas have a mere intelligible object, which it is certainly permitted to admit as a transcendental object, as to which besides we know nothing, yet why to think it as a thing determinable by means of its distinguishing and internal predicates, we, on the other hand, have neither grounds of possibility (being independent of all conceptions of experience) nor the least justification for admitting such an object, and which consequently is a mere thing of thought. Nevertheless amongst all cosmological ideas, that which thus gave occasion to the fourth antinomy, urges us to hazard this step. For the existence not at all grounded in itself, but always conditioned of phenomena, requires us to seek after something distinct from all phenomena, consequently an intelligible object, in which this contingency ceases. But since, if we once have taken the permission of admitting out of the field of the whole sensibility, an of itself existing reality—of looking at phenomena only as contingent modes of representation of intelligible objects—of such beings as themselves are intelligences; nothing then more remains for us, but the analogy according to which we make use of the conceptions of experience in order to make to ourselves, in respect of intelligible things as to which in themselves we have not the least knowledge, still some conception. As we can only know the contingent through experience—but the question here

is, as to the things which are not at all to be objects of experience—we must thus deduce the knowledge of them, from that which is necessary in itself; from pure conceptions of things in general. Hence the first step that we make out of the sensible world, compels us to begin our new acquirements from the investigation of the absolutely necessary being, and to derive from the conceptions of this, the conceptions of all things so far as they are merely intelligible; and this attempt we will make in the following chapter.

## THIRD DIVISION.

## OF THE SECOND BOOK OF

## TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

## THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON.

## FIRST SECTION.

## OF THE IDEAL IN GENERAL.

We have before seen, that by means of pure *understanding-conceptions*, without all conditions of sensibility, no objects at all can be represented, since the conditions of their objective reality are wanting, and nothing but the mere form of thought is met with in them. Nevertheless, they can be represented in concreto, if we apply them to phenomena; for they have in them properly the matter for a conception of experience, which is nothing but an understanding-conception in concreto. But ideas are still further removed from objective reality than *categories*; for no phenomenon can be found, wherein they might be represented in concreto. They contain a certain completeness, to which no possible empirical cognition attains, and reason, thereby, has only a systematic unity in mind, to which it seeks to approach the empirical possible unity, without ever fully reaching it.

But still farther than the ideas, that which I term the *Ideal*, appears to be removed from the objective reality, and under which ideal I understand the idea, not merely in concreto but in individuo, that is, as a single thing alone determinable or in fact determined through the idea.

Humanity in its whole perfection, contains not only the extension of all the essential properties belonging to this nature, which constitute our conception thereof, up to the complete congruence with

its ends—which would be our idea of perfect humanity—but likewise every thing that belongs, besides this conception, to the universal determination of the idea; for of all the opposite predicates, one only can be suitable to the idea of the most perfect man. What an ideal is to us, was to *Plato*, an *idea of the divine understanding*, a single object in the pure intuition of the same, the most perfect of each kind of possible beings, and the original of all copies in the phenomenon.

But without ascending so far, we must confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but also ideals which have not indeed, as the *Platonic*-creative, but yet *practical* force, (as regulative principles,) and lie at the foundation of the possibility of the perfection of certain *actions*. Moral conceptions are not wholly pure reason-conceptions, because something empirical (pleasure or pain) lies at the foundation of them. Nevertheless, in respect of the principle whereby reason sets limits to lawless liberty in itself, (consequently when we pay attention merely to its form,) they may very well serve as examples of pure reason-conceptions. Virtue, and with it human wisdom in its whole purity, are ideas. But the sage (of the stoic) is an ideal, that is, a man who merely exists in thought, but who fully accords with the idea of wisdom. In the same way as the idea gives the *rule*, so the ideal serves in such a case as *prototype* of the universal determination of the copy, and we have no other standard of our actions, but the conduct of this divine man within us, wherewith we compare ourselves, judge, and thereby improve ourselves, although we can never attain to the same. These ideals, notwithstanding we might not concede to them objective reality (existence), are still on this account not to be regarded as chimera, but furnish an indispensable standard for reason, which requires the conception of that which is quite perfect in its kind,

in order thereby to estimate and measure the degree and the deficiency of the imperfect. But to wish to realize the ideal in an example, that is, in the phenomenon, as, for instance, the sage in a novel, is not feasible, and has, moreover, something absurd and little edifying in itself, because the natural limits, which detract continually from perfection in the idea, render all illusion impossible in such an attempt, and thereby the good itself, which lies in the idea, even suspected and similar to a mere fiction.

The case is the same with the ideal of reason, which must always rest upon determined conceptions, and serve as rule and prototype, whether for following up or for judging. But it is quite otherwise with those productions of the imagination, as to which no one can explain himself and give an intelligible conception, as it were *Monograms*, that are only individual traits although determined according to no pretended rule, which constitute more an outline floating, as it were, in the midst of different experiences, than a determined image, such as painters and physiognomers pretend to have in their heads, and which must be an incommunicable shadow of their products, or even their judgments. They may, although only improperly be termed ideals of sensibility, since they must be the non-attainable pattern of possible empirical intuitions, and still afford no rule capable of explanation or examination.

The design of reason, with its *ideal*, is, on the contrary, universal determination according to rules *à priori*, consequently, it thinks an object that is to be universally determinable according to principles; although for this, sufficient conditions are wanting in experience and the conception itself is, therefore, transcendent.

## THIRD DIVISION.

## SECOND SECTION.

## OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL.

## (PROTOTYPON TRANSCENDENTALE.)

Every *conception* in respect of that which is not contained in itself, is undetermined, and is subject to the principle of *Determinableness*—that only one of two contradictorily-opposite predicates to each other can belong to it, which reposes upon the proposition of contradiction, and is consequently a mere logical principle, that makes abstraction of all content of cognition, and has nothing under consideration but its logical form.

But every *thing*, according to its possibility, is still subject to the principle of universal determination, according to which, one of all the possible predicates of *things* must belong to it, so far as they are compared with their contraries. This does not rest merely upon the proposition of contradiction ; for it considers, besides the relationship of two predicates opposed to one another, every thing still in relationship to the *whole possibility*, as the complex of all predicates of things in general, and, whilst it presupposes such possibility as condition *à priori*, it so represents every thing, as if it derived its particular possibility,\* from the share which it has in the whole possi-

\* By means of this principle every thing is referred to a common correlative, that is to say, collective possibility, which, if it (that is, the matter for all possible predicates) should be found in the idea of a single thing, an affinity of all that is possible, would be shewn through the identity of the ground of the universal determination of that.—The *determinability* of every conception is the *universality* (*universalitas*) of the principle of the exclusion of a mean between two opposite predicates, but the *determination of a thing* is subjected to the *allness* (*universitas*), or complex of all possible predicates.

bility in question. The principle of the universal determination concerns therefore the matter and not merely the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates that are to constitute the perfect conception of a thing, and not merely of the analytical representation by means of two opposite predicates, and it contains a transcendental presupposition, namely, that of the matter for all *possibility*, which must contain, *à priori*, the data for the *particular* possibility of each thing.

The proposition—*every existing thing is universally determined*, does not only mean, that from every pair of given predicates opposed to each other, but likewise that from all possible predicates, one always belongs to it. By this proposition there is transcendently compared, not merely predicates with one another logically, but the thing itself, with the complex of all possible predicates. It states tantamount to this, that in order to cognize a thing perfectly, we must cognize all that is possible, and thereby determine it, whether affirmatively or negatively. The universal determination is consequently a conception, that we can never exhibit in concreto according to its totality, and is founded therefore upon an idea, that has its seat alone in reason, which prescribes to the understanding the rule of its perfect use.

Now although this idea of the *complex of all possibility*, so far as it lies at the bottom as condition of the universal determination of every thing, in respect of predicates which might compose the same, is itself still undetermined, and that thereby we think nothing further than a complex of all possible predicates in general—we still find, however, in a nearer investigation, that this idea, as original conception, excludes a multitude of predicates, which as derived, are already given by means of others or cannot subsist with one another, and that it refines itself into an universal determined conception, *à priori*, and thereby

the conception of a single object arises, which is determined universally by means of the mere idea, and consequently must be termed an *ideal* of pure reason.

If we consider all possible predicates, not merely logical but transcendental, that is, according to their content, which can be thought in them *à priori*, we thus find, that through some of them a state of being, through others a state of non-being, is represented. The logical negative which is only designated by the word, not, never properly adheres to a conception, but only to the relationship of this with another conception in the judgment, and therefore cannot by any means be sufficient for this, to designate a conception in respect of its content. The expression—not mortal, cannot at all give to understand, that thereby a mere non-being is represented in the object, but it leaves all content untouched. On the other hand, a transcendental negation means non-being in itself, to which the transcendental affirmation is opposed, which is a something, the conception of which in itself already expresses a state of being, and therefore is termed reality (*sachheit*), since through it alone, and so far as it extends, objects are something (things)—on the contrary, the opposed negation signifies a mere deficiency, and where this negation alone is thought, the annihilation of every thing is represented.

Now no one can think a negation determined, without he has laid at the foundation, the opposite affirmation. He that is born blind, cannot make to himself the least representation of darkness, because he has not any of light; nor the savage of poverty, because he does not know prosperity.\* The ignorant

\* The observations and the calculations of astronomers have taught us much that is wonderful, but the most important certainly is, that they have exposed the abyss of *ignorance*, which human reason, without this knowledge, could have never represented to itself as so great, and as to which reflection must produce a great change in the determination of the final ends of our use of reason.



man has no conception of his ignorance, because ~~he~~ has not any of science, &c. All conceptions of negation therefore are likewise derived, and the realities contain the *data*, and as it may be said, the matter or the transcendental content, for the possibility and universal determination of all things.

If, therefore, a transcendental substratum is laid at the foundation of the universal determination in our reason, which contains, as it were, the whole stock of the matter, whence all possible predicates of things may be taken, this substratum is thus nothing else, but the idea of an All of reality (*omnitudo realitatis*). All true negations are then nothing but *limits*, which, they could not be termed, if the unlimited (the all) did not lie at the foundation.

But there is, likewise, represented by means of this all-possession of reality, the conception of a *thing in itself* as universally determined, and the conception of an entis realissimi is the conception of a single being, since of all possible opposing predicates, one, namely that which belongs absolutely to the state of being, is met with in its determination. It is, therefore, a *transcendental ideal* that lies at the foundation of the universal determination which is met with necessarily in all that exists, and constitutes the highest and perfect material condition of its possibility, to which condition all thinking of objects in general, according to their content, must be referred. But it is also the only proper ideal of which human reason is capable—because only in this single case, an, in itself, general conception of a thing, is through itself universally determined, and can be cognized as the representation of an individuality.

The logical determination of a conception by means of reason, rests upon a disjunctive syllogism, in which the major contains a logical distribution (the division of the sphere of a general conception)—the minor limits this sphere up to a part, and the conclusion

determines the conception through this. The universal conception of a reality in general cannot be divided *à priori*, inasmuch as without experience we know no determinate kinds of reality that would be contained under such class. The transcendental major of the universal determination of all things, is, therefore, nothing else but the representation of the complex of all reality—not merely a conception, that comprehends *under itself* all predicates according to their transcendental content, but which contains them in itself, and the universal determination of every thing rests upon the limitation of this *all* of the reality, since it attributes something thereof to the thing, but the rest is excluded, which accords with the either and the or, of the disjunctive major and the determination of the object, through one of the members of this division in the minor. Hence the use of reason, whereby it lays the transcendental ideal at the foundation of its determination of all possible things, is analogous to that, according to which it proceeds in the disjunctive syllogisms—which was the proposition that I before laid at the foundation of the systematic division of all transcendental ideas, according to which, they are generated parallel and corresponding to the three kinds of syllogisms.

It is clear that reason, in respect of this its object, namely, to represent to itself only the necessary universal determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of such a Being as is conformable to the ideal, but only the idea of the same, in order to derive from an unconditioned totality of the universal determination, the conditioned one, that is to say, that of the limited. The ideal in respect of this reason is, therefore, the original (prototypon) of all things, which as defective copies (ectypa) altogether thence take the matter for their possibility, and whilst they approach more or less to it, still,

at all times, fail therein infinitely short of reaching it.

Thus then all possibility of things (of the synthesis of the diverse according to its matter) is to be looked upon as derived, and only the possibility of that which includes all reality in itself, as original. For all negations (which still are the only predicates whereby every thing else may be distinguished from the real being) are merely limitations of a greater, and finally of the highest reality; consequently, they presuppose this, and are, according to matter, merely derived from it. All diversity of things is only precisely such a diverse manner of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is its common substratum—precisely as all figures are only possible as different modes of limiting infinite space. Consequently, the object merely found in reason of its ideal, is also termed the *primitive being* (ens originarium)—so far as it has none other above it, the *highest Being* (ens summum)—and so far as all as conditioned is subject to it, the *Being of Beings* (ens entium.) But all this does not mean the objective relationship of a real object to other things, but of the *idea* to *conceptions*, and leaves us in complete ignorance, as to the existence of a being of such exceeding preeminence.

And since we cannot say that an original being consists of many derived beings, because each of the latter presupposes the former, and consequently, cannot constitute it, the ideal of the original being must thus also be thought as simple.

The derivation of every other possibility from this original being, to speak precisely, cannot be looked upon also as a *limitation* of its highest reality, and, as it were, as a *division* of the same; for then the original being would be regarded as a mere aggregate of derived beings, which, according to what precedes, is impossible, although at the beginning we so presented

it in the first rough sketch. The highest reality would rather lie at the foundation of the possibility of all things as a *foundation*, and not as a *complex*, and the diversity of the first (*the things*) would not rest upon the limitation of the original being itself, but upon its complete continuation—to which then our whole sensibility would also belong, together with all reality in the phenomenon, which cannot belong to the idea of the highest being, as an ingredient.

Now, if we thus follow up further this our idea in hypostasizing it, we then shall be able to determine the original being, through the mere conception of the highest reality, as one, single, simple, all sufficient, eternal—in a word, determine it, in its unconditioned completeness, through all its predicaments. The conception of such a being is that of *God*, thought in a transcendental sense, and the ideal of pure of reason is thus the object of a transcendental *Theology*, so as indeed I have before stated it.

Still, however, this use of the transcendental idea would already outstep the limits of its determination and its permissibleness. For reason laid it at the foundation only, as the *conception* of all reality, of the universal determination of things in general, without requiring that all this reality should be objectively given, and itself constitute a thing. This last is a mere fiction, by means of which we embrace and realize the diversity of our ideas in an ideal, as a particular being, without our having any title thereto, even once to admit the possibility of such an hypothesis, as then all the consequences also which flow from such an ideal, do not concern the universal determination of things in general, in behalf of which the idea was alone necessary—nor have the least influence thereon.

It is not enough to describe the procedure of our reason and its dialectick; we must also seek to discover the sources thereof, in order to be able to

explain this appearance itself as a phenomenon of the understanding, since the ideal whereof we speak, is founded upon a natural and not merely arbitrary idea. Hence, I ask, how comes reason to this—to consider all possibility of things as derived from a single one, which lies at the foundation, that is to say, from that of the highest reality, and then so to presuppose this reality as contained in a particular original being?

The answer offers itself spontaneously from the observations in the transcendental Analytick. The possibility of the objects of the senses is a relationship of the same to our thinking, wherein something (namely the empirical form) can be thought *à priori*, but that which constitutes the matter, the reality in the phenomenon (what answers to the sensation), must be given, without which it (*this something*) even could not at all be thought, and consequently its possibility not be represented. Now an object of the senses can only be determined universally, if it be compared with all the predicates of the phenomenon, and represented by means of the same, affirmatively or negatively. But since therein, that which constitutes the thing itself (in the phenomenon), that is to say, the real, must be given, without which it even could not at all be thought; but that wherein the real of all phenomena is given, is the sole all-embracing experience, the matter for the possibility of all objects of the sense, must thus be presupposed as given in a complex, upon the limitation of which all possibility of empirical objects, their difference from one another, and their universal determination, alone can rest. Now in fact no other objects but those of the senses, and no where but in the context of a possible experience, can be given; consequently an object is nothing to us, if it does not presuppose the complex of all empirical reality, as condition of its possibility. Now according to a natural illusion then, we look

upon that as a principle which must be valid for every thing, that properly only is valid for those which are given as objects of our senses. Consequently we shall hold the empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things as phenomena, by the omission of this limitation, as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.

But that we afterwards hypostasize this idea of the complex of all reality, follows from this, that we exchange dialectically the distributive unity of the experience-use of the understanding, for the collective unity of an experience-whole, and think in this whole of phenomenon one single thing, which contains in itself all empirical reality, and which then, by means of the before mentioned transcendental subreption, is exchanged for the conception of a thing which stands at the summit of the possibility of all things—to whose universal determination it furnishes the real conditions\*

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### THIRD SECTION.

#### ARGUMENTS OF SPECULATIVE REASON FOR CONCLUDING AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING.

Notwithstanding this pressing want of reason for presupposing something, that may lie completely at the foundation of the understanding for the universal determination of its conceptions, that which is idealistic and merely fictitious in such a presupposition is yet much too obvious to it, as that it should be

\* This ideal, as we shall soon show, of the all most real being, although it in fact is a mere representation, is first *realized*, that is, made into the object—then *hypostasized*,—finally through a natural progress of reason for the completion of unity, even *personified*; since the regulative unity of experience rests not upon phenomena themselves (the sensibility alone) but upon the connexion of their diversity by means of the *understanding* (in an apperception), consequently the unity of the highest reality and the universal determinableness (possibility) of all things seems to lie in a supreme understanding, consequently in an *intelligence*.

thereby alone persuaded to admit at once, a mere self-creation of its thought as a real being, if it were not otherwise forced to seek somewhere its resting point, in the regressus of the conditioned which is given, for the unconditioned, which certainly in itself and according to its mere conception is not given as real—but which alone can complete the series of conditions deduced from their foundations. Now this is the natural course that every human reason, even the commonest, takes, although not every one perseveres in the same. It does not begin from conceptions but from ordinary experience, and therefore lays something existing at the foundation. But this ground sinks away, if it does not rest upon the immoveable rock of the absolutely-necessary. And this itself totters without support, when void space is still without of and under it and it does not itself fill every thing, and thereby leave no place remaining for the *why*—that is, is infinite as to reality.

If something, whatever it may be, exists, it must then be admitted, that something exists *necessarily*. For the contingent exists only under the condition of another thing as its cause, and from this the conclusion is valid henceforth up to a cause, that exists not contingently, and precisely, on this account, without condition necessarily. That is the argument whereon reason founds its progression to the original being.

Now reason looks out for the conception of a being that is suitable for such a prerogative of existence as unconditioned necessity; not so much in order then to conclude from the conception of the same *à priori* as to its existence, (for did reason take this upon itself, it need then only enquire in general amongst pure conceptions, and would not be necessitated to lay a given existence at the foundation); but only to find amongst all conceptions of possible things that which has in itself nothing contrary to absolute necessity.

For that still something must absolutely necessarily exist, it judges to be already established according to the first conclusion. If it can remove every thing which does not coincide with this necessity, except one thing; this is then the absolutely necessary being, whether we may comprehend the necessity thereof, that is, be able to deduce it alone from its conception alone, or not.

Now, that, the conception of which contains in itself for every why the because (*or reason*)—which is defective in no point and in no respect—which reaches every where as condition—seems on this very account to be the suitable being for this absolute necessity—inasmuch as it, in the self-possession of all conditions for every thing that is possible, itself requires no condition—nay, even is not at all capable thereof—consequently at least in one point, it satisfies the conception of unconditioned necessity, in this, that no other conception can be compared to it—which, as defective and requiring to be filled up, manifests in itself no such sign of the independence of all further conditions. It is true, that hence it cannot be concluded securely, that what does not contain in itself the highest and in every respect perfect condition, must on that account itself, according to its existence, be conditioned; but yet has it not then the only characteristic of the unconditioned existence in itself, which reason is powerful in, for cognizing by means of a conception *à priori*, a being as unconditioned.

The conception of a being of the highest reality, would therefore suit itself the best amidst all the conceptions of possible things, to the conception of an unconditioned necessary being, and if even it should not fully satisfy this, yet have we still no choice, but see ourselves compelled to hold to it, because we ought not to cast to the winds, the existence of a necessary being; but if we admit it, still we cannot find any thing in the whole field of sensibility which might



establish a better grounded pretension to such a prerogative in existence.

Thus therefore the natural course of human reason is constituted. First, this convinces itself of the existence of *some* necessary being. In this being it cognizes an independent existence. Then it seeks the conception of the independent of all condition, and finds such, in that which itself is the sufficient condition of every other, that is, in that which contains all reality. But the All without limits, is absolute unity, and carries along with it, the conception of an only, namely, the highest being, and thus reason concludes that the highest being, as the original of all things, exists absolutely necessarily.

A certain foundation cannot be denied to this conception, if the question is as to *Decisions*, that is to say, if once the existence of a necessary being is granted, and we coincide therein, that we must take up our part as to where we will place the same; for then we cannot choose suitably, or rather we have no choice, but are obliged to give our voice in favour of the absolute unity of perfect reality as the source of possibility. But if nothing urge us to decide, and we rather leave this whole matter aside, until we are compelled, through the whole weight of the proofs, into approval, that is, if the thing is only as to *judging*, as to what we know of this problem and what we only flatter ourselves to know, then the above reasoning does not appear nearly in so advantageous a shape, and stands in need of favour, in order to supply the deficiency of its pretensions.

For, if we allow all to be thus valid as it appears to us, that is to say, that firstly from any given existence, (in any case, also, merely from my own,) a correct conclusion arises as to the existence of an unconditioned necessary being — secondly, that I must consider a being which contains all reality, consequently also all condition, as absolutely unconditioned,

and that, therefore, the conception of the thing which is suitable to absolute necessity is hereby found ; still it cannot thence be so concluded, that the conception of an unlimited being, which does not possess the highest reality, contradicts, on this account, absolute necessity. For, although I do not find in its conception, the unconditioned, which carries already along with it the All of conditions, still it cannot be thence deduced, that its existence on this very account must be conditioned ; in the same way that I cannot say in an hypothetical syllogism—where a certain condition is not, (that is to say, in the present case, one of perfection according to conceptions,) there also the conditioned is not. It rather remains allowable to admit as valid all the remaining limited beings, just as well for unconditionedly necessary, although we cannot conclude their necessity from the general conception which we have of them. But in this way, this argument would not have procured us the least conception of the properties of a necessary being, and would not have accomplished any thing.

Nevertheless, there remains in this argument a certain weight, and an authority which, on account of this objective insufficiency, cannot still at once be taken from it. For granted, that there are obligations which should in the idea of reason be quite just, but without all reality of application to ourselves—that is, without impulses—where a supreme being was not presupposed, that could give to the practical laws effect and strength, we should thus, likewise, have an obligation to follow conceptions, which, although they might not be objectively sufficient, are still according to the measure of our reason preponderating, and in comparison with which we yet do not cognize any thing better and more convincing. The duty of choosing would, in such case, move the irresolution of speculation from its equilibrium by means of a practical addition—in fact, reason would find in itself as the

most enquiring judge, no justification, if, under pressing motives, although only defective knowledge, it did not yield to these grounds of its judgment, beyond which we, at least, know none better.

This argument, although certainly it is transcendental, since it rests upon the internal insufficiency of the contingent, is still so simple and natural, that it is adapted to the commonest intelligence, so soon as such is only once led to it. We see things change, arise, and decay—they must therefore, or at least their state, have a cause. But of every cause which can ever be given in the phenomenon, just this same thing may again be demanded. Now where should we place more properly the *supreme* causality than there, where also the *highest* causality is, that is, in that being, which for possible effect contains originally sufficiency in itself, and the conception of which is very easily accomplished by the single stroke of an all-embracing perfection. We hold, then, this highest cause for absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to ascend to it, and no reason to go still further out beyond it. Hence we still see in all nations, amidst their darkest polytheism some sparks of monotheism glimmer, to which reflection and deep speculation had not led, but only a natural progress, gradually rendered intellectual, of the common understanding.

Now there are only three proofs possible from speculative reason as to the existence of God.

All the ways which may be struck into with this view, begin either from determined experience, and the thereby acknowledged particular property of our sensible world, and ascend from this, according to the laws of causality, to the highest being out of the world; or they only lay undetermined experience, that is, some existence empirically at the foundation; or they make abstraction finally of all experience, and conclude wholly *a priori* from mere conceptions as to the existence of a highest cause. The first proof is

the *physicotheological*, the second the *cosmological*, the third, the *ontological* proof. More of these there are not, and even more there cannot be.

I will show, that reason effects as little in one way (the empirical) as in the other, (the transcendental,) and that it in vain expands its wings, in order to rise above the sensible world by the mere force of speculation. But as to what concerns the order, in which these proofs of the enquiry must be proposed, it will be exactly the reverse of that which reason, gradually extending itself, takes, and in which we also first have arranged it. For it will be shown, that although experience furnishes the first occasion thereto, still merely the *transcendental conception* guides reason in this its effort, and marks the limit which it has proposed to itself in all such investigations. I shall, therefore, begin from the investigation of the transcendental proof, and afterwards see what the addition of the empirical can do, in augmentation of its force.

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### FOURTH SECTION.

#### OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

It is easily seen from what precedes, that the conception of an absolutely necessary Being is a pure conception of reason—that is, it is a mere idea, whose objective reality is far from being shown from this, that reason stands in need of it; and which idea only refers to a certain although unattainable perfection, and properly serves more for this, to limit the understanding, than to extend it to new objects. Now, in this case, this strange and contradictory thing takes place, that the conclusion from a given existence in general, to an absolutely necessary being, seems to be stringent

and correct, and yet we have wholly against us, all the conditions of the understanding, for making to ourselves a conception of such a necessity.

Men have at all times spoken of an *absolutely necessary* being, and not given themselves so much trouble to understand, whether and how they can even only think a thing of this kind, as rather to show its existence. Now a definition of this conception is, indeed, very easy, namely, that it is in such a way something, the non-being of which is impossible ; but we are not thereby any wiser in respect of the conditions which render it impossible to look upon the non-being of a thing as absolutely inconceivable, and which conditions properly are what we wish to know, that is to say, whether we think by means of this conception generally something or not. For to reject all conditions, which the understanding at all times requires in order to look at something as necessary, by means of the word *unconditioned*, is far from rendering it intelligible to me, whether I then think through a conception of an unconditioned-necessary, still something, or perhaps nothing at all.

Again, this conception ventured at upon mere chance, and at last become quite current, persons have, moreover, believed so to explain from a multitude of examples—that all further enquiries on account of its intelligibleness seemed quite unnecessary. Every proposition of geometry—for example, “ that a triangle has three angles,” is absolutely necessary, and thus an object is spoken of, which lies out of the sphere of the understanding, as if we perfectly well understood what we would say in respect of the conception of it.

All the alleged examples are taken, without exception, only from *judgments*, and not from *things* and their existence. But the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not an absolute necessity of things. For the absolute necessity of judgment is only a condi-

tioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment. The preceding proposition did not say, that three angles are absolutely necessary, but under the condition that a triangle exists (is given), three angles also exist (in it) necessarily. Nevertheless, this logical necessity has shown so great a power of delusion belonging to it, that because we had formed to ourselves a conception *à priori* of a thing, which conception was so constituted, that, according to our opinion, we conceived existence in its sphere, we thence believed upon being able securely to conclude, that inasmuch as existence belongs necessarily to the object of this conception—that is, under the condition that I suppose this thing as given (existing), its existence also is necessarily supposed, (according to the rule of identity,) and this being itself is consequently absolutely necessary—inasmuch as its existence is thought at the same time in a conception admitted at pleasure, and under the condition that I suppose the object of the same.

If I do away with the predicate in an identical judgment, and I retain the subject, a contradiction thus arises, and consequently I say, that the predicate belongs to the subject, necessarily. But if I annul the predicate, together with the subject, then there arises no contradiction, for there is *no more any thing* which could be contradicted. To suppose a triangle, and yet to do away with the three angles of the same, is contradictory; but to do away with the triangle, together with its three angles, is no contradiction. It is just the same with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. If you do away with the existence of this, you thus do away with the thing itself, together with all its predicates: whence then is the contradiction to be deduced? Externally there is nothing which would contradict, for the thing is not to be externally necessary—and not internally, for you have by the suppression of the thing itself, done away with, at the same time, every

thing internal. God is omnipotent—this is a necessary judgment. The omnipotence cannot be done away with, if you suppose a Divinity, that is, an infinite Being, with the conception of which the first is identical. But when you say, *God is not*, neither the omnipotency, nor any other of his predicates, is then given—because they are all annihilated together with the subject, and in this thought there is not manifested the least contradiction.

You have, therefore, seen, that if I do away with the predicate of a judgment, together with the subject, an internal contradiction can never arise, whatever may be the predicate. Now there remains for you no escape, but that you must say,—there are subjects which cannot at all be done away with, and which, therefore, must remain. But that would just be as much as to say, there are absolutely necessary subjects—a presupposition as to the correctness of which I have precisely doubted, and whose possibility you were to show to me. For I cannot make to myself the least conception of a thing, which, if it were annulled, with all its predicates, would leave behind a contradiction, and without contradiction, I have, by means of mere pure conceptions *à priori*, no mark of impossibility.

Against all these general conclusions, (which no one can deny,) you challenge me through a particular case, which you set up as a proof, by means of the fact, that there is still one, and, indeed, only this one conception, where the non-being, or the doing away with its object, is contradictory in itself, and this is the conception of the all most Real Being. It has, you say, all reality, and you are justified in admitting such a being as possible, (which I for the present admit, although the conception, not contradicting itself, is still far from proving the possibility of the object.)\* Now, under all reality, existence is also

\* The conception is always possible, if it does not contradict itself. This is

comprehended. Therefore existence lies in the conception of a possible. Now if this thing is done away with, so is the internal possibility of the thing done away with, which is contradictory.

I answer: you have already fallen into a contradiction, when into the conception of a thing, which you would only think according to its possibility, under whatever name it may be disguised, you introduced already the conception of its existence. If this be conceded to you, you have thus, according to appearance, won the game, but in fact have said nothing, for you have fallen into mere tautology. I ask you; is the proposition—*this* or *that thing* (which I admit as possible, it may be any thing whatever) *exists*,—is, I say, this proposition, an analytical or synthetical proposition? If it be the first, you thus add nothing through the existence of the thing to your thought of the thing, and then the thought which is in you, must either be the thing itself, or you have supposed an existence as belonging to possibility, and then the existence is concluded according to what is alleged from the internal possibility, which is nothing but miserable tautology. The word, reality, which in the conception of the thing sounds different to existence in the conception of the predicate, does not constitute this. For, if you likewise term reality all the supposition (not determined what you suppose), you have thus already fixed, and admitted as real, the thing with all its predicates, in the conception of the subject, and in the predicate you only repeat it. If you confess, on the contrary, as every reasonable man must justly confess,

the logical sign of possibility, and thereby is its object distinguished from the *nihil negativum*. But it may nevertheless be a void conception, if the objective reality of the synthesis, whereby the conception is generated, is not demonstrated particularly; but which reposes always, as has been shown above, upon principles of possible experience, and not upon the principle of analysis (the principle of contradiction). This is an admonition not to conclude immediately from the possibility of conceptions (the logical) as the possibility of things (the real).



that every proposition of existence is synthetical, how will you then maintain, that the predicate of the existence may not be suppressed without contradiction? since this prerogative individually belongs only to what is analytical, the character of which reposes precisely thereon.

I should certainly hope to reduce to nothing, without any circumlocution, this sophistical argumentation, by means of an exact determination of the conception of existence, if I had not found that the delusion in exchanging a logical predicate for a real one (that is, for the determination of a thing), almost sets at nought all instruction. Every thing may serve that we like, for the *logical predicate*; even the subject can be predicated of itself, for logic makes abstraction of all content. But *determination* is a predicate which is added to the conception of the subject, and augments it. It (*the determination*) must not therefore be already contained in it (*the conception*).

*To be*, is evidently no real predicate, that is, a conception of something, which can be added to the conception of a thing. It is merely the position of a thing, or of certain determinations in themselves. In the logical use it is only the copula of a judgment. The proposition, *God is omnipotent*, contains two conceptions, which have their objects—God and Omnipotence—the word, *is*, is not however a predicate over and above, but only that which lays down the predicate in *relationship* with the subject. Now, if I take together the subject (God) with all its predicates (to which also omnipotence belongs), and say, *God is*, or there is a God, I do not thus lay down any new predicate to the conception of God, but only the subject in itself with all its predicates; and, in fact, the *object* in reference to my *conception*. Both must exactly contain the same thing, and therefore there can nothing further be added to the conception, which merely expresses the possibility, because I think the object

of this conception as absolutely given (through the expression, it is). And thus the real contains nothing more than the merely possible. A *hundred* real dollars do not contain the least more than a hundred possible. For as the latter signify the conception, but the former the object, and the position of it in itself—in case this object contained more than that conception, my conception would not thus express the whole object, and would likewise not therefore be the adequate conception of it. But in the state of my fortune, a hundred real dollars is more than the mere conception of the same (that is, of their possibility). For the object is not merely contained by the reality in my conception analytically, but it is added synthetically to my conception (which is a determination of my state), without, through this existence out of my conception, these said hundred dollars being even in the least augmented.

If I, therefore, think a thing, through whatever and however many predicates I like (even in the universal determination), not the least is added thereby to the thing, because I yet add, that this thing is. For otherwise, not precisely the same, but more would exist than I had thought in the conception, and I could not say, that exactly the object of my conception exists. If I even think also in a thing all reality except one, because I say, that such a defective thing exists, the wanting reality thereby is not added, but it (*this thing*) exists, accompanied by the same want precisely as I had thought it—otherwise something else would exist than I thought. Now if I think a being as the highest reality (without defect), thus the question still always remains whether it exists or not. For although nothing is wanting in my conception of the possible real content of a thing generally, still something is wanting, in this way, in the relationship to my whole state of thought—namely, that the cognition of such object is also possible *à posteriori*.

And here also the cause of the hereby existing difficulty is manifested. If the question were as to an object of the senses, I should then not be able to exchange the existence of the thing with the mere conception of the thing. For, by means of the conception, the object is thought only as conformable with the general conditions of a possible empirical cognition in general, but by means of the existence, as contained in the context of united experience; inasmuch as then the conception of the object is not in the least increased through the connexion with the content of united experience, but our thinking receives by means of the same, a possible perception more. On the contrary, if we will think the existence through the pure category alone, in this way it is no wonder that we can advance no criterium for distinguishing it from pure possibility.

Our conception of an object may therefore contain whatever, and how much soever we will, yet must we thus go out of it, in order to confer existence upon it. In objects of the senses, this occurs by means of the connexion with any one of my perceptions according to empirical laws; but in objects of pure thinking there is no means at all for cognizing their existence, since this must be wholly cognized *a priori*, but our consciousness of all existence (whether through perception immediately, or through conclusions which connect something with the perception) belongs wholly to the unity of experience; and an existence out of this field can certainly not be absolutely declared to be impossible, but is a presupposition which we cannot justify by any thing.

The conception of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea; but on this account exactly, because it is a mere idea, it is quite incompetent for increasing, by means of itself alone, our cognition in regard of that which exists. It is not even competent enough for this, that it could instruct

us in respect of the possibility of a many. The analytical sign of possibility, which consists in this, that mere positions (realities) generate no contradiction, cannot certainly be denied to it; but as the connexion of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis, as to whose possibility we cannot *à priori* judge, because the realities are not specifically given to us, and, if even this also did occur, no judgment at all takes place there, because the sign of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must always only be sought in experience, but to which the object of an idea cannot belong; the celebrated Leibnitz was thus far from effecting that as to which he flattered himself, that is, wishing to discover *à priori* the possibility of so elevated an ideal being.

There is, therefore, in the so celebrated ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from conceptions, all the toil and labour lost, and a man would just as little become richer in knowledge from mere ideas, as a merchant in fortune, if, in order to better his situation, he were to add ciphers to the credit of his cash account.

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### FIFTH SECTION.

#### OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE BEING OF A GOD.

It would be something quite unnatural, and a mere innovation of scholasticism, to wish to deduce from an entirely arbitrarily designed idea, the existence of the self-corresponding object to it. Indeed, we should never have attempted this method, if the want of our reason had not preceded, for admitting something necessary for existence in general, (whereby we could stand still in the ascension), and if reason had not been com-

pelled, as this necessity must be unconditioned and *à priori* certain, to seek a conception which, where possible, satisfied such a demand, and gave to be cognized, an existence wholly *à priori*. Now, this was believed to be found in the idea of an all most real being, and such was thus used only for the more determined knowledge of that, whereof besides men were already convinced, or persuaded it must exist, that is, the necessary being. Still they disguised this natural march of reason, and instead of finishing with this conception, they sought to begin from it, in order to deduce from it the necessity of existence, which necessity, however, it was only destined to complete. Hence arose the unsuccessful ontological proof, which carries along with it, neither for the natural and sound understanding, nor for scholastic examination, any thing satisfactory.

The *cosmological proof*, which we will now examine, retains the connexion of absolute necessity with the highest being; but instead, as the previous proof of concluding from the highest reality as to necessity in existence, it rather concludes from the previously given unconditioned necessity of a being as to its unlimited reality; and it brings so far every thing at least into the track of, I know not whether a reasonable or reasonless, but at least a natural conclusion, which carries along with it the greatest conviction, not only to the common but also the speculative understanding; since it then also palpably draws those first foundation lines of all proofs of natural theology, which men have at all times followed, and will still follow, however we may distort and conceal them by tracery and carving. This proof, which Leibnitz moreover termed *a contingentia mundi*, we will now expose to view, and subject to investigation.

It runs thus: If something exists, then must also an absolutely necessary being exist. Now, I myself

at least exist; consequently, an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor contains an experience—the major the conclusion from an experience in general to the existence of the necessary.\* Consequently, the proof begins properly from experience, therefore it is not deduced wholly *à priori*, or ontologically; and since the object of all experience is called world, it is on this account termed the *cosmological* proof. And as it makes abstraction of every particular property of the objects of experience, whereby this world may be distinguished from every possible one; it is, in this way, already distinguished in its denomination also from the physico-theological proof, which makes use, as arguments, of observations on the particular nature of this our sensible world.

Now, the proof concludes further; that the necessary being can only be determined in a single way, that is, in respect of all possible opposite predicates, only through one of the same; consequently, it must be universally determined through its conception. Now, one single conception only of a thing is possible, which determines universally this thing *à priori*, namely, that of the *entis realissimi*. Consequently, the conception of the most real being of all, is the only one, whereby a necessary being can be thought—that is, there exists a Supreme Being necessarily.

In this cosmological argument so many sophistical principles meet, that speculative reason seems in this case to have summoned all its dialectical art, in order to effect the greatest possible transcendental appearance. We will, however, for a time set its investigation aside, in order only to make evident an artifice

\* This conclusion is too well known that it should be necessary here to propound it at length. It rests upon the pretended transcendental natural law of causality—that all which is *contingent* has its cause, which, provided it again is contingent, equally as well must have a cause, until the series of causes subordinate one to another, must terminate in an absolutely necessary cause, without which it (*this series*) would have no completeness.

of this same reason, wherewith it exhibits an old argument under a changed form as new, and appeals to the agreement of two witnesses, that is to say, a pure reason-testimony, and another of empirical belief, whilst it is only the first alone which simply changes its dress and voice, in order to be taken for the second. For the purpose of laying its foundation very securely, this proof relies upon experience, and thereby gives itself the look, as if it differed from the ontological proof, which places its whole confidence in mere pure conceptions *à priori*. But the cosmological proof only makes use of this experience, in order to make a single step, namely, to the existence of a necessary Being in general. What properties such may have, the empirical argument cannot teach, but then reason wholly takes leave of it, and searches amidst mere conceptions, that is to say, what kind of properties an absolutely necessary being in general must have; or, what, under all possible things, contains in itself the requisite conditions (*requisita*) for an absolute necessity. Now it believes it finds, in the conception of an all real being solely and alone these requisites; and then concludes, that that is the absolutely necessary being. But it is clear we hereby presuppose, that the conception of a being of the highest reality satisfies fully the conception of the absolute reality in existence—that is, we may conclude from the one to the other; a proposition which the ontological argument affirmed, and which we therefore adopt in the cosmological proof, and lay at the foundation, yet which we had intended to avoid. For absolute necessity is an existence from mere conceptions. Now if I say, the conception of the *entis realissimi* is such a conception, and in fact the only one, which is suitable to the necessary existence and adequate to it, I must thus also admit, that from it the latter can be concluded. It is therefore only the ontological proof from mere conceptions, which contains in the

so called cosmological one all force, and the proposed experience is quite idle, except perhaps to lead us to the conception of the absolute necessity; but not in order to show such in any determined thing. For so soon as we have this in view, we must instantly abandon all experience, and seek amongst pure conceptions, which of them decidedly contains the condition of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. But in such a way only to see the possibility of such a being, is thus also to prove its existence, for it is as much as to say, that amidst all things possible, there is one which carries along with it absolute necessity—that is, this being exists absolutely necessarily.

All illusions in conclusions manifest themselves most readily, when we place them before us in a scholastic way. The following is such an exposition:—

If the proposition is correct, that every absolutely necessary being is at the same time the most real being of all (which is the *nervus probandi* of the cosmological proof), it must, at least, like all affirmative judgments be, per accidens, capable of being inverted; therefore some most real beings are at the same time absolutely necessary beings. But now one *ens realissimum* is not different from another in any point, and therefore what is valid of some, contained in this conception, that is valid for all. Consequently I shall (in this case) be able likewise to invert *absolutely*, that is, every all most real being is a necessary being. Now, since this proposition is determined merely from its conceptions *à priori*, the mere conception of the most real being must carry along with it also the absolute necessity of the same—which the ontological proof precisely affirmed, and the cosmological one was unwilling to acknowledge, but yet laid it at the foundation of its conclusions, although in a concealed manner.

Thus then, the second mode which speculative reason adopts, in order to prove the existence of the highest being, is not only equally deceitful with the



first, but has this, moreover, faulty in it, that it commits an *ignorantio elenchi*, since it promises us to conduct us by a new path, but after a little digression it leads us back again to the old, which, on its account, we had abandoned.

I have a short time before said, that in this cosmological argument a whole nest of dialectical arguments lay concealed, which transcendental critick may easily discover and destroy. I will now only indicate them, and leave it to the already exercised reader to investigate farther these fallacious principles and to set them aside.

There then are, for example, 1st. The transcendental principle of concluding from the contingent to a cause, which principle possesses only meaning in the sensible world, but, out of which, it has never even sense. For the mere intellectual conception of the contingent can produce no synthetical proposition, like that of causality, and the principle of this last (*causality*) has no meaning at all, and no sign of its use, excepting only in the sensible world; but in the present case it was to serve precisely for this, in order to issue out beyond the sensible world.—2nd. The conclusion of concluding from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes given one beyond another in the sensible world, as to a first cause, whereto the principles of the use of reason itself do not justify us in experience, are much less able to extend this principle beyond the same (whither this chain cannot at all be prolonged).—3rd. The false self-satisfaction of reason, in respect of the completion of the series; from this that we finally remove all condition, yet without which no conception of a necessity can take place; and because as we then can comprehend nothing further, we admitted this as a completion of our conception.—4th. The exchanging of the logical necessity of a conception of all united reality (without internal contradiction) for the transcendental, which requires

a principle of the feasibility of such a synthesis, but which principle again can only extend to the field of possible experiences, and so on.

The art of the cosmological proof aims merely at this, to avoid the proof of the existence of a necessary being *à priori* through mere conceptions, which proof must be deduced ontologically, but as to which we feel ourselves wholly incompetent. With this view we conclude from a real existence laid at the foundation (an experience in general), as well as it can be done, to an absolutely necessary condition thereof. We are not then necessitated to explain the possibility of this condition. For if it be shown that it exists, the question as to its possibility is quite unnecessary. But if we wish more exactly to determine this necessary being in respect of its quality, we do not then seek that which is sufficient for comprehending from its conception the necessity of the existence, for if we could do this, we had then no need of any empirical presupposition.—No;—we seek only the negative condition, (*conditio sine quâ non*)—without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now, this would succeed well in all other kind of conclusions, from a given consequence to its principle; but here it turns out unfortunately, that the condition which we require for absolute necessity can only be met with in a single being, which, consequently, must contain in its conception every thing which is required for absolute necessity—and hence renders a conclusion *à priori* as to the same possible—that is, I must also conversely be able to conclude, that to what thing this conception (of the highest reality) belongs, such is absolutely necessary; and if I cannot so conclude (as I then am compelled to confess this, if I intend to avoid the ontological proof), I thus fail likewise in my new way, and again find myself there, whence I set out. The conception of the Supreme Being satisfies certainly all questions, *à priori*, which can be proposed on account

of the internal determination of a thing, and is also for this reason, an ideal without parallel, because the general conception indicates the same co-existently as an individuality amongst all possible things. But it affords no satisfaction to the enquiry as to its own existence; yet, respecting which only the question strictly was, and we could not reply to the enquiry of one who admitted the existence of a necessary being, and only wished to know which then amidst all things must be looked upon as such: This, here, is the necessary being.

It may very well be allowed, to *admit* the existence of a being of the highest efficiency, as cause of all possible effects, in order to facilitate for reason, the unity of the grounds of explanation which it seeks. But to go so far beyond, as that we should even say, *Such a being exists necessarily*, is no longer the modest assertion of an allowable hypothesis, but the bold pretension of an apodictical certainty; for, as to that which we give out to be known as absolutely necessary, the cognition thereof must likewise carry along with it absolute necessity.

The whole problem of the transcendental Ideal comes to this—either to find a conception for absolute necessity, or for the conception of something, the absolute necessity of it. If we can do the one, we must then also be able to do the other, for reason only cognizes as absolutely necessary that which is necessary from its conception. But both wholly surpass our utmost endeavours for *satisfying* our understanding upon this point, and likewise all attempts at consoling it, with respect to this its incapacity.

The unconditioned necessity, which we require so indispensably, as the ultimate support of all things, is the real abyss of human reason. Even eternity, however terrifically sublime a *Haller* may depict it, is far from making the same giddy impression upon the mind; for it *measures* only the duration of things, but does

not *support* them. We cannot guard against the thought, yet also cannot we bear it, that a being which we represent to ourselves as the highest amongst all possible, should say, as it were, to itself, I am from eternity to eternity, besides me there is nothing, except that which is something merely by my will ; *but whence am I then ?* Here every thing sinks away under us, and the greatest perfection, like the smallest, floats without support before speculative reason, to which it costs nothing, to let one as well as the other disappear without the least impediment.

Many forces of nature which manifest their existence by means of effects, remain inscrutable to us, since we cannot investigate them far enough by means of observation. The transcendental object lying at the foundation of phenomena, and with it, the ground why our sensibility possesses these rather than other supreme conditions, are and remain impenetrable to us, although the thing itself moreover is given, but only not perceived. But an ideal of pure reason cannot be termed *inscrutable*, since it has shown no further guarantee of its reality but the want of reason, to accomplish by means of this (*ideal*) all synthetic unity. As, therefore, it is not ever given as a conceivable object, as such also it is not inscrutable—it must rather as mere idea find in the nature of reason its seat and its solution, and therefore can be investigated ; for reason consists precisely in this, that we may be able to give an account of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions, either from objective, or in case they are a mere appearance, from subjective grounds.

DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION  
OF THE DIALECTICAL APPEARANCE  
IN ALL THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROOFS OF THE EXIST-  
ENCE OF A NECESSARY BEING.

Both the proofs before adduced were transcendental, that is, were attempted independently of empirical principles. For although the cosmological one lays an experience in general at the foundation, still it is in this way not deduced from a particular quality of the same, but from pure reason-principles, in reference to an existence given through empirical consciousness in general, and it abandons even this guide, in order to rest upon absolutely pure conceptions. Now what in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the dialectical but natural appearance, which connects the conceptions of necessity and the highest reality, and realizes and hypostatizes that which still can only be idea? What is the cause of the inevitability of admitting something as necessary in itself amongst existing things, and yet at the same time of shrinking back, as from a precipice, before the existence of such a being; and how does it happen that reason understands itself as to this, and from the wavering state of a timid and again and again retracted assent, attains to a tranquil insight?

It is something especially remarkable, that, if we suppose something exists, we cannot refrain from the consequence that something must also necessarily exist. The cosmological argument reposed upon this natural (although still not on this account sure) conclusion; on the contrary, admit whatever conception I will of a thing, I yet find that its existence can never be represented by me as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me, whatever it may be that exists, from thinking the non-being of the same—conse-

quently I must certainly admit for the existing in general something necessary, but I can think no single thing itself as necessary in itself. This means, that I can never *complete* the regression to the conditions of the existing, without admitting a necessary being, yet I can never *commence* from the same.

If I must think something necessary for existing things in general, but have no right to think any thing as necessary in itself, it thence follows inevitably, that necessity and contingency must not concern and bear upon the things themselves, since a contradiction else would occur; consequently neither of these two principles is objective, but in any case they can only be subjective principles of reason, that is to say, on the one side, to seek for every thing that is given as existing something which is necessary, that is, never to stop elsewhere but in an *à priori* completed explanation; yet on the other side never likewise to hope for this completeness, that is, to admit as unconditioned nothing empirical, and thereby to dispense with more remote derivation. In such a sense both principles may very well exist together as *evristic* and *regulative* which concern nothing but the formal interest of reason. For the one says, you should so philosophize upon nature, as if there were to every thing which belongs to existence a necessary first ground, simply in order to produce systematic unity in your cognition, whilst you pursue such an idea, that is to say, an imagined supreme being; but the other warns you to admit no single determination, which concerns the existence of things for such an ultimate foundation, that is, as absolutely necessary, but still always to keep the way open for farther derivation, and still to treat it, consequently, at all times as conditioned. But if all which is perceived in things, must be considered as conditionally necessary, no thing also (that may be given empirically) can thus be looked at as absolutely necessary.

But, it hence follows that you must admit the abso-

lutely-necessary *out of the world*, because it is only to serve as a principle for the greatest possible unity of phenomena, as their ultimate foundation, and you can *in the world* never attain to this, inasmuch as the second rule imposes upon you, looking upon all empirical causes of unity at all times as derived.

The philosophers of antiquity regard every form of nature as contingent ; but matter, according to the judgment of common reason, as original and necessary. But had they not considered matter as substratum of phenomena respectively, but *in itself* as to its existence, the idea of absolute necessity would thus immediately have disappeared. For there is nothing which obliges reason to this existence absolutely, but it can do away in thought with such at all times, and without contradiction, yet in thought alone also lay the absolute necessity. A certain regulative principle must therefore lie at the foundation of this persuasion. In fact, also, the highest empirical principle of the unity of phenomena is extension and impenetrability (which together constitute the conception of matter), and *has*, so far as it is empirically unconditioned, a property of the regulative principle in itself. However, as every determination of matter which constitutes the real of the same, consequently also impenetrability, is an effect (action) which must have its cause, and therefore is always derived, so matter still is not suited to the idea of a necessary being, as a principle of all derived unity ;—and since each of its real properties, as derived, is only conditionally necessary, and therefore can be done away in itself ; but therewith the whole existence of matter would be done away with, and if this did not happen, we should then have attained empirically the highest ground of unity, which is forbidden through the second regulative principle ; it hence follows that matter, and in general what belongs to the world, is not suitable for the idea of a necessary original being, as a first principle of the greatest empirical unity, but that it must be placed

out of the world, as we then can always boldly derive the phenomena of the world and their existence from others, as if there were no necessary being, and nevertheless can strive unceasingly for the completeness of the derivation, as if such a being, as a supreme principle, were presupposed.

The ideal of the supreme Being is, according to these considerations, nothing but a *regulative principle* of reason, to look at all conjunction in the world, as if it sprang from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order thereupon to found the rule of a systematic, and according to general rules, necessary unity in the explanation of the same, and it is not an assertion of an existence necessary in itself. But it is at the same time unavoidable, by reason of a transcendental subreption, not to represent this formal principle as constitutive, and to think this unity hypostatistically. For, in the same way as space, because it renders originally possible all forms which are only different limitations of it, although it is only a principle of sensibility, is still held precisely on this account for a something absolutely necessary, existing of itself, and for an object given in itself *a priori*, it happens also quite naturally, that as the systematic unity of nature cannot be set up in any way as the principle of the empirical use of our reason, but so far as we lay the idea of an all most real being as the supreme cause at the foundation—this idea thereby is represented as a real object, and this object again, since it is the highest condition, is represented as necessary; consequently a regulative principle is changed into a *constitutive* one—which substitution manifests itself in this, that if I now consider this supreme being which respectively to the world was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as thing in itself, this necessity is capable of no conception, and therefore must have been met with in my reason only as formal condition of thought, but not as material and hypostatical condition of existence.



## THIRD DIVISION.

## SIXTH SECTION.

OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL  
PROOF.

If then neither the conception of things in general, nor the experience of any existence in general, can afford that which is demanded, there still remains a means to be tried, whether a *determined experience*, consequently that of things of the present world, their nature and order, does not furnish a proof which may assist us securely, as to the conviction of the existence of a supreme being. Such a proof we could term the *physico-theological*. Should this also be impossible, there is then no satisfactory proof possible at all from mere speculative reason, as to the existence of a being which answers to our transcendental idea.

We shall soon perceive from the preceding observations, that a very easy and valid answer to this question may be expected. For how can ever experience be given, which should be conformable to an idea? That which is peculiar to this last consists precisely in this, that an experience can never be congruous with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary all-sufficient original being is so immensely great, so highly raised above all that is empirical—which is always conditioned—that, partly, we can never call up enough matter in experience, in order to fill such a conception, and partly always we grope about amongst the conditioned, and will seek continually in vain after the unconditioned—whereof no law whatsoever of an empirical synthesis furnishes us with an example, or the least guidance to the same.

If the highest being should stand in this chain of conditions, it would thus itself be a member of the

series of the same, and precisely in the same way as the inner members which it precedes, it would require still further investigation on account of its still higher ground. If, on the contrary, we will separate it from the chain, and not, as a mere intelligible being, comprehend it in the series of natural causes, what bridge can reason then well build in order to reach to the same? for all the laws of the transition from effects to causes—nay, all synthesis and extension of our cognition in general, can be placed upon nothing else but possible experience—consequently merely upon objects of the sensible world, and only have meaning in respect thereof.

The present world opens to us so immense a spectacle of diversity, order, fitness, and beauty, whether we pursue these in the infinity of space, or in its unlimited division—that even according to the knowledge which our weak reason has been enabled to acquire of the same, all language fails in expression as to so many and undiscernibly great wonders—all numbers in measuring their power, and even our thoughts in bounds—so that our judgment of the Whole must terminate in a speechless, but so much the more eloquent astonishment. Every where we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, regularity in origin and disappearance; and since nothing has come of itself into the state in which it is, it always thus indicates farther back another thing, as its cause, which renders necessary exactly the same farther enquiry, so that in such a way the great whole must sink into the abyss of nothing, if we did not admit something existing of itself, originally and independently, external to this infinite contingent, which maintained it, and, as the cause of its origin at the same time secured its duration. This highest cause (in respect of all things in the world) how great are we to think it? The world we are not acquainted with according to its whole content, still less do we know how to appreciate its

magnitude by comparison with all that is possible. But what prevents us, that, since we once require in respect of causality an external and supreme being, we should not at the same time, in respect of the degree of perfection, place it *above every thing else possible* ? which we can effect easily, although certainly only through the delicate outline of an abstract conception, when we represent to ourselves, united in it as a single substance, all possible perfection—which conception—favourable to the claim of our reason in the economy of principles—is subjected in itself to no contradiction, and is even advantageous to the extension of the use of reason, in the midst of experience, by means of the direction which such an idea gives towards order and fitness, and yet is never opposed to experience in a decided manner.

This proof deserves at all times to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most adapted to ordinary human reason. It animates the study of nature, just as it itself has its existence from this, and thereby ever receives fresh force. It manifests ends and views, where our observation had not itself discovered them, and extends our cognitions of nature by means of the clue of a particular unity, whose principle is out of nature. But these cognitions react back again upon their cause—namely, the occasioning idea, and increase the belief in a higher being into an irresistible conviction.

It would, consequently, not only be comfortless, but also quite in vain, to wish to take away some thing from the authority of this proof. Reason, which is unceasingly elevated by means of arguments so powerful, and always increasing under its hands, although only empirical ones, cannot, through any doubts of subtilely deduced speculation, be so pressed down, that it must not be roused, as it were out of a dream, from any speculative irresolution, through a glance which it casts on the wonders and the majesty of the uni-

verse ; in order to raise itself from greatness to greatness, up to the highest of all—from the conditioned to the condition—up to the supreme and unconditioned Creator.

But though we have nothing to suggest against the reasonableness and the utility of this proceeding, but have rather to recommend and encourage it, yet still on this account we cannot approve of that pretension, which would assent to this argument as apodictical certainty, and as requiring no favour at all nor extraneous support ; and it can in no way be detrimental to the good cause, to reduce the dogmatical language of an insolent reasoner to a tone of moderation and modesty—to that of a belief sufficient for tranquillity, but not precisely one commanding unconditional surrender. I maintain, therefore, that the physico-theological proof can never alone show the existence of a supreme Being, but it must always leave it to the ontological one (to which it only serves as introduction) to complete this deficiency ; consequently such ontological one still always contains *the only possible proof* (provided generally a speculative proof takes place), which no human reason can disregard.

The chief moments of the alleged physical theological proof are the following:—1st. In the world visible signs are found every where of an arrangement executed according to determined intention with great wisdom, and in a whole of indescribable diversity of content, as well as of unbounded magnitude of extent.—2ndly. This fit arrangement is quite extraneous to the things of the world, and adheres to them only contingently, that is, the nature of different things could not of itself, by means of so many means united with one another, accord with determined ends, if they had not been chosen and disposed for this, quite expressly through a regulating reasonable principle, according to ideas lying at the foundation.—3rdly. There exists therefore an elevated and wise cause (or several), which

not merely as a blindly acting all-powerful Nature through *fruitfulness*, but as an Intelligence through *liberty*, must be the cause of the world.—4thly. The unity of this may be concluded, with certainty, from the unity of the reciprocal relation of the parts of the world, as members of an artificial building, as to that, where our observation reaches,—and still further, with probability, according to all principles of analogy.

Without disputing in this case with natural reason as to its conclusion, when it concludes from the analogy of some productions of nature with that which human reason produces, when it does violence to nature, and compels this not to proceed according to its ends, but to submit itself to ours (in conformity with the same in houses, ships, clocks), there is just such a causality, that is to say, understanding and will lying at its foundation, when it deduces the internal possibility of free acting nature (which first renders possible all art, and perhaps even reason itself) from another although superhuman art,—which conclusion could not support perhaps the strictest transcendental critick ;—yet must we confess, that if we once are to name a cause, we could not here proceed more securely than according to the analogy with the like productions suitable to the end, which are the only ones, whereof the causes and the mode of action are fully known. Reason would not be able of itself to answer this, if it wished to pass from the causality which it knows, to the obscure and undemonstrable grounds of explanation, which it does not know.

According to this conclusion, the fitness and the harmony of so many dispositions of nature must show the contingency of form but not of matter, that is to say, of substance in the world, since for the last there would yet be required, that it could be shown that the things of the world were unsuitable of themselves to the like order and accordance, according to general laws, if they were not themselves, according to *their*

*substance*, the product of a supreme wisdom ; but as to which quite other proofs would be required than those from analogy with human art. This proof, therefore, at the most, could only demonstrate an *architect of the world*, who would be always limited through the fitness of the material which he worked upon, but not a *creator of the world*, to the idea of which every thing is subject, which is very far from being sufficient for the great object which we have in view, that is to say, to shew an all-sufficient original Being. If we would show the contingency of matter itself, we must then have recourse to a transcendental argument, but which in this case was precisely to be avoided.

The conclusion proceeds, therefore, from the order and suitableness generally to be observed in the world, as an absolutely contingent adaptation, to the existence of a cause *proportionate* to it. But the conception of this cause must give us to know something quite *determined* as to it, and it can therefore be none other, but that of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, &c., in one word, all perfection, as an all-sufficient being. For the predicates of very *great*, of amazing, of immeasurable power and excellence, furnish no determined conception at all, and do not *say* specially what the thing is in itself, but are only relative representations of the greatness of the object, which the contemplator (of the world) compares with himself and his power of apprehension, and which turn out equally valuable, whether we augment the object, or diminish the observing subject in relation to it. Where the question is as to the greatness (the perfection) of a thing in general, there is no determined conception but such as comprehends the whole possible perfection, and only the all (omnitude) of the reality is universally determined in the conception.

Now I do not suppose, that any one would presume to see the relationship of the magnitude of the world

observed by him (according to extent as well as content) to omnipotence, that of the order of the world to the highest wisdom, that of the unity of the world to the absolute unity of the creator, &c. Physico-theology can therefore give no determined conception of the supreme cause of the world, and consequently not be sufficient for a principle of theology, which in its turn is to constitute the foundation of religion.

The advance to absolute totality through the empirical way is quite impossible. But this nevertheless is done in the physico-theological proof. What means do we then make use of, in order to leap so wide a chasm?

After we have attained to the admiration of the greatness, the wisdom, the power &c. of the author of the world, and can advance no farther, we abandon then at once this argument, conducted upon empirical proofs, and proceed to the contingency of the world, concluded at the very outset from the order and fitness of the same. Now from this contingency alone, we proceed only through transcendental conceptions, to the existence of an absolutely-necessary, and from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause, to the absolutely determined or determining conception of the same—namely, an all-embracing Reality. Therefore the physico-theological proof came to a stand still in its undertaking—in this embarrassment sprang suddenly to the cosmological proof, and as this is only a disguised ontological proof, it thus completed its intention really only by means of pure reason, although in the beginning it had denied all connexion with this, and had placed every thing upon proofs evident from experience.

The physico-theologists have therefore no cause at all to treat so disdainfully the transcendental mode of proof, and to look down upon it with the self-conceit of clear sighted natural philosophers, as upon the cobweb of obscure speculatists. For if they would only examine themselves, they would find, that whilst

they had proceeded a good way on the ground of nature and of experience, and yet always see themselves just as far from the object that appears in face of their reason, they suddenly quit this ground, and pass over into the region of pure possibilities, where, upon the wings of ideas, they hope to approach nearer to that which had escaped all their empirical investigation. When finally they imagine, after so great a spring, to have secured firm footing, they then extend the now determined conception (into the possession of which they are arrived, without knowing how) over the whole field of creation, and explain the ideal which was simply a product of pure reason, although a pitiful one enough and quite beneath the dignity of its object, through experience—without being willing to confess, that they are arrived at this knowledge or pre-supposition, by another path than that of experience.

Hence, at the foundation of the physico-theological proof, lies the cosmological, and at the foundation of this, the ontological proof, as to the existence of a particular original being as supreme being; and as besides these three ways none other is open to speculative reason, the ontological proof from merely pure conceptions of reason is thus the only possible one, provided only, that a proof at all of a proposition so far elevated above all empirical use of the understanding, is possible.

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### SEVENTH SECTION.

#### CRITICK OF ALL THEOLOGY, FROM SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES OF REASON.

If by Theology, I understand cognition of the primitive being, it is either, that, from pure reason, (*theologia rationalis*) or from revelation (*revelata*.)



Now the first thinks its object either merely through pure reason, by means of mere transcendental conceptions, (*ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium,*) and is termed transcendental theology, or through a conception which it borrows from nature (that of our soul) as the highest intelligence, and must be termed *natural* theology. He who grants only a transcendental theology is termed *Deist*, he who admits, likewise, a natural theology, is termed *Theist*. The first agrees, that we can certainly cognize the existence of a primitive being through mere reason, but of which our conception is merely transcendental—namely, only as of a being which possesses all reality, but which we cannot determine more exactly. The second maintains, that reason is in a state for determining more exactly the object, according to analogy with nature, namely as a being which, by means of understanding and liberty, contains within itself the original foundation of all other things. The first, therefore, represents, under the same, merely a *Cause of the world*, (it remains undecided, whether through the necessity of its nature, or from liberty,) the second represents an *Author of the world*.

Transcendental theology is either that which thinks of deriving the existence of the primitive being from an experience in general, (without determining any thing more exactly as to the world whereto it belongs,) and is termed *Cosmotheology*, or it believes to cognize the existence of this being through mere conceptions, without the aid of the least experience, and is termed *Ontotheology*.

*Natural Theology* concludes as to the properties and existence of an author of the world from the quality, order, and unity which is met with in this world, in which double causality and the rules thereof must be admitted—that is to say, nature and liberty. Hence it ascends from this world to the highest intelligence, either as the principle of all natural, or of all moral

order and perfection. In the first case it is termed *Physicotheology*, in the last *Moral Theology*.\*

As under the conception of God, we are accustomed to understand, not for instance merely a blind working eternal nature, as the root of things, but a supreme Being, which is to be by means of understanding and liberty, the author of things, and as likewise this conception alone interests us, we might thus in strictness deny to the *Deist* all belief in God, and leave him only the assertion of a primitive being as supreme cause. As, however, no one ought on this account to be accused, because he is not confident enough to maintain a thing, with wishing yet to deny it, it is more fair and equitable to say, the *Deist* believes a *God*, but the *Theist* a *living God* (*summam intelligentiam*). We will now investigate the possible sources of all these attempts of reason.

I content myself here, with explaining the theoretical cognition as such a one, whereby I cognize, *what is*, but the practical, whereby I represent to myself, *what ought to be*. Hence the theoretical use of reason is that, by means of which I cognize *à priori*, (as necessary), that something is—but the practical by means of which it is cognized *à priori*, what should be. Now, if it is indubitably certain, but yet only conditioned, that either something is, or should be, a certain determined condition may still thus either be absolutely necessary for this, or it may be presupposed only as voluntary and contingent. In the first case, the condition is postulated (*per thesin*), in the second supposed (*per hypothesin*). As there are practical laws which are absolutely necessary (the moral)—if these necessarily presuppose any existence as the condition of the possibility of their *obligatory* force—this existence must then be *postulated*, for this reason, that the

\* Not theological Ethics—since they contain moral laws which *presuppose* the existence of a supreme ruler of the world, whilst on the contrary moral theology is a conviction of the existence of a supreme being, which conviction is founded upon moral laws.

conditioned, from which the conclusion proceeds to this determined condition, must itself be cognized *à priori* as absolutely necessary. We shall hereafter shew of the moral laws, that they not only presuppose the existence of a supreme Being, but also, as they are in another respect absolutely necessary, they justly postulate it, yet certainly only practically. For the present we still put this mode of conclusion aside.

As when the question is merely as to that which is, (not what should be), the conditioned which is given to us in experience, is also always thought as contingent, so the condition belonging to it can thence not be cognized as absolutely necessary, but serves only as a respectively necessary or rather needful, yet in itself and *à priori*, arbitrary presupposition for the reason-cognition of the conditioned. If, therefore, the absolute necessity of a thing is to be cognized in theoretical cognition, this can alone then happen from conceptions *à priori*, but never as from a cause in reference to an existence which is given through experience.

A theoretical cognition is speculative, if it relate to an object, or to such conceptions of an object as one can arrive at in no experience. It is opposed to the *cognition of nature*, which refers to no other objects or predicates of the same, but such as can be given in a possible experience.

The principle of concluding from that which happens (from the empirically-contingent), as effect, to a cause, is a principle of natural cognition but not of speculative. For, if we make abstraction of it, as of a principle which contains the condition of possible experience in general, and omitting all that is empirical, we would state it of the contingent generally, there then does not remain the least justification of such a synthetic proposition, in order thence to discover in which way I can pass over from something which exists, to something quite different therefrom (named cause)—nay, the conception of a cause loses exactly in the same

way, as of the contingent, in such a mere speculative use, all meaning, whose objective reality may be comprehensible *in concreto*.

Now, if we conclude from the existence of *things* in the world to their cause, this then belongs not to the natural but to the speculative use of reason, since the first does not refer to any cause the things themselves (substances), but only that which *happens*, consequently their *states*, as empirically contingent—and that the substance itself (matter) is, according to its existence contingent, must be a mere speculative cognition of reason. But if the question also in this case were only as to the form of the world, the mode of its conjunction, and the change thereof, and yet I wished thence to conclude as to a cause which is quite different from the world—this again would then be a judgment of mere speculative reason, because the object in this case is no object at all of a possible experience. But then the principle of causality, which is only valid within the field of experience, and out of the same is without use, nay even without meaning, would be wholly diverted from its destination.

I maintain, then, that all attempts of mere speculative use of reason in respect of theology are wholly useless, and null and void according to their internal quality; but that the principles of its natural use do not lead us at all to any theology—consequently, if we do not lay at the foundation, or do not use as a clue, moral laws, there can be no theology at all of reason. For all synthetical principles of the understanding are of immanent use, but for the cognition of a supreme Being, a transcendental use of the same is required, for which our understanding is not at all prepared. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the original being, this being must thus in the chain of objects belong to experience, but then it would be, as all phenomena, again itself conditioned. But, if even we allowed the spring out beyond the limits of experience,

by means of the dynamic law of the relationship of effects to their causes; what conception can this mode of proceeding procure to us? Very far from any conception of a supreme being, since experience never affords us the maximum of all possible effects (which is to depose as a witness of their cause). If it is to be permitted to us, merely, in order to leave nothing void in our reason, to fill up this want of complete determination, by means of a simple idea of the highest perfection and original necessity—this may be admitted certainly out of favour, but cannot be exacted as the right of an irresistible proof. The physicotheological proof might therefore perhaps indeed afford force to other proofs (if such are to be had) since it connects speculation with intuition—but of itself it prepares the understanding for theological cognition, and gives to it for this purpose an exact and natural direction, rather than that *alone* it is able to complete the business.

We hence therefore plainly perceive, that transcendental questions allow only of transcendental answers, that is, from pure conceptions *à priori*, without the slightest empirical admixture. But the question here is palpably synthetic, and requires an extension of our cognition beyond all limits of experience, namely, to the existence of a being which is to correspond to our mere idea, to which no experience can ever be equal. Now, according to our previous proof, all synthetical cognition *à priori* is only thereby possible, because it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience, and all principles are therefore only of immanent validity—that is, they refer only to objects of empirical cognition, or phenomena. Nothing therefore is also effected by a transcendental mode of proceeding in respect of the theology of a mere speculative reason.

But if we would rather call into question all the preceding proofs of Analytick, than be deprived of the conviction of the weight of arguments so long made

use of, we cannot still refuse to satisfy the appeal, if I require, that we should at least justify ourselves as to how, and by means of what illumination, we then trust for taking flight beyond all possible experience, through the power of mere ideas. I would request to be spared new proofs or an improved exposition of the ancient proofs. For, although we have not much to choose amongst them, as finally all speculative proofs still terminate in a single one, namely the ontological, and I therefore need not even fear being particularly incommoded from the fertility of the dogmatic combatants of that reason liberated from the senses spoken of—and although besides, without thinking myself very pugnacious, I will not refuse the challenge, to discover in every attempt of this kind the false conclusion, and thereby nullify its pretension—still however the hope of better success amongst those who have been once accustomed to dogmatical convictions is never wholly given up; and I therefore hold to the single equitable demand, that a man should justify generally and from the nature of human reason, together with all the remaining sources of cognition, as to the way, in respect of which he would begin to enlarge his cognition wholly *à priori*, and to extend it to that point, where no possible experience and consequently no means suffice, for securing to any conception conceived from ourselves, its objective reality. However the understanding may have arrived at this conception, still the existence of its object can never be found in the same analytically, because the cognition of the *existence* of the object consists precisely in this, that such is established in itself *out of the thought*. But it is wholly impossible to issue out of a conception of oneself and without we follow the empirical connexion, (but whereby phenomena always only are given) to arrive at the discovery of new objects and transcendental objects.

But although reason in its merely speculative use is

far from being sufficient for this so important an object, namely, for attaining to the existence of a supreme Being; yet it possesses therein very great utility in *rectifying* the cognition of the same, in case it could be derived elsewhere; in making it in accordance with itself and with every intelligible end, and purifying it from every thing which might be opposed to the conception of an original being, and from all admixture of empirical limitations.

Transcendental theology hence remains, notwithstanding its insufficiency, still of important negative use, and is a continual censure of our reason, if it have merely to do with pure ideas, which exactly on this account, admit none other than a transcendental standard. For if once in another, perhaps practical relationship, the *presupposition* of a highest and all-sufficient Being as supreme Intelligence asserted its validity without contradiction, it would then be of the greatest importance precisely to determine this conception in its transcendental part, as the conception of a necessary and all most real being, and to do away with what is opposed to the highest reality, and what belongs to the mere phenomenon (to anthromorphism in the more extended sense), and at the same time to set aside all opposite assertions, *atheistical*, or *deistical*, or *anthromorphist*—which in a like critical treatise is very easy, since the same grounds by which the incapability of human reason in respect of the assertion of the existence of a like being is placed before us, also necessarily suffice in order to show the unfitness of every contrary assertion. For, whence will any one deduce through the pure speculation of reason, the knowledge that there is a supreme being as the original principle of every thing, or that none of those properties belong to it which we, according to their consequences, represent to ourselves as analogous with the dynamical realities of a thinking being, or that, in the last case, those properties must also be subjected to all

limitations which the sensibility unavoidably imposes upon those intelligences, which we know by experience.

The supreme being remains, therefore, for the mere speculative use of reason, a mere but still a *faultless Ideal*, a conception which concludes and crowns the whole human cognition, the objective reality of which conception cannot indeed be shown in this way, but also cannot be refuted ; and if there is to be a moral theology which can supply this defect, then the previous only problematical transcendental theology thus proves its indispensableness, by determination of its conception and unceasing censure of a reason oftentimes deceived through sensibility, and not always accordant with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence out of the world (not as soul of the world), eternity, without conditions of time, omnipresence, without conditions of space, omnipotence, &c., are merely transcendental predicates, and consequently the purified idea of the same which is so necessary for every theology, can only be derived from the transcendental one.

## APPENDIX

### TO TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICK.

#### OF THE REGULATIVE USE OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON.

The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only confirms what we have already shown in the transcendental Analytick, namely, that all our conclusions which would lead us out beyond the field of possible experience, are deceitful and without foundation ; but it teaches us at the same time this in parti-



cular, that human reason has therein a natural *propensity* for overstepping these limits; that transcendental ideas are just as natural to it, as the categories to the understanding, although with this difference, that as the last lead us to the truth, that is, to the accordance of our conceptions with the object, the first effect a mere but inevitable appearance, the illusion of which we can hardly guard against through the strictest critick.

Every thing which is founded in the nature of our faculties must be conformable to an end, and accordant with the right use of them, if we only guard against a certain misunderstanding, and can discover their proper direction. The transcendental ideas will therefore have, in all likelihood, their good and consequently *immanent* use—although, if their meaning be misinterpreted and they be taken for conceptions of real things, they may be transcendent in the application, and precisely on that account deceitful. For, not the idea in itself, but merely its use, in respect of united possible experience, may be either *exotic* (transcendent) or *indigenous* (immanent), accordingly as it is directed either directly to an object pretendedly corresponding to it, or only to the use of the understanding in general, in respect of objects with which it has to do; and all faults of subreption are at all times to be ascribed to a deficiency of judgment, but never to the understanding or the reason.

Reason never refers exactly to an object, but only to the understanding, and by means of this, to its own empirical use—it produces therefore no conceptions (of objects), but only orders them, and gives to them the unity, which they can have in their greatest possible extension, that is, in reference to the totality of the serieses, as to which the understanding does not perceive any thing at all, but only as to that connexion *whereby* every where *serieses* of conditions are *effected* according to conceptions. Reason has therefore only

strictly for object the understanding, and its suitable disposition—and as this understanding unites the diversity in the object by means of conceptions, so such reason on its part, unites the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas, in setting up a certain collective unity as the aim of the actions of reason, which else are only occupied with distributive unity.

I maintain, therefore, that transcendental ideas are never of a constitutive use, so that thereby conceptions of certain objects would be given, and in the case where they are thus understood, they are merely sophistical (dialectical) conceptions. But on the contrary, they have an excellent and indispensable necessary regulative use, namely, to direct the understanding to a certain end, in respect of which the lines of direction of all its rules terminate in a point, which, although it indeed is only an idea (*focus imaginarius*), that is, a point from which the conceptions of the understanding do not really proceed, because it lies entirely out of the limits of possible experience, yet it still serves for the purpose of procuring to them the greatest unity together with the greatest extension. Now, hence, certainly the illusion arises in respect to us, as if these lines of direction were drawn from an object itself, which lay out of the field of empirically possible cognition, (in the same way as the objects are seen behind the face of a mirror), but this illusion (which we can, nevertheless, prevent, so that it does not deceive,) is however indispensably necessary, if, besides the objects that are before our sight, we wish to see those also at the same time which lie far off behind us—that is, if, in our case, we will discipline the understanding beyond every given experience (the part of united possible experience), consequently also, for the greatest possible and widest extension.

If we survey our cognitions of the understanding in their whole extent, we then find that, that which reason quite peculiarly arranges as to this, and seeks to ac-

comply, is the *systematisation* of cognition—that is, the connexion thereof according to a principle. This reason-unity presupposes at all times an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole of the cognition, which whole precedes the determined cognition of the parts, and contains the conditions for determining *a priori* to each part its place, and relationship to the others. This idea hence postulates perfect unity of the cognition of the understanding, whereby this last becomes not merely an accidental aggregate, but a connected system, according to necessary laws. We cannot then properly say, that this idea is a conception of the object, but of the general unity of these conceptions, so far as it serves as a rule to the understanding. Such conceptions of reason are not derived from nature; we rather interrogate nature as to these ideas, and esteem our cognition as defective, so long as it is not adequate to the same. We admit, that *pure earth, pure water, pure air, &c.*, are difficult to be found. Nevertheless, the conceptions thereof are still necessary (which therefore, as to what regards perfect purity, have only their origin in reason), in order to determine suitably the share which each of these natural causes has in the phenomenon; and thus we reduce all matter to earths (as it were mere weight), to salts and inflammable substances (as force), finally to water and earth as vehicles, (as it were machines, by means of which the previous things act), in order, according to the idea of a mechanism, to explain the mutual chemical operations of matter. For, although we do not thus really express ourselves, still such an influence of reason upon the classifications of natural philosophers is very easily to be discovered.

If reason be a faculty of deducing the particular from the general, then either the general is already in itself certain and given, and then it requires only the *faculty of judgment* for subsumption, and the particular is thereby necessarily determined. This I will

term the apodictical use of reason. Or the general is only problematically admitted, and is 'a mere idea—the particular is certain, but the generality of the rule for this consequence is still a problem—and thus several particular rules which jointly are certain, become tried by the rule, as to whether they proceed therefrom—and in this case, if there is a likelihood that all the pretended particular cases thence are derived, it is concluded as to the generality of the rule, and from this subsequently as to all the cases also which are not given in themselves. This I will term the hypothetical use of reason.

The hypothetical use of reason from ideas laid at the foundation, as problematical conceptions, is properly not *constitutive*, that is to say, not so circumstanced, that thereby, if we wish to judge according to all strictness, the truth follows of the general rule, which has been admitted as hypothesis;—for how shall we know all the possible consequences, which, since they follow from the same admitted principle, show its generality? But it is only *regulative*, in order thereby to produce, as far as possible, unity in the particular cognitions, and thereby to *approximate* the rule to generality.

The hypothetical use of reason refers, therefore, to the systematic unity of the cognitions of the understanding; but this unity is the *touchstone of the truth* of the rules. Conversely, systematic unity (as mere idea) is only a *projected* idea, which we must consider not as given in itself, but only as a problem; but which serves for this, to find a principle for diversity and for the particular use of the understanding, and also thereby to conduct and to render the same connected, in respect of the cases which are not given.

But we only see from this, that the systematical or reason-unity of the different cognitions of the understanding, is a *logical* principle, in order there, where the understanding alone does not suffice for rules, to

aid it by means of ideas, and at the same time to procure uniformity for the diversity of its rules under a principle (systematical), and thereby connexion, so far as it can be done. But whether the quality of objects, or the nature of the understanding which cognizes them as such, is determined in itself to systematic unity, and whether we may postulate in a certain measure this, *à priori*, also without regard to such an interest of reason, and therefore say, that all possible cognitions of the understanding (the empirical comprehended therein) possess reason-unity, and are subjected to common principles, whence they, in spite of their difference, may be derived ; this would be a *transcendental* principle of reason, that would make the systematic unity as method, not merely subjectively and logically, but objectively necessary.

We will explain this through a case of the use of reason. Amongst the different kinds of unity according to the conceptions of the understanding, that also of the causality of a substance belongs, which is termed force. The different phenomena of the self-same substance shew at the first glance so much heterogeneousness, that one must therefore, at first, almost admit so many forces thereof as effects present themselves, as in the human mind sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, discernment, pleasure, desire, &c. A logical maxim prescribes to us, at the outset, to diminish this apparent variety as much as possible, in that way, that through comparison we should discover the concealed identity, and see whether imagination conjoined with consciousness, is not memory, wit, discernment, perhaps even understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental faculty, but as to which logic does not at all make out, whether there is such a one, is at least the problem of a systematic representation of the diversity of faculties. The logical principle of reason requires this unity to be effected as far as possible, and the more the phenomena of one and

the other force are found identical with each other, the more probable is it, that they are nothing but different manifestations of one and the same force, which (comparatively) may be termed their *fundamental force*. And thus we proceed with the rest.

The comparative fundamental forces must again be compared with one another, in order thereby, as we discover their harmony, to approximate them to a single radical, that is, absolute fundamental force. But this reason-unity is merely hypothetical. We do not maintain, that such a one must in fact be met with, but, that we must seek it in favour of reason, namely, for the establishment of certain principles, for the several rules which experience may afford; and when it is practicable, it must in such a manner produce systematic unity in cognition.

But it is evident, if we pay attention to the transcendental use of the understanding, that this idea of a fundamental force in general is not merely determined as problem for hypothetical use, but supposes objective reality, whereby the systematic unity of the various forces of a substance is postulated, and an apodictical principle of reason established. For, without our having once sought the accordance of the several forces—nay, even if it does not succeed with us agreeably to every endeavour to discover it—we still presuppose, such a one is to be met with, and this not only as in the adduced case, on account of the unity of substance, but, where even many forces, although in a certain degree homogeneous, are met with—as in matter in general, reason supposes systematic unity of diverse forces, where particular natural laws stand under more general ones, and the saving of principles is not merely an economical principle of reason, but an internal law of nature.

In fact, it is also not to be seen, how a logical principle of the reason-unity of rules can take place, if a transcendental were not to be presupposed, whereby

such a systematic unity is, as adhering to the objects themselves, admitted *à priori* as necessary. For with what right can reason require in logical use, to handle as a mere concealed unity, the diversity of forces which nature gives us to know, and to deduce it from a fundamental force, so far as it has the power, if it were free to it to admit, that it is equally possible, all its forces were heterogeneous, and the systematic unity of their derivation not conformable to nature? For then it would proceed precisely contrary to its determination, inasmuch as it sets up for the end an idea, which quite opposes the disposition of nature. Neither can we say, that it has beforehand taken this unity of the contingent quality of nature according to the principles of reason. For the law of reason-for seeking it, is necessary, since without the same we should have no reason at all, and yet without this no connected use of the understanding, and in default thereof, no sufficient mark of empirical truth; and therefore, in respect of this last, we must presuppose the systematic unity of nature thoroughly, as objectively valid and necessary.

We find also this transcendental presupposition concealed in an astonishing manner in the principles of philosophers, although they have never cognized such therein, or confessed it to themselves. That all diversities of individual things do not exclude the identity of the *kind*—that the many kinds must be treated only as different determinations of few *genera*, and these of still higher *orders*—that therefore a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical conceptions must be sought, so far as they can be derived from higher and more general ones, in a scholastic rule or in a logical principle, without which no use of the reason would take place, since we can only so far conclude from the general to the particular, inasmuch as general properties of things are laid at the foundation, under which the particular stand.

But, that also in nature such a harmony is to be met with, philosophers presupposed in the known scholastic rule, that we must not multiply without necessity, grounds (principles) (*entia præter necessitatem non est multiplicanda*). Whereby it is said, that the nature of things itself furnishes matter to the unity of reason, and that the apparent infinite difference must not prevent us from suspecting as concealed behind it, unity of the fundamental properties, from which the diversity can only be derived through more determination. In all ages, this unity has been so zealously sought after, although it is merely an idea, that there has been cause found rather for moderating the desire for it, than for encouraging it. It was already doing a great deal, that chemists were able to reduce all salts to two principal classes, acids and alkalis, and still they endeavoured to look at this difference merely as a variety or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental matter. It has been attempted to bring the various kinds of earths (the matter of stones, and even of metals) gradually into three, and finally into two; but not satisfied with this only, they have not been able to give up imagining as concealed under these varieties, a single genus; in fact, from conjecturing a principle as common to these (*the earths*) and the salts. We might perhaps believe, this is a mere economical manœuvre of reason in order to spare itself trouble as much as possible, and an hypothetical attempt, which, if it succeed, gives probability to the presupposed ground of explanation precisely through this unity. But such a self-interested intention is very easily to be distinguished from the idea, according to which every man presupposes this reason-unity is adopted to nature itself, and, that reason in this case does not beg but commands, although without being able to determine the limits of this unity.

If there were amongst the phenomena which offer



themselves to us so great a difference, I will not say according to the form (for therein they may be similar to one another), but according to their content, that is, diversity of existing beings, that even the most acute human reason could not discover, by comparison of one with the other, the least resemblance, (a case which may readily be imagined), the logical law of genera would not then at all take place, and there would be no conception of genus, nor even any universal conception, nor even any understanding, but such as had only to do with these. The logical principle of genera presupposes, therefore, a transcendental one, if it is to be applied to nature (by this I here understand only objects which are given to us). According to the same principle, a necessary homogeneity is presupposed in the diversity of a possible experience (although we cannot determine its degree *à priori*), since without such, no empirical conceptions, consequently, no experience, would be possible.

Opposed to the logical principle of genera, which postulates identity, stands another, namely, that of *Species*, which requires diversity and differences of things, notwithstanding their accordance under the same genus, and it prescribes to the understanding to be not less attentive to the one than to the other. This principle (of acuteness or of the faculty of discernment) limits greatly the levity of the first (the mind), and reason here exhibits a double interest conflicting with itself; on the one side the interest of the *circumscription* (the generality) in respect of the genera, on the other of the *content* (the determinateness) in respect of the diversity of the species, since the understanding thinks, in the first case, certainly much under its conceptions, but, in the second, so much the more *in the same*. This also manifests itself in the very different way of thinking of natural philosophers, some of whom (which are especially speculative), inimical as it were to dissimilitude, always look to the

unity of the genus, others (especially empirical thinkers) seek to split nature unceasingly into so much diversity, that we must almost abandon the hope of judging its phenomena according to general principles.

A logical principle lies also visibly at the foundation of this last mode of thinking, which has for object the systematic completeness of all cognitions, if, beginning from the genus, I descend to the diversity which may be contained under it, and in such a way, I seek to procure extension to the system, as in the first case, where I ascended to the genus, I seek to procure simplicity. For from the sphere of the conception which indicates a genus, just as little is to be seen, as from the space which matter can take up, how far the division of the same can go. Consequently every *genus* requires different *species*, and these again different *sub-genera*, and as none of the last takes place, which has not always again a sphere (circumscription, as *conceptus communis*), reason thus demands in its whole extension, that no kind is to be looked at, as the ultimate in itself, because as it is yet always a conception which contains in itself only that which is common to different things, this conception is not universally determined, consequently also cannot be referred immediately to an individuality, and therefore at all times must contain under itself other conceptions, that is, subordinate kinds. This law of specification might be thus expressed: *entium varietates non temere esse minuendas*.

But we easily see, that also this logical law would be devoid of sense and application, if a transcendental *law of specification* did not lie at the foundation, which certainly indeed does not require, as to the things which may be our objects, a real *infinity* in respect of the differences; for the logical principle which *only* asserts the *indeterminateness* of the logical sphere in respect of

the possible division, does not furnish occasion for this, but yet imposes upon the understanding, to seek under every kind which appears to us, subordinate kinds, and for every difference, less differences. For should there be no lower conceptions, there would also then be none higher. Now the understanding only cognizes every thing through conceptions—consequently so far as it reaches in the division, and never through mere intuition, but always again through lower conceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their universal determination (which is only possible through the understanding), requires an unceasingly continued specification of its conceptions, and a progression to differences ever still remaining, whereof abstraction has been made in the conception of the kind, and still more in that of the genus.

This law also of specification cannot be derived from experience, for this cannot furnish propositions extending so far. The empirical specification soon comes to a stand in the distinction of the diversity, if it have not been led by means of the already preceding transcendental law of specification, as a principle of reason, to seek such distinction, and always still to suppose it, although it be not revealed to the senses. That absorbing earths, according to different kinds, (calcareous and muriatic earths,) exist, required for its discovery a preceding rule of reason, which gave it as a problem to the understanding, to seek the variety, whilst it presupposed nature sufficiently rich, to conjecture it. For we have just in the same way understanding, only under the presupposition of the differences in nature, as under the condition that its objects have uniformity in them, since the very diversity of that which can be comprehended under a conception, constitutes the use of this conception, and the employment of the understanding.

Reason, therefore, prepares for the understanding its field, firstly, by means of a principle of the *homogene-*

*ousness* of the diversity under higher genera; secondly, through the principle of *variety* of the homogeneous, under inferior kinds; and in order to complete the systematic unity, it adds, thirdly, moreover, a law of the *affinity* of all conceptions, which directs a continual transition from one kind to another kind, by means of the gradual increase of the difference. We may, therefore, term these, the principles of *homogeneousness*, *specification*, and *continuity* of forms. The last springs from this, that we unite the two first, after we have completed, as well in rising to higher genera as in descending to lower kinds, the systematic connexion in the idea, for then all the differences are related to one another, inasmuch as they all descend through all the degrees of extended determination, from a single supreme genus.

The systematical unity under the three logical principles may be made sensible in the following way. We may look upon every conception as a point, which, as the point of view of a spectator, has its horizon, that is, a multitude of things, which may be represented from it, and as it were surveyed. Within this horizon, a multitude of points ad infinitum may be given, each of which has again its narrower sphere of view, that is, each kind contains subordinate kinds, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists only of less horizons (subordinate kinds), but not of points, which have no sphere (individuals). But for different horizons, that is, genera which are determined from just so many conceptions, a common horizon may be thought deduced, whence we survey them all as from a central point, which horizon is the higher genus, until finally the highest genus is the general and true horizon, which is determined from the point of view of the highest conception, and comprehends within itself all diversity, as genera, species, and varieties.

The law of homogeneousness leads me to this highest

point of view—the law of specification to all inferior points of view, and to their greatest variety. But as in such a way, there is nothing void in the whole extent of all possible conceptions, and out of this, nothing can be found, there thus springs from the presupposition of that general sphere and universal division of it, the principle—*non datur vacuum formarum*,—that is, there are not different original and first genera, which are as it were isolated and separated from one another (by means of a void interval), but all diverse genera are only divisions of a single supreme and universal genus—and from this principle its immediate consequence, *datur continuum formarum*—that is to say, all differences of kinds limit one another and permit no transition to one another, by means of a spring, but only through all lesser degrees of difference, whereby we may arrive from one to the other: in a word, there is no species or variety which could be the nearest one to another, (in the conception of reason,) but there are still always intermediate species possible, the difference of which between the first and second is less than this their difference from one another.

The first law, therefore, guards against extravagance in the diversity of different original genera, and recommends uniformity; the second, on the contrary, limits again this propensity to accordance, and dictates difference of the varieties, before a person makes the application with his universal conceptions to the individuals. The third unites these two, whilst in the highest diversity it still prescribes uniformity by means of the gradual transition from one species to another, which indicates a kind of relationship of different branches, so far as they all are sprung from the same trunk.

But this logical law of the *continui specierum* (*formarum logicarum*), presupposes a transcendental one (*lex continui in natura*), without which the use of the

understanding through the precept in question would only have been led into error, whilst, perhaps, it would have exactly taken a way opposed to nature. This law, therefore, must repose upon pure transcendental and not empirical grounds. For in the last case it would be posterior to systems—yet strictly has it first produced that which is systematical in the cognition of nature. There are not also, peradventure, concealed behind these laws, intentions through them, as mere attempts, of setting up a proof—although, certainly this connexion where it occurs, affords a powerful ground for holding the hypothetical imagined unity as founded, and the laws have therefore in this respect their utility,—but we see clearly from them, that they deem the parsimony of fundamental causes, the diversity of effects, and a thence proceeding intrinsic affinity of the members of nature to be reasonable and adapted to nature, and these principles consequently carry along with them their recommendation directly, and not merely as aids to method.

But we see easily, that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no congruous object in experience can at all be shewn—not *only* on this account, because the species are really divided in nature, and consequently must in themselves constitute a quantum discretum, and that if the gradual progress in the affinity thereof were continual, it must also contain a true infinity of the intermediate members that lie within two given kinds, which is impossible—but *also*, because we cannot make of this law any determined empirical use at all, inasmuch as thereby not the slightest sign of affinity is indicated, according to which and as to how far, we have to seek the succession of their difference—but nothing more, than a general indication that we have to seek such.

If we transpose the principles now adduced according to their order, for the purpose of disposing them conformably to the *use of the understanding*, the prin-

ciples of systematic *unity* would then, perhaps, stand thus—*Diversity*, *Affinity*, and *Unity*, but each thereof taken as ideas in the highest degree of their perfection. Reason presupposes the cognitions of the understanding which are applied directly to experience, and seeks their unity according to ideas, which unity extends much farther than experience can reach. The affinity of the diverse, without prejudice to its difference, under a principle of unity, does not concern merely the things, but much more still the mere properties and forces of things. Consequently, if for example, by means of an experience (not yet fully determined) the course of the planets is given as circular, and we find differences, we then suppose them to be in that, which can change the circle according to a law constant through all the infinite intermediate degrees, into one of these diverging courses—that is, the motions of the planets, which are not circles, will approach more or less, for instance, to the properties of this (the circle) and fall into an ellipse. Comets manifest a still greater difference in their orbits, since they (so far as observation reaches) never move in circles, but, we conjecture, a parabolic course, which however is allied to the ellipse, and if the major axis of the last be extended very far, cannot be distinguished from such in all our observations. We then arrive by the guide of these principles, at the unity of the genera of these orbs in their form, and thereby besides at the unity of the causes of all laws of their motion (gravitation)—whence afterwards we extend our conquests—and also seek to explain all the varieties and apparent deviations of those rules from the same principle, and finally to add even more than experience can ever confirm; that is to say—to conceive according to the rules of affinity even hyperbolical courses of comets, wherein these bodies entirely abandon our solar system, and whilst they go from sun to sun, unite in their course the more distant parts of a system

unlimited as to us, which is connected through one and the same moving force.

What is remarkable in these principles, and also alone occupies us, is this; that they seem to be transcendental, and although they contain mere ideas for the following up of the empirical use of reason,—according to which ideas this use can only, as it were a symptotically, that is, merely approximatively follow, without ever reaching thereto; still as synthetical propositions *à priori* they have objective but undefined validity, and serve as rule of possible experience, and also really in the working of the same are used successfully as evristic principles, yet without our being able to accomplish a transcendental deduction thereof, which, as has been before shown, is at all times impossible in respect of ideas.

We have distinguished in the transcendental analytick amongst the principles of the understanding, the *dynamical*, as mere regulative principles of *Intuition*, from the *mathematical*, which in respect of the last (*intuition*) are constitutive. Notwithstanding this, the mentioned dynamical laws are certainly constitutive in respect of *experience*, since they render the *conceptions*, without which no experience takes place, *à priori* possible. Principles of pure reason cannot, on the other hand, ever be constitutive in respect of empirical *conceptions*, because no corresponding schema of sensibility can be given to them, and they, therefore, can have no object in concreto. Now, if I depart from such empirical use thereof as constitutive principles, how shall I still secure to them a regulative use, and with the same an objective validity—and what meaning can this use have?

The understanding constitutes an object for reason, just as the sensibility does for the understanding. To render systematical, the unity of all possible empirical actions of the understanding, is a business of reason, in the same way as the understanding connects and



reduces to empirical laws, the diversity of the phenomena through conceptions. But the actions of the understanding without schemata of sensibility, are *undetermined*—in the same way, the *unity of reason* is likewise *undetermined* in itself in respect of the conditions, under which, and in respect of the degree as to how far, the understanding is to connect its conceptions systematically. But, although no schema can be discovered in the *intuition* for the universal systematic unity of all conceptions of the understanding, yet an *Analogon* of such a schema can and must be given, which is the idea of the *maximum* of the division and union of the cognition of the understanding in a principle. For the greatest and absolutely-perfect may be thought determinately, since all restrictive conditions which give undetermined diversity are omitted. The idea of reason, therefore, is an analogon of a schema of sensibility, but with the difference, that the application of the conceptions of the understanding to the schema of reason, is not thus precisely a cognition of the object itself, (as in the application of the categories to their sensible schemata,) but only a rule or principle of the systematic unity of all use of the understanding. Now, as every principle which establishes absolute unity of its use *à priori* to the understanding, is also, although only indirectly, valid as to the object of experience, the principles thus of pure reason likewise have, in respect of such last object, objective reality, not for *determining* something in them, but only in order to indicate the proceeding, according to which the empirical and determined experience-use of the understanding may be universal and accordant with itself, from this cause that it has been brought into connexion with the principle of universal unity, *as much as possible*, and is derived from it.

I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from the quality of the object, but from the interest of reason, in respect of a certain possible

perfection of the cognition of this object, *maxims* of reason. There are thus maxims of speculative reason which rest only upon its speculative interest, although it might certainly seem that they were objective principles.

If mere regulative principles be considered as constitutive, they may thus as objective principles be contradictory—but if we consider them merely as *maxims*, there is then no true contradiction, but merely a different interest of reason, which causes the separation in the mode of thinking. In fact, reason has only one interest, and the contradiction of its maxims is only a difference and reciprocal limitation of the methods, for satisfying this interest.

In such a way, with one reasoner, the interest of the *diversity* (according to the principle of specification,) has more power, but with *another*, the interest of *unity* (according to the principle of aggregation.) Each of these believes to take his judgment from the knowledge of the object, and yet bottoms it only on the greater or less attachment to one of the two principles, neither of which reposes upon objective grounds, but only upon the interest of reason, and which therefore might be termed rather maxims than principles. If I see intelligent men at variance with one another as to the Characteristick of men, animals, and plants, nay even of bodies in the mineral kingdom,—as some, for example, admit particular characters of nations and founded upon descent, and also different and hereditary differences of families, races, and so forth,—others on the contrary contend, that nature in this matter has made entirely the same dispositions, and that all difference rests entirely upon external contingencies—I need then only to consider the quality of the object, in order to comprehend, that it lies too deeply concealed, for either of the parties to be able to speak from insight, as to the nature of the object.

It is nothing else but the twofold interest of reason, as to which, one party is concerned about this thing, and the other party about that, or withal affects it,—consequently the difference of the maxims of the diversity of nature, or of the unity of nature, which may very well be united—but which so long as they are held for objective insights, occasion not only contention but also obstacles, that for a long time arrest the truth, until a means is found for uniting the conflicting interest, and for satisfying reason thereon.

It is precisely the same thing with the assertion or attack of the so celebrated law of *the continual gradation* of created beings, brought into circulation by Leibnitz, and admirably supported by Bonnet, which is nothing but the following up of the principle of affinity resting upon the interest of reason—for neither observation and insight into the arrangement of nature could at all furnish it, as objective assertion. The steps of such a ladder, such as experience can present them to us, stand much too far from one another, and our pretended small differences are commonly in nature itself such wide gaps, that we cannot rely at all upon such observations, (especially in a great diversity of things, where it must ever be easy to find certain resemblances and approximations), as ends of nature. On the contrary, the method for seeking according to such a principle order in nature, and the maxim of looking upon such, although undetermined where or how far, as grounded in nature in general, is certainly a legitimate and excellent regulative principle of reason; but which principle, as such, extends much farther than experience or observation could be likened to it, yet without determining any thing, but only indicating to such the way to systematic unity.

OF THE  
ULTIMATE END OF THE NATURAL DIALECTICK  
OF HUMAN REASON.

The ideas of pure reason can never be dialectical in themselves, but their mere abuse must alone be the cause, that an illusive appearance with respect to us proceeds from them ; for they are furnished to us by means of the nature of our reason, and the supreme tribunal of all the rights and pretensions of our speculation cannot itself possibly contain original deceptions and delusions. Probably they will have therefore their good and suitable determination in the natural disposition of our reason. But the faction of sophists cries out as usual, against absurdity and contradiction, and blames that government into whose most secret plans it is not able to penetrate—whose beneficent influences it should, in fact, thank for even its conservation,—and that very culture which places it in a situation to blame and to judge this government.

We cannot make use of a conception *à priori* with any certainty, without having effected its transcendental deduction. The ideas of pure reason certainly allow no deduction of the same kind as the categories, but if they are to have, in the least, an objective although only undetermined validity, and not to represent mere things of thought, (*entia rationis ratio-cinantis*,) a deduction absolutely of the same must thus be possible, though it is admitted, that it yet diverges far from that, which we can institute with the categories. This is the completion of the critical labour of pure reason, and this we will now undertake.

There is a great difference, whether something is given to my reason as an *object absolutely*, or only as an *object in idea*. In the first case, my conceptions

tend to determine the object ; in the second, there is only really a schema, to which no object is given directly, not even ever hypothetically, but which only serves for this, to represent to us other objects by means of relation to this idea, according to its systematic unity, consequently indirectly. I thus say, the conception of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea, that is, its objective reality is not to consist in this, that it refers exactly to an object (for in such a sense we should not be able to justify its objective validity), but is only a schema ordered according to conditions of the greatest unity of reason, of the conception of a thing in general, which schema only serves for this, to maintain the greatest systematic unity in the empirical use of our reason, since we derive the object of experience, as it were, from the imagined object of this idea, as its foundation or cause. It is then said, for example, the things of the world must be so considered, as if they had their existence from a supreme intelligence. In such a manner the idea is properly only an evristic and not ostensive conception, and indicates not how a conception is constituted, but how we, under the guidance of it, are to *seek* the nature and connexion of the objects of experience in general. Now, if we can show, that although the three transcendental ideas (*Psychological*, *Cosmological*, and *Theological*) are referable directly to no object corresponding to them, nor to the determination of such, yet as rules of the empirical use of reason, under the presupposition of such an *object in the idea*, they lead to systematic unity, and always extend the cognition of experience, but can never be contrary to the same—it is then a necessary *maxim* of reason, to proceed according to such ideas. And this is the transcendental deduction of all ideas of speculative reason, not as *constitutive* principles of the extension of our cognition beyond more objects than experience can give, but as *regulative*

principles of the systematic unity of the diversity of the empirical cognition in general, which is thereby more established and justified in its proper limits than could happen without such ideas, through the mere use of the principles of the understanding.

I will make this clearer. We will, consequent upon the mentioned ideas as principles, connect, *first*, (in psychology) all phenomena, actions, and capacity of our mind by the clue of internal experience, as if the mind were a simple substance, which exists permanently (at least in life) with personal identity, whilst its states, to which those of the body only as external conditions belong, continually change. We must, *secondly*, (in cosmology,) pursue the conditions of the internal as well as of the external phenomena of nature in such a never-to-be-completed investigation, as if the same were infinite in itself and without a first or supreme member, although on this account we do not, out of all phenomena, deny the mere intelligible first grounds of the same, but yet must never bring them into the system of the explanations of nature, since we are not at all acquainted with them. *Thirdly* and lastly, we must (in respect of theology) so consider every thing which always can only belong to the system of possible experience, as *if* this constituted an absolute, yet wholly dependent and ever still within the sensible world, conditioned unity; but still at the same time, as *if* the complex of all phenomena (the sensible world itself) has a single, supreme, and all-sufficient ground out of its sphere, namely, an, as it were, self-subsisting, original, and creative reason, in reference to which we so regulate all empirical use of *our* reason in its greatest extension, as if the objects themselves were sprung from such prototype of all reason,—that is to say,—the internal phenomena of the soul do not emanate from a simple thinking substance, but one from the other, according to the idea of a simple being—the

order of the world and the systematic unity of it do not derive from a supreme intelligence, but deduce the rule from the idea of a supremely wise cause, according to which reason is to be employed for the best, as to its own satisfaction, in the connexion of causes and effects in the world.

Now there is not the least thing which hinders us from *admitting* these ideas also as objective and hypostatical, excepting only the cosmological idea where reason falls upon an antinomy, provided it wishes to realize such, (the psychological and theological do not at all contain the like.) As a contradiction is not in them, how should any one therefore be able to contest with us, their objective reality, since he knows just as little of its possibility, in order to negative it, as we to affirm it. Nevertheless, it is not enough in order to admit something, that there is no positive obstacle to the contrary, and it cannot be allowed to us, to introduce as real and determined objects, ideal beings, which surpass all our conceptions, although they contradict none, upon the mere faith of speculative reason willingly completing its labour. They, therefore, should not be admitted in themselves, but only their reality be valid, as of a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all cognition of nature—consequently they should only be laid down at the foundation as analoga of real things, but not as such things in themselves. We remove from the object of the ideas, the conditions which limit our conception of the understanding, but which also alone render it possible that we can have a determined conception of a thing. And we now think a something, whereof, as to what it may be in itself we have no conception at all, but we yet think a relationship to the complex of phenomena, which is analogous to that which the phenomena have with one another.

If we then admit such idealistic beings, we do not thus properly extend our cognition beyond the objects

of possible experience, but only their empirical unity, by means of the systematic unity, to which the idea gives us the schema, which idea consequently is valid not as constitutive, but merely as regulative principle. For, because we suppose a thing corresponding to the idea, a something, or real being, it is not thereby stated, that we wish to extend our cognition of things through transcendental conceptions; for this being is laid at the foundation only in the idea and not in itself, consequently only in order to express the systematic unity which is to serve us as a rule of the empirical use of reason, without, however, deciding any thing thereon, as to what the foundation of this unity, or the internal property of such a being is, upon which it reposes, as cause.

The transcendental and only determined conception which speculative reason furnishes us of God, is thus in the strictest sense *deistic*, that is, reason does not even furnish the objective validity of such a conception, but only the idea of something whereupon all empirical reality founds its highest and necessary unity, and which something we cannot think otherwise than according to the analogy of a real substance, which, according to the laws of reason, is the cause of all things, provided we in fact so take in hand this thing, as to think it generally as a particular object, and not more satisfied with the mere idea of the regulative principle of reason, we will set aside the completion of all conditions of thought, as too great for human reason—but which cannot subsist together with the intention of a perfect systematical unity in our cognition, and to which reason *at least* sets no limits.

Now, it hence occurs, that if I admit a divine being, I have neither, indeed, the least conception of the internal possibility of its highest perfection, nor of the necessity of its existence, but then I can yet satisfy all the other questions which concern the contingent, and procure for reason the most perfect satisfaction in



respect of the greatest unity to be investigated in its empirical use, but not in respect of this presupposition itself—which shows that its speculative interest, and not its perspicacity, justifies it in starting from a point that lies so far beyond its sphere, in order thence to consider its objects in a complete whole.

Now, here, a difference in the mode of thinking manifests itself in one and the same presupposition, which difference is tolerably subtle, but still in transcendental philosophy, is of the greatest importance. I may have sufficient ground for admitting something relative (*suppositio relativa*) without yet being authorized to admit it absolutely (*suppositio absoluta*.) This distinction suits, if the matter be merely as to a regulative principle, whereof we certainly know the necessity in itself, but not the source thereof, and for which we admit a supreme motive, merely with the intention of thinking so much the more determinedly the generality of the principle,—as, for example, when I think a Being as existing,—which corresponds to a mere and in fact transcendental idea. For, then I can never admit the existence of this thing in itself, since no conceptions whereby I can think an object as determined, extend so far, and the conditions of the objective validity of my conceptions are excluded by the idea itself. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence, have, exclusive of the use, that they render possible the empirical cognition of an object, no meaning at all which would determine an object. They may certainly be used, therefore, for the explanation of the possibility of things in the sensible world, but not of the possibility of a *Cosmical Whole*, since this ground of explanation must be out of the sensible world, and consequently no object of possible experience. Now I can still admit such an incomprehensible being, the object of a mere idea relatively to the sensible world, although not in itself. For, if an idea lie at the foundation of

the greatest possible empirical use of my reason, (the systematic perfect unity as to which I shall soon speak more determinedly,) which can never be in itself represented adequately in experience, although it is indispensably necessary, in order to approximate the empirical unity to the highest degree, I shall thus not only be justified, but even compelled to realize this idea, that is, to apply to it a real object, but only as a something in general, which I cannot at all know in itself, and to which I can only, as to a foundation of every systematic unity, in reference to this last give such properties, as are analogous to the conceptions of the understanding in the empirical use. I shall therefore conceive, according to the analogies of realities in the world, of substances, of causality, and of necessity, a Being which possesses all this in the highest perfection, and, since this idea merely rests upon my reason, I shall be able to conceive this Being as *self-subsistent reason*, which through ideas of the greatest harmony and unity, is the cause of the Universe, in such a way that I omit all the conditions limiting the idea, solely for the purpose, under the protection of such an original principle, of rendering the systematic unity of the diversity in the universe, and by means of the same unity, the greatest empirical use of reason possible, since I look upon all combinations, as if they were arrangements of a supreme reason, of which our own is a feeble image. I think, then, this supreme Being by means of pure conceptions, which have only strictly their application in the sensible world; but as I likewise hold such transcendental presupposition of none other than a relative use, namely, that it is to furnish the substratum of the greatest possible unity of experience, I must thus think a Being which I distinguish from the world, wholly by means of properties that only belong to the sensible world. For, I do not wish in any way, nor am I justified in wishing it, to cognize this object

of my idea, as to what it may be in itself, because for this, I have no conceptions, and even the conceptions of reality, substance, causality, nay even of necessity in existence, lose all meaning, and are empty titles for conceptions, without any content, if I therewith will venture out, beyond the field of the senses. I only think the relation of a being wholly unknown to me in itself to the greatest systematic unity of the universe, merely in order to render such, a schema of the regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical use of my reason.

If we now turn our attention to the transcendental object of our ideas, we thus see that we cannot presuppose *in itself*, its effectivity according to the conceptions of reality, substance, causality, &c. since these conceptions have not the least application to any thing, which is entirely different from the sensible world. Consequently the supposition of reason, of a highest Being as supreme Cause, is merely relative, imagined in favour of the systematic unity of the sensible world, and a mere something in the idea, whereof, as to what it is *in itself*, we have no conception. Hence also is it explained why we in fact require in reference to that which is given existing in the senses, the idea of an *in itself necessary* original Being, but never can have of such and its absolute necessity, the least conception.

We can now expose to view clearly the result of the whole transcendental Dialectick, and determine exactly the ultimate design of the ideas of pure reason, which only become dialectical through the fault of want of circumspection. Pure reason is, indeed, occupied with nothing but itself, and can have even no other occupation, since objects are not given to it for the unity of the conception of experience, but cognitions of the understanding for the unity of the conception of reason, that is, connexion in a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of

the system, and this systematic unity does not serve reason objectively as a principle, in order to extend it beyond all objects, but subjectively as a maxim, in order to extend it beyond all possible empirical cognition of the objects. Still, the systematic connexion which reason can give to the empirical use of the understanding does not only promote the extension of the same, but guarantees also at the same time the correctness thereof, and the principle of such a systematic unity is also objective, but in an undetermined manner (*principium vagum*), not as constitutive principle, in order to determine something in respect of its direct object, but in order, as mere regulative principle and maxim to further and confirm to infinity (indefinitely) the empirical use of reason, through the opening of new ways, which the understanding does not know—without on this account ever in the least being contrary to the laws of the empirical use.

But reason can never think this systematic unity otherwise, than that it gives at the same time an object to its idea, but which object cannot be given by any experience, for experience never affords an example of perfect systematic unity. Now this Being of reason (*ens rationis ratiocinatæ*) is certainly a mere idea, and is, therefore, not admitted absolutely and as something real in itself, but only laid at the foundation problematically, (since we cannot attain to it by means of any conceptions of the understanding,) in order so to look upon all connexion of the things of the sensible world, as if they had their foundation in this Being of reason, but only with the design of founding thereon systematic unity, which may be indispensable to reason, but in every way favourable to the empirical cognition of the understanding, and yet in any case never can be prejudicial to it.

We mistake at the same time the meaning of this idea, if we take it for the assertion, or even only the presupposition of a real thing, to which we thought of

ascribing the foundation of the systematic constitution of the world: we rather leave it wholly undecided what quality in itself, the foundation of the same idea withdrawing itself from our conceptions, has, and suppose only an idea as a point of view, from which solely and alone we can extend the unity spoken of, so essential to reason, and so salutary to the understanding—in a word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of that regulative principle, whereby reason, as far as is in it, extends systematic unity over all experience.

The first object of such an idea, am I myself, merely considered as thinking nature (soul.) If I will investigate the properties with which a thinking being exists in itself, I must interrogate then experience, and I cannot even apply any of all the categories to these objects, except so far as their schema is given in the sensible intuition. But, thereby, I never attain to a systematic unity of all the phenomena of the internal sense. Instead, therefore, of the conception of experience (as to that which the soul really is) which cannot lead us far, reason takes the conception of the empirical unity of all thinking, and because it thinks this unity unconditionally and originally, forms from this same conception, a conception of reason (idea) of a simple substance, which, unalterable in itself (personally identical), stands in community with other real things exterior to it—in a word, the idea of a simple self-subsisting intelligence. But, in this it has nothing else before it, but the principles of systematic unity in the explanation of the phenomena of the soul, namely, to consider all determinations as in a single subject; all forces as much as possible as derived from a single fundamental force; all change as belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being; and to represent all *phenomena* in space as wholly distinct from the actions of *thinking*. Such simplicity of substance, &c. is only to be the schema of this regulative principle, and is not

presupposed, as, if it were the real ground of the properties of the soul. For these, also, may rest upon quite other grounds, which we do not at all know, as we then likewise, could not cognize properly the soul by means of these adopted predicates, although we would allow them to be valid absolutely in respect of it, since they constitute a mere idea, which cannot at all be represented in concreto. Now from such a psychological idea nothing but advantage can arise, provided we only take care, not to let it be valid for something more than a mere idea—that is, merely relatively to the systematic use of reason in respect of the phenomena of our soul. For when no empirical laws of corporeal phenomena, which are quite of another kind, are mixed up with the explanations of that which merely belongs to the *internal sense*—then no flimsy hypotheses of generation, destruction, and palingenesis of souls are permitted—and consequently the consideration of this object of the internal sense is set up wholly pure and unmixed with heterogeneous properties, and, moreover, the investigation of reason is directed to this, to carry out as far as possible the grounds of explanation in this subject to a single principle, all of which is effected best, in fact singly and only, by means of a mere schema, as if it were a real being. The psychological idea also can signify nothing else, but the schema of a regulative conception. For if I, also, only would enquire whether the soul is not spiritual nature in itself, this question has then no meaning at all. For through such a conception, I do not merely take away the corporeal nature, but all nature in general, that is, all predicates of a possible experience, consequently all conditions for thinking an object for such a conception, which nevertheless singly and alone is the cause, that we say the conception has meaning.

The second regulative idea of mere speculative reason is the conception of the world in general.

For nature is strictly the only given object, in respect of which reason requires regulative principles. This nature is twofold, either thinking or corporeal nature. But as to the last, in order to think it according to its internal possibility, that is, to determine the application of the categories to the same, we require no idea, that is to say, a representation transcending experience, nor is there any, in respect thereof, possible, because we are led therein merely by means of sensible intuition, and not as in the psychological fundamental conception (I), which contains *à priori*, a certain form of thinking, namely, the unity of the same. Consequently there remains to us, in respect of pure reason, nothing more than nature in general, and the completeness of the conditions, in it, according to a principle. The absolute totality of the series of these conditions, in the derivation of its members, is an idea which can never be fully accomplished in the empirical use of reason, but still serves as a rule, as to the way in which we should proceed in respect of it, that is to say, in the explanation of given phenomena (*in retrograding or ascending*) so, as if the series were infinite in itself, that is, in *indefinitum*—but where reason itself is considered as determining cause, (*in liberty*), consequently in practical principles, as if we had not an object of the senses, but of the pure understanding before us, where the conditions cannot be placed any more in the series of phenomena, but out of the same, and the series of states may be considered, as if it had commenced absolutely (by means of an intelligible cause)—all of which shows, that the cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, and are quite removed from supposing, as it were constitutively, a real totality of such serieses. The rest we may seek in its place, under the antinomy of pure reason.

The third idea of pure reason, which contains a mere relative supposition of a Being of the only and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological serieses, is the

reason-conception of God. We have not the least foundation for admitting absolutely (for supposing in itself) the object of this idea—for what can in fact enable us, or only even justify us in this, to believe or to assert a Being of the highest perfection, and according to its nature absolutely necessary, from the mere conception of it in itself, if it were not the world, in reference to which the supposition alone can be necessary; and then it manifests itself clearly, that the idea thereof, like all speculative ideas, has no intention of saying any thing more than what reason prescribes, for considering all connexion of the world according to principles of a systematic unity—consequently as if they were all sprung from a single all-comprehensive Being, as supreme and all-sufficient Cause. Hence it is clear, that reason can in this case have no object but its own formal rule in the extension of its empirical use, but never an extension beyond all limits of *empirical use*, and consequently under this idea, no constitutive principle of its use applied to experience, lies concealed

The highest formal unity which rests alone upon the conceptions of reason, is the *conformable to its end* unity of things, and the *speculative* interest of reason renders it necessary, so to look at all arrangement in the world, as if it were sprung from the design of the highest of all reason. Such a principle, for instance, opens to our reason applied to the field of experience, quite new views for connecting the things of the world according to theological laws, and thereby for attaining to the greatest systematic unity of the same. The presupposition of a supreme Intelligence as the sole cause of the universe, though indeed merely in the idea, may therefore at all times be useful to reason and yet this thereby never be injured. For, if we admit beforehand, in respect of the figure of the earth,



(round though somewhat flattened,)\*—of mountains, and seas, &c. purely wise intentions of a Creator, we can in this way make a multiplicity of discoveries. Now, if we stop at this presupposition as a mere *regulative* principle, even error cannot then do us harm. For in any event, there can thence nothing farther follow, but that where we expected a teleological connexion (*nexus finalis*), a mere mechanical or physical one (*nexus effectivus*) is met with, whereby we in such a case miss only one unity more, but do not injure the unity of reason in its empirical use. But even this cross stroke cannot affect the law itself in an universal and theological intention generally. For, although an anatomist may be convicted of an error, provided he refers an organ of an animal body to an end, as to which we can clearly show, that such does not thence ensue, it is still, however, quite impossible to show in a case, that a disposition of nature, whatever it may be, has no end at all. Hence also physiology (that of physicians) extends its very limited empirical knowledge of the ends of the structure of an organic body by means of a principle which merely pure reason furnishes, so far, that we therein admit quite boldly, and at the same time with the consent of all intelligent persons, that every thing in the animal possesses its use and proper intention—which presupposition, if it were to be constitutive, extends much farther than our observation hitherto can justify—whence then it is to be seen, that it is nothing but a regulative principle of reason, in order to attain to the highest systematic unity by means of the idea of the

\* The advantage which a spherical form of the earth procures is sufficiently known, but few know that the flattening of it as a spheroid, alone prevents that the great protuberances of the continent, or even of lesser mountains, cast up possibly by earthquakes, do not continually, and even in a short time, derange greatly the axis of the earth—were not the swelling out of the earth under the line so mighty a mountain, that the jerk of every other mountain can never bring it notably out of its place, in respect of the axis. And yet this wise disposition is explained without hesitation from the equilibrium of the formerly fluid terrestrial mass.

intentional causality of the supreme Cause of the world, and, as if this as supreme intelligence, is the cause of every thing according to the wisest design.

But if we deviate from this restriction of the idea to the mere regulative use, reason thus is led into error in many ways, since it then abandons the territory of experience, which yet must contain the marks of its passage, and ventures itself beyond the same into the incomprehensible and uninvestigable, beyond the height of which it necessarily becomes giddy, since it sees itself, from this point of view, cut off wholly from all use accordant with experience.

The first fault which springs from this, that we make use of the idea of a supreme Being not merely regulatively but (which is contrary to the nature of an idea) constitutively, is the slothfulness of reason (*ignava ratio*.)\* We may so term every principle which causes, that we consider our investigation of nature, whatever it may be, as absolutely completed—and reason therefore gives itself up to repose, as, if it had fully executed its task. Hence, even the psychological idea, if it be used as a constitutive principle for the explanation of the phenomena of our soul, and afterwards even for the extension of our cognition of this subject, still out beyond all experience (its state after death), renders it certainly very convenient for reason, but also entirely spoils and destroys all its natural use according to the direction of experience. Thus the dogmatic spiritualist explains the unchanged subsisting unity of the person through every change of state, from the unity of the thinking substance, which he believes to perceive in the, I, immediately, and the interest which we take in things, which are only first

\* The ancient Dialecticians so termed a paralogism which ran thus:—If thy destiny so decides, that thou art to be cured of this malady, so will it happen, whether thou employest a physician or not.—Cicero says, that this manner of concluding has received its name from this, that provided we follow it, no use of reason farther remains in life. This is the cause, why I have invested the sophistical argument of pure reason with this name.

to happen after our death, from the consciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject, &c. and does away with all natural investigation of the causes of these our internal phenomena from physical grounds of explanation, because he, as it were by the force of a transcendent reason, passes by the immanent cognition-sources of experience in behalf of his convenience, but with prejudice to all knowledge. This disadvantageous consequence strikes us more particularly in the dogmatism of our idea of a supreme Intelligence, and the thereon falsely grounded theological system of nature (physico-theology.) For then all the ends manifesting themselves in nature, and often only made for this purpose by ourselves, serve to render it very convenient to us in the investigation of causes, that is to say, instead of seeking them in the general laws of the mechanism of matter, to appeal precisely to the inscrutable decree of the highest wisdom, and then to look upon the effort of reason as completed, when we dispense with its use, which, nevertheless, no where finds a clue but where the order of nature and the series of changes furnishes it, according to their internal and general laws. This error may be easily avoided, if we consider under the point of view as ends, not simply some portions of nature, as, for example, the distribution of terra firma, the structure thereof, and the nature and situation of mountains, or, in fact, organisation merely in the vegetable and animal kingdom, but render *wholly general* this systematic unity of nature, in reference to the idea of a supreme intelligence. For then we lay at the foundation a finality, according to the general laws of nature, from which laws, no particular arrangement has been excepted, but only indicated more or less cognizably to us, and we have a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a teleological connexion, however, which we do not previously determine, but only in waiting for the same, must pursue the phy-

sical mechanical connexion according to general laws. For thus alone can the principle of intentional unity always extend the use of reason, in respect of experience, without prejudicing it in any case.

The second error which arises from the misconception of the stated principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason (*perversa ratio* *υστερον προτερον* *rationis*). The idea of systematic unity should only serve for this, in order as regulative principle to seek such in the conjunction of things according to general laws of nature, and, so far as something thereof is found in the empirical way, to believe also thus much, that we have approximated to the completeness of its use, although certainly we shall never attain to it. Instead of which, we reverse the matter, and we begin from this, that we lay the reality of a principle of the intentional unity as hypostatical at the foundation—we determine anthropomorphistically the conception of such a supreme Intelligence, since it in itself is wholly inscrutable, and then press in the ends of nature forcibly and dictatorially, instead, as of right, of seeking them in the way of physical enquiry—so that not only teleology, which should merely serve for the purpose of supplying the unity of nature according to general laws, now hereby rather operates to do away with it, but reason hereby likewise destroys even its own end, namely, in respect of this, to demonstrate from nature, the existence of such an intelligent supreme cause. For, if we cannot suppose the highest finality in nature *à priori*, that is, as belonging to the essence thereof, how shall we then be directed to seek it, and to approach by the graduated guidance of the same to the highest perfection of a Creator, as an absolutely necessary, consequently, *à priori*, cognizable perfection? The regulative principle requires to suppose absolutely systematic unity as *unity of nature*, which is not cognized merely empirically, but supposed *à priori*, although still undeterminedly, consequently as result-

ing from the essence of things. But if I lay previously at the foundation a supreme regulating Being, the unity of nature is thus in fact done away with. For, it is wholly foreign to the nature of things, and contingent, and cannot also be cognized from the general laws thereof. Hence arises a vicious circle in the proof, inasmuch as we presuppose that, which properly had to be proved.

To take the regulative principle of the systematic unity of nature for a constitutive one, and to presuppose hypostatically as cause, what only is laid in the idea at the foundation of the uniform use of reason, is merely, as it were, to confound reason. The investigation of nature takes its course quite alone, along the chain of natural causes, according to general laws, certainly according to the idea of a Creator, but not in order to derive from such the finality which it always pursues, but to cognize its existence from that finality which is sought in the essence of the things of nature, and, where possible, in the essence of all things, consequently as absolutely necessary. Now, whether this last thing succeed or not, the idea yet always remains correct, and equally also its use, if it have been limited to the conditions of a mere regulative principle.

Perfect intentional unity is perfection (absolutely considered). If we do not find this in the essence of the things which constitute the whole object of experience, that is, of all our objectively-valid cognition—consequently, in general and necessary laws of nature, how shall we thence conclude precisely as to the idea of a supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of an original being, which is the origin of all causality? The greatest systematic, consequently also intentional unity, is the school and even the basis of the possibility of the greatest use of human reason. The idea of the same is therefore conjoined inseparably with the essence of our reason. This very idea is there-

fore legislative as to us, and it is thus very natural to adopt a legislative reason corresponding to it (*intellectus archetypus*), from which all systematic unity of nature, as the object of our reason, may be derived.

We have stated, in speaking of the antinomy of pure reason, that all questions which pure reason raises, must be answerable absolutely; and that the excuse of the limits of our cognition, which in many natural questions is even as unavoidable as it is just, cannot here be admitted, because here the questions are not proposed as to the nature of things, but only as to their internal disposition. We now can confirm this, according to first appearance, bold assertion, in respect of the two questions wherein pure reason has its greatest interest, and thereby entirely complete our consideration as to the dialectick of it.

If, then, therefore, it be asked (in respect of transcendental theology\*), *firstly*, whether there be something distinct from the world which contains the ground of the arrangement of the world and its connexion according to general laws, the answer then is: *doubtless*. For the world is a sum of phenomena, and there must, therefore, be a transcendental foundation of the same, that is, imaginable, merely according to the pure understanding. Is the question, *secondly*, whether this Being is substance, of the greatest reality, necessary, &c., I then answer: *that this question has no meaning*. For all the categories by means of which I seek to make myself a conception of such an object have none other than empirical use, and have no meaning at all, provided they are not applied to

\* What I have already before said as to the psychological idea and its proper determination, as principle for the merely regulative use of reason, dispenses me from the prolixity of more particularly explaining the transcendental illusion, according to which the stated systematic unity of all diversity of the internal sense is hypostatically represented. The mode of proceeding in this case is very similar to that which the Critick observes in respect of the theological ideal.

objects of possible experience, that is, to the sensible world. Out of this field, they are mere titles to conceptions which we may grant, but whereby also we cannot understand any thing. Is the question, finally, *thirdly*, whether we must not at least think this being distinct from the world according to an *analogy* with the objects of experience, the answer is then : *certainly*—but only as object in the idea, and not in the reality, namely, only so far as it is an unknown substratum of the systematic unity, order, and finality in the system of the world, which reason must make to itself, as the regulative principle of its investigation of nature. Besides, we may permit boldly and blamelessly in this idea, certain anthropomorphisms which are favourable to the mentioned regulative principle. For it is always only an idea, which is referred not at all directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, yet only by means of the schema of the same, namely, a supreme intelligence, who is the author of this world, according to wise ends. What this first principle of the unity of the world is, in itself, was not thereby to be thought, but how we were to employ it, or rather its idea, relatively to the systematic use of reason, in respect of things of the world.

But yet, (it will be asked in continuation) can we admit in such a way a wise and all-powerful author of the world ? *Without all doubt* : and not only this, but we *must* presuppose such a one. But then do we still extend our cognition beyond the field of experience ? *By no means*. For we have only presupposed a something, whereof we have no conception at all what it is in itself (a mere transcendental object), but, we have in reference to the systematic and intentional order of the universe, which order, if we study nature, we must presuppose, conceived the being in question unknown to us, simply according to *analogy*, with an Intelligence (an empirical conception),—that is, we have invested it, in

respect of ends and perfection, which are founded upon the same being, exactly with those properties, which, according to the conditions of our reason, could contain the ground of such a systematic unity. This idea is, therefore, wholly founded respectively upon the *cosmical use* of our reason. But, if we wished to impart to it absolutely objective validity, we should then forget that it is only a being in idea that we think, and, since we then begin from a principle not at all determinable through a consideration of the world, we should thereby not be in a state to apply this principle suitably to the empirical use of reason.

But, (it will further be enquired) can I in such a way still make use of the conception and the pre-supposition of a supreme being, in the rational consideration of the world? *Certainly*—and especially on this account was this idea laid at the foundation by reason. But, now, ought I to consider intentional arrangements as ends, since I derive them from the divine will, although by means of particular dispositions in the world established for this purpose? Yes, this you may also do, but in such a way, that it must be equally valid to you, whether any one says the divine wisdom has so ordered all for its highest ends, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the enquiry into nature, and a principle of systematic and intentional unity thereof, according to general natural laws, and even in fact there where we are not aware of it—that is, it must be just the same thing to you where you perceive this, to say, God has it thus wisely decreed, or Nature has so wisely ordered it. For the greatest systematic and intentional unity which your reason desired to lay, as regulative principle, at the foundation of all investigation of Nature, was precisely that, which justified you in laying at the foundation, the idea of a supreme Intelligence as a schema of the regulative principle; and so far as now, according to this, you find finality in the world, so far have you confirmation of the legitimacy of your idea; but as the



said principle had no other object, but to seek the necessary and greatest possible unity of nature, we shall certainly for this, so far as we attain to it, have to thank the idea of a supreme Being, but we cannot pass by the general laws of nature, in respect of which the idea was only laid at the foundation, without falling into contradiction with ourselves, in order to consider this finality of nature as accidental and hyperphysical according to its origin, inasmuch as we were not justified in admitting a Being with the before-mentioned properties above nature, but only in laying the idea of this at the foundation, in order, according to the analogy of a causal determination of phenomena, to consider them as systematically connected with one another.

In the same way, therefore, we are also justified in thinking the cause of the world in the idea, not only according to a subtle anthropomorphism (without which nothing at all could be thought as to it), namely, as a Being which has understanding, pleasure, displeasure, and likewise a desire and will conformably thereto, but also in attributing to this same Being infinite perfection; and which therefore far surpasses that which we could be justified in, through empirical cognition of the order of the world. For, the regulative law of systematic unity enjoins it, that we should so study nature, as if systematic and intentional unity were every where to be met with to infinity, amidst the greatest possible diversity. For, although we only discover or attain to little of this perfection, yet it still belongs to the legislation of our reason, to seek and to conjecture it every where, and it must at all times be advantageous to us, but never can be disadvantageous, to order the consideration of nature, according to this principle. But it is also clear, under this representation of the idea laid at the foundation of a supreme Creator, that I do not lay at the foundation, the existence and the acquaintance with such a being, but only the idea of the same, and therefore properly I derive nothing from this being, but

only from the idea of the same, that is, from the nature of the things of the world, according to such an idea. A certain although undeveloped consciousness of the true use of this our conception of reason, also seems to have induced the modest and correct language of philosophers in all ages, since they speak of the wisdom and providence of nature and of divine wisdom as synonymous expressions, and in fact prefer the former expression, so long as the question is only as to speculative reason, inasmuch as it restrains the pretension to a larger assertion, than that is wherein we are justified, and at the same time throws reason back upon its own peculiar field, nature.

Thus, pure reason, which at the beginning seems to promise nothing less, than the extension of acquirements beyond all the limits of experience, contains, if we rightly understand it, nothing but regulative principles, which certainly command greater unity than the empirical use of the understanding can attain to, but precisely from this, that they throw back so much farther the point of approximation to the same, they effect in the highest degree the accordance thereof with itself through systematic unity; but if we misunderstand them, and estimate them as constitutive principles of transcendent cognitions, by means of certainly a brilliant, but deceptive appearance, they produce conviction and imaginary knowledge, but therewith everlasting contradictions and disputes.

Thus then, all human cognition begins with intuition, proceeds thence to conceptions, and terminates with ideas. Although it has in respect of all the three elements, sources of cognition *à priori*, which at the first blush seem to despise the limits of all experience, still nevertheless a complete Critick proves, that all reason in speculative use can never issue out with these elements beyond the field of possible experience, and that the proper determination of this supreme faculty of cognition is, only to make use of all

methods and the principles thereof, in order to follow up nature into its very core, according to all the possible principles of unity, under which that of ends is the principal, but never to transcend its limits, out of which there is nothing for us but void space. The critical investigation of all propositions, which can extend our cognition out beyond real experience, has sufficiently convinced us in the transcendental Analytick, that they never can lead us to any thing more than a possible experience, and, if we were not distrustful, even of the clearest abstract and general theorems, and if attractive and specious prospects did not tempt us to reject their force, we might certainly have done away with the tedious examination of all dialectical witnesses, which transcendental reason allows to come forward in favour of its preteasions—since we already knew before hand with complete certainty, that all pretext of the same, although perhaps honourably intended, must yet be entirely useless, because it concerned information which no man can ever acquire. But, since there is never still an end of words, if we do not discover the true cause of the appearance, whereby even the most perspicacious may be deceived, and as the resolution of all our transcendent cognition into its elements (as a study of our internal nature) has, not only no little value in itself, but to the philosopher is always a duty, it was not even only necessary to investigate, in detail, this whole although vain labour of speculative reason up to its original sources, but, inasmuch as the dialectical appearance in this case is not only deceptive according to judgment, but also alluring according to the interest which we here take in judgment, and is at all times natural, and will remain so to all futurity, it was on this account advisable to draw up minutely the papers belonging to this enquiry, and to depose them in the archives of human reason, for the prevention of future errors of a similar kind.

**TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE**  
**OF**  
**METHOD.**



IF I consider the complex of all cognition of pure and speculative reason as an edifice, in respect of which we, at least, have the idea within us, I may then say, we have calculated and determined, in the transcendental elementary doctrine, the materials for such building, whatever height and solidity it may attain to. Certainly it has been found, that although we had a tower in mind, which was to reach up to heaven, the supply of materials was nevertheless only sufficient for a habitation, that was just roomy and high enough, for overlooking our occupations upon the plain of experience—and that such bold undertaking must miscarry from want of material, without ever reckoning upon the confusion of tongues which must inevitably divide the labourers as to the plan, and disperse them all over the world, in order for each, particularly to build according to his own scheme. Now, the question is, not so much as to the materials, but rather as to the plan, and whilst we are warned not to venture upon an arbitrary blind scheme, which perhaps might transcend our entire faculty, we cannot however well refrain in the erection of a firm habitation, from making the design of a building in proportion to the supply which is furnished to us, and is at the same time adapted to our wants.

I understand then, under the transcendental doctrine of method, the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. We shall in this view have to do with a *Discipline*, a *Canon*, an *Architectonick*, and, finally, a *History* of pure reason,

and shall furnish that in a transcendental view, which under the name of *practical Logick*, in respect of the use of the understanding in general, is sought after in the schools, but badly supplied—because, since general logic is not limited to any particular kind of cognition of the understanding (for example, not to the pure), nor likewise to certain objects,—it, without borrowing acquirements from other sciences, can do nothing more than propose titles to *possible Methods*, and technical expressions, whereof we make use in respect of what is systematical in various sciences,—which render the student acquainted before hand with names, the signification and use of which he is afterwards first of all to learn.

## TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.

## FIRST DIVISION.

## DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON.

The negative judgments, which are not so merely according to logical form, but also according to matter, do not stand, in respect of the curiosity of man, in any particular estimation—they are looked upon indeed, as enemies envious of our desire for cognition unceasingly striving after extension, and it requires almost an apology in order to procure toleration for them, and still more, favour and consideration.

We may certainly negatively express *logically* all propositions that we like, but in respect of the content of our cognition in general, whether it is extended by means of a judgment, or limited, the negative have their peculiar business, of only *restraining from error*. Hence also negative propositions, which are to restrain a false cognition, where, nevertheless, an error is never possible, are certainly very true, but yet vain—that is, are not at all adapted to their end, and precisely on that account often laughable. Such was the proposition of that rhetorician—that Alexander without an army had been unable to conquer any countries.

But, where the limits of our possible cognition are very narrow, the inducement for judgment great, the appearance which presents itself, very deceptive, and the disadvantage from errors is very important—there that which is *negative* in instruction, which merely serves for this purpose, to guard us against error, has more importance than much positive information,



whereby our cognition might receive augmentation. We name the *constraint*, whereby the constant tendency to deviate from certain rules is limited and finally annihilated, *discipline*. It is distinguished from *culture*, which is merely to procure one *facility*, without, on the other hand, destroying another already existing. For the formation of a talent, which already of itself has a tendency towards manifestation, discipline will therefore afford a negative,\* but culture and doctrine a positive, assistance.

That the temperament, and likewise that the talents, which allow themselves readily a free and unlimited movement (as imagination and wit) require in many respects a discipline, every one will readily concede. But, that reason upon which it is especially imposed to prescribe its discipline to all other impulses, itself should still require such, this may certainly appear surprising, and, in fact, it has, on this very account, escaped from such a humiliation hitherto, since, from the solemnity and the well-founded dignity with which it stepped forward, no one could easily arrive at the suspicion of a frivolous play (*on its part*) with images instead of conceptions, and words instead of things.

There required no Critick of reason in the empirical use, because its principles are subjected by the touchstone of experience to a constant examination; nor, moreover, in Mathematick, where its conceptions must be exhibited continually in concreto to the pure intuition,—and every thing unfounded and arbitrary thereby becomes immediately ostensible. But, where neither empirical nor pure intuition hold reason in a visible

\* I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, they were accustomed to use the name of *Discipline* synonymously with teaching. But, on the other hand, there are so many other cases where the first expression, as *correction*, is carefully distinguished from the second, as *instruction*—and the nature of things even requires, in fact, peculiar suitable expressions to be retained for this difference—that I should wish we were never permitted to use the first word (*discipline*) in any other than a negative sense.

track, namely, in its transcendental use, according to mere conceptions, it then stands in need so much of a discipline, which may curb its tendency to extension, beyond the narrow limits of possible experience, and restrain it from extravagance and error, that in fact the whole philosophy of pure reason is merely concerned with this negative utility. Particular errors may be remedied by means of *censure*, and the causes thereof, by means of *criticism*. But where, as in pure reason, a whole system of illusions and deceptions is met with, which are thoroughly bound up with one another and are united under common principles, there quite an especial, and certainly negative legislation seems to be requisite, which, under the name of a *Discipline*, from the nature of reason and the objects of its pure use, institutes, as it were, a system of forethought and self-examination, before which no false sophistical appearance can stand, but must betray itself immediately, in spite of all reasons for its justification.

But it is well to observe, that in this second division of transcendental critick, I do not set up the discipline of pure reason according to the matter, but merely as to the method of cognition from pure reason. The first has already occurred in the elementary doctrine. But, there is in the use of reason so much that is similar, to whatever object it may be applied, and yet it is, so far as it is to be transcendental, at the same time so essentially different from every thing else, that without the warning negative doctrine of a discipline particularly appointed for this, errors are not to be avoided that necessarily spring from an improper following up of such methods, which certainly are suitable for reason elsewhere, although not in this case.

## FIRST DIVISION.

## FIRST SECTION.

THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN THE  
DOGMATICAL USE.

Mathematics afford a shining example of a pure reason extending itself successfully, of itself, without the aid of experience. Examples are contagious, particularly for that faculty which naturally flatters itself with having the same good fortune in other cases that has fallen to its lot in one case. Hence, pure reason trusts in the transcendental use to be able to extend itself, just as fortunately and fundamentally, as it happened to it in the mathematical, especially if it applies that method in the one case, which has been of such evident utility in the other. It, therefore, is very important for us to know as to this; whether the method of arriving at apodictical certainty, which in the latter science is termed *mathematical*, is the same as that whereby we seek this self-same certainty in philosophy, and which there must be termed *dogmatical*.

*Philosophical* cognition is the *cognition of reason from conceptions*—mathematical, from the *construction* of conceptions. But to *construct* a conception, is to exhibit à priori the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction of a conception, therefore, a *non-empirical* intuition is required, which, consequently, as intuition, is a single object, but nevertheless as construction of a conception (of a general representation) must express in the representation universal validity for all possible intuitions which belong to the same conception. Thus I construct a triangle when I exhibit the object corresponding to this conception, either by means of mere imagination in the pure in-

tuition, or according to this (*imagination*), likewise, upon paper in the empirical intuition, but upon both occasions wholly *à priori*, without having borrowed the exemplar of this from any experience. The individual delineated figure is empirical, and yet serves to express the conception, without prejudice to its universality, because in this empirical intuition, the action is always only looked at of the construction of the conception, to which many determinations—for example, those of quantity, of sides and angles, are quite indifferent—and consequently abstraction is made of these differences, which do not change the conception of the triangle.

Philosophical cognition considers, therefore, the particular only in the general; mathematical cognition the general in the particular, nay, in fact, in the singular, yet still *à priori* and by means of reason, so that as this singular is determined under certain general conditions of construction, just so the object of this conception to which this singular only corresponds as its schema, must be thought generally determined.

In this form, then, the essential difference of these two kinds of cognition of reason consists, and does not repose upon the difference of their matter or objects. Those who thought of distinguishing philosophy from mathematick in this way, that they stated of the first, that it had merely *quality*, and the second only *quantity* for object, have taken the effect for the cause. The form of mathematical cognition is the cause that such only can refer to quantities. For only the conception of quantities may be constructed, that is exposed *à priori* in the intuition, but qualities can be exhibited in none other than empirical intuition. Hence a reason-cognition of the same can never be possible by means of conceptions. Thus no one can take an intuition corresponding to the conception of reality any where else but from experience, but never of himself can be participant thereof *à priori*, and previous to em-

pirical consciousness of the same. The conical form may be rendered intuitive, without any empirical assistance, merely according to the conception, but the colour of this cone must have been given beforehand in one or other experience. I can by no means exhibit in the intuition, the conception of a cause in general, but from an example which experience furnishes me, &c. Besides, philosophy treats equally as well of quantities as mathematics, as for example of totality, infinity, &c. Mathematick busies itself, also, with the difference of lines and surfaces as of spaces of different quality—with the continuation of extension, as a quality thereof. But, although in such cases they have a common object, still the mode of treating such by reason is, nevertheless, quite different in the philosophical and mathematical consideration. The first adheres merely to general conceptions, the latter can do nothing with mere conceptions, but hastens immediately to intuition, wherein it considers the conception in concreto, yet still not empirically, but only in such a one (*intuition*) as it has exhibited *à priori*, that is, has constructed, and wherein, that which follows from the general conditions of construction, must also be valid generally, as to the object of the constructed conception.

Let the conception of a triangle be given to a philosopher, and let him discover, in his way, how the sum of its angles may have relation to a right angle. He has now nothing but the conception of a figure which is enclosed in three straight lines, and in it, the conception of so many angles. Let him now reflect upon this conception as long as he likes, he will never extract any thing new. He may dissect and render clear the conception of the straight line, or an angle, or the number three, but never can come to the other properties which do not at all lie in these conceptions. But submit this question to the geometer. He commences straightway from it to construct a

triangle. As he knows that two right angles together amount to exactly as much as all the adjacent angles which together can be made from a point on a straight line, he then prolongs one side of his triangle, and obtains two adjacent angles, which are equal together to two right. Then, he divides the external of these angles in drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle, and sees that here an external adjacent angle occurs, which is equal to an internal one, &c. By such a mode he arrives, by means of a chain of conclusions, always guided by the intuition, at the completely clear and at the same time general solution of the question.

But mathematics do not merely construct quantities (*quanta*) as in geometry, but also the mere quantity (*quantitas*) as in algebra, wherein they make abstraction wholly of the quality of the object which is to be thought, according to such a conception of quantity. They, then, select a certain sign of all constructions of quantities in general (numbers, as in addition, subtraction, &c. extraction of roots,) and after they have also indicated the general conception of quantities according to the different relationships thereof, they then expose in the intuition every operation which is generated and changed by means of the quantity, according to certain general rules: where a quantity is to be divided by another, they join the characters of the two according to the indicated form of division, &c. and arrive, therefore, by means of a symbolical construction, equally as well as geometry according to an ostensive or geometrical one, (of the object itself,) there, where discursive cognition, by means of pure conceptions, can never attain.

What may be the cause of this so different position, in which two reasoners find themselves, whereof one takes his way according to conceptions, the other according to intuitions, which he exhibits *à priori* conformably to conceptions? This cause is clear

according to the before propounded transcendental principles. The question, here, is not as to analytical propositions which can be generated through mere analysis of the conceptions, (in this the philosopher would have undoubtedly the advantage over his competitor,) but as to synthetical propositions, and, in fact, such as are to be cognized *à priori*. For, I am not to look to that which I really think in my conception of the triangle, (this is nothing further than the mere definition,) but am rather to proceed beyond it, to properties which do not lie in this conception, but yet belong to it. Now, this is not otherwise possible, except that I determined my object according to the conditions either of the empirical intuition, or of the pure intuition. The first would furnish only an empirical proposition, (by measurement of its angles,) which contained no universality, still less necessity, and the question is not at all as to the like. But, the second procedure is the mathematical and here in fact the geometrical construction, by means of which, in a pure intuition the same as in an empirical, I add the diversity, which belongs to the schema of a triangle in general, and consequently to its conception—whereby, assuredly, general synthetic propositions must be constructed.

I should therefore philosophize in vain as to the triangle, that is, reflect discursively, without thereby in the least advancing farther than to the mere definition, but from which correctly I must begin. There is certainly a transcendental synthesis from pure conceptions, which again only succeeds with the philosopher, but which never concerns more than a thing in general, under whatever conditions its perceptions may belong to advantageous experience. But in the mathematical problems, there is no question as to this and in general not at all of existence, but of the properties of objects in themselves, simply so far as these are conjoined with the conception of the same.

We have sought in the adduced example, only to render clear, the great difference which is to be found between the discursive use of reason according to conceptions, and the intuitive one by the construction of conceptions. The question now is, naturally, what is the cause which renders such a duplex use of reason necessary, and by what conditions we can know, whether only the first, or likewise the second, takes place?

All our cognition refers however last of all to possible intuitions, for through these alone is an object given. Now a conception *à priori*, a (non-empirical conception,) contains already a pure intuition in itself, and then it can be constructed, or nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions, which are not given *à priori*, and then we may certainly judge through it synthetically and *à priori*, but only discursively according to conceptions, and never intuitively by means of the construction of the conception.

Now, of all intuition none is given *à priori*, but the mere form of phenomena, space and time, and a conception of these, as quanta, may be exhibited in the intuition through number *à priori*, that is, constructed either at the same time with the quality thereof (their form), or merely their quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous-diverse). But the matter of phenomena, whereby *things* are given to us in space and time, can only be represented in the perception—consequently *à posteriori*. The only conception which represents *à priori* this empirical value of phenomena, is the conception of *the thing* in general, and the synthetic cognition as to the same *à priori* can never afford any thing farther, than the mere rule of the synthesis of that which the perception may give *à posteriori*, but never the intuition of the real object *à priori*, since this intuition must necessarily be empirical.

Synthetic propositions, which refer to *things* in general, whose intuition is not at all afforded *à priori*,



are transcendental. Hence, transcendental propositions never are afforded by means of construction of conceptions, but only according to conceptions *à priori*. They contain merely the rule, according to which a certain synthetic unity of that which cannot be represented intuitively *à priori* (of perceptions) is to be sought empirically. But, they cannot represent in any case any single one of their conceptions *à priori*, but effect this only *à posteriori*, by means of experience, which is first of all possible according to synthetical principles.

If we are to judge synthetically of a conception, we must then proceed out of the conception, and in fact to the intuition, in which it is given. For if we stopped at that, which is contained in the conception, the judgment would be then merely analytical, and an explanation of the thought, according to that which is really contained in it. But, I can go from the conception to the pure or empirical intuition corresponding to it, in order to consider in concreto the one in the other, and to cognize *à priori* or *à posteriori*, what belongs to the object of that conception. The first is the rational and mathematical cognition, by means of the construction of the conception, the second the mere empirical (mechanical) cognition, which never can afford necessary and apodictical propositions. I might in this way analyze my empirical conception of gold, without thereby gaining any thing farther, than being able to enumerate every thing that I think really under this word, whereby a logical amelioration certainly takes place in my cognition, but no augmentation or increase is obtained. I take, however, the matter which occurs under this name, and institute with it perceptions, which will afford me different synthetic but empirical propositions. I would construct, that is, give *à priori* in the intuition, the mathematical conception of a triangle, and acquire in this way a synthetical but rational cognition. But,

if the transcendental conception of a reality, substance, force, &c. is given to me, it does not thus indicate either an empirical or pure intuition, but only the synthesis of the empirical intuitions, (which therefore cannot be given *à priori*); and there cannot also therefore arise out of this conception—since the synthesis cannot issue out to the intuition which corresponds to this conception—any determined synthetical proposition, but only a principle of the synthesis\* of possible empirical intuitions. Consequently, a transcendental proposition is a synthetic cognition of reason, according to mere conceptions, and therefore discursive, because thereby all synthetic unity of the empirical cognition is first of all possible, but no intuition is thereby given *à priori*.

There is then a double use of reason, which, in spite of the generality of cognition and its generation *à priori*, they have in common, yet in proceeding farther is very different, and precisely on this account, because in the phenomenon, whereby all objects are given to us, they are two points; the form of the intuition (space and time) which can be cognized and determined wholly *à priori*, and the matter (the physical) or the content, which signifies a something, that is met with in space and time, consequently contains an existence and corresponds to sensation. In respect of the last, (*matter*,) which can never be given in a determined manner otherwise than as empirical, we can have nothing *à priori*, but undetermined conceptions of the synthesis of possible sensations, so far as they belong to the unity of the apperception (in a possible experience.) In respect

\* By means of the conception of causes, I issue really out of the empirical conception of an event (where something happens), though not to the intuition which exhibits the conception of cause in concreto, but to the conditions of time in general, which might be found in experience conformably to the conception of causes. I proceed, therefore, merely according to conceptions, and cannot proceed by means of construction of conceptions, since the conception is a rule of the synthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intuitions, and therefore cannot be *given à priori*.

of the first (*form*) we may determine our conceptions in the intuition à priori, in creating for ourselves in space and time the objects themselves by means of homogeneous synthesis, whilst we consider them merely as Quanta. The former is termed the use of reason according to conceptions, wherein we can do nothing more than bring phenomena, according to the real content, under conceptions, which cannot be thereby determined otherwise than empirically, that is, à posteriori (but conformably to such conceptions as rules of an empirical synthesis)—the latter is, the use of reason through construction of conceptions, by means of which, these, inasmuch as they already refer to an intuition à priori, can also, precisely on that account à priori and without any empirical data, be given determined in the pure intuition. To consider every thing that exists, (a thing in space or time)—whether, and how far, it is or is not a Quantum—that an existence in the same or a deficiency must be represented—how far this something (which fills space or time) is a first substratum, or mere determination,—has a reference as to its existence to something else, as cause or effect, and finally, whether it stands isolated or in reciprocal dependence with others in respect of existence,—to consider the possibility of this existence,—the reality and necessity or the contrary thereof—all this belongs to the *cognition of reason* from conceptions—which may be termed *philosophical*. But to determine an intuition à priori in space (*form*), to divide time (*duration*), or to cognize merely the universality of the synthesis of one and the same, in time and space, and the thence resulting quantity of an intuition in general (*number*),—this is the *business of reason* through construction of conceptions, and is termed *mathematical*.

The great success which reason obtains by means of Mathematick, produces quite naturally the conjecture, that, if not as to itself, yet as to its method, it will suc-

ceed also out of the field of quantities, since it reduces all its conceptions to intuitions which it can give à priori, and whereby it, as it were, is mistress of nature ; whilst on the contrary, pure philosophy with discursive conceptions à priori wanders about in nature, without being able to render the reality of the same intuitive à priori, and thereby in fact credible. It seems also, as if the masters of this art were never at all wanting in this confidence, themselves, nor the public in great expectations as to their capability, in case they should ever occupy themselves with the matter. For, as they hardly ever have philosophized with regard to their mathematick (a difficult business), the specific difference of one use of reason from another has thus never come into their mind and thoughts. Current and empirically used rules, which they borrow from common reason, then hold true with them, instead of axioms. Whence they may derive the conceptions of space and time, wherewith they occupy themselves (as the only original quantities) is not at all imposed upon them, and it even seems useless to them, to enquire into the origin of pure conceptions of the understanding, and therewith likewise into the sphere of their validity—but merely to make use of them. In all this, they do quite right, provided only they do not overstep their allotted limits, namely, those of *nature*. But, in this way, they fall from the field of sensibility upon the insecure territory of pure and even transcendental conceptions, where the ground (*instabilis tellus, innabilis unda*) allows them neither to stand nor to swim, and only to make light steps, whereof time does not retain the least trace ; whilst, on the other hand, their march in mathematick forms a high road, which even the latest posterity may tread with confidence.

As we have made it our duty, to determine the limits of pure reason in the transcendental use precisely and with certainty ; but as this kind of

tendency has this particular in it, in spite of the most expressive and clearest admonitions, of allowing itself always to indulge in hope, before one entirely gives up the design, of arriving, beyond the limits of experience at the enchanting regions of the intellectual—it is thus necessary, to carry away, as it were, the last anchor of hope rich in imagination, and to show, that the following up of the mathematical method cannot procure the least advantage in this kind of cognition—except it be that of discovering the deficiencies of itself so much the clearer, and that geometry and philosophy are quite two different things, although certainly in physics they assist one another—consequently, the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.

The foundation of mathematics rests upon Definitions, Axioms, Demonstrations. I will content myself with this, in showing that none of these points, in the sense, wherein the mathematician takes them, can be furnished or imitated by philosophy; that the geometer, according to his method, builds nothing but houses of cards in philosophy, and the philosopher, according to his, can do nothing in the department of mathematics but talk idly, although philosophy consists precisely in the fact of knowing its limits; and the mathematician himself, if his talent is not already, perhaps, limited by nature, and restrained to his department, can neither reject the admonitions of philosophy, nor place himself above them.

1. Of *Definitions*. To *define*, is, as the expression itself indicates, properly only to signify the same, as to exhibit originally the particularized conception of a thing within its limits.\* According to such a requirement, an *empirical* conception cannot be at all defined

\* *Particularity*, means the clearness and sufficiency of signs—*limits*, the precision, that there are no more of these than belong to the particularized proof—but *originally* means, that this determination of limits is not derived elsewhere, and therefore requires no proof, which would render the pretended explanation improper, for standing at the head of all judgments as to an object.

but only *explained*. For, as we have therein only some marks of a certain kind of objects of the senses, it is thus never certain, whether under the word which indicates the same object, we do not at one time think more, at another less signs of the same. Thus one person may think in the conception of *gold*, besides the weight, the colour, the tenacity, the farther property, that it does not rust, another person may perhaps know nothing of this. We make use of certain signs only so long, as they are sufficient for distinguishing; new observations, on the other hand, remove some and add others, and the conception therefore never stands between sure limits. And, indeed, why should it serve to define such a conception—as if, for example, the question be as to water and its properties, we do not stop at that which we think in the word water, but we proceed to experiments, and the word, with the few signs which adhere to it, is to constitute only, a *designation*, and not a conception of the thing—consequently the pretended definition is nothing else but the determination of the word. Secondly, also, to speak exactly, no *a priori* given conception can be defined, for example, substance, cause, right, equity, &c. For I can never be certain, that the clear representation of a given (yet confused) conception, has been developed completely, but when I know, that the same is adequate to the object. But, as the conception of this object, such as it is given, may contain many obscure representations, which we pass over in the analysis, although we certainly employ them always in the application; the particularity of the analysis of my conception is thus always doubtful, and can only be made *probable* through various conformable examples, but never *apodictically* certain. Instead of the expression, *definition*, I would rather use that of *exposition*, which is always a modest one, and which the critic can to a certain degree allow to be valid, and yet, in respect of particularity, have some hesitation. As, therefore,

neither empirical nor *à priori* given conceptions can be defined, so, none other than arbitrarily thought ones remain, as to which we can attempt this art. I can always in such a case define my conception, for I must at least know, what I have intended to think, because I have formed this deliberately, and it has neither been given to me, through the nature of the understanding, nor through experience, but I cannot say that thereby I have defined a true object. For, if the conception reposes upon empirical conditions, for example, a ship's chronometer, the object and the possibility thereof is thus still not given by means of this arbitrary conception—I do not thence ever know, whether it has an object at all, and my explanation may be rather termed a declaration (of my project) than definition of an object. Consequently, no other conceptions remain, that are suitable for defining, but those which contain an arbitrary synthesis, that can be constructed *à priori*—consequently, Mathematick only has definitions. For this exhibits in the intuition also *à priori*, the object which it thinks, and such certainly cannot contain either more or less than the conception, since, through the explanation, the conception would be given of the object originally, that is, without deriving the explanation from any other. The German language possesses for the expressions of *exposition*, *explanation*, *declaration* and *definition*, nothing more than one word *erklarung*, and therefore we must abate something already from the strictness of the pretension, since we refused, for instance, to philosophical explanations the honourable name of definition, and we wish to limit the whole observation to this—that philosophical definitions are only expositions of given conceptions, but mathematical, constructions of originally made conceptions, and the former are only analytical through analysis, (whose completeness is not apodictically certain,) the latter, accomplished synthetically, and therefore, they *form* the conception itself,

whilst on the contrary, the first only explain it. It hence follows—

(a.) That we must not in Philosophy so far imitate Mathematick, in premising definitions, only perhaps as mere experiment. For, as they are decompositions of given conceptions, these conceptions, although still confused, thus precede, and the imperfect exposition precedes the perfect one, so that from some signs which we have deduced from a yet imperfect analysis, we can conclude previously many things, before we have attained to the perfect exposition, that is, the definition; in a word, that in philosophy, the definition as measured clearness, must rather conclude than begin the work.\* On the contrary, we have not in mathematick any conception at all before the definition, through which the conception is first of all given—(*the definition*) must therefore and can likewise at all times thence originate.

(b.) Mathematical definitions can never err. For, since by means of the definition, the conception is first given, it thus contains precisely only that which the definition wills to have thought by means of it. But, although as to the content, nothing erroneous can therein present itself, yet still sometimes, although only seldom, in the form (of dressing it up), there is a deficiency, namely, in respect of precision. Thus, the common explanation of a circular line, that it is a curved line, whereof all the points are equally far distant from a single one (the centre), has this fault, that the determination, curved, is introduced unneces-

\* Philosophy swarms with faulty definitions, particularly such, as certainly really contain elements for definition, but still not complete. If we could not begin at all with a conception, until we had defined it, it would stand very ill with all philosophizing. But since, so far as the elements (of analysis) reach, a good and sure use thereof is always to be made, defective definitions also, that is, propositions which, properly, are not definitions, but otherwise true, and are therefore approximations to them, may be employed very usefully. In mathematics the definition belongs *ad esse*, in philosophy *ad melius esse*. It is beautiful but often very difficult to attain to this. The juriconsults have yet to find out a definition of their conception of right.



sarily. For, there is required a particular theorem, which is deduced from the definition, and which can be easily shown ; that every line whereof all the points are equally far from a single one, is curved (no part of it straight). Analytical definitions may, on the contrary, err in various ways, either because they introduce signs which really do not lie in the conception, or are deficient in particularity, which constitutes what is essential to a definition, since we cannot be so fully certain of the perfection of its analysis. On this account the method of mathematics in defining cannot be imitated in philosophy.

2. Of *Axioms*. These are synthetical propositions *a priori*, so far as they are immediately certain. Now, a conception cannot be conjoined with another synthetically, and yet immediately, since, in order that we may issue out beyond a conception, a third intermediate cognition is necessary. As philosophy, then, is merely the cognition of reason according to conceptions, no principle will thus be met with therein, which deserves the name of an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, are susceptible of axioms, inasmuch as they, by means of the construction of conceptions in the intuition of the object, can conjoin the predicates thereof immediately and *a priori* ; for example, that three points always lie in a plane. On the contrary, a synthetical principle merely from conceptions, never can be immediately certain, as for example, the proposition, that every thing which happens has its cause, because I must look about for a third thing, namely, the condition of the time-determination in an experience, and I could not cognize such a principle, directly immediately from the conceptions alone. Discursive principles are, therefore, something quite different from intuitive, that is, from axioms. The first still require at all times a deduction, which the last can wholly dispense with, and as these are evident precisely for the same cause—which is a thing that phi-

losophical principles with all their certainty, can still never pretend to—so any synthetic proposition of pure and transcendental reason is infinitely far from being as palpable (as men are in the habit of tauntingly saying) as the proposition, that twice two make four. I have, certainly, in the *Analytick*, in the table of the principles of the pure understanding, also mentioned certain axioms of intuition, but the there adopted principle was itself no axiom, but only served for this, to furnish the principle of the possibility of axioms in general, and was itself only a principle from conceptions. For, even the possibility of mathematics must be shown in the transcendental philosophy. Philosophy has, therefore, no axioms, and must never thus impose absolutely its principles *à priori*, but must satisfy itself with this, in justifying its claim to the same, by means of fundamental deduction.

3. Of *Demonstrations*. Only an apodictical proof, as far as it is intuitive, can be called demonstration. Experience certainly teaches us that which exists, but not, that it could not be at all otherwise. Consequently, empirical proofs cannot procure any apodictical proof. But, from conceptions *à priori*, (in discursive cognition,) intuitive certainty, that is evidence, can never spring, however apodictically certain the judgment may yet otherwise be. Mathematics only contain, therefore, demonstrations, because they derive their cognition not from conceptions but from the construction thereof, that is, from the intuition which can be given *à priori* corresponding to the conceptions. Even the procedure of algebra with its equations, from which it derives truth together with the proof, through reduction, is in fact no geometrical but still characteristic construction, wherein we exhibit in the intuition conceptions by signs, especially of the relationship of quantities; and without our ever regarding what is evristic, it guarantees all conclusions from errors in this way, that each

of the same is exposed to view, whilst on the contrary, philosophic cognition must abandon this advantage, since it must always consider the general in abstracto, (by means of conceptions,) whilst mathematics can weigh the general in concreto, (in the individual intuition,) and, moreover by means of pure representation *à priori*, whereby each false step becomes visible. I should, therefore, rather term the first *acroamatic* (discursive) *proofs*, since they are only introduced through mere words, (the object in thought,) than *demonstrations*, which, as the expression already shows, proceed in the intuition of the object.

Now it follows from all this, that it is not at all fitting the nature of philosophy, especially in the field of pure reason, to strut about with a dogmatic air, and to adorn itself with the titles and ornaments of mathematics, to the order of which it nevertheless does not belong, although it has every motive to hope, as to a sisterly connection with the same. Such pretensions are vain and never can succeed; they must rather cause the retrogression of their object, in discovering the illusions of reason mistaking its limits, and bringing down by means of a sufficient explanation of our conceptions, the presumption of speculation, to modest but solid self-cognition. Reason, therefore, in its transcendental investigations will never be able to look before it so securely, as if the way which it had taken thus led directly to the goal, and cannot reckon so confidently upon the premises laid at its foundation, that it is not necessary, frequently to look back, and to observe, if in the progress of the conclusions, faults perchance do not discover themselves, which had been overlooked in the principles, and which render it necessary, either to determine them better, or entirely to change them.

I divide all apodictical propositions, (whether they may be demonstrable, or yet immediately certain) into *Dogmata* and *Mathemata*.. A direct synthetical propo-

sition from conceptions is a *dogma*; on the contrary, a like proposition through construction of conceptions is a *mathema*. Analytical judgments, teach us, strictly, nothing more of the object than what the conception, which we have of it, already contains in itself, since they do not extend the cognition beyond the conception of the subject, but only explain this. They cannot, therefore, suitably be termed dogmata (which word perhaps we could translate by *Apothegm*). But under the stated two kinds of synthetical propositions à priori, according to the ordinary use of language, only those belonging to philosophical cognition can bear this name, and we should hardly term the propositions of arithmetic or geometry, dogmata. This use, therefore, confirms the explanation which we gave, that only judgments from conceptions, and not those from the construction of conceptions, can be termed dogmatical.

Now, the entire pure reason contains, in its mere speculative use, not a single direct synthetical judgment from conceptions. For, through ideas, as we have shown, it is not capable of any synthetical judgments, which possessed objective validity—but through conceptions of the understanding, it establishes, indeed, sure principles, yet not at all directly from conceptions, but always only, indirectly, through reference of these conceptions to something quite contingent, namely, *possible experience*; but then these principles, if this (something as object of possible experiences) is presupposed, may be absolutely apodictically certain, yet in themselves (directly) they cannot ever be cognized à priori. Thus, the proposition—“that every thing which happens has its cause,” no one can see fundamentally from this given conception alone. Consequently, it is no dogma, although in another point of view, namely, the single field of its possible use, that is, of experience, it can be very well and apodictically shown. But, it is termed a *principle*

and not a *theorem*, although it requires to be proved, for this reason, that it has the particular property, that it makes its proof, namely, experience, first even possible, and must be always presupposed therein.

Now, if there is in the speculative use of pure reason also not any dogmata, according to content, all *dogmatical* method is unsuitable in itself, whether, in fact, it is borrowed from the mathematician, or is a particular mode. For, it only conceals faults and errors and deceives philosophy, whose particular object it is, to expose every step of reason in its clearest light. Still the method may be always *systematical*. For, our reason (subjectively) is itself a system, but in its pure use, by means of mere conceptions, only a system of investigation according to principles of unity, for which *experience* alone can furnish the matter. But in this place nothing can be said as to the peculiar method of a transcendental philosophy, as we have only to do with a Critick of the state of our faculties—whether we can, in fact, build up our edifice at all, and how high, from the materials which we have, (from pure conceptions *à priori*).

### THIRD DIVISION.

#### SECOND SECTION.

#### THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN RESPECT OF ITS POLEMICAL USE.

Reason must be subjected, in all its undertakings, to Critick, and cannot derogate from the liberty thereof, by means of any inhibition, without doing injury to itself, and drawing upon itself a suspicion disadvantageous to it. Now, there is nothing so important, in respect of utility, nothing so sacred, that should escape from this searching and reviewing investigation, which knows no respect of person. The very existence of reason rests upon this liberty, which has no dictatorial

authority, but whose expression is at all times nothing but the compact of free citizens, each of whom must be able, without restraint, to express his scruples, and even his *veto*.

But now, although reason can never *repudiate* Critick, still has it not always cause to *fear* it. But pure reason in its dogmatical (not mathematical) use, is not so intimately acquainted with the exact observation of its supreme laws, that it must not appear with timidity, nay, indeed, with a total abrogation of all its pretended dogmatical importance, before the critical eye of a higher and judicial reason.

The matter is quite otherwise, when it has not to do with the censure of a judge, but the claims of its fellow citizens, and, on the contrary, has merely to defend itself. For, as these will be just as dogmatical, although in denying, as the first (*reason*) was in affirming, a justification *κατ'ανθρώπον* takes place, which guarantees against all detriment, and procures a titular possession, that need not fear any strange pretensions, although it cannot itself be sufficiently proved *κατ'αλήθειαν*.

Now, by the polemical use of pure reason, I understand the defence of its propositions against the dogmatical negatives of the same. The question in this case is, not whether its assertions might not also perhaps be erroneous, but only, that no one could ever maintain the contrary with apodictical certainty (nay, even only with considerable appearance). For, then are we still not under sufferance in our occupation, provided we have before us a title, though not a sufficient one to the same, and it is quite certain, that no one can ever demonstrate the illegality of this possession.

It is an afflicting and discouraging thing, that there should in general be an Antithetick of pure reason, and that this, which, nevertheless, represents the highest tribunal in all contentions, should fall into contradic-

tion with itself. We have certainly had, previously, before us such an apparent antithetick of the same, but it was evident, that it rested upon a misunderstanding, as for instance, according to the common prejudice, phenomena were taken for things in themselves, and then we required an absolute completeness of their synthesis, either in one way or the other, (but which in both ways was equally impossible)—and which cannot at all be expected of phenomena. There was therefore then no real *contradiction* of *reason* with itself in the propositions—"the series of phenomena *given in themselves*, has an absolute first beginning," and, "this series is absolutely, and in *itself* without any beginning"—for both propositions subsist very well together, since *phenomena* according to their existence (as phenomena) are *in themselves* nothing at all, that is, something contradictory,—and, therefore, their pre-supposition must naturally draw after it contradictory consequences.

But such an error cannot be pretended, and thereby contradiction imputed to reason—if perchance some one should affirm theistically—"there is a *Supreme Being*," and on the contrary, atheistically, "*there is no Supreme Being*,"—or in physiology "every thing which thinks is of absolute permanent unity, and consequently different from all perishable material unity," to which another person sets up in opposition,—"the soul is not immaterial unity, and cannot be excepted from perishableness." For, the object of the question, in this case, is independent of every thing that is foreign, that would contradict its nature, and the understanding has only to do *with things in themselves*, and not with phenomena. There would, therefore, certainly, a true contradiction be met with here, if pure reason had only something to say on the negative side, that approximated to the foundation of an assertion,—for as to what concerns the Critick of the arguments of the dogmatical-affirmative, these we may

very well concede it, without on that account surrendering these propositions, which still, at least, have in their favour the interest of reason, to which the opponent cannot at all appeal.

I am certainly not of the opinion which eminent and reflecting men, (for example *Sulzer*) have so often expressed, when they felt the weakness of the arguments hitherto adduced, that we might hope we should still one day find out, evident demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of our pure reason ; “there is a God”—“there is a future life.” I am certain, rather, that this will never happen. For, where will reason derive the foundation of such synthetical assertions, which do not refer to objects of experience and their internal possibility ? But, it is also apodictically certain, that no man will ever appear, who can assert the *contrary* with the least appearance, much less dogmatically. For, since he could still only prove this by means of pure reason, he must then undertake to show, that a supreme Being, and that the thinking subject in us, as pure intelligence, is *impossible*. But, whence will he derive the knowledge which would authorize him to judge thus synthetically as to things beyond all possible experience. We may therefore be quite unconcerned as to this, that any one will some day prove to us the opposite, and, we have even no need on this account, to think as to scholastic proofs, but may always adopt those propositions, which accord perfectly well with the speculative interest of our reason, in the empirical use, and are moreover the only means of uniting it with the practical interest. We have for the opponent (who, in this case, must not be considered merely as a critic) our non liquet in readiness, which must infallibly confound him, inasmuch as we do not repudiate his retorting upon us—because we have the subjective maxim of reason constantly in reserve, which necessarily fails our adversary, and under the protection of which, we may



look with tranquillity and indifference upon all his blows in the air.

In such a way there is, strictly, no Antithetick at all of pure reason. For the only arena for this, would be to be sought in the field of pure theology and psychology; but this ground supports no champion in his full armour, and with weapons that are to be dreaded. He can only step forth in joke and bravado, which may be laughed at as a child's play. This is a consolatory observation, which again gives encouragement to reason—for whereupon would it else rely, if it, which alone is called upon to dispel all errors, itself were disturbed, without being able to hope for peace and quiet possession.

Every thing, which nature itself orders, is good for some end. Even poisons serve for this, to overcome other poisons which are generated in our own humours, and must therefore not be wanting in a complete collection of remedies (*Pharmacopœia*). The objections against the persuasions and obstinacy of our mere speculative reason, are themselves given through the nature of this reason, and must therefore possess their right destination and object, which we must not cast to the wind. Why has Providence placed many objects so high for us, although they are connected with our highest interest, that it is almost only permitted to us, to meet with them in an obscure, and with regard to ourselves even doubtful perception, and whereby inquiring looks are more excited than satisfied? Whether it is useful, in respect of such views, to hazard bold determinations is, at least, doubtful, perhaps it is even dangerous. But at all times, and without any doubt, it is useful to place enquiring as well as investigating reason at perfect liberty, so that unhindered, it may provide for its own interest, which is thereby promoted, equally as well in setting limits to its views, as in its extending such, and which at all times suffers, when strange hands

interfere, in order to bias it, contrary to its natural course, in accordance with forced intentions.

Let then your adversary only speak reason, and combat him merely with the arms of reason. As to any thing else, be without apprehension on account of the good cause (of practical interest), as this never comes into play in mere speculative conflict. The contest discovers then nothing, but a certain antinomy of reason, which, reposing upon the nature of itself, must necessarily be listened to and examined. The contest cultivates the same through consideration of its object in two modes, and justifies its judgment in this way, that it limits such. That which here is at variance, is not the *thing* but the *tone*. For, there remains still enough left for you, to speak the language of a firm *belief*, justified by the most severe reason, although you are compelled to give up that of *science*.

If the question had been put to the phlegmatic David Hume, *a man* especially constituted for equilibrium of judgment: what causes you, by means of doubts struck out with so much labour, to undermine the conviction so consoling and so useful to man, which their reason-insight arrives at, for the assertion and the determined conception of a supreme Being? he would answer in this way—nothing but the intention of advancing reason farther in its self cognition, and at the same time a certain dissatisfaction as to the constraint which it is wished to do to reason, whilst men take upon themselves airs with it, and at the same time prevent it, from making an honest confession of its weakness, which in the examination of itself is evident to it. If you enquire, on the contrary, from Priestley, devoted only to the principles of the *empirical* use of reason, and opposed to all transcendental speculation, what motives he had for overthrowing our soul's liberty and immortality, (the hope of future life is with him only the expectation of a miracle

in resurrection)—two such fundamental supports of all religion—he, who himself is a pious and zealous teacher of religion; he would then not be able to answer any thing else but, the interest of reason—which loses thereby, when we desire to withdraw certain objects from the laws of material nature, the only ones, which we can know and determine exactly. It would appear unfair to blame the latter, who knows how to conciliate his paradoxical assertions with the object of religion, and give pain to a well-thinking man, because he cannot find his road so soon as, out of the field of physicks, he has gone astray. But this favour must equally well be granted to the not less well intentioned, and as to his moral character, irreproachable Hume, who cannot abandon his abstract speculation from this cause, that he correctly conceived that its object lay quite out of the limits of natural philosophy, in the field of pure ideas.

Now, what is to be done here, especially in respect of the danger, which hence seems to threaten the common good? Nothing is more natural, nothing more equitable than the resolution which you have to take on its account. Let these people still go on—provided only they manifest talent and profound and novel research—in a word, if they only manifest reason, reason in this way always gains. If you employ other means than those of an unconstrained reason, if you raise the cry of high treason, if you call out for the public, which understands nothing at all as to such subtle elaborations, as it were to quench a fire, you thus render yourself ridiculous. For, the question is not at all here as to what thereby may be advantageous to the general good, or disadvantageous, but only, how far reason can certainly advance in its speculation abstracted from all interest, and whether we must reckon something upon this in general, or in fact rather give it up in favour of the practical. Instead, therefore, of striking right and

left with the sword, look tranquilly rather from the secure seat of critick upon this strife, which is fatiguing to the combatants, but entertaining to you, and which must terminate advantageously, as to your knowledge, in a certain bloodless issue. For, it is a very absurd thing to expect explanation from reason, and yet to prescribe before hand to it, as to which side it must necessarily lean. Besides, reason is already of itself so well curbed and held in bounds by reason, that it is not all necessary for you to call the guard, in order to oppose civil resistance to that party, whose apprehended superiority of force appears to you to be dangerous. In this Dialectick there is no victory, as to which you would have cause to be afraid.

Reason, likewise, very much stands in need of such a conflict, and it were to be desired, that it had been brought on earlier, and with unlimited public toleration. Then a mature Critick would so much the sooner have been brought about, and by the manifestation of which, all these disputes must of themselves disappear, inasmuch as the contending parties learn to perceive their darkness, and the prejudices which have disunited them.

There is in human nature a certain impurity, which still at the last, like every thing that proceeds from nature, must contain a disposition for good ends, namely, an inclination to conceal its true sentiments, and to make a show of certain others, which we hold to be good and commendable. Most certainly, by means of this tendency for concealing themselves, as well as also for assuming an advantageous appearance, men have not been merely civilized, but gradually in a certain measure rendered moral, since as no one was able to penetrate the varnish of decency, honesty and morality—consequently into the assumed real examples of the good that he saw around him—he discovered a school of improvement for himself. But this disposition for making ourselves better than

we are, and of uttering sentiments that we have not, serves only, as it were, provisionally for this, to draw man out of his rude state, and to allow him at least first to assume the manner of the good which he knows ; for subsequently, if the genuine principles be once developed and transferred into the faculty of thought, the falsehood in question must then by degrees be vigorously combated, inasmuch as it otherwise corrupts the heart, and chokes the spring of right sentiments, under the luxuriating weeds of beauteous appearance.

I am sorry to perceive this same impurity, dissimulation, and hypocrisy, even in the expressions of the speculative mode of thought, wherein men, nevertheless, have much fewer impediments, and no advantage is given, from making in an upright manner, openly and unreservedly, the avowal of their ideas. For, what can be more disadvantageous to knowledge, than to impart to one another, even mere ideas falsified—to conceal doubts which we feel against our own assertions—or to give a colouring of evidence to arguments which are not satisfactory to ourselves? So long, however, as mere private vanity causes these secret evasions (which, in speculative judgments that have no particular interest, and are not easily capable of an apodictical certainty, is commonly the case), then so does the vanity of others, with *public approbation*, still resist ; and matters come to that point at last, where the purest intention and sincerity would have brought them, although much earlier. But, where the generality imagine this, that subtle disputants are occupied with nothing less than to shake the basis of the public weal, it then seems to be, not only agreeable to prudence, but also permissible and indeed very honourable, to come to the assistance of the good cause even with superficial arguments, rather than to give the advantage only to its pretended opponents—to lower our tone to the moderation of a mere practical con-

viction—and to compel us, to confess the deficiency of speculative and apodictical certainty. I should however think, that under the intention of sustaining a good cause, nothing certainly worse in the world can be united, than cunning, concealment, and fraud. That, in the consideration of the rational grounds of a mere speculation, every thing must take place honourably, is, indeed, the least that we can require. But, could we also only reckon securely upon this little, the contest of speculative reason as to the important questions of God, Immortality (of the soul), and Liberty, would then either long since have been decided, or very soon be accomplished. Thus, purity of sentiment stands frequently in inverse relation with the goodness of the cause itself, and such, perhaps, has more sincere and eloquent opponents, than supporters.

I presuppose, therefore, readers who are not willing to see any just cause defended by injustice. In respect of such it is now decided, that, according to our principles of critick, if we do not look at that which does happen, but what rightly should happen, there must not strictly be any Polemick of pure reason. For, how can two persons enter into a contest as to a matter, the reality of which, neither of the two can exhibit in a real, nor yet even in a possible experience, over the idea of which he only broods, in order to extract something from it *more* than idea, namely, the reality of the object itself? By what means will they get out of the contest, since neither of the two can make his case exactly comprehensible and certain, but only can attack and overthrow that of his opponent? For, this is the fate of all assertions of pure reason; that, as they issue out beyond the conditions of all possible experience, out of which no document of truth is any where to be met with, yet still must make use of the laws of the understanding, which are merely destined for empirical use, but without which, no step in synthetical thinking is effected, such assertions

manifest, at all times, nakedness to the antagonist, and, on the other hand, may turn the defencelessness of their opponent to advantage.

We may consider the Critick of pure reason as the true tribunal for all its controversies, for it is not involved in those that refer immediately to objects, but is established for this purpose, to determine and to judge of the rights of reason in general, according to the principles of its first institution.

Without this critick, reason is, as it were, in the state of nature, and cannot render valid or secure its assertions and pretensions, otherwise than through war. Critick, on the contrary, which derives all decisions from the fundamental rules of its own establishment, whose authority no one can doubt, procures us the repose of a legal state, wherein we are not to conduct our differences, otherwise than by *trial*. That which terminates the action in the first state is *victory*, whereof both parties boast, and whereupon for the most part, a still more insecure peace ensues, which the Supreme authority that interposes has concluded, but in the second state, the *sentence*, as it here effects the origin of the differences, must procure an eternal peace. The endless contests of a mere dogmatical reason compel us, finally, also to seek for quiet in some Critick of this reason itself, and in a legislation that is founded upon it; in the same way that Hobbes maintains, that the state of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and that we must necessarily abandon it, in order to subject ourselves to legal controul, which only limits our liberty therein for this purpose, that it may subsist together with the liberty of every one, and precisely thereby, with the general good.

To this liberty, there then belongs also that of submitting our thoughts, our doubts, which we cannot ourselves solve, publicly to judgment, without on this account being decried as a turbulent and dangerous citizen. This lies already in the original right of

human reason, which knows no other judge again than general human reason itself, wherein every one has his suffrage; and, as all the amelioration whereof our situation is susceptible, must proceed from this, such a right is in this way sacred, and must not be infringed upon. It is also very unwise, to exclaim against certain bold assertions or daring attacks, as dangerous, which already have the agreement of the greatest and best part of the public on their side, for this is to give them a weight which they ought not at all to possess. When I hear, that a not common intellect has argued away the liberty of the human will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of a God, I am then curious to read his book, because I expect from his talent, that he will increase my knowledge. I know quite decidedly beforehand, this, that he will not have effected any thing as to these points, not on this account, because I, perhaps, believed myself to be in possession of irrefragable proof of these important propositions, but because transcendental critick, which has disclosed to me the whole stock of our pure reason, has fully convinced me, that, in the same way, as such is quite inefficient for affirmative assertions in this field, just as little, or still less, will it know how to be able to maintain any thing negative with respect to these questions. For, whence will this assumed independent thinker derive his knowledge; that for example, there is no supreme Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible experience, and on this account also, out of the limits of all human insight. I should, certainly, not read the dogmatical defender of the good cause against this opponent, because I know beforehand, that he would attack the seeming grounds of the other only on this account, in order to procure admission for his own, besides which, an every day appearance does not still afford so much matter for fresh observations, as one that is strange and ingeniously imagined. On the contrary, the, in his own



way, dogmatical adversary of religion, would furnish desirable occupation for my Critick, and inducement to further justification of its principles, without there being on his account any thing in the least to fear.

But young people, who are confided to academical instruction, are still, at least, to be warned against the like writings, and restrained from early acquaintance with such dangerous propositions, before their judgment is matured, or rather the doctrines which it is desired to instil into them, are firmly rooted, in order to resist boldly all persuasion to the contrary, whence-soever it may proceed.

If we must hold to the dogmatic procedure in matters of pure reason, and the refutation of the opponent must be strictly polemical, that is to say, be so constituted, that we should enter into the lists, and arm ourselves with proofs for opposite assertions, nothing certainly would be more prudent *for the moment*, but nothing at the same time more vain and fruitless *as to duration*, than to put into tutelage for a long time the reason of youth, and to guard it, at least, thus long, against seduction. But, if in the sequel, either curiosity or the fashion of the time place such writings in their hands, will then such juvenile conviction still be a barrier? He who does not bring any thing but dogmatic arms in order to resist the attacks of his adversary, and does not know how to develope the concealed dialectick that lies, not less in its own bosom than in that of the adversary, sees apparent reasons arise which have the prerogative of novelty, against apparent reasons which have no longer the same, but rather excite suspicion on the part of an abused credulity of youth. He fancies he cannot better manifest, that he has out grown the age of discipline, that when he thinks himself above those well intentioned warnings, and habituated to dogmatisms, he swallows in deep draughts, the poison which dogmatically corrupts his principles.

Exactly the contrary of what we here advise, must take place in academical teaching, but certainly only under the presupposition of a fundamental instruction in the Critick of pure reason. For, in order to bring the principles thereof as soon as possible into exercise, and to show their sufficiency in the greatest dialectical appearance, it is absolutely necessary, to direct the attacks so formidable to the dogmatist against his reason still weak, though yet enlightened by the critick, and to let him make the attempt at proving the groundless assertions of the opponent, piece by piece, according to the stated principles. It cannot be difficult at all to him, to resolve them into mere vapour, and he thus early feels his own force, for fully securing himself against the like pernicious delusions, which, finally, must lose as to him, all appearance. Now, although the selfsame blows which destroy the edifice of the enemy, must also be even equally dangerous to his own speculative building, if he thought perchance of attaining to the like, still is he quite unconcerned as to this, because he does not at all require to dwell therein, and has yet before him a view into the practical field, where he can with cause hope for a firmer basis, in order to raise upon the same, his rational and salutary system.

Hence therefore there is no proper polemick in the field of pure reason. Both sides are fighters against air, who contend with their shadow, since they go out beyond nature, where nothing is present for their dogmatic grasps, which can be seized and held. They fight in vain—the shadows that they destroy spring up again in a moment, like the heroes in Walhalla, again to be able to amuse themselves in bloodless conflicts.

But, there is no allowable sceptical use of pure reason that can be termed the principle of *neutrality*, in all its controversies. To excite reason against itself, to furnish it with weapons on both sides, and then to regard tranquilly and tauntingly its fiercest encounters,

does not look well from a dogmatic point of view, but has the appearance of a mischievous and malicious disposition in itself. If, however, we contemplate the invincible blindness and vanity of the sophisters, which will not be modelated by means of any critick, there is still really no other remedy then, but to oppose to the vaunt of the one side, another which is founded upon the very same rights, so that reason by means of the opposition of an enemy, at least may be made only to pause, for the purpose of setting some doubt as to its pretensions, and paying attention to Critick. But wholly to acquiesce in these doubts, and therefore to put the matter aside; to wish to recommend the conviction and the avowal of our ignorance, not merely as a remedy against dogmatical self-conceit but, at the same time, as the mode of ending the conflict of reason with itself, is quite an unprofitable design, and can by no means be suitable to the object, of affording repose to reason, but is at the best only a means, to awaken it out of its sweet dogmatical dream, in order to bring its state into more careful investigation. As however this sceptical manner of drawing itself out of a vexatious action of reason, seems to be, as it were, the shortest road to arrive at a permanent philosophical tranquillity, or at least the high road which those willingly take, who mean to give themselves a philosophical importance in a sarcastic disparagement of all investigations of this nature, I thus find it necessary to expose this mode of thinking in its peculiar light.

OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SCEPTICAL CONTENTMENT  
OF PURE REASON AT VARIANCE WITH ITSELF.

The conscience of my ignorance (if this ignorance is not at the same time cognized as necessary), instead of this, that it should put an end to my investigations, is rather the especial cause of awakening them. All

ignorance is either that of things, or of the determination and limits of my cognition. If the ignorance be only contingent, it must then instigate me, in the first place, to enquire *dogmatically* into things (objects), in the second, to inquire *critically* into the limits of my possible cognition. But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary, and consequently frees me from all farther enquiry, is not to be made out empirically from *observation*, but only *critically* in the *sounding* of the first sources of our cognition. The determination of the limit of our reason can therefore only happen according to grounds *à priori*; but the limitation thereof, which is a cognition, although only undetermined, of an ignorance never wholly to be dissipated, can also be cognized *à posteriori*, through that which in all knowledge still remains ever to be known. The first kind of cognition of its ignorance alone possible through critick of reason itself, is therefore *science*, the last nothing but *perception*, as to which we cannot say, how far the conclusion from the same may extend. If I represent to myself the surface of the earth (according to sensible appearance) as a disk, so cannot I know, how far it extends. But experience teaches me this—that wheresoever I may reach, I always see a space about me, wherein I might advance further—consequently I cognize the limits of my, at all times, real geographical knowledge, but not the limits of all possible geography. But still, if I am so far advanced as to know that the earth is a sphere, and its surface a spherical surface, I in this way can also cognize determinately and according to principles *à priori*, from a small part of the same, for example, from the quantity of a degree, the diameter, and by means of this, the complete boundary of the earth, that is, its surface; and although I am ignorant in respect of the objects which this surface may contain, still I am not so in respect of the sphere which contains them, nor the greatness and limits thereof.

The complex of all possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a plain surface, which has its apparent horizon, namely, that which embraces the whole circumference of the same, and is termed the reason-conception of the unconditioned totality. It is impossible to attain to the same empirically, and all attempts have been vain for the purpose of determining it *à priori*, according to a certain principle. Still however, all the questions of our pure reason refer to that which may lie out of this horizon, or yet in any event, in its boundary line.

The celebrated *David Hume* was one of these geographers of human reason, who fancied to have disposed of all such questions sufficiently in this way, that he banished them out of the horizon of the same reason, although he could not determine it. He stopped especially at the principle of causality, and remarked very justly as to it, that we do not rely as to its truth, (not even the objective validity of the conception of an effective cause in general,) upon any observation at all, that is, cognition *à priori*—that consequently also, the necessity of this law does not in the least constitute its whole force, but a mere general usefulness thereof in the course of experience, and a thence arising subjective necessity, which he named, habit. Now, from the inability of our reason to make of this principle, a use extending beyond all experience, he concluded as to the nullity of all pretensions of reason in general, for going beyond that which is empirical.

We may term a proceeding of this kind for subjecting the *Facta* of reason to examination, and, if we like, to blame, the *Censure* of reason. It is beyond doubt, that this censure leads inevitably to *doubt* in respect of all transcendental use of principles. But, this is only the second step, which is far from completing the work. The first step in matters of pure reason which denotes the infancy of the same is

*dogmatical.* The just mentioned second step is *sceptical*, and gives evidence of the circumspection of the faculty of judgment grown wise by experience. But there is still, then, a third step necessary, which only belongs to the matured and virile faculty of judgment, which has, at its foundation, secure maxims, and as to their generality, verified ones, namely, to subject to appreciation, not *Facta* of reason, but reason itself, according to its whole faculty and fitness for pure cognitions *à priori*—which is not the censure, but the *Critick* of reason, whereby not only *limits* but the determined *bounds* of the same—not merely ignorance as to one or the other part, but in respect of all possible questions of a certain kind, is not indeed, as it were, only conjectured, but demonstrated from principles. Thus scepticism is a resting place for human reason, where it may reflect upon its dogmatic pilgrimage, and make the plan of the country in which it is, in order to be able to choose its way for the future with greater certainty, but not a dwelling place for constant residence; for this can only be met with in a perfect certainty, either as to the cognition of the objects themselves, or of the bounds, within which all our cognition of objects is enclosed.

Our reason is not, for instance, an undeterminable wide extended plain, the limits of which we only thus cognize generally, but it must rather be compared to a sphere, whose diameter may be found by the curve of the arc at its surface (from the nature of synthetical propositions *à priori*), but whence also the content and the limitation of the same sphere is afforded with security. Out of this sphere (field of experience) nothing is object in respect of it, nay, the questions themselves as to the like pretended objects, concern only subjective principles of a general determination of relationships which may present themselves under the conceptions of the understanding within this sphere.

We are really in possession of synthetical cognition à priori, as the principles of the understanding show, which anticipate experience. Now, if any one cannot at all make comprehensible to himself the possibility thereof, he may thus certainly doubt at the outset, whether they even really dwell in us à priori ; but still he cannot conclude this to be an impossibility of the same, by means of mere forces of the understanding, and declare as null, the steps which reason makes according to their standard. He can only say, provided we perceive their origin and authenticity, we thus can determine the compass and the limits of our reason—but before this has occurred, all the assertions of this last are rashly hazarded. And in such a manner a general doubt as to all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds on its way without critick of reason itself, is perfectly well founded, but still on this account such a progress could not be wholly denied to reason, if it were prepared and secured by means of a better foundation. For, all the conceptions, nay all the questions which pure reason proposes to us, do not lie perhaps in experience, but again even only in reason, and must, therefore, be able to be solved and comprehended as to their validity or nullity. We are, likewise, not justified in repudiating these problems, under the pretence, moreover, of our incapacity, as if their solution lay really in the nature of things, and to deny to ourselves their further investigation ; but as reason only has engendered these ideas in its bosom, it is bound, therefore, to render up an account, as to their validity or dialectical appearance.

All sceptical polemick is only properly directed against the dogmatist, who, without setting distrust upon his original objective principles, that is, without critick, pursues proudly his way—merely in order to disturb him in his imagining, and to bring him to self-cognition. In itself, it decides nothing in respect of what we can know, and on the other hand, what we

cannot know. All vain dogmatic attempts of reason are facta, which it is always useful to submit to censure. But this cannot decide any thing as to the expectations of reason, in hoping for a better issue to its future endeavours, and establishing pretensions thereon: mere censure, therefore, can never bring to a conclusion, the contest as to the rights of human reason.

As Hume is, perhaps, the most ingenious of all sceptics, and without contradiction, the most remarkable, in respect of the influence which the sceptical procedure may have, in stirring up a fundamental investigation of reason, it very well requites the trouble, to represent as far as is suitable to my object, the march of his conclusions, and the errors of so clever and estimable a man, which, nevertheless, had their commencement in the track of truth.

Hume had it, perhaps, in thought, although he never fully developed it, that we go out, in judgments of a certain kind, beyond our conception of the object. I have termed this kind of judgments *synthetical*. How I can go out from my conception, which I have had hitherto by means of experience, is subjected to no difficulty. Experience is itself such a synthesis of perceptions as increases my conception, which I have by means of a perception, through other additional ones. But, we also believe to be able *à priori* to go out from our conceptions, and to extend our cognition. This we attempt, either through the pure understanding, in respect of that which can at least be an *object of experience*, or even through pure reason, in respect of such properties of things, or, likewise, indeed, of the existence of such objects, as can never present themselves in experience. Our sceptic did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as, however, he ought to have done, and held precisely this addition of conceptions from themselves, and, as it were, the self delivery of our understanding (as well as of reason),



without being impregnated by experience, as impossible—consequently all pretended principles thereof à priori as imaginary ; and found, that it is nothing but habit resulting from experience and its laws, consequently mere empirical, that is, contingent rules in themselves, to which we attribute a pretended necessity and universality. But, for the support of this strange proposition, he referred to the general admitted principle of the relationship of cause and effect. For, as no understanding-faculty can lead us from the conception of one thing to the existence of something else, which is thereby generally and necessarily given ; he thus believed being able hence to conclude, that we have nothing without experience, which could increase our conception, and justify us in such an à priori extending itself judgment. That the solar light which illuminates wax, at the same time melts it, notwithstanding it hardens the clay, no understanding from conceptions that we previously had of these things could suppose, much less conclude legitimately, and only experience could teach us such a law. On the other hand, we have seen in transcendental logic, that although we never can *immediately* issue out beyond the content of the conception which is given to us, we can still cognize fully à priori the law of the connexion with other things, but in reference to a third, namely, possible experience, consequently still à priori. If, therefore, wax previously solid, melts, I can thus cognize à priori, that something must have preceded (for example, solar heat) whereupon this has ensued according to a constant law, although without experience, I could not certainly cognize *determinately* à priori nor without the instruction of experience, from the effect the cause, nor from the cause the effect. He concluded, therefore, erroneously, from the contingency of our determination *according to the law*, as to the contingency of the law itself, and he confounds the passage from the conception of a thing to possible

experience (which occurs *à priori*, and constitutes the objective reality of that conception), with the synthesis of the objects of real experience, which certainly is always empirical—but, through this he made, from a principle of affinity, which has its seat in the understanding and expresses necessary connexion, a rule of association, which is merely found in the imitative faculty of imagination, and can exhibit only contingent, but not objective conjunctions.

But the sceptical errors of this otherwise extremely profound man, sprang principally from a defect which he had nevertheless in common with all Dogmatists, namely, that he did not survey systematically all kinds of synthesis of the understanding *à priori*. For then he would have found, without here making mention of others, for example, the *principle of permanence*, such a one, which just as well as that of causality, anticipates experience. He would thereby also have been able to indicate to the understanding extending itself *à priori* and to pure reason, determined limits. But, as he only *restricted* our understanding, without *limiting* it, and established certainly a general distrust, but no determined acquaintance as to the ignorance inevitable to us—and as he brings some principles of the understanding under censure, without bringing this understanding, in respect of its whole faculty, to the touchstone of Critick—and whilst denying to it what it really cannot satisfy, he goes further and refuses to it all power of extending itself *à priori*, although he has not brought into an appreciation this whole faculty—this then occurs to him, which at all times destroys scepticism, namely, that it itself is doubted, since its objections repose only upon *Facta*, which are contingent, but not upon principles, which can effect a necessary renunciation of the right of dogmatic assertions.

As, likewise, he knew no difference between the well founded pretensions of the understanding, and

the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which however his attacks are principally directed ; reason, whose peculiar action is thereby not in the least disturbed, but only impeded, does not thus feel the space for extending itself closed, and can never be wholly diverted from its attempts, although it is hit here and there. For, it arms itself for resistance against attacks, and thereupon carries its head still so much the higher, for the purpose of establishing its claims. But, a complete estimate of its whole faculty, and the thence arising conviction of the certainty of a small possession, amidst the vanity of higher pretensions, does away with all litigation, and engages it to be satisfied with a limited, but indisputable property.

Against the non-critical dogmatist, who has not measured the sphere of his understanding, consequently has not determined, according to principles, the limits of his possible cognition ; who therefore does not already know before hand, how much he is capable of, but thinks of discovering it by means of mere experiments, these sceptical attacks are not only dangerous, but are even destructive to him. For, if he be surprised into a single assertion which he cannot justify, and whose appearance also he cannot resolve upon principle, suspicion thus falls upon the whole, however convincing such may be in other respects.

And this is the way the Sceptic, the censor of the dogmatic sophister, leads to a sound critick of the understanding, and of reason itself. When he has arrived at it, he has thus no further combat to fear, since he then distinguishes his possession from that which entirely lies out of the same, as to which he lays no pretensions, and whereby likewise, he cannot be *implicated* in controversies. Thus the sceptical procedure is not, certainly, as to the questions of reason, *satisfactive* of itself, but nevertheless *preparative*, in order to awaken its circumspection, and to point to fundamental means, which can secure it in its legitimate possession.

## FIRST DIVISION.

## THIRD SECTION.

THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN RESPECT OF  
HYPOTHESES.

Since we finally know thus much by means of the Critick of our Reason, that we cannot know any thing at all in fact in its pure and speculative use—must it not open so much the wider field to *hypotheses*, whilst it is allowed to us, at least, to invent—to opine—if not to affirm?

If the imagination is not, for instance to *extravagate*, but to *invent* under the strict superintendence of reason, something must still always be previously wholly certain and not imagined, or be mere opinion, and this is the *possibility* of the object itself. Then it is certainly permitted, on account of the reality of the same, to have recourse to opinion, but which, in order not to be vain, must be brought, as ground of explanation into connexion with that which is really given and consequently is certain, and so is termed *hypothesis*.

Now as we cannot form to ourselves the least conception, of the possibility of the dynamical connexion à priori, and that the category of the pure understanding does not serve for this purpose, to think, but only to understand the like, where it is met with in experience; so we cannot originally conceive a single object agreeably to a new and not empirically proposed quality, according to these categories, nor lay such quality, at the foundation of an allowable hypothesis, for this would be, to submit to reason empty chimeras, instead of the conceptions of things. In the same way, it is not permitted to imagine to oneself any

new original forces ; as for example, an understanding which is capable of envisaging its object without sense, or an attractive force without any contact, or a new kind of substance—which, for instance, should be present in space without impenetrability, consequently, also, no community of substances, which is different from all that experience presents ; no presence, other than in space—no duration, except merely in time. In a word, it is only possible for our reason to make use of the conditions of possible experience, as conditions of the possibility of things ; but by no means wholly independent of this, to create them, as it were, itself, since the like conceptions, although free from contradiction, would still, nevertheless, be without object.

The conceptions of reason are, as stated, mere ideas, and have certainly no object in any experience, but yet on this account, they do not indicate fictitious objects, and, thereby at the same time, admitted as possible. They are merely thought problematically, in order, in reference to them (as evristic fictions), to found regulative principles of the systematic use of the understanding in the field of experience. If we depart from this field, they are then mere things of thought, whose possibility is not demonstrable, and which, therefore likewise cannot be laid at the foundation, by means of an hypothesis, of the explanation of real phenomena. It is quite allowed, to think the soul is simple, in order, according to this *idea*, to fix a perfect and necessary unity of all faculties of the mind, although we cannot see such in concreto, as the principle of our judgment of its internal phenomena. But to *assume* the soul as simple substance (a transcendental conception), is a proposition which would not only be indemonstrable (as several physical hypotheses are), but likewise hazarded quite arbitrarily and blindly, because the simple cannot occur in any experience at all, and provided we here understand under substance, the

permanent object of the sensible intuition, the possibility of a *simple phenomenon* is not in any way to be seen. Mere intelligible beings, or mere intelligible properties of the things of the sensible world, may be received, under a valid title of reason, as opinion, although (inasmuch as we have no conceptions of their possibility, or their impossibility) they cannot be denied dogmatically, by means of any pretended better insight.

For the explanation of given phenomena, no other things and grounds of explanation can be adduced, than those which have been placed in connexion, according to the already known laws of phenomena, with those given. A *transcendental hypothesis*, in respect of which a mere idea of reason was used, for the explanation of the things of nature, would consequently be no explanation at all, since that which we do not sufficiently understand from admitted empirical principles, would be explained through something, whereof we understand nothing at all. The principle of such an hypothesis would also serve strictly only for the satisfaction of reason, and not for the advancement of the use of the understanding in respect of objects. Order and intentionality in nature must in their turn be explained from natural causes and according to natural laws, and even the most extravagant hypotheses, provided they are only physical, are here more tolerable than an hyperphysical one, that is, the appeal to a divine Author, which we presuppose in this behalf. For, this would be a principle of indolent reason (*ignava ratio*), to pass by at once all causes, whose objective reality, at least according to possibility, we may yet learn through progressive experience, in order to repose in a mere idea, which is very convenient to reason. But as to what concerns the absolute totality of the ground of explanation in the series of the same, this can produce no impediment in respect of cosmical objects, because as these are

nothing but phenomena, never any completed thing can be hoped for in them in the synthesis of the series of conditions.

Transcendental hypotheses of the speculative use of reason, and a liberty, in any event to make use of hyperphysical, for supplying the want of physical grounds of explanation, cannot at all be allowed, partly since reason is not thereby further advanced, but rather the whole progress of its use is cut off, partly since this licence must finally deprive it of all fruits of the cultivation of its own peculiar territory, namely, experience. For, if the explanation of nature is here or there difficult, we have thus constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which dispenses us from all such investigation, and our inquiry terminates not through insight, but through entire incomprehensibility of a principle, which was already so conceived before hand, that it must contain the conception of the absolute First.

The second requisite point for the admissibility of an hypothesis is its sufficiency, in order to determine thence *à priori*, the consequences which are given. If we are necessitated for this end, to recur to auxiliary hypotheses, they thus furnish the suspicion of a mere fiction, since each thereof requires the same justification in itself, which the thought laid at the foundation needed, and consequently can give no sufficient testimony. If, under the presupposition of an unlimited perfect cause, there is no want in fact of grounds of explanation, as to all finality, order, and magnitude which are found in the world ; still such presupposition, amongst all the aberrations and evils manifesting themselves, at least according to our conceptions, still requires new hypotheses, in order to be saved from these things, as objections. If the simple substantiality of the human soul, which has been placed at the foundation of its phenomena, is impugned by the difficulties of its phenomena, similar to the changes

of matter (increase and decrease), new hypotheses must then be called in aid, which are certainly not without appearance, but are still without any credibility, except that, which opinion admitted as fundamental principle, accords to them, yet which opinion they are to vindicate.

If the assertions of reason adduced here as examples (incorporeal unity of the soul and existence of a supreme Being,) are not to be valid as hypotheses, but as *à priori* proved dogmata, the question then is not at all respecting them. But in such a case, we take care certainly, that the proof has the apodictical certainty of a demonstration. For to wish to render the reality of such ideas merely *probable*, is an absurd resolution, precisely in the same way, as if we meant to prove a proposition of geometry merely probable. Reason, separated from all experience, can only cognize every thing *à priori* and as necessary, or not at all—consequently, its judgment is never opinion, but either a forbearance from all judgment, or apodictical certainty. Opinions and probable judgments, as to that which belongs to things, can only occur as principles of experience of that which is really given, or as consequences according to empirical laws of that which as real lies at the foundation—consequently, only in the series of the objects of experience. To *opine* out of this field, is the same thing as to play with thoughts, except it must be, that from an insecure way of judgment, we held merely the opinion, peradventure thereby to find the truth.

But although in mere speculative questions of pure reason, no hypotheses take place, in order to found thereon propositions, still they are wholly allowable, in order in any event for defence only—that is, not in a dogmatical but yet in a polemical use. But, I understand by defence, not the increase of the arguments of its assertion, but the mere frustration of the apparent views of the opponent, which are to over-



throw our asserted proposition. But all synthetic propositions from pure reason have this peculiar to themselves, that if he who maintains the reality of certain ideas never yet knows enough, in order to make this his proposition certain, on the other hand, the adversary can just know as little, in order to maintain the contrary. Now, this equality in the lot of human reason certainly favours in speculative cognition neither of the two, and it is then also the true arena of never-ending hostilities. But it will be evident afterwards, that yet in respect of practical use, reason has a right to suppose something, which it was not justified in presupposing in any way, in the field of mere speculation, without sufficient grounds, since all such presuppositions do injury to the perfection of speculation, but in respect of which, practical interest does not at all concern itself. There (*in morals*) is reason consequently in possession, the legitimacy of which it need not prove, and as to which in fact it could not even adduce a proof. The opponent, therefore, is the person to prove. But as this party knows precisely as little any thing, in respect of the object in doubt, in order to demonstrate the non-existence of it, as the first did, who maintained its reality, an advantage thus manifests itself on the part of him, who asserts something as a practically necessary presupposition (*melior est conditio possidentis*). It is open, that is to say, to him, from the necessity of self defence, as it were, to make use of the same means in favour of his good cause, as the adversary against the same—that is to say, of hypotheses, which are not at all to serve for this, to strengthen the proof thereof, but only to demonstrate, that the adversary understands much too little as to the object of the contest, that he should be able to flatter himself in respect of us, as to an advantage of speculative unity.

Hypotheses are, therefore, allowed in the field of pure reason, only as weapons of war, not in order to

ground a right thereupon, but only to defend it. But the opponent in this cause, we must always seek in ourselves. For speculative reason, in its transcendental use, is in itself dialectical. The objections, which might be to be feared, lie in ourselves. We must collect them as old, but never prescriptive pretensions, in order to found an external peace upon their annihilation. External quiet is only delusive. The germ of hostilities, which lies in the nature of human reason, must be extirpated: but how can we extirpate it, provided we do not afford liberty, nay, even, nourishment to it, for pushing out shoots, whereby to manifest itself, and afterwards to pull it up by the roots? Think therefore yourself as to objections, upon which no opponent has yet fallen, and lend him even weapons, or set him upon the most favourable ground which even he himself can desire. There is nothing at all thereby to fear, but rather to hope, that is to say, that you will procure for yourself a possession, never hereafter to be contested.

Now the hypotheses of perfect reason, belong also to a perfect accoutrement, which, although they are only leaden weapons (since they are tempered by no law of experience), yet are always able to effect as much as those which any adversary may make use of against you. If, therefore, the difficulty press upon you (in any other not speculative respect), of an admitted immaterial nature of the soul and subjected to no corporeal change, that still experience serves to show the advancement as well as the destruction of our faculties of the soul, merely as different modifications of our organs; you may then weaken the force of this proof in this way, that you admit our body is nothing, but the fundamental phenomenon, to which, as condition, in the present state (life), the whole faculty of sensibility, and therewith all thinking, refers. That the separation of the body is the end of this sensible use of your faculty of cognition, and the beginning of the intellectual. The body was, therefore, not the cause

of thought, but a mere restraining condition of it, consequently was truly to be looked upon, as the promotion of sensitive and animal life, but so much the more likewise as obstacle to the pure and spiritual one, and the dependence of the first (*thinking*) upon the corporeal constitution, proves nothing as to the dependence of the whole life upon the state of our organs. But you might go still further, and raise in fact quite new doubts, either not suggested before, or not pushed far enough.

The accidentality of generations, which in men as well as in irrational animals, depends upon the opportunity, and besides this also frequently upon nourishment, upon government, its whims and caprices, often indeed upon crime, presents a great difficulty against the opinion of a duration extending itself to eternity, of a creature, whose life has first commenced under circumstances so inconsiderable, and so wholly left to our own liberty. As to what regards the duration of the whole species (here upon earth) this difficulty in respect thereof has little in it, since the contingency in the individual is nevertheless subjected to a rule in the whole; but, in respect of each individual, to expect so powerful an effort from so insignificant a cause, seems certainly doubtful. But, against this you may summon a transcendental hypothesis, that all life is properly only intelligible, not at all subjected to changes of time, and has neither begun through birth, nor will end by death. That this life is nothing but a mere phenomenon, that is, a sensible representation of the pure spiritual life, and that the whole sensible world is a mere image, which hovers before our present mode of cognition, and, like a dream, has in itself no objective reality—that, if we should envisage things and ourselves as they are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, with which our only true community has neither begun by birth, nor will terminate through the death of the body (as mere phenomena), &c.

Now although we do not know the least, as to all this which we have here pleaded hypothetically, against the attack, nor maintain it in earnest, and all is not even an idea of reason, but a conception imagined merely for defence, we still thereby conduct ourselves quite conformably to reason, inasmuch as we only show to the opponent who fancies he has exhausted all possibility, because he has given out the deficiency of its empirical conditions erroneously, as a proof of the total impossibility of that which is believed by us, that he can embrace just as little by means of mere laws of experience, the whole field of possible things in themselves, as we can procure out of experience, any thing for our reason in a fundamental way. He who employs such hypothetical opposite means, against the pretensions of a boldly denying adversary, must not be held responsible for this, that he is desirous of appropriating them to himself as his true opinions. He abandons them, so soon as he has done away with the self-conceit of the adversary. For however unassuming and moderate it is to be considered, provided a person conducts himself in respect of strange assertions merely adversely and negatively, yet so soon as he will render valid these his objections as proofs of the contrary, the pretension becomes not less vain and imaginary, than if he had seized hold of the affirmative side and its assertion.

We hence see therefore, that in the speculative use of reason, hypotheses have no validity as opinions in themselves, but only relatively to opposed transcendent pretensions. For the extension of the principles of possible experience to the possibility of things in general, is just as much transcendent, as the assertion of the objective reality of such conceptions, which can find their objects no where but out of the limits of all possible experience. What pure reason judges assertorically, must (like every thing which reason cognizes) be necessary, or it is nothing

at all. Consequently it contains in fact no opinions at all. But the stated hypotheses are only problematical judgments, which at least cannot be contradicted, although certainly not be shown by any thing, and are therefore no private opinions, and yet still cannot be easily exempted (even for internal tranquillity) from scruples rising up against them. But in this quality we must retain them, and, in fact, carefully prevent that they do not come forward, as authenticated of themselves and as of an absolute validity, and that they do not overwhelm reason with fictions and illusions.

#### FIRST DIVISION.

##### *FOURTH SECTION.*

#### THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN RESPECT OF ITS PROOFS.

The proofs of transcendental and synthetic propositions have this peculiar to themselves, amongst all the proofs of a synthetical cognition *à priori*; that reason in such, by means of its conceptions, must not apply itself directly to the object, but previously must prove the objective validity of the conceptions, and the possibility of the synthesis of the same, *à priori*. This is not, for instance, merely a necessary rule of precaution, but concerns the essence and the possibility of the proofs themselves. If I am to issue out, beyond the conception of an object *à priori*, this then is impossible without a particular clue, and one existing out of this conception. In mathematics it is the intuition *à priori* which guides my synthesis, and there, all the conclusions can be deduced immediately from the pure intuition. In transcendental cognition, so long as it has to do merely with conceptions of the

understanding, this standard is possible experience. The proof does not show, that is to say, that the given conception (for example, as to what happens) leads directly to another conception (that of a cause); for such passage would be a jump, which cannot be at all justified, but it shows that experience itself, consequently the object of experience, without such a connexion, would be impossible. The proof, therefore, must show at the same time the possibility of arriving synthetically and *à priori*, at a certain cognition of things, which was not contained in the conception of them. Without this attention, proofs run like waters which overflow their banks, impetuously and irregularly, there, where the tendency of concealed association accidentally leads them. The appearance of conviction that reposes upon the subjective causes of association, and is held to be the insight of a natural affinity, cannot at all counterbalance the doubtfulness, which equitably must arise as to such hazardous steps. And hence all the attempts of showing the principle of sufficient reason, according to the general admission of the learned, have been vain, and before transcendental Critick appeared, men would rather, as they still could not abandon this principle, appeal arrogantly to the common understanding of mankind (a resource which at all times shows that the cause of reason is desperate), than be willing to seek new dogmatic proofs.

But if the proposition, as to which a proof is to be deduced, is an assertion of pure reason, and if I indeed by means of mere ideas will issue out beyond my conceptions of experience, this proposition must then so much the more contain within itself the justification of such a step of synthesis (provided it is otherwise possible), as a necessary condition of its demonstrative force. However specious also, therefore, the pretended proof of the simple nature of our thinking substance may be, from the unity of the apperception, still the diffi-

culty irremediably stands in opposition to it, that, as absolute simplicity is yet no conception which can be referred immediately to a perception, but must be concluded merely as idea, it is not at all to be seen, how the simple consciousness, which is or at least may be contained in all thinking, although it is so far a simple representation, can lead me to the consciousness and the knowledge of a thing in which thinking alone can be contained. For, if I represent to myself the force of my body in motion, it is thus, so far as to me, absolute unity, and my representation of it is simple—hence can I also represent this by means of the motion of a point, because the volume in this case makes no difference, and can be thought without diminution of the force, however small we like, and therefore also, as existing in a point. But from this, still shall not I conclude; that, provided nothing but the moving force of a body is given, the body can be thought as simple substance, for this reason, that its representation is abstracted from all quantity of the content of space, and it is therefore simple. Now from the circumstance, that the simple in the abstraction is quite different from the simple in the object, and that the I, which, in the first sense, contains no diversity at all in itself,—in the second, where it signifies the point itself (*the soul*), may be a very complex conception, namely, for containing and indicating very much in itself; I discover a paralogism. But in order previously to conjecture it, (for without such a preliminary conjecture we should never entertain any suspicion against this proof), it is absolutely necessary to have always at hand, an immanent criterium of the possibility of such synthetical propositions, which are to prove more than experience can give, which criterium consists in this; that the proof is not led directly to the desired predicate, but only by means of a principle of possibility to extend our given conception *a priori* to ideas, and to realize them. If this

caution were always used, if, still, before the proof were sought, we previously took counsel within ourselves judiciously, how, and with what ground of hope, we might indeed expect such an extension, by means of pure reason, and whence, in like cases, we should therefore deduce these views, which cannot be developed from conceptions, and likewise cannot be anticipated in reference to possible experience; we should then spare ourselves many laborious and yet fruitless efforts, whilst we do not exact of reason any thing which evidently exceeds its power, or, rather, we subject it, which, in the paroxysms of its speculative desire for extension is not easily moderated, to the discipline of moderation.

The first rule is, therefore, this, to seek no transcendental proofs without having previously reflected, and therefore justified to oneself, whence we will deduce the principles, whereupon we think of establishing them, and with what right we may expect from them, the right issue of conclusions. Are they principles of the understanding (for example, of causality), it is then in vain, by their means, to attain to ideas of pure reason, for they are valid only for objects of possible experience. Should they be principles from pure reason, so again all labour is in vain. For reason possesses such, certainly, but as objective principles they are all dialectical, and can in any case only be valid as regulative principles of the systematical connected experience-use. But, if such pretended proofs already exist, oppose then to the deceitful conviction, the non liquet of your mature judgment, and although you cannot penetrate the illusion of them, still you have then full right to require the deduction of the therein employed principles, which deduction, provided such are to arise from pure reason, can never be procured for you. And thus you are not ever required, to concern yourself with the development and opposition of every groundless appearance, but you may at once send in a



mass all Dialectick, inexhaustible as it is in artifices, before the tribunal of critical reason, which requires laws.

The second particularity of transcendental proofs is this, that for each transcendental proposition, only a single proof can be found. If I am not to conclude from conceptions, but from intuition which corresponds to a conception, whether a pure intuition as in mathematics, or an empirical as in natural philosophy, the intuition laid at the foundation thus gives me diverse matter for synthetical propositions, which matter I can connect in more than one manner, and as I may set out from more than one point, I can arrive by different ways, at the same proposition.

But, now, each transcendental proposition emanates from one conception, and supposes the synthetical condition of the possibility of the object according to this conception. The argument can therefore only be a single one, since besides this conception there is nothing further, whereby the object could be determined; the proof, therefore, cannot contain any thing further than the determination of an object in general according to this conception, which likewise is only a single one. We had deduced, for example, in the transcendental Analytick, the principle, "every thing which happens has a cause," from the single condition of the objective possibility of a conception of that which happens in general, and, that the determination of an event in time, consequently, this (event) as belonging to experience without being subject to such a dynamic rule, would be impossible. Now, ~~this~~ likewise is the only possible argument; for merely by this, that an object is determined for the conception by means of the law of causality, the represented event has objective validity, that is, truth. Other proofs have certainly been sought, besides, of this principle, for example, from contingency, but if this is considered more clearly, we cannot discover any

knowledge of contingency, but *the thing happened*, that is, existence, before which a non-existence of the object precedes, and therefore it always comes back again to the same argument. If the proposition is to be proved, "Every thing which thinks is simple," we must not then stop at the diversity of the thought, but permanently remain, simply, at the conception of the I, which is simple, and to which all thought is referred. It is just the same thing with the transcendental proof of the existence of God, which only rests upon the reciprocability of the conceptions of the most real and necessary being, and can be sought for no where besides.

By means of this warning observation, the Critick of the assertions of reason is very much reduced. Where reason exercises its calling, by means of mere conceptions, there is only a single proof possible, if any one at all is possible. Consequently, if we see the dogmatist already advance with ten proofs, then may we assuredly believe, that he has none at all. For had he one, which (as in matters of pure reason must be the case) proved apodictically, for what purpose would he require the remainder? His object is only like that of the parliamentary advocate—one argument is for one person, another for another, namely, to render useful to himself the weakness of his judges, who, without going deep into the matter, and in order to be soon rid of the business, lay hold of just the first which strikes them, and decide accordingly.

The third rule peculiar to pure reason, when in respect of transcendental proofs it is subjected to a discipline, is, that its proof must be never *apagogical* but always *ostensive*. The direct or ostensive proof is in all kinds of cognition, that, which, with the conviction of the truth, unites at the same time insight into the sources of the same—the apagogical on the contrary, may indeed produce certainty, but not comprehensibleness of the truth, in respect of the connexion

with the grounds of its possibility. Hence, the latter (*the apogogical*) are rather an aid, than a procedure which satisfies all the views of reason. Still these have a preference of evidence over the direct proofs, from this cause, that the contradiction carries along with it at all times more clearness in the representation, than the best conjunction, and thereby more approximates itself to the intuitiveness of a demonstration.

The precise cause of the use of apogogical proofs in different sciences is certainly this. If the grounds from which a certain cognition is to be deduced, lie too diversely or too deeply concealed, we then seek whether it is not to be attained through consequences. Now, if the *modus ponens*, for concluding as to the truth of a cognition from the truth of its consequences, were only then allowed, in case all possible consequences from it are true; in that case only a single ground is possible for this, and which, consequently, is the true one. But this mode of proceeding is unfeasible, since it surpasses our powers to see all possible consequences from any admitted proposition: still we make use of this mode of concluding, although certainly under a certain indulgence, when the question is for the purpose of showing something merely as hypothesis, whilst we allow the conclusion according to analogy—that, in case as many consequences as we have ever investigated, truly coincide with an admitted cause, all the remaining possible ones will also coincide with it. On such account through this mode, an hypothesis can never be converted into demonstrated truth. The *modus tollens* of syllogisms, which conclude from consequences to causes, proves not only quite convincingly, but likewise very easily. For, if even only one single false consequence can be deduced from a proposition, then this proposition is false. Now, instead of running through the whole series of reasons in an ostensive proof, which may lead to the truth of a cognition, by means of the perfect insight into its

possibility, we need only find a single false one, amidst the consequences flowing from the contrary thereof—this contrary is then likewise false—consequently, the cognition which had to be proved, true.

But the apogogical mode of proof can only be permitted in those sciences, where it is impossible to substitute the subjective of our representations for the objective, namely, the cognition of that which is in the object. But where this last is predominant, then it must frequently happen, that the contrary of a certain proposition either contradicts merely the subjective conditions of the thought but not the object, or that both propositions, only under a subjective condition, which is erroneously held to be objective, contradict one another; and as the condition is false, both may be false, without that from the falsehood of the one, it can be concluded as to the truth of the other.

In mathematics, this subreption is impossible, consequently they (*the proofs*) have there their proper place. In physics, since every thing therein is founded upon empirical intuitions, the illusion spoken of may certainly be guarded against for the most part, by means of several compared observations, but this kind of proof is still, in this case, commonly, of no value. But the transcendental investigations of pure reason are all disposed within the proper medium of the dialectical appearance, that is, of what is subjective, which presents itself to, or, in fact, presses itself upon reason in its premises, as objective. Now, here, as to what concerns synthetical propositions, it cannot at all be permitted to justify our assertions from this cause, that we set up in opposition, the contrary. For, either this opposition is nothing else, but the mere representation of the combat of the opposite opinion, with the subjective conditions of comprehensibleness through our reason, which certainly does nothing as to this, in rejecting on this account the thing itself, (as, for example, the unconditioned necessity in the

existence of a being cannot absolutely be comprehended by us, and consequently, with propriety opposes itself *subjectively* to every speculative proof of a necessary supreme Being, but improperly to the possibility of such an original being *in itself*;) or both parties, the affirming equally with the negating, deceived by the transcendental appearance, lay at the foundation an impossible conception of the object, and then the rule holds, *non entis nulla sunt prædicata*, that is, that which we maintain affirmatively, and that which we maintain negatively, as to the object, are both equally incorrect, and we cannot attain apagogically to the cognition of the truth, by means of the refutation of the contrary. Thus, for example, if it be presupposed that the sensible world *in itself* is given according to its totality, it is then false, that it is *either* infinite according to space, or must be finite and *limited*; for this reason, that both are false. For phenomena, (as mere representations), which would be given *in themselves* (as objects), are something impossible, and the infinity of this imagined whole would certainly be unconditioned, but contradicts (since every thing in phenomena is conditioned) the unconditioned determination of magnitude, which nevertheless is presupposed in the conception.

The apagogical argument is, moreover, the particular illusion, whereby the admirers of the solidity of our dogmatical sophisters have at all times been amused:—it is, as it were, the champion who will prove the honour and undoubted right of his adopted party from this, that he engages to fight with any one who is disposed to doubt it, although by such boasting nothing is decided as to the point, except merely as to the respective strength of the antagonists, and, in fact, even only on the part of him, who sets himself on the offensive. The spectators, in seeing that each in his turn, is at one time victor, and at another vanquished, frequently hence take occasion, sceptically to doubt

as to the object itself of the contest. But they have no cause for this, and it is sufficient to remind them : *non defensoribus istis tempus eget*. Every one must establish his cause by means of a proof derived through transcendental deduction of arguments, that is, directly; in order that we may see, what his reason-pretensions have to adduce for themselves. For, if his opponent relies upon subjective grounds, it is then very easily to be refuted, but without advantage to the dogmatist, who commonly just in the same way depends upon the subjective causes of judgment, and in like manner may be pushed into a corner by his opponent. But, if both parties act merely directly, they will, then, of themselves, either remark the difficulty, nay the impossibility of discovering the title to their assertions, and finally can only appeal to prescription—or Critick will readily discover the dogmatical appearance, and necessitate pure reason, to surrender its pretensions carried too far in the speculative use, and to retire within the limit of its peculiar territory, namely, practical principles.

## TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.

### SECOND DIVISION.

#### THE CANON OF PURE REASON.

It is humiliating to human reason, that it executes nothing in its pure use, and moreover even stands in need of a discipline, in order to restrain its extravagancies, and to guard against the illusions which thence result to it. But, again, on the other hand, it again elevates it and gives to it a confidence in itself, that it can and must exercise even this discipline

without admitting another censure over itself, whilst the bounds which it is compelled to set to its speculative use, limit at the same time the sophistical pretensions of every adversary ; and consequently, every thing which still might remain over to it, from its previously exaggerated requirements, may be fixed securely against all attacks. The greatest and perhaps only use of all philosophy of pure reason is, therefore, in fact, merely negative ; as, for instance, it does not serve as *Organon* for the extension, but as *Discipline* for the determination of limits, and instead of discovering truth, it has only the silent merit of guarding against error.

Still, however, there must be somewhere a source of positive cognitions that belong to the domain of pure reason, and which perhaps only give occasion to errors from a misunderstanding, yet in fact constitute the object of the effort of reason. For, to what cause else should in fact be ascribed the inextinguishable desire of fixing a firm footing somewhere, absolutely out beyond the limits of experience ? It (*reason*) conjectures objects, which carry along with them a great interest for itself. It treads the way of pure speculation in order to approach nearer to these objects, but they fly before it. Better success, probably, is to be hoped for it, in the only way which still remains open to it, namely, that of the *practical* use.

I understand under a Canon, the complex of principles *à priori* of the legitimate use of certain faculties of cognition in general. Thus, general logic in its analytical part is a canon for the understanding and reason in general, but only according to the form, for it makes abstraction of all content. Thus, the transcendental analytick was the canon of the pure *understanding*, for this is alone capable of true synthetic cognition *à priori*. But, where no legitimate use of a faculty of cognition is possible, there is no canon. Now, all synthetical cognition of pure reason

in its speculative use, according to all the hitherto adduced proofs, is wholly impossible. Consequently, there is no canon at all of the speculative use of it, (for this is wholly dialectical), but all transcendental logic is in this respect nothing but discipline, consequently, if there is a perfectly legitimate use of pure reason—and in which case there must be a canon of the same—this canon will thus not concern the speculative, but the *practical use of reason*; which we will therefore now investigate.

## THE CANON OF PURE REASON.

### FIRST SECTION.

#### OF THE ULTIMATE END OF THE PURE USE OF OUR REASON.

Reason is urged, by an impulse of its nature, to issue out beyond experience-use, and to venture itself in a pure use, and by means of mere ideas, up to the extremest limits of all cognitions, and for the first time to find rest, only in a systematic whole subsisting of itself. Is this effort, then, founded merely upon its speculative, or rather, singly and alone, upon its practical interest?

I will now set aside the success which pure reason has in a speculative view, and only inquire as to those questions, the solution of which constitutes its ultimate end; whether it ever does or does not attain this, and in respect of which end, all other have merely value as means. These ultimate ends, according to the nature of reason, will necessarily again have unity, in order unitedly to favour that interest of humanity, which is subjected to no higher one.

The final end, wherein the speculation of reason lastly terminates in the transcendental use, concerns



three objects ;—the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. In regard of all three, the mere speculative interest of reason is only small ; and in respect thereof, a tiresome labour and one contending with unceasing obstacles of transcendental investigation, would certainly hardly be undertaken, since as to all the discoveries which might thereupon be to be effected, we can still make no use, which shows its utility in concreto, that is, in physics. The arbitrament may even be free, yet this nevertheless can only concern the intelligible cause of our will. For, as to what concerns the phenomena of the manifestations of the same, that is, actions, we must thus, according to an inviolable fundamental maxim, without which we can exercise no reason in the empirical use, never explain such, otherwise than the rest of the phenomena of nature, namely, according to its unchangeable laws. If, in the second place, the spiritual nature of the soul (and with this its immortality) may be perceived, still from this, no account yet can be given, either in respect of the phenomena of this life, as a ground of explanation, or as to the particular property of a future state, inasmuch as our conception of a corporeal nature is merely negative, and does not augment in the least our cognition, nor afford any suitable material for consequences, except perhaps for such, as can only be valid as fictions, but which cannot be acknowledged by philosophy. If, in the third place, the existence of a supreme Intelligence were also proved, we should then certainly render thence comprehensible to ourselves, the conformableness to ends in the arrangement of the world, and the order in the whole, but we should by no means be authorized to derive from this, any particular arrangement and order, or, where it is not perceived, thereupon boldly to conclude it, because it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason, not to pass by natural causes, and to

give up that, as to which we can inform ourselves by experience, in order to derive something which we know, from that which wholly surpasses all our knowledge. In a word, these three propositions remain always transcendent for speculative reason, and have no immanent use at all, that is, allowable for objects of experience, and, therefore, in some way useful to us ; but they are considered in themselves entirely useless efforts, and still therewith extremely difficult ones of our reason.

If, then, these three cardinal propositions be not at all necessary for *knowledge*, and yet are recommended to us stringently through our reason, their importance thus will necessarily only belong properly to what is *practical*.

Practical is every thing which is possible by means of liberty. But if the conditions of the exercise of our free will are empirical, reason then in this can have none other than regulative use, and only serve to operate the unity of empirical laws, as, for example, in the doctrine of prudence, the unity of all ends, which are given to us by our inclinations in the single one, *happiness*, and the agreement of the means in order to attain to it, constitutes the whole business of reason, which on this account can afford none other than *pragmatical* laws of free action for the obtaining of the ends recommended to us by the senses, and, consequently, no pure laws, fully determined *à priori*. On the other hand, pure practical laws, whose end is fully given *à priori* by means of reason, and which do not command empirically conditioned, but absolutely, would be products of pure reason. But such the *moral* laws are, consequently these belong alone to the practical use of pure reason, and allow of a canon.

The whole accoutrement therefore of reason, in the elaboration which we may term pure philosophy, is in fact only directed to the three mentioned problems.

But these themselves have again their more remote object, namely, *what is to be done*, provided the will be free, and provided there is a God, and a future world. Now, as this concerns our conduct in reference to the highest end, so is the ultimate object of a nature providing wisely for us in the system of our reason, strictly directed to what is moral.

But much precaution is required, in order, as we direct our attention to an object which is foreign to transcendental philosophy,\* not to digress into episodes, and to violate the unity of the system; and, on the other hand, in saying too little as to our new matter, not to let it be wanting in clearness or convincingness. I hope to effect both, by this, that I keep myself as near as possible to the transcendental, and put wholly aside, that which perhaps in this might be psychological, that is to say, empirical.

And it is then, first, to be remarked, that I shall make use, at present, of the conception of liberty only in the practical sense, and I shall set aside here, as being already decided, that in transcendental signification, which cannot be supposed empirically as a ground of explanation of phenomena, but is itself a problem for reason. An arbitrament, namely, is merely *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*), that cannot be determined otherwise than by means of sensible impulses, that is, *pathologically*. But that arbitrament which can be determined independently of sensible impulses, consequently through causal motives, which are only represented by reason, is called free arbitrament (*arbitrium liberum*), and every thing which is connected with this, whether as cause or consequence, is termed *practical*. Practical liberty

\* All practical conceptions refer to objects of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, that is, of pleasure or pain—consequently at least indirectly, to objects of our feeling. But, as this is no representation faculty of things, but lies out of the whole faculty of cognition, the elements of our judgments belong, so far as they refer to pleasure or pain, consequently to practical, not to the complex of transcendental philosophy, which has only to do with pure cognitions *a priori*.

can be proved by experience. For, not only that which attracts, that is, affects the senses immediately, determines the human arbitrament, but we have a faculty by means of representations of that which even in a remoter way is advantageous or prejudicial, for subduing the impressions upon our sensible appetitive faculties ; but these reflections as to that, which in respect of our whole state, is desirable, that is, is good or useful, repose upon reason. This reason also therefore prescribes laws which are Imperatives, that is, are objective *laws of liberty*, and which state what ought *to happen*, although perhaps it never does happen, and distinguish themselves in this respect from the *laws of nature*, which only treat of that which *happens*, and on account of which they are termed practical laws.

But whether reason itself in these actions, whereby it prescribes laws, is not again determined by other influences, and that, which in respect of sensible impulses is called liberty, may, in regard of higher and more remote effective causes, not again be nature, this does not concern us, in what is practical, inasmuch as we only immediately ask of reason for a *prescript* for conduct ; but it is a mere speculative question, which we, so long as our object is directed to what is to be done and what left undone, may set aside. We cognize therefore practical liberty by means of experience, as one of the natural causes, namely, a causality of reason in respect of the will, whilst transcendental liberty requires an independency of this reason itself (in respect of its causality for beginning a series of phenomena), from all determinating causes of the sensible world, and so far it seems to be contrary to the laws of nature—consequently to all possible experience—and therefore remains a problem. But to reason in its practical use, this problem does not at all appertain, and we have therefore only to do with two questions in a canon of pure reason

which concern the practical interest of pure reason, and in respect of which a canon of its use must be possible, namely—is there a God?—is there a future life? The question as to transcendental liberty concerns only speculative knowledge, which we may set aside as quite indifferent, when we have to do with what is practical, and as to which already sufficient explanation is to be found in the antinomy of pure reason.

## THE CANON OF PURE REASON.

### *SECOND SECTION.*

#### OF THE IDEAL OF THE HIGHEST GOOD AS A GROUND OF DETERMINATION OF THE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON..

Reason led us in its speculative use through the field of experiences, and, as complete satisfaction was never to be met with there, in respect to it, it led us from thence to speculative ideas, but which finally led us back again to experience, and therefore completed its object certainly in a very useful manner, but not in one conformable to our expectation. Now there yet remains open to us another attempt; that is to say, whether pure reason is to be met with also in practical use—whether in this it tends to ideas that reach the highest ends of pure reason, which we have before indicated, and whether this reason therefore cannot procure to us, from the point of view of its practical interest, what it denies wholly in respect of the speculative.

All interest of my reason (the speculative equally with the practical) is united in the three following points:—

1. *What can I know?*
2. *What ought I do?*
3. *What may I hope?*

The first question is merely speculative. We have, (as I flatter myself,) exhausted all possible answers in respect of it, and finally found that, with which certainly reason must satisfy itself, and if it does not look to the practical, has cause too to be content; but from the two great ends, whereunto this whole effect of pure reason was strictly directed, we remain just as far removed, as if we had refused the task for convenience-sake immediately at the outset. If, therefore, the question is as to knowing, it is, at least, so far sure and decided, that this, in regard of the two problems in question, can never be our lot.

The second question is merely practical. As such it certainly can belong to pure reason, but then it is still not transcendental, but moral, consequently it cannot in itself occupy our Critick.

The third question, namely: now provided I do what I ought, what may I then expect? is practical and theoretical at the same time, so that the practical, only as a clue, leads to the answer of the theoretical, and, if this ascends high, the speculative question. For all *hoping* leads to happiness, and is in respect of what is practical and the law of morality, precisely the same as knowing and the law of nature in respect of the theoretical cognition of things. The first (*hoping*) terminates finally in the conclusion, that something is, (which determines the ultimate possible end); *because something should happen*: the latter (*knowing*), that something is (which acts as supreme cause), *because something happens*.

Happiness is the satisfaction of all our inclinations (as well, extensive, according to the diversity of the same, as, intensive, according to degree, and likewise, protensive, according to duration). The practical law from the motive of *happiness*, I name pragmatik (rule

of prudence); but, that, in case there is such a one, which has no motive other than the *merit of being happy*, moral (law of morality). The first counsels what is to be done, if we wish to participate in happiness, the second prescribes how we are to conduct ourselves, in order only to be worthy of happiness. The first is grounded upon empirical principles, for, otherwise than by experience, I can neither know what inclinations there are, which desire to be satisfied, nor what the natural causes are, which can effect their satisfaction. The second makes abstraction of inclinations and natural means for satisfying them, and considers only the liberty of a reasonable being in general, and the necessary conditions, by which alone this liberty accords with the distribution of happiness agreeably to principles, and may therefore repose at least upon mere ideas of pure reason, and be cognized *à priori*.

I admit that there are really pure moral laws, which determine wholly *à priori* (without reference to empirical motives, that is to say, happiness) the general demeanour, that is, the use of the liberty of a reasonable being in general, and that these laws command *absolutely* (not merely hypothetically, under presupposition of other empirical ends), and therefore are in all respects, necessary. I may presuppose with justice this proposition, not only in appealing to the proofs of the most enlightened moralists, but to the moral judgment of every man, provided he will think clearly as to such a law.

Pure reason contains, therefore, not certainly in its speculative use, but nevertheless in a certain practical, that is to say, moral one, principles of the *possibility of experience*, namely, of such actions, as *could* be met with in the *history* of humanity agreeably to moral precepts. For, as this reason prescribes, that such ought to take place, they must thus also be able to take place, and there must therefore be a particular

kind of systematic unity possible, namely, the moral one, since the systematic unity of nature, according to *speculative principles* of reason could not be shown, inasmuch as reason has causality certainly in respect of liberty in general, but not in respect of the whole of nature; and moral principles of reason may certainly produce free actions, but not laws of nature. Hence, the principles of pure reason have objective reality in its practical, but especially in its moral use.

I term the world, so far as it is conformable to all moral laws (as, then, it may be, according to the *liberty* of reasonable beings, and, as it ought to be, according to the necessary laws of morality) a *moral world*. This is conceived so far merely as intelligible world, since therein abstraction is made of all conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality in the same, (the weakness or corruption of human nature). It is therefore so far, a mere but still practical idea, which can and ought to have really its influence upon the sensible world, in order to render it, so far as possible conformable to this idea. The idea of a moral world has therefore objective reality, not as if it referred to an object of an intelligible intuition, (such we cannot even at all think), but to the sensible world, though as an object of pure reason in its practical use, and, a corpus mysticum of reasonable beings therein, so far as the free arbitrament of these under moral laws, has in itself absolute systematic unity equally with itself, as with the liberty of every other person.

This was the answer to the first of those two questions of pure reason which regard the practical interest: *Do that whereby thou wilt become worthy of being happy*. Now the second question enquires—how, if I so conduct myself, that I am not unworthy of happiness, may I hope also to be able thereby to be a participator in it? The point is, in respect of



the answer to this, whether the principles of pure reason, which prescribe *à priori* the law, likewise necessarily therewith connect this hope.

I say, therefore ; that precisely in the same way as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in its *practical* use, it is equally necessary also to assume, according to reason, in its *theoretical* use, that every one has cause to hope for happiness in the same proportion that he has rendered himself worthy thereof by his conduct, and that, therefore, the system of morality is inseparably conjoined with that of happiness, but only in the idea of pure reason.

Now, if in an intelligible, that is to say, moral world, in whose conception we make abstraction of all the obstacles of morality (inclinations), such a system of happiness proportionally conjoined with morality may be also thought as necessary, because liberty, partly stimulated, partly restrained, by moral laws, would itself be the cause of general happiness, the reasonable beings therefore themselves under the guidance of such principles, would be the authors of their own lasting welfare, and, at the same time, of that of others. But this system of a morality rewarding itself is only an idea, the execution of which rests upon the condition, that every one does what he ought, that is, all actions of reasonable beings so occur, as if they had sprung from a supreme arbitrament, which comprehends in itself, or under it, all private wills. But, as the obligation from the moral law remains valid for every one's particular use of liberty, although others do not conduct themselves conformably to this law, it is thus neither determined from the nature of the things of the world, nor the causality of actions themselves and their relationship to morality, in what way they will refer their consequences to happiness—and the adduced necessary conjunction of the hope of being happy, with the indefatigable endeavour to render oneself worthy of happiness, cannot be cog-

nized through reason, if we lay merely nature at the foundation, but can only be hoped for, provided a *supreme reason*, which commands according to moral laws, is at the same time laid at the foundation, as cause of nature.

I term, *the Ideal of sovereign good* the idea of such an intelligence, wherein the morally most perfect will, conjoined with the greatest beatitude, is the cause of all happiness in the world, so far as this stands in exact relationship with morality (as the worthiness of being happy). Pure reason, therefore, can only find, in the ideal of the highest *original* good, the foundation of the practical necessary connexion of both elements of the highest derived good, namely, of an intelligible, that is, *moral* world. Now, as necessarily by means of reason, we must represent ourselves as belonging to such a world, although the senses only exhibit to us nothing but a world of phenomena, we must thus admit, that first world as a consequence of our conduct in the sensible world, since the latter does not offer to us such a connexion, as a future world in respect to ourselves. God and a future life, therefore, are two inseparable presuppositions, of the obligation that pure reason imposes upon us, according to the principles of the self-same reason.

Morality in itself constitutes a system, but not happiness, except so far as such is distributed exactly adapted to virtue. But this is only possible in the intelligible world, under a wise author and ruler. Reason sees itself compelled to accept such a one, together with life in such a world, which we must look upon as a future one, or to look at the moral laws as mere chimeras, since their necessary consequence, which the same reason connects with them, must, without the presupposition in question, fall away. Hence, also, each man regards the moral laws as *commands*, but which they could not be, if they did not connect *à priori* consequences adapted to their rules,

and, therefore, carried along with them *promises* and *menaces*. But this also they could not do, if they did not lie in a necessary Being as the supreme Good, which can alone render such a unity conformable to its end possible.

*Leibnitz* termed the world, so far as therein we look only to reasonable beings, and their connexion according to moral laws, under the government of the highest good, the *kingdom of grace*, and distinguished it from the *kingdom of nature*, where these beings certainly are subjected to moral laws, but do not expect any other consequence of their conduct, than according to the course of nature of our sensible world. To see oneself, therefore, in the kingdom of grace, where all happiness waits upon us, except so far as we ourselves do limit our share in the same, by the unworthiness of being happy, is a practical necessary idea of reason.

Practical laws, so far as they are at the same time subjective grounds of actions, that is, subjective principles, are termed *maxims*. The *judgment* of morality, according to its purity and consequences, occurs according to *ideas*; the *observance* of its laws, according to *maxims*.

It is necessary that our whole course of life should be subject to moral maxims, but it is at the same time impossible that this occur, if reason does not connect with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an effective cause, which determines to the conduct according to this law, whether in this or another life, a result precisely corresponding to our highest ends. Without, therefore, a God, and a world not now visible to us, but hoped for, the sublime ideas of morality are certainly objects of approbation and astonishment, but not motives of premeditation and execution, since they do not fulfil the whole end which is natural to every reasonable being, and is determined *à priori* and is necessary, through the very same pure reason.

Happiness alone is as to our reason far from being the perfect good. Reason does not approve such (however greatly still inclination might wish it), provided it is not united with the worthiness of being happy, that is, moral good conduct. Morality alone, and with it the mere *worthiness* of being happy, is likewise still far from being the sovereign good. In order to complete this, he who has not conducted himself as unworthy of happiness, must be enabled to hope to be a participator in it. Even reason, free from all private end, if, without thereby considering its own interest, it set itself in the place of a Being who has distributed all happiness to others, cannot judge otherwise; for in the practical idea both points are essentially conjoined, although in such a manner, that the moral sentiment, as condition, first renders possible the participation in felicity, and not conversely, the prospect of felicity the moral sentiment. For in the last case, it would not be moral, and, therefore, likewise, not worthy of all happiness which cognizes in the face of reason no other limitation, but that which is derived from our own immoral conduct.

Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of reasonable beings, whereby they are worthy of the same, alone constitutes the supreme good of a world, in which we must absolutely place ourselves according to the orders of pure but practical reason, and which decidedly is only an intelligible world, inasmuch as the sensible world does not promise us, from the nature of things, the like systematic unity of ends, and the reality of which cannot be grounded upon any thing else but upon the presupposition of a supreme original good, from self-subsisting reason, provided with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and completes according to the most perfect finality, the general order of things, although deeply concealed from us in the sensible world.

Now, this moral theology has a peculiar advantage over the speculative, that it leads infallibly to the conception of a single *all most perfect and reasonable* First Being, whereunto speculative theology never *directs* us from objective grounds, and much less could be able to *convince* us of the same. For we do not find either in transcendental or natural theology, howsoever far reason therein may lead us, any sufficient motive for admitting a single being only that we presuppose for all natural causes, and upon which we had at the same time sufficient cause for making these in all respects dependent. On the contrary, if we consider from the point of view of moral unity, as a necessary law of the world, the cause which alone can give to this the conformable effect, and consequently, as to ourselves, constraining force, it must then be a single supreme Will that comprehends within itself all these laws. For, how would we find under different wills perfect unity of ends? This will must be omnipotent, so that all nature and its reference to morality in the world may be subjected to it—omniscient, so that it may cognize the internal of sentiments and their moral worth—omnipresent, so that it may be ready immediately for all the necessities which supreme cosmical optimism demands—eternal, so that at no time this harmony of nature and liberty be wanting, &c.

But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences—which world, though as mere nature it only can be termed sensible world, yet as a system of liberty, intelligible, that is, moral world (*regnum gratiæ*), tends also inevitably to the unity conformable to its end of all things, which constitute this great whole according to the general laws of nature, in the same way as the former according to general and necessary laws of morality, and it unites practical reason with speculative. The world must be represented as having arisen from one idea, if it is to coincide with that use of reason, without which we should esteem

ourselves even unworthy of reason, namely, the moral one, which reposes absolutely upon the idea of the supreme Good. All investigation into nature thereby receives a direction according to the form of a system of ends, and becomes, in its greatest developement Physico-theology. But this, as it commences, nevertheless, from moral order, as a unity founded in the essence of liberty, and not accidentally established through external directions, reduces the finality of nature to reasons, which must be *à priori* connected inseparably with the internal possibility of things, and thereby to a transcendental *theology*, which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection for a principle of systematic unity, and which ideal connects all things according to general and necessary laws of nature, whilst they all have their origin in the absolute necessity of a single original Being.

What *use* can we ever make of our understanding in respect of experience, if we did not propose to ourselves ends? But the highest ends are those of morality, and these pure reason, only, can give us to know. Now supplied with these and under the guidance thereof, we can make of the knowledge of nature itself no use conformable to its end in respect of cognition, where nature has not itself laid down unity conformable to its end; for without this, we should have had even no reason itself, inasmuch as we should have had no instruction for it, and no cultivation through objects, which would afford matter for such conceptions. But the systematic unity in question is necessary, and founded in the essence of the will itself; therefore this will, which contains the condition of the application thereof in concreto, must likewise be so; and thus the transcendental gradation of our cognition of reason would not be the cause, but merely the effect of the practical finality which pure reason imposes upon us.

And we therefore find in the history of human

reason—that, before the moral conceptions were sufficiently purified, determined, and the systematic unity of ends seen according to them, and in fact from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a considerable degree of the cultivation of reason for many other sciences, could only produce, partly rude and vague conceptions of the Divinity, and partly left a surprising indifference with regard to this question. A greater elaboration of moral ideas which would be made necessary by means of the extremely pure moral law of our religion, sharpened reason as to the object, by means of the interest which it was necessitated to take as to the same, and without either extended cognitions of nature, or correct and certain transcendental knowledge, contributing to this, (the like have been wanting in all ages), such ideas effected a conception of the divine essence, which we now hold to be the correct one, not because speculative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it perfectly coincides with the moral principles of reason. And thus in the end always, pure reason only, though merely in its practical use, has the merit of connecting with our highest interest, a cognition which mere speculation can only imagine but not render valid; and thereby making it, not certainly into a demonstrated dogma, but yet into an absolutely necessary presupposition, as to its most essential ends.

But if practical reason have now attained this high point, namely, the conception of a sole original Being as the highest Good, yet must it not attempt in any way, as if it had raised itself beyond all empirical conditions of its application, and had soared to the immediate knowledge of new objects, to start from this conception, and to deduce the moral laws themselves from it. For these would be precisely that, the *intrinsic* practical necessity of which led us to the presupposition of a self-subsisting Cause, or of a wise Governor of the world, in order to

give effect to those laws, and consequently we cannot regard them according to this effect again as contingent and derived from mere will, especially from such a will in regard to which we should have no conception at all, provided we had not imagined it according to such laws. So far as practical reason has the right to lead us, we shall not hold our actions for obligatory on this account, that they are commands of God, but we shall look at them on this account as the divine commands, because we are obligated thereto internally. We shall study liberty under the unity conformable to its end, according to the principles of reason, and only so far believe to be conformable to the divine Will, as we keep the moral law sacred which reason teaches from the nature of the actions themselves, and thereby believe to serve this will alone, because we promote well-being in ourselves and in others. Moral theology is therefore only of immanent use, namely, to fulfil our destiny here in the world, in harmonizing with the system of all ends—and not fanatically, or in fact, ever wickedly abandoning the clue of a moral legislative reason in the right conduct of life, for the purpose of connecting this immediately with the idea of the supreme Being, which would give a transcendental use, but which, precisely in the same way as that of mere speculation, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.

## CANON OF PURE REASON.

### *THIRD SECTION.*

#### OF OPINING, KNOWING, AND BELIEVING.

The Holding to be true is an event in our reason which may repose upon objective grounds, but requires also subjective causes in the mind of him



who then judges. If it be valid for every one, so far as it has only reason, the ground thereof is then objectively sufficient, and the holding of a thing for true is then termed *conviction*. If it have only its foundation in the particular quality of the subject, it is then termed *persuasion*.

Persuasion is a mere appearance, since the ground of the judgment that lies in the subject only, is held to be objective. Consequently, such a judgment has also only private (*individual*) validity, and the holding of a thing for true, cannot be imparted. But Truth reposes upon the accordance with the object, in respect of which, consequently, the judgments of every understanding must be accordant (*consentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter se*). The touchstone of the holding a thing for true, whether it be conviction or merely persuasion, is, therefore, externally, the possibility of imparting it, and of finding this holding for true, valid for the reason of every man; for then it is at least a presumption that the ground of the accordance of all judgments, notwithstanding the difference of subjects with one another, will repose upon the common foundation, namely, the object, with which they consequently will all accord, and thereby show the truth of the judgment.

Hence persuasion cannot certainly be distinguished subjectively from conviction, if the subject have before its eyes the holding for true merely as phenomenon of its own mind: but the experiment which we make with the grounds of this, which are valid for us, as to another understanding, whether they operate the self same effect, upon this other reason as upon ours, is nevertheless a means, although only a subjective one, not assuredly for operating conviction, but nevertheless for disclosing the merely private validity of the judgment, that is to say, something in it, which is mere persuasion.

If, moreover, we can develope the subjective *causes*

of the judgment, which we take for its objective *grounds*, and consequently explain the deceptive holding for true, as an event in our mind, without having need for this of the quality of the object, we thus expose the appearance, and are thereby no longer deceived, although we still are always in a certain degree cajoled, if the subjective cause of the appearance belong to our nature.

I can *maintain* nothing, that is, declare as a necessarily valid judgment for every man, except what produces conviction. Persuasion I can retain for myself, if I am content with it, but I cannot, and ought not wish to make it valid out of me.

The holding for true, or the subjective validity of the judgment, in reference to conviction (which at the same time is valid objectively) has the three following degrees: *Opining*, *Believing* and *Knowing*. *Opining* is with consciousness an insufficient holding for true, subjectively *equally* as objectively. If this last (*opining*) is only sufficient subjectively, and is at the same time held to be insufficient objectively, it is then termed *Believing*. Lastly, the sufficient holding for true subjectively, equally as well as objectively, is termed *Knowledge*. The subjective sufficiency is termed *conviction*, (as to myself,) the objective *certainty*, (as to every one.) I shall not stop for the explanation of such comprehensible conceptions.

I must never venture to *opine*, without at least *knowing* something, by means of which the merely problematical judgment in itself, receives a connexion with truth, which connexion, although not complete, is still more than arbitrary fiction. The law, moreover, of such a connexion must be certain. For if I in respect of the law have also nothing but opinion, then every thing is only a play of the imagination, without the least reference to truth. In judgments from pure reason, it is not at all permitted to *opine*. For since they are not supported upon reasons of

experience, but every thing is to be cognized *à priori*, where every thing is necessary, the principle of connexion thus requires universality and necessity—consequently entire certainty—as otherwise no guide at all to truth is met with. It is therefore absurd to opine in pure mathematics; we must know or abstain from all judgment. The case is just the same with the principles of morality, as we must not hazard an action upon the mere opinion that something is permitted, but we must know it.

In the transcendental use of reason, on the other hand, to opine is certainly too little, but to know is likewise too much. With mere speculative intention we cannot, therefore, at all judge in this case, since subjective grounds of holding for true, such as those which can effect belief, deserve no approbation in speculative questions, because they do not hold themselves free of all empirical assistance, nor are imparted to others in equal measure.

But the theoretical insufficient holding for true can be termed generally belief merely in *practical reference*. Now this practical intention, is either that of *ability* or of *morality*, the first for arbitrary and contingent ends, but the second for those absolutely necessary.

If once an end be proposed, the conditions for the attainment of the same are thus hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjective, but still only comparatively sufficient, if I know no other conditions at all, by which the end was to be attained; but it is absolute and sufficient for every one, if I know certainly that no one can be acquainted with other conditions that lead to the proposed end. In the first case, my presupposition and the holding for true of certain conditions, is mere contingent belief, but in the second case, a necessary one. The physician is compelled to do something with his patient who is in danger: but he is not acquainted with the disease.

He looks at symptoms, and judges, since he knows nothing better, that it is a phthisis. His belief in his own judgment even is merely contingent—another perhaps might better hit upon it. I term such, contingent belief, but what lies at the foundation of the real use of means for certain actions, the *pragmatical belief*.

The usual touchstone, whether something is mere persuasion, or at least subjective conviction, that is, firm belief, which some one maintains, is Wagering. Frequently a man states his propositions with such confident and inflexible defiance, that he seems wholly to have laid aside all apprehension of error. A wager startles him. Sometimes it appears that he certainly possesses such persuasion enough as may be estimated at a ducat in value, but not at ten. For, the first ducat he indeed stakes readily, but at ten he is then for the first time aware, which previously he had not remarked, namely, that it is nevertheless very possible he is in error. Provided we represented to our mind, that we were to wager the happiness of a whole life upon this, our exulting judgment would then give way very much, and we should be exceedingly alarmed, and so discover for the first time, that our belief did not extend thus far. The pragmatic belief has in this way only a degree, which according to the difference of interest that is at stake therein, may be great or yet small.

But, since, although in reference to an object we can undertake nothing at all, and therefore the holding for true is merely theoretical, still in many cases we may embrace and imagine to ourselves in thought, an undertaking for which we fancy to possess sufficient grounds, provided there is a means for constituting certainty of the thing, so there is, in mere theoretical judgments, an *Analogon* of what is *practical*, the holding of which for true, the word *Believing* suits, and which we may term *doctrinal belief*. If it were pos-

sible to decide through an experience, so might I very well wager as to this point all my property, that at least in some one of the planets that we see, there were inhabitants. Consequently, I say it is not mere opinion but a firm belief (as to the correctness of which I would, to begin with, hazard many advantages in life), that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.

Now, we must confess that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal Belief. For, although in respect of theoretical cognition of the world, I have nothing to *order* which necessarily presupposes this thought, as condition of my explanations of the phenomena of the world, but rather am compelled so to make use of my reason, as if every thing were merely nature, still the unity conformable to its end, is so great a condition of the application of reason to nature, that since experience moreover furnishes me freely examples of it, I cannot at all pass it by. But for this unity, I know no other condition which it made to me, as clue for my investigation of nature, but when I presuppose that a supreme intelligence has thus ordered every thing according to the wisest ends. Consequently, it is a condition, certainly of a contingent but yet not unimportant intention, namely, in order to have a guide in the investigation of nature, to presuppose a wise Creator of the world. The result of my researches likewise, so frequently confirms the utility of this presupposition, and nothing can decidedly be adduced in opposition, that I say much too little, if I desire to term my holding for true, merely an opinion, for it may even be said in this theoretic relationship, that I firmly believe in God—but this belief, however, in strict signification, is then nevertheless not practical, but must be termed a doctrinal belief, which the *theology* of nature (physico theology) must every where necessarily operate. In respect of

this self-same wisdom in regard of the excellent endowment of human nature, and the shortness of life so badly adapted to it, an equal satisfactory cause for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul, may be met with.

The expression of belief is in such cases an expression of modesty as to *objective* intention, but at the same time, of the firmness of confidence as to *subjective*. If I wished here to term the mere theoretical holding for true, also hypothesis only, which I was justified in admitting, I should thereby already find myself pledged to have a conception, more as to the quality of a cause of the world and of another world than I really can show—for what I admit likewise only as hypothesis, of this must I, according to its properties, at least, still know so much, that I need *not* invent *its conception*, but only *its existence*. But the word belief refers only to the guide which an idea gives me, and to the subjective influence upon the advancement of my actions of reason, which keeps me fast to the same guide, although as to this, I am not in a state to give an account with a speculative object.

But the mere doctrinal belief has something unsteady about it; one is often turned from this, through difficulties which present themselves in speculation, although we certainly always infallibly return back again thereto.

It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For there it is absolutely necessary that something must happen, namely, that I should in all points fulfil the moral law. The object is here indispensably established, and there is only one single condition, according to my view, possible, under which this end coheres with all ends together, and thereby possesses objective validity, namely, that there is a God and a future world:—I also know quite certainly, that no one is acquainted with other conditions that lead to this unity of ends under the moral law. But as the moral

precept therefore is at the same time my maxim (as reason then commands that it is to be so), I shall thus infallibly believe the existence of God and a future life, and I am sure, that nothing can render this belief vacillating, since thereby my moral principles themselves would be subverted, which I cannot relinquish without being detestable in my own eyes.

In such a way there still remains to us enough, after the disappointment of all the ambitious views of a reason wandering about beyond the limits of experience, as that we have cause to be satisfied therewith in a practical point of view. Certainly, no one is able to boast that he knows there is a God, and that there is a future life, for if he knows this, he is then exactly the man whom I long have sought after. All knowing (if it concern an object of pure reason) can be imparted, and I should likewise therefore be able to hope through his instruction to see my knowledge extended in so wonderful a manner. But no, the conviction is not *logical* but *moral* certitude, and as it reposes upon subjective grounds (moral sentiment), so must I not ever state, that *it is* morally certain there is a God, &c., but that *I am* morally certain. That is, the belief in a God and another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment, that as little as I incur the danger of losing the first, just so little do I fear, that the second can ever be torn from me.

The only difficulty which is met with in this case is, that this reason-belief is founded upon the presupposition of moral sentiments. If we depart from this, and adopt a belief that would be quite indifferent as to moral laws, the question then which reason proposes, becomes merely a problem for speculation, and may then certainly be still supported by strong grounds from analogy, but never with those to which the stubbornest scepticism must surrender.\* But in these ques-

\* The human mind takes (as I believe it occurs necessarily in every reasonable being) a natural interest in morality, although it is not undivided and prac-

tions no man is free from all interest. For, although he might be severed from the moral one, by the want of good sentiments, still there yet remains enough besides, in this case, in order to cause, that he should *fear* a divine existence and a futurity. For nothing further is required for this purpose than that he is not able to plead *certainty*, that no such being, and no future life is to be met with; for which effect, inasmuch as this must be shewn through mere reason—consequently apodictically—he would have to demonstrate the impossibility of both, which certainly no reasonable being can undertake. This would be a *negative* belief, which could not produce certainly morality and good sentiments, but yet the Analogon of the same, that is, could restrain powerfully the outbreak of what is bad.

But it will be said, is this all which pure reason executes, in opening views out beyond the limits of experience? nothing more than two articles of belief? the common understanding, without, as to this, consulting philosophers, would have been able also, in fact, to execute as much!

I will not here boast of the merit which philosophy has, as to human reason, by means of the laborious effort of its Critick—though it be granted, that such merit also in the result were to be found merely negative; for as to this, something more will appear in the following section. But do you require, then, that a cognition which concerns all men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only be discovered to you by philosophers? That very thing which you blame, is the best confirmation of the correctness of the previous assertions, since it discovers what in the beginning we could not foresee, namely,

typically preponderating. Fortify and increase this interest, and you will find reason very docile and even more enlightened, for in uniting with practical also speculative interest. But if you do not look to this, that you first or at least half way make good men, so will you never make out of them sincerely believing men.



that nature in respect of that which affects all men without distinction, has not to be charged with any partial distribution of its gifts, and that the highest philosophy in respect of the essential ends of human nature, cannot advance any further than the guide which this nature likewise conferred upon the most common understanding.

### TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.

#### THIRD DIVISION.

#### THE ARCHITECTONICK OF PURE REASON.

I understand by an *Architectonick* the art of systems. As the systematic unity is what first of all forms the usual cognition into science, that is, from a mere aggregate of it forms a system, so is Architectonick the doctrine of the Scientific in our cognition in general, and belongs therefore necessarily to the doctrine of method.

Under the direction of reason, our cognitions in general should be no rhapsodies, but they must constitute a system, wherein alone they can support and advance their essential ends. But I understand by a system, the unity of diverse cognitions under an idea. This is the reason-conception of the form of a whole, so far as through this conception, the sphere of the diverse as well as of the parts with one another, is determined *à priori*. The scientific reason-conception contains, therefore, the end and the form of the whole that agrees with this. The unity of the end, to which all the parts refer, and in the idea of such likewise to one another, causes that each part may be left out in our acquaintance with the rest, and no contingent addition or undetermined quantity of perfection, which has not its *à priori* determined limits, takes place.

The whole is therefore membered (articulatio), and not heaped together (coacervatio), it may increase, certainly, internally (per intus susceptionem), but not externally (per appositionem), as an animal body whose growth adds no member, but without change of proportion, renders each of its members stronger, and more fit for its ends.

The idea requires a *Schema* for completion, that is, from the principle of the end in view, an à priori determined essential diversity and order of parts. The schema which is not designed according to an idea, that is, from the main end of reason, but empirically, according to views presenting themselves contingently, (whose multitude we cannot know before hand), gives *technical* unity, but that which arises consequent upon an idea, (where reason furnishes its ends à priori, and does not wait empirically), founds *architectonical* unity. What we term Science, cannot arise technically, on account of the resemblance of the diverse, or of the contingent use of the cognition in concreto for all kinds of arbitrary external ends, but architectonically, by reason of the affinity and the derivation of a single supreme and intrinsic end, which first of all renders the Whole possible; the schema of which science must contain the outline (monogramma), and the division of the whole into parts, according to the idea, that is, à priori, and must separate this securely from all others, and according to principles.

No one attempts the thing, to establish a science without his laying an idea at the foundation. But in the elaboration of this, the schema, nay, even the definition which he gives directly at the beginning of his science, very seldom answers to his idea, for this lies in reason as a germ, wherein all parts lie concealed, still very much enveloped, and hardly cognizable to microscopic observation. On this account, we must explain and determine sciences,

inasmuch as they still are conceived from the point of view of a certain general interest, not according to the description which the author thereof gives of them, but according to the idea, which, from the natural unity of the parts that he has brought together, we find grounded in reason itself. For then it is found, that the author and also frequently his later followers, wander about an idea which they have not themselves even been able to render clear, and consequently to determine the particular content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.

It is unfortunate, that only for the first time, after we have long collected rhapsodically as materials for building, according to the indication of a concealed idea lying in us, many cognitions referring to it—in fact, after we have for a long time connected them technically, it is then first of all possible, to perceive the idea in a clearer light, and to sketch architectonically a whole, according to the ends of reason. Systems seem, like worms mutilated at the commencement by means of a generatio æquivoca, from the mere confluence of united conceptions, to have been rendered perfect by time, although they had all together their schema, as the original germ, in reason merely developing itself, and on this account, not only is each articulated according to an idea, but besides this again, all as members of a whole are united with intentionality one to another in a system of human cognition, and allow of an Architectonick of all human science, which now, when so much material is already collected, or can be taken from the ruins of decayed old buildings, would not only be possible, but not even difficult. We satisfy ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, to sketch merely the *Architectonick* of all cognition from *pure reason*, and we begin from the point where the common root of our cognition-faculty divides, and throws out two branches, one of which is *reason*. But

I understand here by reason, the whole supreme cognition-faculty, and set, therefore, the rational, in opposition to the empirical.

If I make abstraction of all content of cognition objectively considered, all cognition is then, subjectively, either historical or rational. The historical cognition is, *cognitio ex datis*, but the rational, *cognitio ex principiis*. A cognition may be originally given, whencesoever you like, still it is in him who possesses it, historical, when he only cognizes in the degree, and so far as was given to him elsewhere; whether this have been given to him through immediate experience or recital, or yet instruction, (general cognitions). Consequently he, who has learned particularly a system of philosophy, for example, the *Wolfian*, although he have all principles, explanations, and proofs, together with the division of the whole scientific edifice in his head, and could count the whole on his fingers, has none other than a complete *historical* cognition of the *Wolfian* philosophy: he knows and judges only so much as has been given to him. Deny him a definition, then he knows not whence he is to deduce another. He forms himself according to an external reason, but the imitative faculty is not the generative faculty, that is, the cognition did not spring in him from reason, and although it objectively was certainly a reason-cognition, nevertheless, subjectively, it is thus merely historical. He has comprehended and retained well—that is, learned well, and is the copy in stucco of a living man. Reason-cognitions, which are so objectively, (that is, at the beginning only can result from the individual reason of man), must only then alone subjectively also bear this name, when they have been derived from the general sources of reason, whence also Critick and indeed even the rejection of what has been learnt, can spring, that is, from principles.

Now all reason-cognition is either that from conceptions, or from the construction of conceptions—the former is termed philosophical, the second mathematical. I have already treated in the first Division with regard to the internal difference of the two. Hence, a cognition may be objectively philosophical, and still is subjectively historical, as with the greater part of scholars, and with all, who never see farther than the school, and remain all their life long, scholars. But it is, however, remarkable that mathematical cognition as we have learned it, still can be valid also subjectively as reason-cognition, and in it such a difference as in the philosophical does not take place. The cause is, that the sources of cognition, whence the teacher only can draw, lie nowhere else but in the essential and true principles of reason, and, consequently, can be deduced from no where besides by the scholar, nor, perhaps, can they be contested, and on this account, that the use of reason occurs here only in concreto, although still à priori, that is to say, in the pure, and for this very cause, faultless intuition, and excludes all illusion and error. Amongst all the reason-sciences (à priori) we can merely learn Mathematick alone, but never Philosophy (except it be historical), but as to what concerns reason, at the most, we can only learn to *philosophize*.

Now the system of all philosophical cognition is *Philosophy*. We must look upon it objectively, if we thereby understand the archetype of the judgment of all attempts at philosophizing, which is to serve to judge every subjective philosophy, whose edifice is oftentimes so diverse and so changeable. In this way philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science, that is given no where in concreto, but which we seek to approach so long, in different ways, until the only pathway, very much grown over by sensibility, is discovered, and the hitherto unsuccessful ectype succeeds, in making itself like to the prototype, so far as

it is permitted to men. Up to this point we can learn no philosophy, for where is it—who has it in possession—and whereby may it be cognized? We can only learn to philosophize, that is, to exercise the talent of reason, in pursuing its general principles in certain experiments at hand, but always with the reservation of the right of reason, to seek to confirm, or to reject these, in their very sources.

But up to this point, the conception of philosophy is only a *scholastic conception* of a system, namely, of cognition, which is sought only as science, without having for its end, any thing more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, consequently the *logical* perfection of the cognition. But there is besides, a *cosmical conception* (*cosmicus conceptus*), which has always lain at the foundation of this term, especially if we have, as it were, personified it, and represented itself, as a prototype in the ideal of the *philosopher*. In this respect, *philosophy* is the science of the reference of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanæ*), and the philosopher is not a reason-artificer, but the legislator of human reason. In such a sense, it would be very vain-glorious to term oneself a philosopher, and to pretend to be equal to the prototype, which only lies in the idea.

The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician, are still only reason-artificers, whatever distinguished success the two first may yet have in cognitions of reason, and the two last in philosophical cognition particularly. There is, however, a teacher in the ideal, which forms all these, and uses them as an instrument, in order to advance the essential ends of human reason. This one only must we term the philosopher, but as such himself still is met with nowhere, but the idea of this legislation everywhere in every human reason, we will thus only hold to the last, and determine more accurately what philosophy according

to this last cosmical conception\* prescribes, as systematic unity from the point of view of ends.

Essential ends are still not on this account the supreme; only one of which alone can be possible (in the perfect systematic unity of reason). Consequently they are either the final end, or subordinate ends, which belong to the first necessarily, as means. The first is none other than the whole destination of man, and philosophy in respect of the same is termed Moral. On account of the pre-eminence which moral philosophy has over every other aspiration of reason, there was also understood amongst the ancients by the term of Philosopher, always at the same time and particularly the Moralist, and even, the external appearance of self-control by means of reason, causes, according to a certain analogy, that even now we term any one with his circumscribed knowledge, philosopher.

The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has then two objects, nature and liberty, and contains, therefore, the natural law equally as well as the moral law—at the beginning, in two particular systems, but finally, in a single philosophical one. The philosophy of nature refers to all that *is*: that of morality only as to that, which *ought to be*.

But all philosophy is either cognition from pure reason, or reason-cognition from empirical principles. The first is termed pure, the second empirical philosophy.

Now, the philosophy of pure reason is either *Propaedeutick* (pre-exercise), which investigates the faculty of reason, in respect of all pure cognition *à priori*, and is termed *Critick*; or, secondly, the System of pure reason (science), the whole, (true as well as apparent) philosophical cognition from pure reason in systematic connex-

\* *Cosmical conception* is here termed that which concerns what necessarily interests every man—consequently I determine the intuition of a science according to *scholastic conceptions*, when it is only looked at as one of the aptitudes for certain arbitrary ends.

ion and is called *Metaphysick*—although this name may be given also to the whole of pure Philosophy, including Critick, in order to embrace equally the investigation of all that which ever can be given *à priori*, as well as the representation of what constitutes a system of pure philosophical cognitions of this kind, but it is different from all empirical, together with all mathematical use of reason.

Metaphysick divides itself into that of the *speculative* and *practical* use of pure reason, and is, therefore, either *Metaphysick of Nature*, or *Metaphysick of Morals*. The first contains all pure reason-principles from mere conceptions (consequently to the exclusion of mathematics) of the *theoretic* cognition of all things; the second, the principles which determine and render necessary, *à priori*, that which is to be *done and left undone*, (*conduct*). Now as to actions, morality, is the only legitimation which wholly *à priori* can be deduced from principles. Consequently the Metaphysick of morals is strictly the pure morality in which no anthropology (no empirical condition) is laid at the foundation. Now the Metaphysick of speculative reason, is that which we are accustomed to term in the strict *sense* metaphysick—but so far, however, as pure moral philosophy belongs to the particular genealogy of human, and, in fact, philosophical cognition from pure reason, we will retain for it the first denomination, although here we put this aside, as not now belonging to our object.

It is of the most extreme importance to *isolate* cognitions, which, according to their class and origin are different from others, and thus carefully to avoid, that they do not flow together incorporated with others, with which they, in use, are usually conjoined. What the chemist does in the separation of matter—what the mathematician does in his doctrine of pure quantities, is far more imperative upon the philosopher, so that he may determine with certainty, in respect of



the share which a particular kind of cognition has in the vagabond use of the understanding, its particular value and influence. Human reason, since the time it has thought, or rather since it has reflected, has, therefore, never been deprived of a Metaphysick, but still has never been able to expose it sufficiently purified from all that is extraneous. The idea of such a science is even as old as speculative human reason—and what reason does not speculate, whether, in fact, it occur in a scholastic or popular manner? We must, however, confess, that the difference of the two elements of our cognition, of which the one wholly *à priori* is in our power, the other only *à posteriori* can be taken from experience, remained yet very obscure, even to thinkers by profession—and hence never could accomplish the determination of the limit of a particular kind of cognition—consequently not the true idea of a science which has so long and so much occupied human reason. If we said Metaphysick is the science of the first principles of human cognition, we did not, through this, remark quite a particular kind, but a rank only in regard of generality, whereby therefore, this could not be separated distinctly from what is empirical; for even under empirical principles there are some general, and on this account higher than others—and in the series of such a subordination, (as we do not distinguish that which is cognized wholly *à priori*, from that which is only cognized *à posteriori*), where shall we place the division which separates the first part and the superior members, from the last and the subordinate? What should we say to this, if Chronology could only so indicate the epochs of the world, that it divided them into the first centuries, and into those following it? It would be asked—does the fifth, the tenth century belong likewise to the first? Precisely in the same manner, I ask, does the conception of the Extended belong to Metaphysick? You answer—yes, certainly, and also

that of body? Yes—and that of fluid body? You are startled—for if it went on farther in this way, everything will thus belong to metaphysick. Hence we see that the mere degree of subordination (the particular under the general) can determine no limits of a science, but, in our case, the total dissimilarity and difference of the origin. But, what on the other hand still obscured the fundamental idea of metaphysick, was, that it manifests a certain similarity as cognition *à priori* with mathematick, which certainly as to what concerns the origin *à priori*, allies them with one another, but as to what concerns the mode of cognition from conceptions, in respect of the first in comparison with the mode of judging in the second through construction of conceptions *à priori*,—consequently as to the difference of a philosophical cognition from a mathematical one—there then manifests itself a very decided dissimilarity, which certainly, as it were, has at all times been felt, but never could be reduced to clear criteria. Hence has it now happened, that as philosophers have erred even in the developement of the idea of their science, the elaboration of the same could have no determinate end and no secure rule; and in a project so arbitrarily made, ignorant of the way which they were to take, and at all times differing with one another as to the discoveries which each pretended to have made in his own way, they brought their science, first with others, and lastly even with themselves, into contempt.

All pure cognition *à priori* by means of the particular faculty of cognition, wherein alone it can have its seat, constitutes therefore a particular unity, and metaphysick is that philosophy which is to represent such cognition in this systematic unity. The speculative part of that which has particularly appropriated to itself this name, namely, what we term *Metaphysick of Nature*, and considers all so far as it is, (not that

which should be,) from conceptions à priori, is then divided in the following manner.

What in the stricter sense is called *Metaphysick* consists of *Transcendental philosophy*, and the *Physiology* of pure reason. The first considers only the *understanding* and reason itself in a system of all conceptions and principles, which refer to objects in general, without assuming objects which were given (*Ontologia*.) The second considers *nature*, that is the complex of given objects, (whether they may be given to the senses, or if we like in another mode of intuition) and is therefore *Physiology* (although only rationalis). But now, the use of reason in this rational consideration of nature, is either physical or hyperphysical, or better still, either *immanent* or *transcendent*. The first refers to nature so far as its cognition can be applied in experience (in concreto), the second to that connexion of the objects of experience, which transcends all experience. This *transcendent* physiology has therefore an *internal* or *external* connexion, but both of which go beyond possible experience in respect of its object—the first is the physiology of all nature, that is, *transcendental cognition* of the universe; the latter, is that of the connexion of all nature with a being beyond nature, that is, *transcendental cognition* of God.

*Immanent* physiology, on the other hand, considers nature as the complex of all objects of the senses, consequently so as it is given to us, but only according to conditions à priori, under which it can be given to us in general. But there are only two kinds of objects thereof—first, those of the external senses, consequently their complex, *corporeal nature*: secondly, the object of the internal sense, the soul, and according to the fundamental conceptions of the same in general, the *thinking nature*. The *Metaphysick* of corporeal nature is termed *Physics*, but inasmuch as they are only to contain the principles of its cognition à

priori, rational Physics. The Metaphysick of thinking nature is termed *Psychology*, and from the now adduced reason, only the *rational cognition* of this is here<sup>5</sup> to be understood.

Hence, the entire system of Metaphysick consists of four different principal parts. 1. *Ontology*. 2. *Rational Physiology*. 3. *Rational Cosmology*. 4. *Rational Theology*. The second part, namely, the Physics of pure reason contain two divisions, *Physica rationalis*\* and *Psychologia rationalis*.

The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason prescribes even this division—it is therefore *architectonical* according to its essential ends, and not merely *technical* according to contingently admitted affinities, and, as it were, established by chance—but precisely on this account also, it is unchangeable and legislative. But there are in this also some points which excite doubt, and might weaken the conviction of its legitimacy.

First, how can I expect a cognition *à priori*, consequently Metaphysick, as to objects, so far as they are given to our senses, consequently *à posteriori*? And how is it possible to cognize according to principles *à priori* the nature of things, and to arrive at a *rational Physiology*? The answer is, we take from experience nothing further than is necessary to give us an object, partly of the external, partly of the internal sense. The first occurs by means of the mere conception, matter (impenetrable inanimate extension), the last through the conception of a thinking Being (in the empirical representation, I think.) Besides, in the whole Metaphysick of these objects, we must refrain entirely

\* We are not by any means to think that I hereby understand that which we commonly term *Physica generalis*, and which is rather *Mathematick*, than *Philosophy of Nature*. For the Metaphysick of Nature separates itself entirely from *Mathematick*, and is far from offering views extending so far as the last, but is still very important in respect of the Critick of pure understanding-cognition in general, applying itself to nature—failing which, mathematicians being attached to certain common, but still indeed metaphysical conceptions, have surcharged Physics imperceptibly with hypotheses, which disappear in a Critick of these principles, without still thereby doing the least prejudice to the use of *Mathematick* in this field (which is quite indispensable).

from all empirical principles, which might still add to the conception an experience, in order thence to judge something as to these objects.

Secondly, where then does *empirical Psychology* remain, which has always maintained its place in Metaphysick, and from which in our days such great things for the explanation thereof have been expected, after the hope had been abandoned of executing anything suitable à priori? I would answer, it is fixed there where proper (empirical) physics must be placed, that is to say, by the side of *applied* Philosophy, for which pure philosophy contains the principles à priori, which therefore must certainly be conjoined with the first, but not confounded. Empirical Psychology must therefore be wholly banished from Metaphysick, and is already entirely excluded from it through the idea of the same. However, we must still always concede to it a place therein (although only as episode) according to the use of the schools, and in fact from economical motives, since it is not yet so rich that it should constitute a study of itself, and is still too important, as that we should entirely exclude it, or attach it elsewhere, where it must find still less affinity, than with Metaphysick. It is therefore, merely a long domiciled stranger, to whom during a certain time a resting place has been allowed, until he shall have been able to establish his own residence in a complete Anthropology, (the appendix to an empirical natural Philosophy.)

This is therefore the general idea of a metaphysick, which, as we required more for it at the beginning than can reasonably be demanded, and flattered ourselves during a long time with pleasing expectations, at last fell into general contempt, as men saw themselves deceived in their hopes. From the whole tenour of our Critick we shall have been sufficiently convinced, that although metaphysick cannot be the basis of religion, yet it must always remain as its bulwark, and that

human reason, which is already dialectical from the tendency of its nature, can never dispense with such a science, which restrains it, and by means of a scientific and thoroughly enlightened self-cognition, arrests the devastation which a lawless speculative reason would otherwise most infallibly introduce into morals as well as religion. We may, therefore, be sure, that however disdainfully or contemptuously those act, who learn to judge of a science, not according to its nature, but only according to its contingent effects, we shall always revert to it again, as to a beloved one estranged from us, inasmuch as reason, since the thing here concerns essential ends, must labour unweariedly, either in favour of fundamental knowledge, or upon the overthrow of correct views already existing.

Metaphysick, therefore, of nature as well as of morals, especially the Critick of reason venturing itself upon its own wings, which precedes preparatively (propaedeutically), alone constitute that which we in a right sense may designate philosophy. This refers all to wisdom, but by the way of the science, the only one which if it once have been cleared, is never obliterated, and allows of no errors. Mathematics, Physics, even the empirical knowledge of man, possess a great value as means for the most part to the contingent, but still at last, the necessary and essential ends of humanity, yet then only through the medium of a reason-cognition from mere conceptions, which, call it what we like, is strictly nothing but Metaphysick.

Precisely on this account metaphysick is also the completion of all *culture* of human reason, which is indispensable, although we set aside its influence, as science for certain determinate ends. For, it considers reason according to its elements and highest maxims, which must lie at the foundation even of the *possibility* of some sciences, and at the foundation of the *use* of all. That it, as mere speculation, serves rather for the

purpose of restraining from error, than for extending cognition, does no prejudice to its value, but rather gives to it dignity and consideration through the censorial office, which secures the general order and harmony, in fact the well-being of the scientific commonweal, and restrains its resolute and fruitful efforts from wandering from the main point—the general happiness.

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## TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.

### *FOURTH DIVISION.*

#### THE HISTORY OF PURE REASON.

This title only stands here in order to indicate a place which remains open in the system, and which must in future be supplied. I content myself, from a mere transcendental point of view, namely, from the nature of pure reason, with casting a cursory glance over the whole of its labours hitherto, which, certainly, it is true, presents to my view a building, but one only in ruins.

It is sufficiently remarkable, although it naturally could not occur otherwise, that men in the infancy of philosophy start from that point, where we now should rather finish, namely, with studying first the cognition of God, and the hope, or rather indeed the quality, of another world. Whatever the ancient customs which still remained over from the rude state of nations, might have introduced as gross conceptions of religion, yet this still did not prevent the enlightened portion from dedicating itself to free enquiry in respect of such object, and it was easily perceived, that there could be no fundamental and more certain mode of pleasing the invisible power which governs the world, at least, in order to be happy in another world,

than virtuous conduct. Hence theology and morality were the two springs, or rather the two points of reference, in all abstract investigations of reason, to which subsequently man has always devoted himself. The first was, however, properly that which drew into the subject by degrees mere speculative reason, and which afterwards became so celebrated under the name of Metaphysick.

I will not now distinguish the times in which this or that change in metaphysick took place, but only represent in a hasty sketch, the difference of idea which induced the most important revolutions. And then I find a threefold object, in favour of which the most important changes have been effected upon this theatre of contention.

1. *In respect of the object* of all our cognitions of reason, some were merely *Sensual*, others merely *Intellectual* philosophers. *Epicurus* may be termed the principal philosopher of sensitivity, Plato of the *intellectual*. But this difference, however subtle it may be, had already commenced in the earliest times, and had maintained itself uninterruptedly. They of the first opinion maintained, that all reality is in the objects of the senses, all the rest is imagination—they of the second say, on the contrary, there is nothing but appearance in the senses, only the understanding cognizes what is true. But on this account the former did not precisely deny reality to the conceptions of the understanding, but with them it was only *logical*, with the others *mystical*. The first allowed *intellectual conceptions*, yet admitted mere sensible *objects*. The last required that the true objects were merely *intelligible*, and asserted an *intuition* through the pure understanding, that was accompanied by no sense, and according to their opinion only a confused one.

2. *In respect of the origin* of pure reason-cognitions whether they are derived from experience, or independently of it, have their sources in reason.




*Aristotle* may be looked upon as the head of the *Empirists*, and *Pluto* of the *Noologists*. *Locke*, who in modern times followed the one, and *Leibnitz* the other, (although at a sufficient distance from his mystical system), were, however, still unable in this dispute to come to any decision. *Epicurus*, however, on his side, conducted himself much more consistently according to his sensual system (for he never in his conclusions issued out beyond the limits of experience), than *Aristotle* and *Locke*, (but especially the last,) who after he had deduced all conceptions and principles from experience, proceeds so far in the use thereof, that he maintains that we could as evidently prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, (although both objects lie entirely out of the limits of possible experience), as any mathematical theorem.

3. *In respect of Method.*—If we are to term any thing method, it must then be a proceeding according to *principles*. We can then decide the now dominant method in this branch of the investigation of nature into the *naturalistic* and *scientific*. The *Naturalist* of pure reason adopts it as a principle, that by means of common reason without science, (which he terms sound reason,) more can be effected in respect of the most important questions that constitute the problems of metaphysick, than by speculation. He maintains, therefore, that we can determine the magnitude and the distance of the moon more securely according to the measurement of the eye, than by mathematical circumlocution. This is mere misology reduced to principle, and what is most absurd, the neglect of all artificial means is recommended as a *peculiar method* for extending our cognition. For, as to what concerns the naturalists as to the *want* of more information, we cannot with justice impute any thing to them. They follow common reason, without boasting themselves of their ignorance, as a method, which is to contain the secret of drawing the truth from the deep well of Demo-

critus. *Quod satis est sapio mihi: non ego curo esse, quod Arcesilas ærumnosique Solones. Pers.* is their motto, with which they can live satisfied and worthy of approval, without troubling themselves as to science, or with confounding its business.

As to what regards the observers of a *scientific* method they have thus here their choice, either of proceeding *dogmatically* or *sceptically*, but yet, at all events, are under the obligation of proceeding systematically. If I here name, in respect of the first, the celebrated *Wolf*, and as to the second *David Hume*, I can according to my present object leave the others unnoticed. The *critical* road is yet open. If the reader have had pleasure and patience in travelling along this in my company, then may he judge whether, if it is agreeable to him to contribute his part thereto, for the purpose of making this bye-path into a high road, what many centuries could not effect, may not now be attained before the expiration of the present, namely—the bringing of human reason into entire contentedness, with regard to what has hitherto, but in vain, occupied its curiosity.



## EXPLANATION OF TERMS,

ACCORDING TO THE VIEWS OF MELLIN AND OTHERS.

**ACROAMATIC** (*Acroamatisch*). In this proof we have the object of the conception in question only in mind, and the conception is merely expressed through words, and not sensible exhibition. It is discursive and not intuitive.

**ACTION** (*Handlung*) signifies the relationship of the subject of causality to the effect. It is also called by Kant, the causality or causeship of the cause, though of causality in a sense different to that of effective causes.

**AGGREGATE** (*Aggregat, Rhapsodie*). If a whole of cognition so consists of many parts, that the same are placed with one another in a contingent connexion, such a whole is termed Aggregate. The categories of Aristotle, for instance, are an aggregate, whilst those of Kant, being not contingent but necessary, constitute a System. A number of dollars thrown into a chest is an aggregate; arranged according to a connecting principle, they form a system.

**ALL OF REALITY** (*All der Realitat*). *Omnitudo realitatis* is the idea of an object, wherein all possible properties exist together, so that no one is wanting. The object itself is termed the transcendental Ideal.

**ANALOGY OF EXPERIENCE** (*Analogie der Erfahrung*) is an analogy, *a priori*, of experience, according to which all objects must be cognized in such relationships as are identical with the relationships of experience; for example, in all phenomena (objects of experience), there are properties which refer to each other, as the substance to the accident: that is to say, in all experiences there is something that persists, which is neither increased nor diminished, (the substance), and something that always changes, (accident), &c. &c.

**ANTHROPOLOGY** (*Anthropologie*), the theory of the empirical conditions of human nature.

**ANTITHETICK** (*Antithetik*) does not concern itself with what is only partial, but considers general cognitions in respect of their contradiction with one another, and the causes thereof. Transcendental Antithetick is an investigation of the Antinomy of pure reason, its causes and result. If we do not apply our reason to objects of experience, but venture to extend it beyond the limits of experience, sophistical illusive theorems then arise, which find their necessity in the nature of the conditions of reason; only that, unfortunately, the object has equally as valid and necessary grounds of assertion on its side.

**APODICTICAL** (*Apodictisch*), is that which is connected with the consciousness of necessity.

**APPEARANCE** (*Schein*) is always taken in the sense of delusive appearance, the subjective ground of the judgment being held to be objective.

**APPARENT** (*Scheinbar*). Specious.

**APPERCEPTION** (*Apperception*), Self-consciousness, Consciousness of oneself, or the simple Representation of the I. If a subject capable of representations possesses such, it, besides, always connects with these representations, that it (the subject) has them. This second representation, that I, the representing subject, has these representations, is called the consciousness of myself, or the apperception. This representation is simple, and is an effect of the understanding, which thereby connects all the diversity of a representation in a single representation, or according to Kant's mode of expression, produces a Synthesis.

**APPREHENSION** (*Apprehension*) is that connexion (synthesis), by means of which, representations as modifications of the mind are placed together in an intuition, so that thereby perception is possible. The junction of several representations is termed the Synthesis of Apprehension.

**ARISING OF A THING** (*Entstehung*), is origin.

**ARTICULATION** (*Gliederung*) is the structure of a science as to its members; the limits, completeness, and portion of parts, &c.

**ÆSTHETICK** (*Æsthetik*). Theory of Sensibility, or the Science of the rules of Sensibility in general.

**CANON** (*Kanon*) is the Complex of Principles à priori, or of the fundamental prescripts arising from the human faculty of cognition itself, which determine how certain cognition-faculties in general are to be used, provided their use is a correct one, that is, such, that cognition of the truth is thereby possible. It treats of the proper use of our faculty of cognition.

**CATEGORY** (*Kategorie, Stammbegriff, Gedankenform, Predicament*), is properly the rule which the Understanding, by means of its own essential law, lays at the foundation of nature, for joining all the given diversity in our consciousness; or, it is the unity which is given to the mere synthesis, by the means of the function of the understanding, of the different representations in an intuition. In a transcen-

dental sense, categories are subjective conditions of thinking, that is to say, they have their foundation in the property of the understanding itself, but they have objective validity for empirical use, or, they are conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects of experience; so that there can be no object of experience which has not quality, quantity, relationship, cause, &c. They are devoid of sense and meaning, unless accompanied by sensible and empirical intuition; for without this, they are mere forms of thinking in general. They cannot be extended to objects in themselves, (without a restriction to our sensibility).

COGNITION (*Erkenntniss*). This word being used by Kant both in the feminine and neuter gender, it may be observed, that the change depends upon the sense in which the word is taken, whether subjectively or objectively. If as the former, it is made feminine, as the latter, neuter. Cognition is the determined reference of certain representations to an object, that is, that object, in the conception whereof, the Diverse of a given intuition is united.\* *Erkenntniss-vermogen* is the cognition-faculty, or the faculty of cognition.

CONCEPTION (*Begriff*). Cognition by conceptions is a mode of cognizing an object, when I have not the same *immediately* before me. If I see a tree before me, its immediate representation strikes upon the senses, and I have an intuition of it, but if I represent to myself the tree by means of certain characteristics, which I seek for in the intuition of it, as, for example, the trunk, branches, and leaves, these characteristics are termed signs, and the complex of them is termed the Content of the conception, and affords a *mediate* representation of the tree. The difference between pure and empirical conceptions does not concern the origin of either in time, or the mode whereby we come to the consciousness thereof, but the origin of the same, from the source and the content. Hence an empirical conception is that which does not only arise by occasion of experience, but to which experience also furnishes the matter. A pure conception is that with

\* The different degrees of the objective value of our cognition are given in Kant's Logic, and consist of these steps: Representing something to oneself (*vorstellen*) is the first degree of cognition; representing to oneself with consciousness (*wahrnehmen*) or perceiving, is the second; knowing (*kennen*) something, or representing to oneself something in comparison with other things, as well in respect of identity as difference, is the third; cognizing (*erkennen*) or knowing something with consciousness, the fourth; understanding (*verstehen*) cognizing through the understanding by means of the conceptions or conceiving something, the fifth; cognizing something through reason or perspecting (*einsehen*) the sixth; and comprehending something (*begreifen*), that is, cognizing it through reason or *a priori* in a degree sufficient for our purpose, the seventh. For all our comprehending is only *relative*, that is sufficient for a certain purpose: *absolutely*, we do not comprehend any thing. Nothing more can be comprehended than what the mathematician demonstrates, as for example, that all the lines in a circle are proportional, and still he does not comprehend how it happens, that so simple a figure has these properties. The field of the intelligence and of the understanding is therefore in general much greater than the field of conceiving or of reason.

which no sensation is mixed up. The conception of cause is a pure conception of this kind, since I have no sensible object which I would term Cause. For a Pure Conception of the Understanding, see CATEGORY.

CONCRETO, IN, signifies, in Objects of experience; where many things may be differently constituted from what they are, in *Abstracto*.

CONDITION and CONDITIONED (*Bedingung* and *Bedingtes*) are, correlative conceptions. The condition is the ground which must be presupposed; and what presupposes a condition is the conditioned, conditionate, or conditional.

CONFORMABLENESS or CONFORMITY TO END (*Zweckmässigkeit*), means also, if we may so express it, Intentionality. Tissot has used the word Finalité, which is hardly more French than Finality used in the present translation, is English, but both words convey the idea of fitness, looking to the end in view; and such is the meaning of the original expression. It consists, in nature, in the representation that all the laws thereof, made known to us by experience, however various, coincide for a conception that contains the grounds of their existence, and which is termed the object of nature.

CONSCIOUSNESS (*Bewusstseyn*, *Selbstbewusstseyn*, *Apperception*) is simple representation of the I, and likewise an effect of the understanding, whereby all variety of a representation is connected in a single representation, or effects what is termed Synthesis. If, for example, I think that I see, all the variety in the representation of seeing is connected through the single representation of the I. If the variety in the representation I see, were as spontaneously produced in my subject as the variety of the same is spontaneously connected, then the understanding would envisage, and we should have intellectual intuitions. But the variety arises from this, that the sensibility is affected; for I cannot procure light, eyes, or objects through mere thinking, if they do not exist; therefore the sensibility envisages by means of the affections, and the understanding thinks or unites, through the synthesis alluded to, the variety given by means of the affections.

CONSTITUTIVE (*Constitutiv*) means objectively determining or legislating. It is a predicate which expresses that something à priori determines, how something else must be, or is to be. For example, the principle of all axioms of intuitions is not only constitutive for experience but also for intuition, as, for instance, the principle, at page 154. "All phenomena are, according to intuition, extensive quantities." By means of this, it is established à priori, that no other objects of experience can occur to us, but those which we must envisage as extended quantities. The same is therefore called a *constitutive* principle for intuition and experience. That which is *constitutive* is opposed to that which is *regulative*.

COSMOLOGICAL IDEA (*Weltbegriff*.) There cannot be more than four of these, see page 328; and they have been termed such from their containing the condition of all phenomena, whose sphere is the world. They are divided into the mathematical and dynamical.

COSMOLOGY (*Kosmologie*). The science whose object is the com-

plex of all phenomena (the universe); or the metaphysical philosophy of the supersensible properties of all objects.

CRITICAL (*Critisch*) is the opposite of that which is dogmatical (*dogmatisch*).

CRITICK, CRITICISM, CRITIQUE (*Critik*) is the examination of pure Reason, and is called in Germany simply, THE CRITICK, κατ' ἐξοχήν. It is the Science of the pure faculty of reason, or the investigation of that which reason is able to know or effect, independently of experience.

DEDUCTION, (*Deduction*): when transcendental, it is the explanation of the manner in which conceptions or propositions à priori may refer to objects, or, it is the justification of the objective and general validity and the knowledge of the possibility of a synthetical proposition, or a conception, when they are à priori. The term is a legal one. The proof by which a claim is substantiated is termed the Deduction.

DEMONSTRABLE (*Demonstrabel*). A conception or proposition is so termed, when the object corresponding can be given to it, whether in the pure or empirical intuition. It does not signify, what is proved, but what is sensibly exhibited. The conceptions of reason, on the other hand, though not without foundation, are termed indemonstrable, for such ideas as, God, the Soul, &c., cannot be exhibited in the intuition; but the conception of quantity is demonstrable, for it can be given in the intuition of space à priori, that is, in a straight line. Kant makes use of the term, to demonstrate, in a like sense with the Anatomist.

DETERMINATION (*Bestimmung*). The action of determining or the attributing of one of two contradictory predicates, as for instance, when we speak of a man and say, that he is learned or unlearned. The predicate in this way is the determination.

DIALECTICK (*Dialektik*) is the Logic of Appearance, and as logical or formal, it treats of the sources of error and illusion, and the mode of destroying them; as transcendental, it is the exposure of the natural and unavoidable illusion that arises from human reason itself, which is ever inclined to look upon phenomena, as things in themselves, and cognitions à priori, as properties adhering to these things, and in such way to form the Supersensible, according to this assumed cognition of things in themselves.

DIALEXIS (*Dialeze*). Mellin considers the word should be *Dialele*.

DICHOTOMY (*Dichotomie*), a bimembral division.

DISCURSIVE (*Discursiv*) expresses one of the two modes by which reason cognizes. Reason cognizes either *immediately*, that is to say, as in geometry, where it exhibits the object itself through the faculty of imagination, and then is termed intuitive; or it cognizes *mediately*, as it occurs in philosophy, where it thinks the objects by signs. Intuitively, reason represents to itself a triangle, and finds therein the properties of all possible triangles; and discursively, it looks at virtue, as a state of triumph of the moral principle over the immoral desires of sensibility, where we have not the object before



us, but think it through mere signs, as state, triumph, moral principle, &c.

**DIVERSE, MULTIFARIOUS, MULTIPLEX, VARIOUS, (*Mannichfaltig*).** If I perceive a tree, nothing is present to me but what I see and feel, and therefore, in my sensations of seeing and feeling, lies, what I term the matter of the tree. If I make abstraction of all the connexion which exists amongst the parts of the same; of the order in which they are arranged; of every conception through which they can be thought as a whole, whether as homogeneous or heterogeneous; in short, if we consider them as something real, not connected with one another, we have thus a conception of the Diverse in the phenomenon.

**DOGMATISM (*Dogmatismus*).** The pretension of advancing in metaphysical inquiries without the Critick of pure reason. For instance, when the Understanding fancies that it is possible for it to attain to pure certain cognitions of reason, as, for example, the knowledge of God, the Soul, &c., without having previously investigated the faculty whence these pure cognitions of reason arise, this is the Dogmatism of metaphysics. That of pure reason is the assertion of an intellectual commencement in the series of phenomena, or of a world-limit, or that the world had a beginning.

**EMPIRICAL (*Empirisch*).** See TRANSCENDENTAL.

**EPIGENESIS (*Epigenesis*).** of pure reason is the System of the generation of experience out of the pure conceptions of the understanding, that is, it assumes that these conceptions render experience possible, or contain the ground of all experience in general: or in other words, it is that explanation of the coincidence of the categories, as pure intellectual conceptions with the objects of experience, agreeably to which explanation, these conceptions being forms of thought, experience and its objects, as such, become possible.

**EURISTIC EURISTIC (*Heuristisch*).** See OSTENSIVE.

**EXHIBITION (*Darstellung*).** A triangle in its construction is this.

**EXISTENCE (*Daseyn*).** Those who hold objects for things in themselves maintain, that existence is something lying in the conception of the object, or a sign of the conception itself, whilst the theory of existence, as entertained by Kant, is, that it is only a representation of the relationship of the object to the thinking faculty, and therefore no sign at all of the conception of the existing thing, and, that the conception of existence is not to be abstracted from an existing thing, but has its origin in the property of the thinking faculty itself.

**FACILITY (*Fertigkeit*) or *Habitus*,** which is not to be confounded with *Leichtigkeit* (promptitudo). The latter refers rather to the mechanical faculty, and the former to the will.

**FORCE (*Kraft*).** The conception of force springs from the pure understanding, when we think a substance which as cause produces

an effect. We must not however say of the thing (the substance) that it is a force, but that it has a force. The word force is a general name for every thing that is a ground upon which the production of the determination reposes.

FREEDOM, LIBERTY (*Freiheit*). Transcendental liberty is nothing else but the (empirical) unconditioned causality of the cause in the phenomenon, that is, such a causality as is not farther dependent upon any other cause in the phenomenon, and consequently is, as cause, absolute spontaneousness. This, as we have seen, is one of the three unavoidable problems of pure reason. This idea, and other like transcendental ideas Kant terms cosmical conceptions, partly by reason of the unconditioned completeness, (which we think of in the conception of the world), and whereupon the conception of the universe reposes, which itself is only an idea; partly because they refer only to the connexion of phenomena, and consequently to synthesis in experience. The idea of Transcendental Liberty is a Cosmical Conception, or, what is here the same thing, a Cosmological Idea.

HOMOGENEOUSNESS (*Gleichartigkeit*) or UNIFORMITY. These two significations have been used indifferently one for the other.

IDEALISM (*Idealism*), see REALISM. IDEAL THING (*Gedankending*) an empty conception, or conception without object.

IMAGE (*Bild*) is a sensible intuition for a conception, which the empirical faculty of imagination produces from perceptions. Five spots are an image of the conception which I form to myself of the number five.\*

IMPERATIVE (*Imperativ*) that which contains a Should or Ought, (*Sollen*). It is the formula of the commandment (*Gebot*) of reason.

IMMANENT (*Immanent*) is opposed to Transcendent. Those principles are immanent, the application of which is held wholly within the bounds of possible experience. For example, the principle that "all change has its cause," is a principle of pure empirical use, and may therefore be termed an immanent principle of the pure understanding.

INTELLIGIBLE (*Intelligibel*), INTELLECTUAL, or INTELLIGENTIAL, is opposed, to what is Sensible; see Sensible for a more full explanation of these terms.

INTEREST (*Interesse*) is that whereby reason becomes practical, that is, a cause determining the will. It is called pure, when the universal validity of its maxim is a sufficient determinative of the will, and empirical, when it determines the will only by means of another object of appetite.

INTUITION (*Anschaung*). To see an object is to have an intuition of it, and the word is derived from seeing, but it nevertheless signifies, not merely representations through sight, but all the sensible

\* In page 14, in reference to this, there is an error, the comma should come after the word, image, instead of the number 5.

representations in which the object is represented immediately, whether in seeing, or hearing, or smelling, or tasting, or feeling. The fragrance of a rose, if even my eyes were blindfolded, and the sound of music, I (*anschau*) i. e. perceive by intuition or intuitively, through the senses of smelling, and of hearing. The term therefore "to envisage," which has generally been made use of throughout the preceding translation, in deference to the valuable opinion, in all that regards Kant's philosophy, of Mr. Semple, who, in his late excellent translation of that writer's *Metaphysic of Ethics*, has recommended the employment of this term for the verb *anschauen*, is not strictly correct, but as the word most generally refers to seeing, it has been found convenient to make use of a term which refers specifically to this sense.

**LIMITATION** (*Beschränkung, Begrenzung, Einschränkung*) one of the three categories of quality. It is reality conjoined with negation. Every thing in the sensible world is limited, that is, the realities which it has have always a degree, above and below which, greater or less degrees can be thought to infinity.

**LIMITS** (*Schranke, Grenze*). The original words are not quite synonymous. Negations which affect a quantity, so that such has not absolute completeness, are called, *Schranken*. The points of the limitation of a quantity are termed, *Grenzen*.

**MATHEMATICS OR MATHEMATICK MATHESIS** (*Mathematik*). The pure cognition of reason, which is founded upon the construction of conceptions, by means of the exhibition of the object in an intuition *a priori*: or the System of all cognition, from the *construction* of conceptions.

**MATTER** (*Materie*) is one of the conceptions of reflexion, which is laid at the foundation of every other reflexion, and is inseparably connected with every use of the understanding. See **FORM**.

**MAXIM** (*Maxime*) is a subjective principle, which therefore is not objectively valid, but reposes upon an interest of the Subject.

**METAPHYSICS OR METAPHYSICK** (*Metaphysik*) is the philosophy of pure reason: pure natural philosophy, or the whole insulated speculative cognition of reason, which is raised above the instruction of experience, through mere conceptions. It is cognition through pure reason without any impression upon the senses.

**METHODOLOGY** (*Methodenlehre*) Transcendental doctrine of method. The elementary doctrine has been called by some *Elementology*, or the science treating of the form of a metaphysical system.

**MODALITY** (*Modalität*) is the name of one of those dynamical categories which express relationship to the faculty of cognition, or that synthetic unity by which the relationship of the object is thought of to the cognition-faculty.

**MOMENT** (*Moment*). The moments of thinking in general are the three functions of Modality for judging, problematically, assertorically, and apodictically. The degree of each reality, as a cause, is termed a moment.

**MONOGRAM** (*Monogramm*) a single line drawn according to no determinate rule.

**MULTITUDE, MULTIPLICITY** (*Menge*).

**NATURE** (*Natur*) signifies the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to general laws: or, the first internal principle or foundation of every thing which belongs to existence or the effectivity of a thing. In this sense every thing has its nature, but such things are phenomena, or nature in the empirical sense. The existence of things in themselves (supersensible nature) we cannot cognize. It will be seen, that causes of or belonging to nature, have been frequently rendered in the preceding translation "natural causes."

**NECESSITY** (*Nothwendigkeit*). There are judgments which are named apodictical, wherein the affirmative or negative is looked upon as apodictical, and such is logical necessity: real is the material physical necessity of existence, or the impossibility of non-existence.

**NOUMENON** (*Noumen*). A thing in itself, which can be cognized through the understanding. In a positive sense, it would be the object of a non-sensible intuition, if there were another mode of intuition than through the senses, and the understanding were able to perceive by intuition instead of thinking, which is its peculiar province. It is opposed to Phenomenon.

**OBJECTIVE** (*Objectiv*). In every cognition we can distinguish the subject which cognizes, and the object which is cognized. When a star is observed in the heavens, the star is the object, and I am the subject. The words objective and subjective have both a transcendental and empirical meaning. In experience there may be something objective, and yet, as to its origin, subjective. The star alluded to is objective in experience, but the space which it occupies, consequently, as to the three dimensions of the same, it yet is according to its origin, subjective, being a mere form adhering to our sensible faculty of intuition; without a subjective property, nothing would be present to the being who perceives by intuition.

**OPINE TO** (*Meinen*), the lowest degree of holding for true or of the subjective validity of the judgment, in reference to conviction.

**ORGANON** (*Organon*) in general, means a collection of the rules by which a scientific system can be constructed; the organon of pure reason, is that which has reference to the science of all cognitions a priori, or what is termed, Metaphysick.

**OSTENSIVE** (*Ostensiv*). An ostensive conception indicates how an object is constituted. It is opposed to the euristic conception which indicates how, under its guidance, the quality and connexion of objects of experience in general are to be sought. The conception of a man, a house, &c., is an ostensive one; the conception of a supreme intelligence (for theoretic reason) is an euristic conception.

**PARALOGISM** (*Paralogismus*). A syllogism which, though it has the appearance of a right conclusion, is false in point of form, is termed

a fallacy (*Trugschluss*). A like conclusion is a paralogism, so far as one deceives oneself with it; and when one endeavours to deceive others with it, it is a *Sophism*.

PERCEPTION (*Wahrnehmung*) is in no way synonymous with *Vorstellung*, although they are not unfrequently used one for the other. The empirical intuition is a Representation, (*Vorstellung*), but I have only a Perception (*Wahrnehmung*), when the representation is accompanied by consciousness.

PHENOMENON (*Erscheinung*). Phänomenon, or what appears to the senses. It is opposed to Noumenon. See NOUMENON.

PHYSICO-THEOLOGY (*Physiko-theologie*) is the effort of reason to conclude from the ends of nature (which can only be cognized empirically), as to the supreme cause and its properties.

POSSIBILITY (*Möglichkeit*), the form of a problematical judgment; the conceivable connexion of two conceptions.

PRACTICAL (*Praktisch*). The strict meaning of this word is immediate will-determining, and the Critick of practical reason is nothing else but the critick of that faculty of reason which immediately determines the will.

PRAGMATICAL (*Pragmatisch*) is that which holds true as the foundation of general welfare.

PSYCHOLOGY (*Psychologie*) embraces the whole cognition of the thinking subject, or it is the doctrine of mind. It is a part of physics in the more extended sense.

QUANTA CONTINUA (*Fliessende grossen*) are such as no part thereof is the smallest possible, (no part in fact simple).

QUANTITY (*Grosse*). The passage at page 159 is extremely obscure in the original, in consequence probably of some error of the press, all the German editions closing the parenthesis at the words, "given measure," whilst it apparently should be after "intensive quantity." It may also be remarked here, that the passage at page 52, section III, is doubtful; in the original the genitive case is used "of objects," and thus the whole sentence is obscured. It should, in all likelihood, be the accusative, and the sentence would then be "Intuition in space and time represents external objects, as well as the self-intuition of the mind, both, &c."

REALISM (*Realism*) is the assertion that certain objects of our cognition exist independently of our mode of cognizing them. The critical formal or transcendental Realism is the theory, that every thing which is envisaged in space or time, consequently all objects of an experience possible to us, are things subsisting in themselves. The contrary of this is Transcendental Idealism.

REGULATIVE (*Regulativ*) does not, à priori, determine how something must be, or is to be, but how something must be sought. See CONSTITUTIVE.

RHAPSODY (*Rhapsodie*), used by Kant figuratively, to intimate a want of connexion between the parts of a science.

**SCHEMA** (*Schema*), termed by Mr. Semple *effigiation*, is the representation of a universal proceeding of the imagination to procure for a conception its image. To all conceptions an object must be given, and objects are given to us only through the modification of our sensibility. Pure conceptions *à priori* must contain *à priori* formal conditions of the sensibility, (of the internal sense especially), under which alone the pure understanding-conception *à priori* can be applied to any object *à priori*. This formal and pure condition of sensibility, and to which the pure understanding-conception is restricted in its use, is termed by Kant the transcendental schema of this understanding-conception. The procedure with these Schemata, or the sensible conditions under which pure understanding alone can be used, he also termed the *Schematismus* of the pure understanding. The schema is only in itself a product of the imagination, but it is still to be distinguished from an image in this respect, that it is no single intuition. Five dots in a line are, for example, an image of the number five; but the schema of a conception, for instance, of a number in general, is more the representation of a method of representing a multitude according to a certain conception, for instance a thousand, in an image, than this image itself.

**SENSATION** (*Empfindung*). This is the effect of the impression which the object makes upon the mind. It is a perception which refers to the subject only, as a modification of his state.

**SENSE INTERNAL** (*Sinn innere*) Self-consciousness of Apprehension : the Empirical Apperception.

**SPACE** (*Raum*) is a pure intuition, which lies at the foundation of all external intuitions, and is represented as an infinitely given quantity. It is the formal condition of all matter, that is, without it, no matter, and consequently no corporeal world, can be thought. Space and time have no transcendental objectivity, that is, they are in themselves non-existing, independent of our intuition-faculty; but they have objectivity in respect of the empirical use, that is, they exist as to all beings that possess such a faculty of intuition as ourselves.

**SENSIBLE, or SENSITIVE, or SENSUAL** (*Sensibel*). These terms are opposed to *intelligible*, &c., and signify, when they are used as to cognitions, that such spring from the senses and not from the understanding. To speak of "an intellectual world," is incorrect, as cognitions and not objects are intellectual. There is some little difference in the above three expressions, inasmuch as an object perceived through the senses is *sensible*; a cognition, on the other hand, which springs from the senses is *sensitive*;—for instance—that cognition which springs from the objects of our world of sense. In the same way an object which can only be perceived intuitively through the understanding, is *intelligible*, but a cognition which springs out of the understanding, as, for example, that all changes have a cause, is *intellectual*. *Sensual* and *sensitive* are also different: a cognition is termed *sensual* or *sensible*, when it consists of *sensations*; and *sensi-*

tive, when it is given through the form of the sensibility. The cognition of light is sensual, that of a triangle sensitive.

**SERIES** (*Reihe*). The cosmical one is the series of phenomena. This ascends or descends. The word is used in German in the plural number, and has therefore been employed in the same way occasionally in the translation, particularly where it rendered the meaning more perspicuous.

**SPECIFICATION LAW** OF (*Specificationsgesetz*). The principle of variety or difference.

**SPONTANEOUSNESS** (*Spontaneität*). In general, spontaneity is self-active, unconditioned causality. In particular, the spontaneity of the representing faculty consists in the activity or operation of the representating subject upon the impressions received.

**SUBJECT** (*Subject*) AND **SUBJECTIVE** (*Subjective*) are opposed to object and objective, for the explanation of which see these terms.

**SUBSISTENCE** (*subsistenz*) the existence of the substance, as inherence is that of the accident.

**SYLLOGISM** (*Schluss*). Every deduction of one judgment from another which occurs through a particular function of thinking, is called a Syllogism, the last term of which is the conclusion or consequence.

**TECHNICK** (*Technik*) of Nature is termed, in Teleology, the causality of nature, so far as we find in its products something similar to a purpose. It is divided into Technica naturæ intentionalis, and Technica naturæ naturalis; the first opposed to the mechanism of nature, which is the determination of causes agreeably to the laws of motion, and the second being identical with this mechanism.

**TELEOLOGY** (*Teleologie*) is the mode of judging of natural science according to the principle of ends or purposes.

**THEOREM** (*Lehrsatz* *Lehrspruch*) or Lemma, Dogma, erroneously printed apothegm page 555.

**THINKING** (*Denken*) Thought, Cogitation, Excogitation. The verb has also the same significations. To think is to cognize by means of conceptions. All thinking, however, points first to intuitions as means. If I hear the voices of men in the streets, my senses (*anschauen*) perceive these by intuition, but it is my understanding which thinks that these sounds are the voices of men.

**TIME** (*Zeit*) is a pure intuition which lies at the foundation of all intuitions in general, and is represented as an infinitely given quantity. The representation of time does not begin, as something that is empirical, but is presupposed in sensible impressions. What comes into the senses is represented only by means of time as simultaneous or successive, and it is the original perceptive representation of the possibility of the two.

**TRANSCENDENT** (*Transcendent*, *Überschwinglich*) is that which is opposed to immanent, and which only belongs to what is out of experience, or transcends the same.

**TRANSCENDENTAL** (*Transcendental*) means that kind of cognition which concerns the possibility and the use of cognition *a priori*. Thus, the cognition that space, with all the geometrical determinations of the same, is not at all of empirical origin, and the possibility how it still may be referred *a priori* to objects of experience, is transcendental. This is opposed to empirical, which not only relates to, but also arises from, experience.

**UNCONDITIONED, UNCONDITIONAL, OR UNCONDITIONATE**, (*Unbedingtes*), see **CONDITIONED**. It is that which is absolutely and in itself or internally possible, and is exempted from the conditions circumscribing a thing in time or space.

**UNDERSTANDING** (*Verstand*) is the faculty which conjoins the diversity which is furnished us by the senses, and forms into a whole, the sensible representations which are given to us. The word *Verstand* is used occasionally as being synonymous with *Vernunft* (reason), and is the faculty of cognition in general, and in this sense the Critick of pure Reason might be termed also the Critick of pure Understanding. The discursive Understanding is the faculty of cognizing objects, not immediately, but through conceptions. And as intuition belongs to cognition, and as a faculty of a complete spontaneity of intuition, or which perceives the intuition not passively, but produces spontaneously from itself a cognition-faculty different from and independent of what is the sensibility,—would be consequently Understanding in the widest sense;—we might think such an intuitive, envisaging, Understanding (*intellectus intuitivus*), negatively, as a non-discursive Understanding. The *gemeiner menschenverstand* and the *gemeinsinn* are *sensus communis logicus* or common sense, and the *gesunder verstand*, sound sense.

**UNIVERSALLY-VALID**, (*Allgemein gultig*) when referred to a judgment, expresses that which, under certain conditions, every one must judge in the same way. These judgments are again divided into subjectively-valid and objectively-valid. If the condition be objective, that is, if it lie in the object represented through the judgment, it is then an objectively universally valid judgment. For example, "roses are red," is an objectively universally valid judgment, because the condition of the judgment is in the object of experience, or the red roses. "The roses are beautiful," is a subjectively universally valid judgment, since the condition of the judgment lies in the taste of the person judging, through which alone something is found to be beautiful.



